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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the impact of EU law and policy on the Member 
States‟ higher education institution (HEI) sectors with a particular emphasis on the 
exposure of research in universities to EU competition law. This study is exception-
ally well-suited to illustrate how applying EU economic law to formerly public sec-
tors can create tensions between the economic and the social in the EU. Given the 
reluctance of the Member States to openly develop an EU level HEI policy, these 
tensions appear as unintended consequences of the traditional application of Treaty 
provisions such as those on Union citizenship, free movement and competition to 
the HEI sector which may endanger the traditional non-economic mission of Euro-
pean HEIs. Whilst the effects of Union citizenship and free movement law on HEIs 
have received some attention, the impact of EU competition law constitutes a largely 
unexplored site. 
This thesis submits that intended and unintended consequences of the EU eco-
nomic constitutions are enhanced by a parallel tendency of Member States to com-
mercialise formerly public sectors such as the HEI sector. Here, commercialisation 
is mirrored in offering study places only against substantive fees instead of as a pub-
lic service funded from the public purse and in encouraging universities to compete 
for public research funding as well as to attract funding from the private sector. This 
kind of commercialisation makes HEIs vulnerable to the seemingly inevitable pulls 
of internal market law which might, in turn, lead to further commercialisation. This 
thesis investigates the potential problems through doctrinal analysis and a qualitative 
study focussing on the exposure of HEI research to EU competition law as an under-
researched example of exposure to economic constraints. It concludes that such ex-
posure may compromise the wider aims that research intensive universities pursue in 
the public interest. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: An interdisciplinary analysis of the mission of Euro-
pean HEIs and potential external constraints 
1.1. Introduction 
The position of HEIs in the European integration project mirrors tensions be-
tween EU economic integration and the EU's and its Member States‟ wider missions, 
which are frequently discussed as tensions between economic and social integration. 
On the one hand, the European Union does not use the supranational method of inte-
gration in this field but employs soft law measures (Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) and the extra-EU Bologna Process). On the other hand, the main activities of 
HEIs, namely higher education and research, constitute yet another field where the 
forces of directly applicable Treaty provisions, such as Union citizenship, the free 
movement provisions and provisions on competition law and state aid, may decon-
struct some national policy concepts. At the same time, HEIs in many Member 
States have been subjected to national policies, partly influenced by EU policy, that 
force them to commodify their „products‟, making HEIs more vulnerable to the more 
economic provisions of EU law and potentially forcing further commercialisation 
which could endanger the traditional non-economic mission of European HEIs. The 
thesis analyses how EU law and policy impact on the HEI sector with a specific fo-
cus on the exposure of HEI research to EU competition law. 
Whilst tensions between the economic and the social have generally received 
increasing awareness over the last decade,1 HEIs have received less attention in this 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the contributions in G de Burca and B de Witte, Social Rights in Europe (OUP, 
Oxford 2005), M Dougan and E Spaventa, Social welfare and EU law (Hart Publishing, Ox-
ford/Portland/Oregon 2005), U Neergaard, R Nielsen and L Roseberry, Integrating Welfare 
Functions into EU Law - From Rome to Lisbon (DJØF, Copenhagen 2009), E Mossialos et al, 
Health systems governance in Europe: the role of EU law and policy (CUP, Cambridge 2010), 
D Schiek, U Liebert and H Schneider, European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after 
the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP, Cambridge 2011), N  ruun, K L rcher and I Sch mann, The Lisbon 
Treaty and social Europe (Hart, Oxford/Portland 2012), L Burroni, M Keune and G Meardi, 
Economy and society in Europe: a relationship in crisis (Edward Elgar, Chelten-
ham/Northampton 2012), B Cantillon, H Verschueren and P Ploscar, Social inclusion and social 
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respect and work which has investigated the influences of EU law on HEIs has 
mainly focussed on citizenship and the free movement provisions.2 The conse-
quences of EU competition law have only been tentatively investigated by few au-
thors3 and almost exclusively with regard to the education aspect of HEIs.4 Further-
more, the discussion on the position of HEIs in Europe which takes place more 
widely in other disciplines5 has received only limited attention from an EU legal 
studies perspective.6 
This thesis aims to fill these gaps, by linking the debates and situating Euro-
pean HEI policy within the context of European integration theories. It will, further-
more, conduct an in-depth legal doctrinal analysis of potential EU competition law 
                                                                                                                                          
protection in the EU: interactions between law and policy (Intersentia, Cambridge/Portland 
2012), P Whyman, M Baimbridge and A Mullen, The political economy of the European social 
model (Routledge, Milton Park/New York 2012), U Neergaard et al, Social Services of General 
Interest in Europe (T.M.C. Asser, The Hague 2013) and D Schiek, The EU Economic and Social 
Model in the Global Crisis (Ashgate, Farnham 2013).  
2 See, for example, AP Van der Mei, 'EU Law and Education: Promotion of student mobility versus 
protection of the education systems' in M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds), Social welfare and EU 
law (Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland/Oregon 2005), M Dougan, 'Cross-border educational 
mobility and the exportation of student financial assistance' (2008) 5 European Law Review 
723, S Garben, 'The Belgian/Austrian Education Saga' (2008)1Harvard European Law Working 
Paper, N Reich, 'Herkunftsprinzip oder Diskriminierung als Maβstab fuer Studentenfreizügig-
keit?' (2009), 18 EuZW 637 and D Damjanovic, '“Reserved areas” of the Member States and the 
ECJ: the case of higher education' in H-W Micklitz and B De Witte (eds), The European Court 
of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, Cambridge 2012).  
3 Mainly E Steyger, 'Competition and Education' in J de Groof, G Lauwers and G Dondelinger (eds), 
Globalisation and Competition in Education (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2002), H Swen-
nen, 'Onderwijs en Mededingsrecht' (2008/2009) 4 Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onder-
weisbeleid 259, F Amato and K Farbmann, 'Applying EU competition law in the education sec-
tor' (2010) 6 IJELP 7 and R Greaves and A Scicluna, 'Commercialization and competition in the 
education services sector - Challenges to the education service sector from the application of Ar-
ticles 101 and 102 TFEU' (2010) 6 IJELP 13. 
4 The exception is S Huber and J Prikoszovits, 'Universitäre Drittmittelforschung und EG-
Beihilfenrecht' (2008) 19 EuZW 171.  
5 See, for example, F Van der Ploeg and R Veugelers, 'Higher education reform and the renewed Lis-
bon strategy: role of member states and the European Commission' (2007) 1901CESifo Working 
Paper, AR Cardoso et al, 'Demand for Higher Education Programs: The Impact of the Bologna 
Process' (2008) 54 CESifo Economic Studies 229, H-A Koch, Die Universität - Geschichte einer 
europäischen Institution (Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, Darmstadt 2008), JG Wissema, 
Towards the Third Generation University (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton 2009) or 
the contributions to J Enders and E de Weert, The changing face of academic life (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York 2009), M McKelvey and M Holem, Learning to compete in 
European Universities (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton 2009) and D Palfreyman and T 
Tapper, Structuring Mass Higher Education (Routledge, New York/London 2009). 
6 Most prominently by S Garben, 'The Bologna Process: From a European Law Perspective' (2010) 16 
ELJ 186.  
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constraints on HEIs. This analysis is further specified for HEI research in three 
Member States, whose HEI systems have been commercialised to different degrees. 
A qualitative empirical study will illustrate even more specifically how research in 
universities may be impacted upon by EU competition law (as an example of expo-
sure to economic constraints) and in how far pivotal actors in universities are aware 
of this impact. This thesis will, thus, not only expound the knowledge about Euro-
pean (legal) integration and its effects on national HEI policies, but will also offer 
practical insights which can serve as guidance for policymakers and professionals in 
the national HEI sectors, allowing them to address potential problems and identify 
best practices. 
1.2. Studying EU law constraints on HEIs  
HEIs are investigated as a field where Member States avoid establishing supra-
national law, but where HEIs, nevertheless, can come within the ambit of directly 
applicable EU law, especially if Member States pursue national policies of commer-
cialisation thereby increasing the likeliness of applicability of the more economic 
provisions of directly applicable EU law. Therefore, provisions of EU law seemingly 
unrelated to HEIs such as those on citizenship, the fundamental freedoms, competi-
tion and state aid can „spill over‟ and might lead to unintended consequences for na-
tional policy choices. This may even trigger further commercialisation of the sector, 
which, in turn, may endanger the traditional non-economic missions of European 
HEIs. The thesis analyses how EU law and policy impact on the HEI sector with a 
specific focus on potential constraints from EU competition law on research in HEIs 
as an example of exposure to economic constraints.  
This question is investigated from political and social science perspectives as 
well as through legal doctrinal analysis of legislation and case law,7 culminating in a 
qualitative empirical study covering ten universities in three Member States. Re-
search in publicly funded research intensive universities has been chosen as the field 
for the empirical study, since market structures are increasingly being introduced in 
this area and HEIs thus compete with each other and with other research providing 
                                                 
7
 For more on legal doctrine analysis see EH Tiller and FB Cross, 'What is legal doctrine?' (2006) 100 
Northwestern University Law Review 517, especially p. 518 seq.  
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actors. Research, therefore, has the potential to fall into the ambit of the more eco-
nomic provisions of EU law and thus lends itself as an illustrative example of the 
constraints that may arise for the sector. EU competition law has been chosen, not 
only because there is little research on its potential impact, but also because this im-
pact has the potential to demand significant changes in HEI practice, as already evi-
dent in the Research Framework‟s8 requirement to introduce full costing for research 
in publicly funded research organisations in Europe, including HEIs. The doctrinal 
and empirical investigation of competition law implications will demonstrate that 
even more demands for commercialisation of public universities may derive from 
EU competition law.  
The thesis is structured into six chapters (including this introductory chapter). 
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to illuminating the historical and 
theoretical background. It will be shown how HEIs moved away from their tradi-
tional mission to become more economic in nature, leading to a potential spilling-
over from the more economic provisions of EU law. Chapter 2 will analyse the cur-
rent EU and extra-EU policies showing that Member States were reluctant to use the 
supranational method of integration. It will then demonstrate in overview the poten-
tial of spill-over from directly applicable EU law, namely from Union citizenship, 
the free movement provisions and competition law. Chapter 3 continues this study in 
more detail in the area of EU competition law. It will first assess the concept of „un-
dertaking‟ and services of general economic interest (SGEIs) to determine in how far 
HEIs might fall under the competition law provisions in the first place. The second 
part of chapter 3 then conducts an in-depth legal-doctrinal analysis of potential con-
straints on HEIs arising from competition and state aid law.  
Chapter 4 prepares for the empirical study by laying out which countries have 
been chosen for the study and introducing a common approach to discussing their 
research systems. Each country is then analysed in a separate subchapter after which 
a section provides a tentative overview of potential conflicts with competition law. 
The empirical study is contained in chapter 5. In its first subchapter the methodology 
of the empirical study is explained showing, inter alia, how the universities under 
                                                 
8 Community framework for state aid for research and development and innovation OJ [2006] C 
323/01 (Research Framework). 
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scrutiny have been chosen and how the interview questions have been drafted as well 
as how the interviews will be analysed; namely by employing a framework devel-
oped on the basis of the results of chapters 3 and 4. This is followed by a subchapter 
on each country discussing the economic constraints in the relevant system as ex-
perienced by interviewees, their awareness of and the potential constraints arising 
from EU competition law. Chapter 6 will connect the results of the empirical study 
with the previous chapters thereby assessing how applying the EU‟s economic con-
stitution to HEIs may lead to unforeseen consequences including further commodifi-
cation which could endanger the traditional non-economic mission of European 
HEIs. The constraints faced by the sector are then contextualised in the wider debate 
before concluding that alternative strategies to EU policy on HEIs might be desir-
able.  
1.3. Historical and theoretical background 
As mentioned above the remainder of this chapter will outline the development 
of Europe‟s HEIs to explain their character and current influences upon them. It will 
also position the thesis within the approaches of European integration theory to illu-
minate the theoretical background.  
1.3.1. The original non-economic purpose of European HEIs 
The first HEIs9 in Europe developed in the Middle Ages10 and have since un-
dergone two significant periods of change.11 Originally HEIs were bodies widely 
                                                 
9 The terms HEI and university are used interchangeably here as in most literature on the subject (see 
M Allen, The Goals of Universities (Milton Keynes, Philadelphia 1988) p. 14). This phenome-
non, might be based on the fact that for many centuries the university was the most important 
HEI in the meaning of the term today. Where differentiation is essential this has been made 
clear.  
10 See DJ Farrington and D Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education (OUP, Oxford 2012) p. 11 
who trace the earliest forerunner HEI in Europe back to the Pandidakterion in what is now Istan-
bul in 425 AD. The first universities in the narrower sense in Europe then developed in the High 
Middle Ages starting with the University of Bologna in 1158. See also WB Cowan, R Cowan 
and P Llerena, 'Running the marathon' in M McKelvey and M Holem (eds), Learning to compete 
in European Universities (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton 2009) p. 278, Koch (n 5) p. 
20 seq, Wissema (n 5) p. 3, 9. 
11 The features of universities in different periods are elaborated upon here in an ideal-typical manner 
in the Weberian sense by describing the archetype extracted from common appearances. Such an 
analysis thus explicitly does not entail that every situation is exactly in accordance with the ar-
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autonomous from church and state.12 This, despite the Bible being regarded as the 
ultimate truth, allowed them to question current doctrine (the scholastic method) 
which is considered the beginning of academic freedom.13 Whilst the medieval uni-
versities‟ main focus was to teach students recognising „divine truth‟, professors also 
conducted experiments and knowledge transfer activities such as serving as advisors 
or judges.14 As HEIs developed under pre-nation-state conditions and Latin served as 
the lingua franca, they were international institutions engaged in lively mutual ex-
change.15  
In early modernity16 corresponding to the rise of nation states in Europe, HEIs 
too became national institutions. At the same time, societal developments such as the 
exploration of (to Europeans) hitherto unknown parts of the world, discoveries in the 
natural sciences by Copernicus, Galileo and, later, Newton and the rise of humanist 
philosophy nourished HEIs.17 In the 19
th
 century, the Prussian Minister of Education 
Wilhelm von Humboldt established a new concept by integrating a stronger research 
focus into the nationalised HEIs.18 Accordingly, research was conducted for the sake 
                                                                                                                                          
chetype, instead it is more a trend becoming apparent. See M Weber, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft (Zweitausendundeins, Frankfurt am Main 2005) p 4 seq. 
12 See JC Scott, 'The Mission of the University: Medieval to Postmodern Transformations' (2006 ) 77 
The Journal of Higher Education p. 7, G Neave, 'The Academic Estate Revisited: Reflections on 
Academia‟s Rapid Progress from the Capitoline Hill to the Tarpeian Rock' in J Enders and E de 
Weert (eds), The changing face of academic life (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York 
2009) p. 19, R Stichweh, 'Universitaet in der Weltgesellschaft' (2009 academic speech at the 
Dies Academicus der Universitaet Luzern) http://www.unilu.ch/files/Universitaet-in-der-
Weltgesellschaft.pdf accessed 19 January 2010 p. 2, Wissema (n 5) p. 6 seq, 10.  
13 See Scott (n 12) p. 2 seq, 8 seq, Wissema (n 5) p. 5, Allen (n 9) p. 16. 
14 See Scott (n 12) p. 6 seq, Wissema (n 5) p. 4 seq, 9 seq, Allen (n 9) p. 16, W Clark, Academic Cha-
risma and the Origins of the Research University (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2006) 
p. 4 seq, Neave (n 12) p. 24. 
15 See Scott (n 12) p. 7 seq, Wissema (n 5) p. 10, Stichweh (n 12) p 2. 
16 Early 16
th
 until late 18
th
 century. See M Erbe, Die frühe Neuzeit (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2007) p. 
11. 
17 See Scott (n 12) p. 10 seq, Wissema (n 5) p 9 seq, 14, Cowan, Cowan and Llerna (n 10) p. 279, 
Clark (n 14) p. 6 seq, Allen (n 9) p. 16, 21, Koch (n 5) p. 74 seq. 
18 See Scott (n 12) p. 19 seq, Wissema (n 5) p. 13 seq, E Denninger, 'Art. 5 Abs. 3 I GG' in E 
Denninger and others (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(3rd edn, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, Neuwied/Kriftel 2001) p. 10, Clark (n 14) p. 3 seq, 
Cowan, Cowan and Llerna (n 10) p. 279, Neave (n 12) p. 24. Further on Humboldt‟s writings 
about the university see Koch (n 5) p. 143 seq. 
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of acquiring new knowledge with no applications in mind,19 was chiefly mono-
disciplinary with increasing specialisation and was supposed to inform teaching. Fur-
thermore, the ideas of allowing students to choose their courses freely and to guaran-
tee professors freedom of choice regarding the directions of research and teaching, 
strengthened the academic freedom.20  
By the end of the 19
th
 century European universities had thus developed into 
research intensive institutions which, despite being nationalised, retained a high de-
gree of academic freedom and autonomy. They served the public purpose in the na-
tional interest by teaching and conducting research for knowledge‟s sake rather than 
towards a particular, commercially exploitable aim and were funded mainly by the 
state.21  
1.3.2. The republican university in the US 
HEIs across the Atlantic developed differently; influenced by the spirit of es-
tablishing a democratic republic, the US HEI model focussed on equality of access 
(which, however, did not initially include gender and race) and equality between 
academic subjects. This led to the establishment of a vast variety of HEIs and was 
the basis for the beginning of mass higher education.22 Two sets of ideas shaped a 
second trend in US HEIs; the philosophy of the Progressive Era (late 19th until mid 
20th century) aimed at the refinement of big business and government towards their 
use for the public and economic efficiency23 and the Wisconsin Idea promoted that 
                                                 
19 Applied research as well as some research in the very expensive „big science‟ thus developed 
mainly outside HEIs. See further Scott (n 12) p. 21 seq. 
20 See H Röhrs, Der Einfluss der klassischen Deutschen Universitätsidee auf die Higher Education in 
Amerika (Deutscher Studienverlag, Weinheim 1995) p. 124, Denninger (n 18) p. 10 seq, Clark 
(n 14) p. 3 seq, H Connell, 'The growing significance of the research mission to higher education 
institutions' in H Connell (ed) University Research Management (OECD, Paris 2004) p. 19, 
Scott (n 12) p. 20 seq, Wissema (n 5) p. 13 seq, E de Weert, 'Organised Contradictions of Teach-
ing and Research: Reshaping the Academic Profession' in J Enders and E de Weert (eds), The 
changing face of academic life (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York 2009) p. 135, 140, 
Neave (n 12) p. 31. 
21 In the following, the term HEIs when used in the European context refers to these (usually public) 
institutions which combine research and tertiary education, since, despite the fact that there are 
now also other forms of HEIs, these classical European HEIs, for which the term „university‟ 
could almost be used interchangeably, are the focus of this research. 
22 See Röhrs (n 20) p. 104, 116 seq, 121 seq, Scott (n 12) p. 14 seq, 17.  
23 The Progressive Era with its high time from 1890 to 1916 was a movement of various interest 
groups, however, with some major influences from the white US middle classes who next to the 
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HEIs should be of service to the public through, inter alia, a focus on applied re-
search, vocational education as well as knowledge exchange and facility sharing.24 
As a result, HEIs were expected to serve society more directly, for example, through 
providing vocational education, conducting applied research and cooperating with 
businesses and government.25 This also led to an increase in external funding for, as 
well as influences on, the directions of research.26 
These universities, while still serving the public good, were susceptible to 
commercialisation of academic life. As early as in 1970, critical observers noticed 
that the logic of the market place had become increasingly dominant in US universi-
ties, as aptly summarised in the term „commodification‟.27 This term, though of 
Marxist origin,28 is used here to describe the changing process towards creating 
something for market rather than for ideal purposes.29 On the basis of this business-
like re-conceptualisation, US universities started to compete with each other and to 
reach out to international markets of education, arguably creating a world-wide mar-
ket for higher education and academic research dominated by industrial centres of 
the world.30 
                                                                                                                                          
mentioned focus also included a broad variety of other issues such as women‟s suffrage, restric-
tion of immigration and prohibition. See AS Link, 'What Happened to the Progressive Move-
ment in the 1920's?' (1959) 64 The American Historical Review 833, F Jaycox, The Progressive 
Era (Facts on File, New York 2005) preface and introduction, MJ Sklar, The United States as a 
developing country: studies in U.S. history in the Progressive Era and the 1920s (CUP, Cam-
bridge/New York 1992) p. 38. 
24 The Wisconsin Idea started in Wisconsin and was originally focussed on the state‟s university. See 
further JD Hoeveler, 'The university and the social gospel: the intellectual origins of the 'Wis-
consin Idea'' (1976) 59 Wisconsin Magazine of History 282. 
25 See Scott (n 12) p. 23 seq, Allen (n 9) p. 21 seq, Röhrs (n 20) p. 108, 115 seq, 123. 
26 See Röhrs (n 20) p. 107 seq, Scott (n 12) p. 27 seq. The external influences on universities have 
later been criticised in the student protests of the 1960s (Scott (n 12) p. 24). 
27 W Shumar, College for sale: a critique of the commodification of higher education (Routledge, 
Milton Park/New York 2013 (republication, originally 1997)). 
28 Ibid pp. 15seq. 
29 See also H Radder, The commodification of academic research: science and the modern university 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 2010), p. 4 seq who perceives the interpretation and 
assessment of processes on the basis of economic criteria as the main characteristic of commodi-
fication.  
30 See S Choon Fong, 'The global challenge for universities' in S Marginson and R James (eds), Edu-
cation, Science and Public Policy - Ideas for an Education Revolution (Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton 2008) p. 79 seq who predicts that Asia will be this centre in the future.  
- 9 - 
 
1.3.3. Gradual commodification of European HEIs 
European HEIs did not go through an idealistic phase of orienting themselves 
on how to serve the public good more directly. However, from the second half of the 
20
th
 century onwards universities were gradually re-structured in congruence with 
the demands of increasingly complex economies demanding qualified employees. 
Governments aimed at expanding access to higher education from the 1980s, open-
ing existing HEIs to more students and creating a number of new HEIs. Dwindling 
public resources31 seemed to require the end of free university education and the in-
troduction of study fees. The increased numbers of institutions competed for public 
and private resources and also for being perceived as offering the most competitive 
education and highest levels of employability. The influence of the global successes 
of US universities contributed to the acceleration of internationalisation; together 
with new information technologies (IT), it incited the national European HEIs to re- 
internationalise, using English as the new lingua franca and supporting student and 
researcher mobility as well as international research collaborations.32 
While all this did not necessitate turning the activities of HEIs into marketable 
services, it certainly facilitated this development. The concept of commodification 
seems suitable to describe the recent developments of European HEIs. As briefly 
mentioned above, commodification is the process by which an activity (such as 
higher education or research) is changed in order to become a service tradeable on 
markets. This process thus turns education and research from a public good into a 
                                                 
31 Former Higher Education Minister for England, David Lammy, for example, declared that „any 
pressures on spending should be seen against the background of a long-term increase in student 
numbers […] with "more students than ever before in our history"‟. See H Richardson, 'Univer-
sity budget cuts revealed' BBC News (1 February 2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/education/8491729.stm accessed 2 February 2010. 
32 See Choon Fong (n 30) p. 80 seq, Connell (n 20) p. 17 seq, 22 seq, Cowan, Cowan and Llerna (n 
10) p. 278 seq, 290 seq, E Deiaco, M Holmen and M McKelvey, 'From social institution to 
knowledge business' in M McKelvey and M Holmen (eds), Learning to Compete in European 
Universities (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton 2009) p. 329 seq, de Weert (n 20) p. 143 
seq, L Hubig, Die Universitaet - Leistungsbemessung und -bewertung in einer komplexen Or-
ganisation (Josef EUL Verlag, Lohmar/Koeln 2009) p. 51, Konsortium Bildungsberichterstat-
tung, Bildung in Deutschland (Bertelsmann Verlag, Bielefeld 2006) p. 101, Neave (n 12), D Pal-
freyman and T Tapper, 'What is an „Elite‟ or „Leading Global‟ University?' in D Palfreyman and 
T Tapper (eds), Structuring Mass Higher Education (Routledge, New York/London 2009) p. 
205 seq, 209 seq, Röhrs (n 20) p. 109 seq, 115, Scott (n 12) p. 30 seq, T Steinfeld, 'Unternehmen 
Universitaet' (2009) 5 Forschung & Lehre 346 p. 346, Stichweh (n 12) p. 2, Wissema (n 5) p. 17 
seq, 31 seq. 
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commodity. European public HEIs, as has been mentioned above, are national insti-
tutions. They are publicly funded, containing elements of national identity and cul-
ture and are tasked with accumulating and disseminating knowledge and providing 
higher education (without a particular, commercially exploitable aim) for all.33 Espe-
cially public higher education can be regarded as belonging to the welfare state as 
wider access to HEIs is seen as a precondition of participation in complex economies 
and thus increasingly constitutes an element of social policy. Therefore, in Europe, 
where higher education and research can widely be comprehended as a public good, 
commodification of HEIs also inverts the process of de-commodification characteris-
tic for public services in the welfare state.34 
The following trends are seen as characteristic for the commodification of 
European HEIs: public funding is reduced which leads to the introduction of busi-
ness style administration of HEIs as well as competitive parameters for public fund-
ing and the need to look for alternative sources. Private providers start offering de-
gree courses and organising research projects in the HEI „market‟. Academic re-
search not only becomes more interdisciplinary, but also more applied.35 Further-
more, universities start to focus on such fields of research where demand by business 
                                                 
33 U Teichler, 'Geschichte und Entwicklung der Bildungsprogramme der Europaeischen Union' in U 
Teichler (ed), Die Internationalisierung der Hochschulen - Neue Herausforderungen und 
Strategien (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2007) p. 105, H Walkenhorst, 'Explaining 
change in EU education policy' (2008) 15 Journal of European Public Policy 567 p. 567, 574 
seq.  
34 Esping-Andersen coined the term „de-commodification‟ to explain the purpose of welfare systems 
as a means to create independence for individuals of their capacity to engage in the market. See 
G Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990) p. 21 
seq, 35 seq, G Esping-Andersen, Social Foundation of Postindustrial Economies (OUP, Oxford 
1999) 43 seq.  
35 The following definition used by the OECD in its Fracati Manual will be used throughout this the-
sis: „Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new 
knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any par-
ticular application or use in view. Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in 
order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical 
aim or objective. Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge 
gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, 
products or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substan-
tially those already produced or installed.‟. OECD, Frascati Manual (OECD, Paris 2002).  
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and public funders is greatest, disregarding their ideal aims. HEIs also increasingly 
cooperate with industry and commercially exploit the results of their own research. 36 
1.3.4. Positioning of the thesis in European integration theory 
These two recent, though not necessarily linked,37 tendencies of commerciali-
sation and internationalisation have not gone unnoticed at the European level where 
HEIs did not originally play a role, and attempts have been made to establish Euro-
pean policies on HEIs. However, as will be explained further in chapter 2, the supra-
national method of integration was not chosen. Instead Member States decided to 
apply EU and extra EU soft law approaches. The negative connotation of these ap-
proaches38 and (particularly since the economic crisis) of the EU in general,39 might 
make further integration into the hard law frame unlikely at present.  
                                                 
36 For more on commodification trends see, Connell (n 20) p. 17 seq, 21 seq, Deiaco, Holmen and 
McKelvey (n 32) p. 330 seq, Palfreyman and Tapper (n 32), Choon Fong (n 30) p. 78 seq, 82 
seq, Steinfeld (n 32), Stichweh (n 12) p. 2, Cowan, Cowan and Llerna (n 10), de Weert (n 20), 
Hubig (n 32) p. 50 seq, 57, B Jongbloed and B van der Meulen, Investeren in Dynamiek - Ein-
drapport Commissie Dynamisering Deel 1 (2006) available on 
http://www.utwente.nl/cheps/publications/Publications%202006/dynamiek1.pdf p. 28 seq, B 
Kempen, 'Universitaet - Zentrum der Forschung?' (2009) 5 Forschung & Lehre 334, Konsortium 
Bildungsberichterstattung (n 32) p. 101 seq, Neave (n 12), Röhrs (n 20) p. 106 seq, M Thornton, 
Privatising the public university (Routledge, Abingdon 2012). In favour of these trends see Wis-
sema (n 5) p. 17 seq, 31 seq, 38 seq, Van der Ploeg and Veugelers (n 5) p. 26 seq. 
37 Internationalisation was, for example, also a feature of the medieval university model (see above) 
and there were tendencies towards commodification in the US American model in recent dec-
ades before re-internationalisation. In fact, HEIs worked closely with national industry partners 
and government in the frame of the national war effort in the second World War and the Cold 
War as part of the second US American HEI trend of serving society directly. See Röhrs (n 20) 
p. 107 seq, Scott (n 12) p. 27 seq. 
38 See chapter 2 below on criticism of the Lisbon/Europe2020 Strategy and, especially, the Bologna 
Process. Although the latter is not an EU mechanism, it might negatively influence supranational 
integration, since the general public often does not differentiate between EU and extra EU 
measures at the European level. As an example for the latter see the statement by a journalist in 
a German weekly news magazine; „[...] die seit zwei Jahren anhaltenden  emühungen der 27 
Bologna- ildungsminister, die „Grundfreiheit des Wissens“ in die EU-Verträge aufzunehmen 
[...]‟ (... the for two years continuing efforts of the 27  ologna education ministers to integrate 
the fundamental freedom of knowledge into the EU Treaties ...). S Dreisbach, 'Studienreform - 
Gleichberechtigung sieht anders aus' FOCUS-Online (4 August 2010) 
http://www.focus.de/wissen/campus/tid-18713/studienreform-gleichberechtigung-sieht-anders-
aus_aid_521074.html accessed 12 December 2013. 
39 Most significantly, this has been recently expressed in the UK Prime Minister‟s speech on UK-EU 
relations (available as PDF on http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/560654/cameron-europe-
transcript.pdf) urging renegotiation of this Member State‟s status in the EU and promising a ref-
erendum on exiting the EU completely (further on the speech see, for example, BBC News, 
'David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU' BBC News (23 January 2013) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148282 accessed 22 February 2013). See further on 
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This latter assumption is based on social constructivist conceptions of the EU 
integration project. Social constructivism is an approach in European integration 
theory40 which employs a societal notion of the European project by focussing on all 
agents rather than just on Member States. According to social constructivism, reality 
is created by agents which are both influenced by and simultaneously influencing the 
social space.41 Therefore, if the agents are negative or even hostile towards the social 
space (in a certain policy area) this can limit further development of said area. In re-
spect of HEI policy at the European level, Member States seem to have already de-
cided to keep this area out of the supranational EU frame and, as other important 
agents in this space, such as students and academics, are critical towards measures at 
the EU and wider European level, a coherent EU supranational policy seems unlikely 
to develop in the near future.  
While HEI policies are thus still the main responsibility of the Member States, 
HEIs are not immune to EU law.42 It is well established that EU law enjoys primacy 
over national law43 and that certain provisions have direct effect.44 Constitutionalised 
                                                                                                                                          
the rise of euroscepticism D Schiek, 'The EU's Socio-economic Model(s) and the Crisi(e)s - any 
Perspectives?' in D Schiek (ed) The EU Economic and Social Model in the Global Crisis (Ash-
gate, Farnham/Burlington 2013) p. 11 seq with further references.  
40
 
European integration theory evolved in the interdisciplinary subject of EU studies and aims at ex-
plaining changes in the political reality in the EU. See RA Cichowski, The European Court and 
Civil Society (CUP, Cambridge 2007) p. 3, DN Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration 
(2nd edn Routledge, London/New York 2009) p. 14, T Diez and A Wiener, „Introducing the 
Mosaic of Integration Theory' in A Wiener and T Diez (eds), European Integration Theory (2nd 
edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) p. 1 seq. The approaches in European integration theory differ in a va-
riety of ways, for example, as to their assumption of the end state and the importance given to 
the process of integration (PC Schmitter, 'Neo-Neofunctionalims' in A Wiener and T Diez (eds), 
European Integration Theory (1st edn, OUP, Oxford 2004) p. 47 seq with a useful diagram on p 
48) or as to how far they consider non-actors (D Schiek, 'Re-embedding Economic and Social 
Constitutionalism: normative perspectives for the EU' in D Schiek, U Liebert and H Schneider 
(eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP, Cam-
bridge 2011) p. 19 seq). For an overview of varying approaches of European integration theory 
see A Wiener and T Diez, 'Taking Stock of Integration Theory' in A Wiener and T Diez (eds), 
European Integration Theory (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) p. 243 seq, 250 seq. 
41 For more on social constructivism see T Risse, 'Social Constructivism and European Integration' in 
A Wiener and T Diez (eds), European Integration Theory (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009). 
42 Similar E Beerkens, 'The Emergence and Institutionalisation of the European Higher Education and 
Research Area' (2008) 43 European Journal of Education p. 407.  
43 6/64 Costa. 
44 26/62 Van Gend. 
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elements of EU integration45 thus apply to HEIs, if they fall within their ambit. This 
means that certain areas of EU law can spill-over into HEI policies and have an in-
fluence upon them. Spill-over is a concept of neo-functionalism, another approach in 
European integration theory. While neo-functionalism expects an ever closer Union 
as the outcome of European integration, it is more concerned with the process it-
self.46 Regarding this process, neo-functionalism assumes that a certain policy can 
only with difficulty be integrated in itself, since policy areas tend not to be com-
pletely separable. Therefore, it is likely, even though the newer versions of neo-
functionalism acknowledge other outcomes, that an integrated area will „spill-over‟ 
(functional spill-over) into other areas potentially fostered by European institutions 
(cultivated spill-over).47 Such spill-over could cause unforeseen problems for HEIs 
which will be outlined in chapter 2. On a more general level, this is also problematic 
since spill-over is often triggered by individuals relying on rights derived from EU 
law48 and is therefore not necessarily coherent or in the general interest. This can 
also be seen through the prism of social constructivism because agents are altering 
the social space by enforcing their rights, in turn leading the social space to expand 
by spilling over into other areas. Furthermore, with regards to the more economic 
areas of EU law, the recent commodification of HEIs increases the likeliness of ap-
                                                 
45 On the constitutional character of EU law see further D Schiek, Economic and Social Integration - 
The challenge for EU constitutional law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2012) p. 64 seq. 
46 In both it can be regarded as the antipode of liberal intergovernentalism which assumes the Mem-
ber States to remain the sole masters. See further on liberal intergovenmentalism A Moravcsik 
and F Schimmelfennig, 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' in A Wiener and T Diez (eds), European 
Integration Theory (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009). 
47 On neo-functionalism see Schmitter (n 40), A Niemann and PC Schmitter, 'Neofunctionalism' in A 
Wiener and T Diez (eds), European Integration Theory (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009), L 
Hooghe and G Marks, 'The neo-functionalists were (almost) right: politization and European in-
tegration' in C Crouch and W Streeck (eds), The Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, Social 
Order and Political Conflict (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006), G de Burca, 'Rethinking law in 
neo-functionalist theory' (2005) 12 Journal of European Policy 310, W Sandholtz and A Stone 
Sweet, 'Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance' in E Jones, A Menon and S Weather-
ill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012). 
With a focus on competition law, which arguably is one of the most integrated areas with exten-
sive powers of the Commission, see L McGowan, 'Theorizing European Integration: revisiting 
neo-functionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC competition 
policy' (2007) 11 EIoP p. 3, 5 seq. 
48 The important role of individuals in enforcing EU law can be seen in the high number of prelimi-
nary ruling procedures; with the exception of 2003, preliminary ruling procedures have been the 
most common kind of new cases to come before the Court every year since 1994 with 404 new 
cases in 2012. See Court of Justice, Annual Report 2012 (Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg 2013) p. 109/110. 
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plicability of some of these norms. The potential legal consequences, can, in turn, 
drive HEIs towards even further commodification. However, the main activities of 
HEIs, teaching and research, are not only of a heightened social relevance,49 but the 
provision of these „services‟ as public services by public HEIs is socially important 
in itself, as it allows for a certain independence (for example, independence from 
market forces regarding the direction of research and teaching and equality in access 
to higher education for students).50  
According to critical political economy (an approach in European integration 
theory which explains integration with economic reasoning),51 the European integra-
tion project started out as an economic integration endeavour, as this was assumed to 
be the best way to rebuild the war aggrieved economies of the Member States.52 
Economic integration is, therefore, at the current stage of European integration, more 
constitutionalised than social integration.53 The latter is here understood in a wider 
sense as areas with a social purpose which empower the individual through de-
commodification and thus includes areas such as health care and education, rather 
than just social policy in the narrower sense. Given the general turn towards neolib-
eralism of the European integration project in recent decades,54 many policy areas 
previously provided by the state in the general interest, such as utilities and later 
health care, have been subjected to the regime of constitutionalised economic EU 
                                                 
49
 B Lange and N Alexiadou, 'How to Govern for Solidarity? An Introduction to Policy Learning in 
the Context of Open Methods of Coordinating Education Policies in the European Union' in M 
Ross and Y Borgmann-Prebil (eds), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (OUP, Oxford 
2010), p. 235. 
50
 See M-E Geis, 'Universitäten im Wettbewerb, 1. Bericht' (2010) 69 VVDStRL 364, p. 390 as re-
gards independence in research and S Collini, 'Browne's Gamble' (2010) 32 London Review of 
Books 23, 23 seq, as regards problems for teaching, inter alia inequality of access and depend-
ence on market forces in a market system.  
51
 
AW Cafruny and JM Ryner, 'Critical Political Economy' in A Wiener and T Diez (eds), European 
Integration Theory (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009). 
52 See Article 2 EEC Treaty: „The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common mar-
ket and progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between the states belonging to it.‟  
53 Schiek (n 45) p. 74.  
54 According to critical political economy, a shift from the post-war „European Social Model‟ towards 
a more neoliberal endeavour took place after the Bretton Wood crisis. See Cafruny and Ryner (n 
51) p. 224 seq, 237 seq. 
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law,55 while social integration has only developed slowly to balance this. Now, edu-
cation and research in public HEIs may only be the latest public service with a social 
aim threatened to face constraints arising from EU economic integration as will be 
outlined further in chapter 2.  
1.4. Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has delineated the topic of the PhD, set out the re-
search question and provided an overview of the research around the topic under 
study. It has described the methods to be used and outlined the structure of the thesis. 
It has then explained the historical and theoretical background for studying HEIs un-
der EU law constraints. In this it has been shown that European HEIs are tradition-
ally widely autonomous institutions funded by the state which provide higher educa-
tion for knowledge‟s sake and research with a strong focus on curiosity driven, basic 
research. Recently, these HEIs have tended towards commodification and interna-
tionalisation. Having employed approaches from European integration theory it has 
been shown that directly applicable EU law can spill-over into the sphere of HEIs 
potentially requiring further commodification.  
The aim of this thesis is to explore this further by, first, situating HEIs in the 
context of EU policy and law and then conducting an empirical study focussing on 
exposure of HEI research to EU competition law as an underresearched example of 
exposure to economic constraints in order to obtain a more in-depth appreciation of 
the constraints HEIs may face in a specific field. The next chapter will provide a dis-
cussion of EU policy on HEIs and the potential of spill-over from directly applicable 
EU law in overview.   
                                                 
55 See, for example, on the incorporation of the utility sector into the ambit of competition law and 
offering an explanation in neo-functionalism McGowan (n 47) p. 11, 13. He also points to exter-
nal factors (p. 12) in line with generally more neo-liberal thinking as explained by critical politi-
cal economy.  
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Chapter 2 
The position of HEIs in European Policy and Law 
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the position of HEIs in 
European law and policy as well as discussing potential spill-over from directly ap-
plicable EU law. It will be shown that the EU hard law frame currently only contains 
limited competences in devising policies regarding HEIs. Instead, policy is made 
through EU and extra-EU soft law. Nevertheless, other provisions of EU law have 
already spilled over into the area of HEIs influencing national policy concepts. On-
going commodification could increase this effect, thereby endangering the traditional 
non-economic mission of European HEIs.  
The chapter is divided into two subchapters. It first explores how HEIs are po-
sitioned within EU policy and law and what reasons might be behind this. The sub-
chapter following thereafter will then be dedicated to the examination of potential 
„accidental‟ effects directly applicable EU law might have on HEIs. The chapter will 
end in a conclusion bringing together the results and leading over to the next chapter. 
2.2. Locating HEIs in European policy 
As has been discussed in chapter 1, the two main activities of HEIs are higher 
education and research. An exploration of the position of HEIs in EU law and policy 
thus requires an examination of policy areas in education and research and develop-
ment (R&D). It will be shown that „hard‟ EU competences are limited in both areas. 
The need for a certain degree of coordination beyond the Member States identified in 
chapter 1 has instead led to policies outside the supranational EU framework. EU 
competences will first be discussed here and will be followed by an analysis of EU 
and extra-EU soft law policies.  
2.2.1. Supranational EU policy on education and R&D  
When the European Communities (European Coal and Steel Community, 
European Atomic Energy Community and European Economic Community (EEC)) 
were founded, the founding Treaties contained only a few isolated provisions on 
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education and R&D. This might have been the case because European integration 
started as an economic integration endeavour and the economic value of HEIs was 
not apparent at the time.56 Applying neo-functionalism as conceived by Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet, this might also be due to the fact that initially there were no „trans-
actors‟ desiring cross-border interaction.57 With further development of the Commu-
nity, however, these areas became part of EU policy, potentially because the com-
modifcation of HEIs made their economic value more apparent, whilst simultane-
ously the EU expanded its mission and activities. This latter phenomenon can be 
equally explained both by neo-functionalism and social constructivism. Schmitter‟s 
version of (neo-)neo-functionalism58 accounts for political spill-over through the 
shifting of expectations to the EU level and for cultivated spill-over through EU in-
stitutions working towards integration in new areas. According to Sandholtz‟ and 
Stone Sweet‟s neo-functionalism, transactors or „agents‟ in social constructivist par-
lance influence integration, if this seems desirable to them. Nevertheless, Member 
States have been reluctant to give up their power in the area of HEIs. This is perhaps 
unsurprising considering the fact that HEIs are regarded, partly, as belonging to the 
welfare state (directly affecting national finances) and also as part of national culture 
and identity and as such educating future leaders and civil servants and stimulating 
national industry and development.59 The competences of the EU thus remain lim-
ited.  
2.2.1.1. EU education policy 
Article 128 EEC was most significant amongst the few provisions on education 
in the founding Treaties; it gave the Council the power to „lay down general princi-
ples for implementing a common vocational training policy‟.60 The Treaty of Maas-
                                                 
56 Similar Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 571 seq.  
57 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (n 47). 
58 Schmitter (n 40), Niemann and Schmitter (n 47). 
59 See Teichler (n 33) p. 105, Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 567 with further references. On the purpose of 
HEIs see also section 1.3.1 The original non-economic purpose of European HEIs above. 
60 For more on Article 128 EEC and problems resulting from this limited competence in the field of 
vocational education, see W Hummer, 'Vom "Europaeischen Hochschulraum" zum "Eu-
ropaeischen Forschungsraum". Ansaetze und Perspektiven einer europaeischen Bildungs- und 
Forschungspolitik' in M Prisching, W Lenz and W Hauser (eds), Bildung in Europa - 
Entwicklungsstand und Perspektiven (Verlag Österreich, Wien 2005) p. 56 seq.  
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tricht specified the provision on vocational training and renumbered it to Article 127 
EC. Furthermore, general education, including higher education, became a policy 
area to be found in Article 126 EC. These provisions, however, only provided sup-
plementary competences and did not enable the Community to harmonise national 
education systems. The Treaty of Amsterdam merely renumbered the provisions to 
Articles 149 – 150 EC and neither the Treaty of Nice nor the draft European Consti-
tution included any content changes. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, education is to be 
found in Articles 165 – 166 TFEU and sport has been added to the title, but the com-
petences remained unchanged. The Union, therefore, still has very limited compe-
tences basically amounting to the possibility of passing programmes to support na-
tional education policies.61  
However, since the 1970s the Council of Education Ministers started meeting, 
European Parliament (EP) and Commission have education divisions, education re-
ceived a budget and education policy could be reviewed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). There have been successful EU programmes,62 most 
significantly the Erasmus programme established in the late 1980s which aims to 
encourage the mobility of students and in the course of which the European Credit 
Transfer System (ECTS) was invented.63 Despite its being limited to supporting and 
complementing national policies, there thus is education policy at the supranational 
level which is driven economically (to facilitate the internal market) and politically 
(to achieve European integration and identity).64  
2.2.1.2. Diploma recognition 
Despite the limited competences for education at the EU level, functional spill-
over from free movement provisions has taken place early on. To achieve the free 
movement of persons in the internal market it was necessary to harmonise certain 
aspects of access to individual professions and therefore, inter alia, to harmonise pro-
                                                 
61 On EU competences for education see Hummer (n 60) p. 33 seq, 57 seq, 71, Teichler (n 33) p. 105 
seq, Garben (n 6) p. 189 seq, Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 568, Van der Ploeg and Veugelers (n 5) p. 
19. 
62 See Teichler (n 33) p. 111 seq. 
63 On EU education policy see Garben (n 6) p. 187 seq, Teichler (n 33) p. 105 seq, 109 seq, Van der 
Ploeg and Veugelers (n 5) p. 22, 24 seq, Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 568 seq. 
64 On motives and developments see Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 571 seq. 
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fessional recognition65 of diplomas to guarantee access to regulated professions.66 A 
regime of directives based on what is now Article 53 TFEU has been passed in this 
respect, which have later been consolidated into Directive 2005/36/EC.67 Addition-
ally, the Court has made it clear68 that Member States have to check the substantive 
comparability of qualifications received in another Member State in cases not cov-
ered by secondary law.69  
It is generally assumed that academic diploma recognition cannot be harmo-
nised on the basis of Article 53 TFEU since the internal market competences are re-
garded as having strict functionality and, therefore, not allowing abstract content or 
structural harmonisation, especially if the strict subsidiarity of Article 165 and 166 
TFEU is taken into account.70 Academic recognition thus still takes place according 
to national law, potentially influenced by the Bologna Process which will be dis-
cussed further below. The only other requirements arising from primary EU law 
concern cases where both academic and professional recognition are possible. Here, 
the migrant may not be forced to choose and if one form of recognition has been ob-
tained, the other can still be sought at a later stage under certain circumstances. In 
particular, when academic recognition is requested for professional reasons in addi-
tion to professional recognition, it cannot be denied. Also, if academic recognition 
has been obtained, but does not in itself give access to the profession, professional 
recognition can be additionally demanded.71  
                                                 
65 Professional recognition allows the migrant the right to carry the title of the profession, but not the 
host state‟s academic title, Hummer (n 60) p. 67. 
66 Regulated professions can, according to national law, only be executed after the fulfilment of cer-
tain qualifications, Hummer (n 60) p. 61.  
67 Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications OJ [2005] L 255/22. There 
have been additional amendments since. A consolidated version of Directive 2005/36/EC can be 
found on http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2005L0036:20110324:EN:PDF.  
68 See e.g. C-340/89 Vlassopoulou.  
69 On diploma recognition see Hummer (n 60) p. 60 seq, Garben (n 6) p. 191, Van der Ploeg and 
Veugelers (n 5) p. 22 seq. Fo a more extensive discussion see H Schneider, Die Anerkennung 
von Diplomen in der Europ ischen  emeinschaft (Maklu, Antwerpen 1995). 
70 Hummer (n 60) p. 58 seq. See also Garben (n 6) p. 191 seq, S Garben, EU Higher Education Law - 
The Bologna Process and Harmonization by Stealth (Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn 2011) p. 186 
seq who thinks that a different interpretation would be possible and a CJEU judgement would be 
needed for clarification.  
71 See Hummer (n 60) p. 67 seq. 
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2.2.1.3. EU R&D policy 
Whilst the Founding Treaties also contained no provisions on R&D, a common 
R&D policy was starting to be adopted from the 1970s onwards. This was based on 
Article 235 EEC (now Article 352 TFEU) which gave the EEC the competence to 
„take the appropriate measures‟ where action was deemed necessary to achieve the 
Community‟s objectives. This led to the adoption of the First Framework Pro-
gramme72 in 1983, which defined a budget and activities for a period of three years 
and focussed mainly on energy research. Efforts amplified from the late 1980s on-
wards, as R&D was considered increasingly important for the development and 
competitiveness of Europe.73 With the Single European Act the policy area „research 
and technological development‟ was incorporated into primary law as Articles 130f - 
130q EEC. These provisions officially foresaw the multi-annual Framework Pro-
grammes (FPs)74 as a basis for more detailed initiatives. The competences given to 
the EEC were complementary in nature, meaning to support actions of the Member 
States. However, unlike in education policy they did not stand under strict subsidiar-
ity and an absolute prohibition of harmonisation. The policy aims were to increase 
collaborative research with businesses, support cooperation beyond the EU, the dis-
semination and transfer of knowledge, increase of competition and support of mobil-
ity in the Community. The Maastricht Treaty made „research and technology‟ a 
Community objective (Article 3 m EC), while the Treaty of Amsterdam only renum-
bered the provisions, but the content was neither changed with this Treaty nor with 
Treaty of Nice.75  
Since the Treaty of Lisbon the provisions on R&D have been located in Article 
179 – 190 TFEU and they have been slightly strengthened. Under Article 4 TFEU 
research policy has become a shared competence and the Union can pass legislation 
in addition to FPs to attain the European Research Area (ERA) following the ordi-
                                                 
72 Framework Programme for Research 1984-87 COM(83) 260 final. 
73 RA Jones, The Politics and Economics of the European Union (2nd edn Edward Elgar, Chelten-
ham/Northampton 2001) p. 325 seq. This corresponds with the changing nature of HEIs as de-
scribed in chapter 1. 
74 Further on the FPs see Jones (n 73) p. 329. 
75 On the development of supranational R&D policy and its objectives see Jones (n 73) p. 325 seq, 
Hummer (n 60) p. 33 seq, 70 seq, K Lenaerts and P Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the Euro-
pean Union (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005) p. 318 seq. 
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nary legislative procedure (Article 182 (5) TFEU). Paragraph 1 of Article 179 TFEU 
makes R&D a Union objective and explicitly mentions the establishment of the ERA 
in which „researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely‟. The lat-
ter is stressed again in paragraph 2 which foresees that the Union shall aim at „per-
mitting researchers to cooperate freely across borders and at enabling undertakings 
to exploit the internal market potential to the full‟. Furthermore, the title „research 
and technological development‟ is complemented by the words „and space‟ and a 
new Article 189 TEFU on a common space policy has been inserted.76 All together, 
seven FPs have been passed, the last of which, FP7,77 will be replaced in 2014 by 
Horizon202078 bringing EU research funding closer to the Europe2020 Strategy 
which will be discussed further below.79 
2.2.1.4. Interim conclusion on supranational EU policy  
The value of education and research became more apparent towards the end of 
the 20
th
 century with the shift from an industrial production-based society to a 
knowledge-based one.80 Additionally, as discussed in chapter 1, the nature of HEIs 
changed towards commodification and internationalisation. These developments 
made European coordination desirable. EU education and R&D policy began to de-
velop, but the Member States seemed reluctant to provide the Union with extensive 
competences or indeed to utilise potential possibilities of existing competences. Gar-
ben, for example, argues conclusively that there might already be a basis in primary 
law for legislation on academic recognition of diplomas.81 This might be explained 
with ongoing controversies in the public realm about „competences creep‟, the le-
gitimacy of the European project and the desire to keep education policy national 
                                                 
76 This would have been similar under the Constitution. See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 75) p. 319. 
77 Decision 1982/2006/EC concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Commu-
nity for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) OJ 
[2006] L 412/01. 
78 European Commission, 'Horizon 2020 - The EU Framework Programme for Research and Innova-
tion' (2012) http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020 accessed 7 
March 2013.  
79 For an in-depth analysis of the governance and functioning of EU research policy at supranational 
and soft law (OMC) level see A Pilniok, Governance im europäischen Forschungsförderver-
bund (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2011). 
80 Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 574 seq. 
81 See Garben (n 6) p. 189 seq, Garben (n 70) p. 184 seq. 
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and retain power. Nevertheless, further coordination appears to have been deemed 
necessary. Therefore, a significant part of European policies affecting HEIs started 
using soft law mechanisms to avoid the supranational policy mode.82  
2.2.2. EU soft law: The Lisbon/Europe2020 Strategy 
As it was deemed that Europe was in need of reform to keep up with its com-
petitors and face internationalisation of HEIs, the European Council in Lisbon in 
2000 announced that its strategic goal for the next ten years would be for the EU „to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world‟.83 Particularly relevant for HEIs in this respect was the announcement of the 
ERA, the concept of which encourages many of the commodification trends dis-
cussed in chapter 1,84 and the endorsement of the aims of the Bologna Process as part 
of the Lisbon Strategy.85 The Lisbon Strategy itself is only a declaration and not le-
gally binding. Instead the OMC has been chosen as the appropriate instrument for 
achieving the aims of the Lisbon Strategy which have been further specified in nu-
merical targets.86 It is supposed to allow common will formation and enhance social 
learning by providing a network for EU organs, national authorities and social part-
ners as well as the private and the third sectors. The Commission evaluates progress 
on the basis of reports and the European Council, meeting annually, lays down the 
guiding principles, decides about the following measures and coordinates the proc-
ess.87 The effects of this soft law approach will be discussed together with the effects 
                                                 
82 See also Garben (n 6) p. 187seq, P Maassen and C Musselin, 'European Integration and the Euro-
peanisation of Higher Education' in A Amaral et al (eds), European Integration and the Govern-
ance of Higher Education and Research (Springer, Dordrecht/London 2009), Walkenhorst (n 
33) p. 573 seq, Teichler (n 33) p. 114. 
83 Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 Presidency Conclusion paragraph 5.  
84 Presidency Conclusion (n 83) paragraph 12 seq. This was based on Commission Communication 
„Towards a European research area‟ COM (2000) 6 final, 18.01.2000.  
85 Presidency Conclusion (n 83) paragraph 25 seq. 
86 I Begg, 'Is there a Convincing Rationale for the Lisbon Strategy?' (2008) 46 JCMS 427 p. 431, L 
Cohen-Tanugi, Beyond Lisbon - A European Strategy for Globalisation (PIE Peter Lang, Brus-
sels 2008) p. 23 seq, 47 seq, Hummer (n 60) p. 72 seq. An in-depth account of the OMC can be 
found in, for example, S Kröger, 'The Open Method of Coordination: Underconceptualisation, 
overdetermination, de-policisation and beyond' in S Kröger (ed), What we have learnt: Ad-
vances, pitfalls and remaining questions in OMC research (EIoP 2009). 
87 Cohen-Tanugi (n 86) p. 23 seq, Hummer (n 60) p. 72 seq.  
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of the Bologna Process below in the interim conclusion on the position of HEIs in 
European policy.  
The ambitious numerical targets have not been met and the Lisbon Strategy 
was re-launched in 200588 and re-introduced after the financial crisis as the new 
Europe2020 Strategy in 2010.89 The most important numerical targets in higher edu-
cation and research to be achieved by 2020 are: an increase in research spending to 
3% GDP, a decrease of school drop-out rates to less than 10% and an increase to 
40% of all 30-34 year olds with tertiary education. None of these differ significantly 
from the original aims.90  
2.2.3. Extra EU-Modes: The Bologna Process 
Following the initiative of the education ministers of Italy, France, Germany 
and the UK to reform European higher education systems expressed in the „Sor-
bonne-Declaration‟,91 the education ministers of 29 European countries92 officially 
launched the Bologna Process with the „ ologna Declaration‟ in 1999.93 The Bolo-
gna Declaration is not legally binding and, with 47 countries involved at present, the 
Bologna Process goes far beyond the EU.94 The overall aim of the Bologna Process 
was to establish an internationally competitive „European Higher Education Area‟ 
(EHEA) by 2010 which was specified through long-term and intermediate targets in 
regular ministerial meetings. Additionally, a follow-up group tasked with facilitating 
                                                 
88 Brussels European Council 22 and 23 March 2005 Presidency Conclusions. Further on the devel-
opment of the Lisbon Strategy see Cohen-Tanugi (n 86) p. 51 seq, Hummer (n 60) p. 74. 
89 Brussels European Council 17 June 2010 Conclusions.  
90 For an overview of targets and current achievements see, Eurostat „Europe 2020 indicator‟ (2013) 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/headline_indicators 
accessed 5 December 2013. 
91 Sorbonne Joint Declaration on harmonisation of the architecture of the European higher education 
system by the four Ministers in charge for France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
Paris, the Sorbonne, 25 May 1998. 
92 The 15 EU Member States of the time, all of the candidate countries which subsequently became 
Member States in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements except Cyprus as well as Iceland, Norway 
and Switzerland. On the beginnings of the Bologna Process see Eurydice, Focus on Higher Edu-
cation in Europe 2010: The impact of the Bologna Process (Eurydice, Brussels 2010) p. 9 seq. 
93 Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education of 19 June 1999. 
94 For the latest up-dates and evaluations of the Bologna Process see Eurydice, The European Higher 
Education Area in 2012: Bologna Process Implementation Report (Education, Audiovisual and 
Culture Executive Agency, Brussels 2012).  
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the development of the process was set up. It contains, alongside representatives of 
the Bologna countries and the Commission (which joined as a member in 2001), rep-
resentatives of the Council of Europe, the European University Association (EUA), 
the European Students Union and other organisations.95 The main features include 
the achievement of a common three-cycle study structure (undergraduate, master and 
doctoral level), the standard issuing of diploma supplements, the implementation of a 
module system, the usage of ECTS, the establishment of national qualification 
frameworks describing the qualifications available and the introduction of quality 
assurance.96 At the 2009 Leuven conference it was agreed to proceed with the Bolo-
gna process until 2020, as it was generally regarded as successful by the participating 
countries.97 Consequently, in 2010 the EHEA was officially launched at the meeting 
in Budapest-Vienna.98  
2.2.4. Interim conclusion: The location of HEIs in European policy 
While originally not featuring in primary law, policies on education and re-
search have been developed at the supranational level. The main competences, how-
ever, still lie with the Member States. That this strict divide is difficult to maintain 
has already been shown; functional spill-over from free movement provisions has led 
to the need for secondary legislation on the professional recognition of diplomas. 
Furthermore, coordination beyond what has been achieved within these policies 
seemed necessary, but the Member States opted for the Bologna Process and the 
OMC rather than extending primary law competences or using existing competences 
to their full potential. Only with the Treaty of Lisbon has the competence base for 
R&D been slightly strengthened. However, that does not appear to have led to exten-
sive legislation so far. The Lisbon/Europe2020 Strategy and the Bologna Process are 
only soft law and thus not legally binding. It has been suggested that their advan-
                                                 
95 On the history and set up of the Bologna process see Eurydice (n 92) p. 9 seq, Hummer (n 60) p. 49 
seq.  
96 See further Eurydice (n 94) p. 7 seq, Hummer (n 60) p. 47 seq, Van der Ploeg and Veugelers (n 5) 
p. 21 seq.  
97 Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Leuven 
and Louvain-la-Neuve, 28-29 April 2009 no. 1, 24.  
98 Budapest-Vienna Declaration on the European Higher Education Area 12 March 2010 paragraph 1.  
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tages lie in their flexibility, the prevention of undesired consequences of suprana-
tional integration and their involvement of various actors.99  
However, these approaches do have their disadvantages. As can be seen from 
the Lisbon Strategy which originally envisaged for its targets to be achieved by 
2010, results cannot be achieved as straightforwardly as with hard law. Nevertheless, 
many have described these soft law approaches as having developed a certain inevi-
tability, that they intertwine and that they are leading into the direction of further 
commercialisation.100 Indeed, the Bologna process in particular has certainly 
changed the landscape of European higher education. It has done so despite being 
unpopular with stakeholders such as students and academics who, inter alia, criticise 
the, in their eyes, too inflexible three cycle structure and the focus on employability. 
It has also been felt that the process would lead to fierce competition among stu-
dents, be too paternalistic and would not fit with every subject.101 Since, however, 
the Europe2020 and the Bologna Process are only soft law mechanisms the Member 
States do not have to implement them. Neither do the features of the Bologna Proc-
ess demand exact implementation, but instead they provide guidelines (for example, 
the length of three years of undergraduate study is a minimum requirement not a 
fixed term). It might thus often be the national measures and not necessarily the Bo-
                                                 
99 See Begg (n 86) p. 430 seq (433). 
100 E.g. A Nóvoa, 'Ways of thinking about education in Europe' in A Nóvoa and M Lawn (eds), Fab-
ricating Europe - The formation of an education space (Kluwer, Dordrecht 2002), G Neave and 
P Maassen, 'The Bologna Process: an intergovernmental policy perspective' in P Maassen and J 
Olsen (eds), University dynamics and European integration (Springer, Dordrecht 2007), P Ravi-
net, 'From Voluntary Participation to Monitored Coordination: why European countries feel in-
creasingly bound by their commitment to the Bologna Process' (2008) 43 European Journal of 
Education 354, S Croché, 'Bologna Network: a new sociopolitical area in higher education' 
(2009) 7 Globalisation, Societies and Education 489, Å Gornitzka, 'Bologna in Context: a hori-
zontal perspective on the dynamics of governance sites for a Europe of Knowledge' (2010) 45 
European Journal of Education 535, A Corbett, 'Education and the Lisbon Strategy' in P Cope-
land and D Papadimitriou (eds), The EU's Lisbon Strategy: evaluating success, understanding 
failure (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke 2012). 
101 See, for example, U Banscherus et al, Der Bologna-Prozess zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit 
(Hochschule und Forschung, Leutheusser Druck, Coburg 2009) p. 11 seq with further references 
on criticism in Germany, AR Cardoso et al, 'Demand for Higher Education Programs: The Im-
pact of the Bologna Process' (2008) 54 CESifo Economic Studies 229 on criticism regarding the 
degree structure, Hummer (n 60) p. 78 seq on problems in Austria, R Cippitani and S Gatt, 'Le-
gal Developments and Problems of the Bologna Process within the European Higher Education 
Area and European Integration' (2009) 34 Higher Education in Europe 385, p. 391 on legal and 
practical problems with a focus on Italy, S Garben, 'The Future of Higher Education in Europe: 
The Case for a Stronger Base in EU Law' (2012) 50 LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper 
Series p. 20 seq with further references on student and teacher protests.  
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logna features themselves which attract the criticism. It has indeed been argued that 
the  ologna Process serves as „an efficient smokescreen for governments to agree on 
unpopular reforms‟102 while advertising them as binding and thus putting implemen-
tation pressure on national parliaments. Additionally, while these approaches are ad-
vertised as bottom-up, only certain actors participate. In particular, since the EP, the 
CJEU and the general public are not involved, this could be regarded as causing de-
mocratic concerns.103  
The turn towards commodification which endangers the traditional non-
economic mission of HEIs through the soft law measures, the confusing jungle of 
EU law, EU soft law and international instruments as well as the democratic con-
cerns mentioned, make one wonder whether a coherent supranational policy on HEIs 
would not have been the better choice. However, the negative perceptions of the soft 
law measures and the EU in general might, as explained above in chapter 1, make 
further integration into the EU hard law frame momentarily unlikely. At the same 
time, HEIs are not immune to the forces of directly applicable EU law which can 
lead to spill-over.  
2.3. Spill-over from directly applicable EU law 
EU law constraints on HEIs can arise from different provisions. Firstly, the Un-
ion Citizenship provisions in their broad application by the Court potentially open 
higher education systems to more students than they were originally created for. This 
could have an increasing impact on the organization of national higher education 
systems.104 Secondly, HEIs might, as a result of the commodification tendencies ana-
                                                 
102 Garben (n 6) p. 206.  
103 See also Garben (n 6) p. 205 seq, Garben (n 70) p. 210 seq. See also Walkenhorst (n 33) p. 579 
seq, Maasen and Musselin (n 82) p. 9 seq. Garben also explores the question of whether the Bo-
logna Process could be seen as depriving the Union of its power and contradicting Article 4 (3) 
TEU and Article 5 TEU and therefore it could be regarded as illegal for Member States to under-
take action collectively instead of using the EU frame. Garben (n 6) p. 198 seq, Garben (n 70) p. 
203. In the latter she concludes, though, that while the course taken was not exactly in the spirit 
of cooperation, it would probably not amount to a breach of law.  
104 See M Dougan, 'The spatial restructuring of national welfare states within the European Union: the 
contribution of Union Citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon' in U Neergaard, R 
Nielsen and LM Roseberry (eds), Integrating welfare functions into EU Law: from Rome to Lis-
bon (DJØF Forlag, Copenhagen 2009) p. 154 seq, U Neergaard, R Nielsen and L Roseberry, 'In-
troduction' in U Neergaard, R Nielsen and L Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into 
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lysed in chapter 1, more regularly fall under the free movement provisions. Thirdly, 
HEIs could (in part) be regarded as undertakings and thus fall under the competition 
rules. The latter two areas of law might then require further commodification threat-
ening the traditionally non-economic mission of European HEIs. In the following, a 
brief description of these areas of law will be undertaken.  
2.3.1. Union Citizenship 
Traditionally, national public services were based on nationality and territorial-
ity. These traditional settings changed through European integration. According to 
the free movement provisions, economically active citizens of other Member States 
have to be treated as nationals, which, inter alia, allows them to take part in their host 
state‟s education system and makes them eligible for benefits. With the introduction 
of Union Citizenship, free movement and the prohibition of discrimination were then 
extended to all Union citizens.105 
2.3.1.1. Union Citizenship and HEIs 
According to Article 21 TFEU every Union citizen has the right to reside 
wherever he or she wishes within the EU. Article 18 TFEU provides that a Union 
citizen legally residing in the territory of another Member State has the right to equal 
treatment. However, this is subject to Directive 2004/38/EC,106 which gives Member 
States the right to deny residency if the Union Citizen does not have sufficient in-
come and health insurance and would thus become an unreasonable burden on the 
host state. However, a line of CJEU case law broadened the scope of the Citizenship 
                                                                                                                                          
EU Law - From Rome to Lisbon (DJØF Forlag, Copenhagen 2009) p. 7. On the role of the Court 
in the sphere of citizenship see, M Dougan, 'Judicial Activism or constitutional interaction? 
Policymaking by the ECJ in the Field of Union Citizenship' in H-W Micklitz and B De Witte 
(eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, Cam-
bridge/Antwerp/Portland 2012).  
105 See Dougan 2009 (n 104) p 154 seq, M Dougan and E Spaventa, 'Educating Rudy and the non 
English patient: a double bill on residency rights under Article 18 EC' (2003) 28 European Law 
Review 699, p. 699 seq, Dougan (n 2) p. 723, C Kohler and N Görlitz, 'Auswirkungen des eu-
roparechtlichen Diskriminierungsverbots auf den Bildungssektor - Grundlinien der Rechtspre-
chung des Europaeischen Gerichtshofs' (2008) 4 IJELP 92 p. 93 seq, AAM Schrauwen, 'The Fu-
ture of EU Citizenship: Corrosion of National Citizenship?' SSRN eLibrary p. 4 seq.  
106 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 
and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC OJ [2004] L 158/77. 
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provisions. It remains the case that only the financially independent migrant have to 
be granted residency, but this independence does not have to cover absolutely every 
circumstance. A certain amount of solidarity from the host state can be expected and 
such limited reliance on the host state‟s finances does not give the host state the right 
to deny residency.107 When it comes to equal treatment, the lawfully residing EU 
migrant (and his or her family members) can expect equal treatment even if secon-
dary measures normally exclude the reliance on benefits if such reliance is only tem-
porary.108 Besides that, unless there is a „real link‟ to the host state‟s society,109 Un-
ion Citizenship can only offer the right to equal treatment regarding access to social 
benefits without the security of residency rights.110 In the field of higher education, 
the Court in Gravier111 developed the approach (now to be found in Article 24 Direc-
tive 2004/38) that no discrimination is allowed in any area connected with access to 
higher education, but that access to additional support (for example, maintenance 
grants) could be limited to permanent residents since it would otherwise constitute an 
unreasonable burden for the host state.112  
A similar approach is taken towards the home state and the exportation of 
grants; generally no territoriality requirement can be imposed unless either the in-
creased number of potential benefit recipients would provide an unreasonable burden 
                                                 
107 C-184/99 Grzelczyk, C-413/99 Baumbast.  
108 C-184/99 Grzelczyk, C-138/02 Collins. 
109 C-85/96 Martinez Sala, C-209/03 Bidar. More recently in C-158/07 Förster the Court up-held this 
line of reasoning. It did, however, allow a rather long residency requirement (five years) for the 
„real link‟ to be established.  
110 C-456/02 Trojani. 
111 293/83 Gravier. C-39/86 Lair paragraph 16. These cases were decided before Union Citizenship 
had been established with the Treaty of Maastricht and the Court thus needed to go into some 
length to explain why students would fall under the Treaty provisions in the first place. They 
were, however, decided on the basis of what is now Article 18 TFEU. The latter has, with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, been incorporated into the citizenship provisions after it has been read together 
with what is now Article 21 TFEU for some time.  
112 On the Citizenship rulings see M Dougan, 'Fees, grants, loans and dole cheques: who covers the 
costs of migrant education within the EU?' (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 943, Dou-
gan (n 2) p. 723 seq, Dougan 2009 (n 104) p. 157 seq, Dougan (n 105), Van der Mei (n 2) p. 225 
seq, Kohler and Görlitz (n 105) p. 95 seq, J De Groof, 'European higher education in search of a 
new legal order' in BM Kehm, J Huisman and B Stensaker (eds), The European Higher 
Education Area: Perspectives on a Moving Target (Sense Publishers, Rotterdam 2009) p. 80 p. 
92 seq. 
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or no „real link‟ to the home state exists anymore.113 The two approaches are re-
garded cumulatively and interactive in that the migrant‟s home state is supposed to 
support him or her until his or her ties to the host state are close enough to allow 
benefits to be granted there. The latter argument was posited as the way forward in 
the field of educational mobility.114 It is noticeable that in the citizenship cases the 
Court takes into account the individual circumstances of the case and does not allow 
the Member States to rely solely upon generalized criteria.115  
Member States have eagerly tried to retain control over social areas. In health 
(Article 168 TFEU), education (Article 165 seq TFEU) and social security (Article 
151 seq TFEU) the EU has only limited competences. In the field of education, the 
Member States avoided the supranational mode of harmonisation and during the ne-
gotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon116 much emphasis was placed on the principle of 
conferral of competences and the principle of subsidiarity. The Court‟s judgements 
on EU Citizenship have thus been criticised for interfering with national welfare sys-
tems which are particularly sensitive areas closely related to national finances.117 
Additionally, the Court‟s case to case approach makes this area somewhat unpredict-
able. Even if one might disagree and instead find the Court‟s overall approach to be 
reasonable, appearing as it does, to strike a balance between upholding the free 
movement of citizens and the concerns of the Member States, the cases discussed 
subsequently demonstrate that the citizenship provisions can in fact lead to signifi-
cant spill-over into policies regarding HEIs. 
                                                 
113 C-499/06 Nerkowska and in the field of education C-11-12/06 Morgan and Bucher, C-523-585/11 
Prinz and Seeberger and, recently, C-220/12 Thiele and C-275/12 Elrick all on restrictions to the 
exportation of maintenance grants in Germany. On the exportation of grants and the earlier case 
law see NN Shuibhne, 'Case C–76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes–Schwarz v. Finanzamt Bergisch 
Gladbach, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 September 2007, not yet reported; Case C–
318/05, Commission v. Germany, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 September 2007, not 
yet reported; Joined Cases C–11/06 & C–12/06 Morgan v. Bezirksregierung Köln; Bucher v. 
Landrat des Kreises Düren, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 23 October 2007, not yet re-
ported' (2008) 45 CMLR. 771, Dougan (n 2) p. 727 seq and (n 112) p. 980 seq, Schrauwen (n 
105) p. 4 seq, 9 seq. 
114 For an in-depth discussion see van der Mei (n 112). See also Dougan (n 2) p. 737. 
115 See further those mentioned in n 112.  
116 In this regard it is even said that the problems during the constitutional reform process might 
partly have been caused by a negative opinion towards Union Citizenship and what it brings 
with it. See Dougan 2009 (n 104) p. 164 seq. 
117 On this point see Dougan (n 2) p. 729, 738, Dougan 2009 (n 104) especially p. 161 seq, 181 seq, 
Schrauwen (n 105) 10 seq. 
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2.3.1.2. The infringement procedure against Austria and Belgium  
The infringement procedures against Austria and Belgium are especially inter-
esting here.118 Both countries had an „open-access to education‟ policy in order to 
increase the percentage of their population in tertiary education.119 Residents only 
had to have a secondary school certificate to be admitted to an HEI. For students 
from other Member States, however, additional requirements were imposed; they 
had to qualify for the same course of study in their home state. Austria and Belgium 
deemed this necessary to avoid an influx of German and French students respectively 
who, given the much stricter requirements for university accession in their home 
states, would come to the neighbour states where they could gain access more easily 
and also study in their native language. It was feared that this would become too 
much of a burden on state finances and perhaps threaten the open access. The Court, 
however, decided that these rules constituted indirect discrimination and therefore 
infringed Article 18 TFEU. It did not accept the defence due to a lack of evidence 
and as it deemed the discriminatory system disproportionate.120 The judgments re-
ceived fierce academic criticism because the Court was regarded as having over-
stepped its competences in an area of primary responsibility of the Member States. 
While the Court, in fact, just followed its long established case law that access to 
higher education requires equal treatment, whilst additional benefits do not, these 
cases, indeed, had a significant impact on the policy choice of the open education 
system which either had to be surrendered or opened up to a large influx of non-
residents. It was generally considered that the Court should at least have been more 
lenient at the justification stage rather than demanding hard proof and applying a 
strict proportionality test.121  
                                                 
118 Cases C-147/03 Commission v Austria C-65/03 and Commission v Belgium respectively. There 
had already been an infringement procedure against  elgium for quota legislation in the 1980‟s 
(case 42/87) which had been found to infringe the Treaty. See Kohler and Görlitz (n 105) p. 97. 
119 The fact that this is after all a goal of Lisbon Strategy has, however, not been brought as a justifi-
cation in the proceedings.  
120 For more on the cases see Damjanovic (n 2) p. 157 seq, Reich (n 2) p. 637, Kohler and Görlitz (n 
105) p. 95 seq, Garben (n 2) paragraph 6 seq, C Rieder, 'Case C-147/03, Commission of the 
European Communities v. Republic of Austria' (2006) 43 CMLR. 1711. 
121 See Damjanovic (n 2) p. 158 seq, Reich (n 2) p. 637 seq. 
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After the judgments, Austria and Belgium abolished the discriminatory meas-
ures which led to disproportionately high numbers of German and French students in 
certain subjects studying in both states, especially in the field of medicine.122 As 
these were considered to be mostly „free-riders‟, it was feared that this would also 
result in a threat to the health care system. Both countries thus introduced quota sys-
tems reserving 75% (Austria) and 70% (Belgium) of the places for residents.123 The 
Commission then, again, initiated infringement procedures against Austria and Bel-
gium, but suspended them for five years in order for the countries to gather evidence 
that the quota system might be necessary.124  
However, in line with both neo-functionalism and social constructivism, inte-
gration cannot necessarily be halted by such arrangements and in the meantime a 
preliminary reference from a Belgian court came before the CJEU.125 Upon a claim 
for access by French students, the national court had asked about the compatibility of 
the quota system with Article 18 TFEU and any potential justifications due to the 
threats to the national education and, potentially, health care system. In its questions, 
the national court also pointed to the fact that open access to education was equally 
an aim of Article 165 TFEU and Article 13 (2) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) and that Article 165 TFEU states that 
the Union shall support this and Article 13 (2) ICESC contains a standstill obligation 
towards measures achieving that aim. The CJEU, confirming its earlier case law, de-
cided that Articles 18 and 21 TFEU prohibit such a quota system, but that „the objec-
tive of protection of public health‟ could constitute an exemption. It was left to the 
national court to determine the latter. A similar outcome had been suggested in the 
pre-ruling literature, since by doing this the Court could reach a political compro-
mise by upholding its former case law and avoiding the more general questions of 
who pays for cross-border education and how an open access system can be upheld 
                                                 
122 Up to 80% of French students were, for example, enrolled in the relevant subjects in Belgium. 
Damjanovic (n 2) p. 162 with further references.  
123 Damjanovic (n 2) p. 163 with further references.  
124 It has been suggested that Austria‟s strong demand during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations to ex-
pressly declare public education as a non-economic service of general interest for which Article 
2 Protocol 9 reassures the competence of the Member States might also have played a role in 
that respect. See Damjanovic (n 2) p 163. 
125 See case C-73/08 Bressol.  
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in net receiver states.126 The issue thus seems to remain a sore point, as can be seen 
by the Austrian attempt to reduce the public transport available to permanent resident 
students, something that has equally been found to infringe the citizenship provi-
sions.127 Another ploy is the current considerations of introducing fees for all stu-
dents which would then be covertly repaid to Austrian students through higher main-
tenance grants as a „payback‟ for German plans to introduce road charges.128 
2.3.1.3. Interim conclusion on Union citizenship and HEIs 
Union citizenship generally only provides students with the right to reside in 
the territory and have access to the higher education of another Member State.129 
Additional benefits are generally excluded for EU migrant students unless a „real 
link‟ to the host state can be established. Instead these benefits can be exported from 
the home state. Whilst this system does not seem to cause too many concerns gener-
ally, the cases of Belgium and Austria have shown that the citizenship provisions can 
have significant spill-over effects threatening the whole concept of an open access to 
education policy. Here further regulation seems required.130  
2.3.2. The free movement provisions 
The free movement provisions are the core of internal market law. They require 
that goods (Articles 34 TFEU seq), economically active persons (Article 45 TFEU 
seq for workers and Article 49 TFEU seq for establishment), services (Article 56 
TFEU seq) and capital (Article 63 TFEU seq) from all EU Member States can move 
                                                 
126 See, Garben (n 2) paragraph 20 seq. Rieder (n 120) p. 1725, by contrast, suggested that the quota 
system would infringe EU law. 
127 C-75/11 Commission v Austria. 
128 BR.de, 'Die Alpenrepublik schlägt zurück' BR.de (2 December 2013) 
http://www.br.de/nachrichten/oberbayern/inntalautobahn-maut-vignette-100.html accessed 2 
December 2013. 
129 In England there currently appears to be some confusion about what exactly has to be granted to 
other EU citizens and certain fee loans have been halted. However, there does not appear to suf-
ficient information available to assess this situation further. See S Malik, 'College course subsidy 
spirals out of control' The Guardian (18 November 2013) 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/nov/18/college-course-chaos-budget-shortfall ac-
cessed 22 November 2013 
130 Van der Mei (n 112) p. 232 seq had suggested a justified quota system which, however, seems 
difficult as the Court only let the concerns about the health system count as a justification and 
not the threats to the education system itself. On the attempts to establish a reimbursement 
scheme between certain Member States see Damjanovic (n 2) p. 162 seq with further references.  
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freely within the EU. They are therefore provisions of economic law, which on the 
surface do not have anything to do with HEIs.  
Early on, however, the free movement of persons spilled over into the sphere of 
HEIs with regards the professional recognition of diplomas as discussed above. Fur-
thermore, the free movement of economically active persons provides full equal 
treatment rights. The Court has, therefore, made it clear that limitations in respect of 
access to maintenance grants and benefits, which apply to mere citizens, do not ap-
ply to free moving economically active persons.131 The latter can, thus, access grants 
and benefits which, in some cases, might have an effect on such benefit schemes. 
Access to education is also extended to third country nationals related to economi-
cally active EU migrants, who, once in education, have an independent residency 
right which they could extend to family members.132  
The other area which could influence HEIs within the free movement provi-
sions is the free movement of services (or establishment, if on a more permanent ba-
sis). If higher education and research are regarded as services, Article 56 TFEU (or 
Article 49 TFEU) would prohibit restrictions on foreign and commercial providers of 
these services unless there is a valid justification. Initially, the Court‟s view was that 
education, including higher education, was not a service in the meaning of the 
Treaty, as, in Europe, education is not „normally provided for remuneration‟, even if 
students occasionally pay insubstantial fees.133 However, the Court also made it clear 
that education has to be regarded as a service, if it is taking place in institutions 
which are „financed essentially out of private funds, in particular by students or their 
parents, and which seek to make an economic profit‟.134 Following this line of rea-
                                                 
131 C-39/86 Lair. This has been reaffirmed in case C-46/12 N. In C-542/09 Commission v the Nether-
lands and case C-20/12 Giersch the Court also declared the denial of the portability of a grant to 
the child of a migrant and frontier worker respectively, if they did not fulfil a certain length of 
residence, as incompatible with Article 45 TFEU. In Giersch the Court considered the aim of in-
creasing the percentage of residents with tertiary education as a valid justification, but found the 
residency requirement to be disproportionate. The latter is interesting, since increasing the per-
centage of residents with tertiary education is after all an aim of the Lisbon/Europe 2020 Strat-
egy, but this had not been brought as a justification in the citizenship cases of Austria and Bel-
gium mentioned above. It now seems that it can potentially be a valid justification ground for a 
limitation of free movement. 
132 C-529/11 Alarape. 
133 Cases 263/86 Humbel and, for higher education, C-109/92 Wirth. 
134 Case C-109/92 Wirth paragraph 13 seq. 
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soning, one would assume that a similar distinction would have to be made in the 
area of research. This means that basic research in the general interest with not iden-
tifiable paying „customer‟ would not amount to a service, whilst commercial re-
search for private clients would.135 For education as well as for research, the distinc-
tion would probably have to be made on a case to case basis. 
During the last decades of on-going commodification at the national levels, 
there have already been a number of cases where the Court declared activities by 
(higher) education institutions to be services in the meaning of the Treaty. The cases 
all concerned education, but it seems possible that in the future there will also be 
cases concerning research. In the case Neri136 an Italian national wanted to study at 
the Italian subsidiary of an English private HEI which provided educational courses 
for an English university, but was informed that the degree which she would obtain 
from these studies would not be recognized as a qualification in Italy. Here the Court 
clearly stated that „organisation for remuneration of university courses is an eco-
nomic activity‟ and the Italian administrative practise of not recognising such de-
grees was found to be infringing the freedom of establishment. The cases Schwarz137 
and Jundt138 were both about tax advantages. In Schwarz German residents wanted 
to claim tax advantages for school attendance fees for their child incurred in Scot-
land. This was refused by the German tax authorities because the legislation only 
provided such an option for attendance fees incurred in Germany. The Court held 
that this infringed the free movement of services.139 In Jundt a lawyer residing in 
Germany who had provided a university course in France wanted to claim tax advan-
tages which could have been claimed for educational courses provided in German 
HEIs. This was equally refused by the local authorities due to national legislation. 
The Court again held such legislation to be an infringement.  
                                                 
135 The Commission draws a similar distinction in the Research Framework (n 8) for the field of state 
aid law (further below). 
136 Case C-153/02 Neri.  
137 Case C-76/05 Schwarz. 
138 Case C-281/06 Jundt. 
139 This has been reaffirmed in case C-56/09 Zanotti, where the Court, however, allowed a maximum 
limit for reimbursement set at the level of the costs of the same education in a national public 
HEI.  
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These cases illustrate that, especially with increasing commodification, HEIs 
can come into the ambit of the free movement provisions and this can have unfore-
seen consequences. Excluding private providers or imposing strict regulations on 
them, which is often demanded to safeguard quality and equality in higher educa-
tion,140 could, for example, constitute a restriction of the free movement of services 
or the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, as the cases discussed above illustrate, 
tax advantages could no longer be granted exclusively to national (public) providers. 
Such consequences could have significant effects on national policy concepts for 
HEIs. 
2.3.3. Competition rules 
Competition and state aid law aims to avoid collusions, dominant positions and 
state interference which could hinder free competition and controls mergers. How-
ever, entities only fall under these provisions, if they are „undertakings‟. The Court 
has defined an undertaking as „every entity engaged in an economic activity, regard-
less of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed‟.141 An eco-
nomic activity consists, according to the Court, of „offering goods or services on the 
market‟.142 With ongoing commodification of HEIs, they might qualify as undertak-
ings. How far this can be expected and what consequences this could have for them 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has illuminated the rather complicated situation of HEIs in EU 
policy and law. Whilst HEIs did not originally play a role in EU policy and law, on-
going commodification and internationalisation seem to have required a certain 
amount of coordination. Nevertheless, the policy areas appeared to be too treasured 
by Member States to provide the EU with far reaching competences. Rather than 
utilising the supranational frame, Member States have thus opted for EU and extra-
                                                 
140 See on concerns regarding private providers in higher education UCU, „High cost, high debt, high 
risk: why for-profit universities are a poor deal for students and taxpayers‟ (UCU, 2011) avail-
able at http://whitepaper.web.ucu.org.uk/files/2011/08/HighCostHighDebtHighRisk.pdf.  
141 See case C-41/90 Höfner paragraph 21. 
142 See case 118/85 Commission v Italy paragraph 7. 
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EU soft law mechanisms. It has been held that these cause democratic concerns, as 
they are agreed upon by national governments without involvement of the EP. Fur-
thermore, despite their soft law character, many have pointed to implementation 
pressures on national legislators, the intertwining of the two mechanisms and the 
emanating tendency towards commodification. It has thus been suggested that there 
have been attempts to justify, unpopular, national policy choices with, in particular, 
the  ologna „rules‟.  
Additionally, HEIs are not immune to directly applicable EU law. Spill-over 
can result from citizenship, free movement and competition law provisions. That this 
can have severe effects on national policy choices has been shown by the cases of 
Austria and Belgium. Whilst the Court has suffered a great deal of criticism for rul-
ing on matters affecting HEIs due to spill-over from directly applicable EU law, 
Member States remain reluctant to establish a coherent supranational strategy. 
Therefore the law in this area is made on a case to case basis without a coherent 
strategy, which creates fragmentation and can lead to legal uncertainty.143 As regards 
the more economic provisions of EU law, the likeliness that HEIs will fall into their 
ambit increases with ongoing commodification which, in turn, might require even 
further commodification potentially endangering the traditional non-economic mis-
sion of European HEIs as discussed in the last chapter. In the remainder of the thesis 
this will be studied more specifically on the example of EU competition law, a thus-
far less explored area. The next chapter will begin this study with an in-depth legal 
doctrinal assessment of potential competition law constraints on HEIs. 
  
                                                 
143 Similar Schrauwen (n 105) p. 10 seq. 
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Chapter 3  
HEIs and EU competition law144 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to conduct an in-depth legal doctrinal assessment of 
potential competition law constraints on HEIs. As introduced in more detail in chap-
ter 1, this thesis uses the relatively unexplored relation between HEIs and EU com-
petition law as an example of how applying the EU‟s economic constitution to for-
merly public sectors may increase tensions between economic integration and the 
EU‟s wider aims, including social integration. The general analysis of potential 
competition law constraints on HEIs in this chapter lays the ground for a detailed 
discussion of research in HEIs in three Member States in the following chapters.  
Since there is no CJEU case law yet, the analysis has to be conducted theoreti-
cally by drawing on experiences in national case law as well as on experiences of the 
application of competition law to public services in other areas, such as health care. 
The chapter will employ a contextual approach by, firstly, discussing the notions of 
„undertaking‟ and „SGEIs‟, as, in effect, they are both limits on the reach of competi-
tion law. The second subchapter discusses possible constraints arising from the ap-
plication of the competition rules on HEIs, namely from the prohibition of anti-
competitive collusions in Article 101 TFEU, from the prohibition of the abuse of a 
dominant market position in Article 102 TFEU, from the merger control regime in 
Regulation 139/2004/EC and from the prohibition of state aid in Article 107 TFEU. 
This will be followed by a conclusion bringing together the results of this chapter. 
3.2. Application of EU competition law on HEIs? - The notions of 
‘undertaking’ and ‘SGEIs’ 
As we have seen in chapter 2, competition law is only applicable to „undertak-
ings‟ which, as will be discussed further below, are defined as bodies which are con-
ducting an economic activity. Originally public services, such as utilities and em-
                                                 
144 A condensed version of this chapter has been published as A Gideon, 'Higher Education Institu-
tions and EU Competition Law' (2012) 8 Competition Law Review 169. 
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ployment and health services were not considered under the competition law regime. 
However, with increasing liberalisation of these services145 they have, over time, 
been progressively regarded as economic activities.146 Therefore, the entities which 
conduct them, as well as public market regulations regarding such service have been 
subjected to EU competition law.147 The aim behind this development has been to 
achieve the single market by excluding national protectionism.148 The problem is, 
however, that such services cannot always both be provided in a competitive market 
and, at the same time, retain their general interest character including such elements 
as universal provision, trust based relationships149 or equality of access.150 Therefore, 
Article 106 (2) TFEU offers an exemption for SGEIs in cases where the application 
of competition rules obstructs the provision of the SGEI. The importance of this pro-
vision has increased with more public services being regarded as economic in nature. 
Nevertheless, placing public services „in the market‟ requires a more commercial 
mode of operation and the exemption is not necessarily always available because the 
Court sometimes conducts a very strict proportionality test.151 In the following, the 
notion of „undertaking‟, the relationship between public regulation of markets and 
                                                 
145 For more on liberalisation tendencies in the Member States, see P Vincent-Jones, The New Public 
Contracting (OUP, Oxford 2006) p. 358 seq. 
146 This is in line with critical political economist assumptions that the European integration project 
became more neo-liberal in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century and can also be seen as a func-
tional spill-over. For more on integration theory, see chapter 1 above.  
147 For more on the inclusion of public services into EU competition and internal market law see, 
Steyger (n 3) p. 275, T Prosser, 'Competition Law and Public Services: From Single Market to 
Citizenship Rights?' (2005) 11 European Public Law 543, T Prosser, 'EU competition law and 
public services' in E Mossialos et al (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010), D Chalmers, G Davies and G Monti, European Union Law 
(CUP, Cambridge 2010) p. 1013 seq, C Graham, EU and UK Competition Law (Pearson Educa-
tion, Harlow 2010) p. 68, Neergaard U, „Services of general economic interest under EU law 
constraints‟ in Schiek D, Liebert U and Schneider H (eds), European Economic and Social Con-
stitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP, Cambridge 2011) p. 174 seq. 
148 An extreme example of liberalisation is Directive 2008/6/EC amending Directive 97/67/EC with 
regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services OJ 
[2008] L 52/3, which, in Article 1 (8) provides that all special and exclusive rights shall be 
abandoned in postal services.  
149 On the latter, see C Newdick, 'Charities in the Health Care Market: Can Trust survive NHS com-
petition?' (2007) 18 The King's College Law Journal 415. 
150 Additionally, the question has been raised by Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1046 seq 
with further references, if liberalisation has actually practically led to more competitive markets 
and, in effect, to greater consumer welfare.  
151 Prosser 2005 (n 147) p. 544, 549, 560, Prosser 2010 (n 147) p. 315 seq, 335 seq. 
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EU competition law and the notion of „SGEIs‟ will be analysed before evaluating the 
position of HEIs in these regards. 
3.2.1. The notion of ‘undertaking’ 
An entity is subject to the Treaty provisions on competition law, if it is an „un-
dertaking‟ in the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. The concept of „undertaking‟ is not 
defined in the Treaty itself. Instead the definition is to be derived from the Court‟s 
case law according to which „the concept of undertaking encompasses every entity 
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the 
way in which it is financed‟.152 An activity is economic in nature if it consists of „of-
fering goods or services on a market‟153 which can, in principle, be offered commer-
cially. All entities engaged in such activities are thus undertakings, irrespective of 
whether or not the services have actually been offered commercially. In particular, it 
does not matter if the entity is profit-making or not, nor whether or not it forms part 
of the state‟s administration. It also does not have to have legal personality, as the 
legal form is irrelevant for the definition. Therefore, third sector154 and public or-
ganisations can be regarded as undertakings even if they do not make a profit and, in 
the case of public organisations, are financed from taxes or social insurance contri-
butions.155 Obviously, this broad definition leaves very few activities outside the 
                                                 
152 C-41/90 Höfner paragraph 21.  
153 118/85 Commission v Italy paragraph 7.  
154 Most commonly defined as neither the public nor the private sector, the third sector (also referred 
to as, for example, voluntary sector or community sector) is made up of organisations with spe-
cific charitable goals which operate in a not-for profit fashion. See I Wendt and A Gideon, 'Ser-
vices of general interest provision through the third sector under EU competition law con-
straints: The example of organising healthcare in England, Wales and the Netherlands' in D 
Schiek, U Liebert and H Schneider (eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism af-
ter the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP, Cambridge 2011) p. 255. 
155 On the concept of „undertaking‟ see A Jones and BE Sufrin, EC Competition Law (OUP, Oxford 
2011) p. 124 seq, J Aicher et al, „EGV Art. 81 Verbot wettbewerbsbeschränkender Vereinbarun-
gen und Verhaltensweisen (Nizza-Fassung)‟ in Grabitz E, Hilf M and Nettesheim M (eds), Das 
Recht der Europäischen Union (40th edn, Beck, Munich 2009) paragraph 51, 56 seq, 67 seq, 
Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 964, Graham (n 147) p. 66 seq, A Kaczorowska, Euro-
pean Union Law (2nd edn, Routledge, London/New York 2011) p. 780 seq, 785 seq, W Weiß, 
'EGV Art. 81 (ex Art. 85) [Verbot wettbewerbsbeschränkender Maßnahmen]' in C Callies and M 
Ruffert (eds), Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union (3rd edn, Beck, München 2007) 
paragraph 13, W Sauter and H Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law (CUP, Cam-
bridge 2009) p. 75 seq, 80 seq, 95, W Sauter, 'Services of general economic interest and univer-
sal service in EU law' (2008) 33 European Law Review 167 p. 181 seq, Steyger (n 3) p. 276, 
Swennen (n 3) p. 263 seq, 278 seq. 
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competition law regime, as it seems hard to imagine an activity that could not, at 
least in principle, be conducted commercially.  
The EU courts have acknowledged two exceptions: the exercise of sovereign 
power and the offering of services governed by the principle of solidarity. The sov-
ereignty exception applies when an entity acts in the service of the state‟s preroga-
tives to conduct acts of official authority, irrespective of whether this authority is 
executed by a public or private entity.156 The principle of solidarity157 exception has 
been found to apply to national social insurance schemes, such as health, pension 
and accident at work insurance schemes, if contributions were disproportionate to the 
risks and the benefits paid to the beneficiaries had no relation to the amount of the 
contribution. The schemes thus involved an element of cross-subsidy where insured 
persons with higher incomes or constituting lower risks supported those with lower 
incomes or those suffering from higher risks. Additionally, the Court took aspects 
such as the public nature and necessity of compulsory schemes to ensure their finan-
cial equilibrium into consideration when employing this exception.158 Without the 
principle of solidarity, such national insurances schemes could be regarded as under-
takings.159 The concept of „undertaking‟ is, however, relative;160 an entity can be re-
garded as being an undertaking for certain parts of its activities even if other parts 
fall under one of the two exceptions. For the former parts, the undertaking (as it is 
                                                 
156 C-364/92 Eurocontrol paragraph 19 seq, in particular paragraph 30 and 31, C-343/95 Diego Cali v 
SEPG paragraph 16 seq, C-113/07 P SELEX paragraph 65 seq.  
157 For more on the principle of solidarity in competition law, see M Ross, 'Promoting Solidarity: 
From Public Services to A European Model of Competition?' (2007) 44 Common Market Law 
Review 1057 p. 1067 seq, N Boeger, 'Solidarity and EC competition law' (2007) 32 European 
Law Review 319. 
158 C-159, 160/91 Poucet et Pistre paragraph 18 seq, C-218/00 Cisal paragraph 38 seq, C-264, 306, 
354, 355/01 AOK Bundesverband paragraph 45 seq, C-205/03 P FENIN paragraph 25 seq.  
159 C-244/94 FFSA and others paragraph 15 seq, in particular paragraph 22, C-67/96 Albany para-
graph 77 seq.  
160 The notion „relative concept‟ was used by the Advocate-General in C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner 
paragraph 72 („the notion of “undertaking” is a relative concept in the sense that a given entity 
might be regarded as an undertaking for one part of its activities while the rest fall outside the 
competition rules‟) and adopted by Jones and Sufrin (n 155) p. 125 seq. Others use the term 
„functional approach‟ to describe the fact that the CJEU does not consider a whole entity as an 
undertaking per se, but differentiates between its tasks (see, for example, Chalmers, Davies and 
Monti (n 147) p. 1026). 
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then defined), has to comply with the competition rules, unless it is exempted by Ar-
ticle 106 (2) TFEU.161  
In summary, for an entity not to fall under the competition rules, it has to con-
duct an activity that is, per se, not economic in nature, is part of the states preroga-
tives or is organised on the basis of solidarity. Demonstrating the former seems 
nearly impossible, as it is difficult to imagine which activities might not theoretically 
be offered on a market. Regarding the exceptions, it appears from case law that the 
more commercial elements an entity or a system adopts, the more likely it becomes 
that it will be regarded as undertaking.  
3.2.2. Anti-competitive regulation of markets by Member States 
It was not only entities providing public services that came under the scrutiny 
of EU competition law, however, but also public market regulation. Firstly, accord-
ing to the case law, a general obligation regarding anti-competitive state regulation 
arises from Article 4 (3) TEU which contains the „principle of sincere cooperation‟ 
in achieving the aims of the Treaties. The effet utile of competition law would be un-
dermined, according to the Court, if the Member States were allowed to keep in 
force legislation which allows or even requires undertakings to engage in anti-
competitive conduct.162 There seems to be no public interest exemption from this 
principle.163 However, state legislation based on a recommendation by a committee 
                                                 
161 On the exceptions and the relative concept of „undertaking‟ see Jones and Sufrin (n 155) p. 127 
seq, Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1026 seq, Aicher et al (n 155) paragraph 52, 61, 70 
seq, Graham (n 147) p. 67, 68 seq, Kaczorowska (n 155) p. 781 seq, Sauter and Schepel (n 155) 
p. 79 seq, 83 seq, 95, Sauter (n 155) p. 182 seq, Prosser 2010 (n 147) p. 319 seq. On the second 
exception see also Steyger (n 3) p. 276, Swennen (n 3) p. 263 seq, 278 seq. The latter interest-
ingly raises the point that rather than asking whether or not it is desirable that competition law is 
applicable to public undertakings, one could ask the question whether competition law as a 
whole should be drafted differently, as currently it conceivably favours a specific kind of under-
taking. In a completely different competition law the problems arising from application on pub-
lic services could become irrelevant.  
162 13/77 INNO v ATAB para. 30 seq. The Court, in this case, established the principle that, while the 
competition law provisions only apply to undertakings, national legislation requiring or enabling 
undertakings to violate competition law, infringes Article 4 (3) TFEU (then Article 5 EEC) in 
conjunction with the competition law provisions.  
163 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1019 suggest that this might change in the future after the 
Court considered „ancillary constraints‟ in C-309/99 Wouters as part of Article 101 TFEU. The 
Court also followed this line of reasoning in C-519/04 P Meca-Medina. Both cases, however, 
concerned very specific circumstances and it has to be seen how far this line of reasoning can 
actually be utilised beyond such cases. 
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of experts from industry will not be regarded as a decision by an association of under-
takings if the experts come to their decision independently from any interested undertak-
ings and if governmental review of the composition of the committee and the decision is 
possible.164 Chalmers et al call this a „procedural defence‟165 which ensures that national 
law is in the public interest rather than national governments giving in to industrial lob-
bying. The Court has applied Article 4 (3) TEU in conjunction with Article 101 (1) 
TFEU in cases where an actual infringement of competition law by undertakings 
took place rather than allowing the review of legislation as such in itself.166 Purely 
governmental regulation of the market might thus still be possible from this perspec-
tive.167 
Secondly, Article 106 (1) TFEU has led to the opening of markets because it 
prohibits national measures regarding „public undertakings and undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights‟ to infringe the TFEU. In con-
trast to Article 4 (3) TEU, which is not limited in its substantive scope, Article 106 
(1) TFEU is thus applicable only to such undertakings.168 It does not, however, pro-
hibit the existence of these,169 but only those measures170 regarding such undertak-
ings which infringe the Treaty. Article 106 (1) TFEU has been used to review legis-
lation without an actual infringement by an undertaking having occurred.171 Whilst 
Article 4 (3) TEU has mostly been employed in cartel cases, the abuse of a dominant 
                                                 
164 C-185/91 Reiff paragraph 14 seq, case C-35/99 Arduino paragraph 34-37. 
165 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1018 seq. 
166 C-2/91 Meng paragraph 14 seq. As there was no actual collusion between undertakings in this 
case, the Court did not find an infringement of Article 4 (3) TFEU in conjunction with Article 
101 TFEU. 
167 For more on the limits of market regulation according to Article 4 (3) TFEU see Chalmers, Davies 
and Monti (n 147) p. 1014 seq, Steyger (n 3) p. 277, Weiß (n 155) paragraph 14. 
168 For more on the definition of „public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States 
grant special or exclusive rights‟ see R Wish, Competition Law (6th edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) p. 
221 seq. 
169 155/73 Sacchi paragraph 14: „Article 90 (1) [EEC, now Article 106 (1) TFEU] permits Member 
States inter alia to grant special or exclusive rights to undertakings.‟  
170 Further on the definition of „measures‟ see Wish (n 168) p. 224, who concludes that a wide ap-
proach, similar to the approach concerning the definition of the term in respect to the free 
movement provisions, is envisaged here. 
171 18/88 RTT paragraph 23 seq.  
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position has predominantly been dealt with under Article 106 (1) TFEU.172 In this 
respect it seems that any legislation containing the threat of putting an undertaking 
into a position where it is abusing, cannot help but or is likely to abuse its domi-
nance, infringes Article 106 (1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU.173 
Article 4 (3) TEU and Article 106 (1) TFEU therefore render inapplicable such 
national measures which infringe competition law (or other Treaty provisions). 
While this does not require market opening as such, it can lead to new national legis-
lation that does so. Chalmers et al express the opinion that the Court has enforced 
Article 106 (1) TFEU and Article 4 (3) TEU in a less harsh manner against Member 
States than it could have. Instead, it used these provisions as a threat to encourage 
the „voluntary‟ opening of markets.174 Additionally, it has been remarked that the 
Court seems less strict in its assessment the more „public‟ or „social‟ the service. 
Sometimes the Court, however, does not seem to go through the effort of demon-
strating an infringement with regards to public services at all, but goes straight to 
examining the exemption in Article 106 (2) TFEU.175  
3.2.3. SGEIs 
If public services are regarded as economic ones, the competition rules have to 
be complied with unless they can be exempted as SGEIs by Article 106 (2) TFEU. 
However, SGEIs are not a straight forward concept and confusion has arisen in many 
areas.176  
                                                 
172 See, for example, C-49/07 MOTOE paragraph 50. 
173 On Article 106 (1) TFEU see Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1020 seq, Wish (n 168) p. 
220 seq, Neergaard (n 147) p. 182, Sauter and Schepel (n 155) p. 93 seq, 96. 
174 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1014. 
175 See Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1014, 1024 seq with further references, Neergaard (n 
147) p. 183 seq, Weiß (n 155) paragraph 15, Wish (n 168) p. 231. 
176 Neergaard (n 147) p. 183 seq, Aicher et al (n 155) paragraph 69, E-J Mestmäcker and H 
Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (2nd edn, Beck, München 2004) § 34, paragraph 
17, Wish (n 168) p. 220, Sauter (n 155) p. 167, 183, Steyger (n 3) p. 276. 
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3.2.3.1. Terminology 
The term SGEIs is, itself, bewildering, since, despite the word „economic‟ be-
ing part of the term, the interest behind those services177 is public rather than eco-
nomic. The criterion „economic‟ refers to the fact that these are economic services to 
start with, as otherwise they would not fall under competition law and thus would 
not need to be exempted. The term „services of general interest‟ (SGIs) is used as an 
umbrella category for SGEIs and non-economic services by the Commission.178 Ac-
cording to Hatzopoulos the notion of SGIs seems to correspond with the French 
„service public‟ and the „overriding principles of general interest‟ established as a 
justification in the field of the free movement provisions.179 The terms „public ser-
vices‟ and „public service obligations‟ are not used by the Commission, as it deems 
them „ambiguous‟.180 The Court, however, seems to use them in the same context as 
SGEIs. The main characteristics of SGIs are universality, equality of access, a cer-
tain level of quality, continuity and a public aim.181 
 Additionally, a new category, called „social services of general interest‟ 
(SSGIs), was introduced by the Commission in the early 2000s.182 The definition of 
                                                 
177 The term „services‟ under Article 106 (2) is to be understood in a wider sense than „services‟ un-
der Article 57 TFEU to also include the production and distribution of goods. See Mestmäcker 
and Schweitzer (n 176) §34, paragraph 17. 
178 See Commission Communication „Services of general interest in Europe‟ (2001/C 17/04) Annex 
II. Different ETUCE, The European Court of Justice’s rulings on the definition of educational 
services (ETUCE, 2006) available on 
http://etuce.homestead.com/Campaign_Directive_Services/ENG/ETUCE_NoteECJ_education_
ENG.doc p. 2 where SGIs are equated to non-economic services.  
179 V Hatzopoulos, 'Services of General Interest in Healthcare: An Exercise in Deconstruction?' in U 
Neergaard, R Nielsen and L Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law - 
From Rome to Lisbon (DJØF Forlag, Copenhagen 2009) p. 226. Regarding the correspondence 
of the term with the French „service public‟ see Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (n 176) §34, para-
graph 17. See Sauter and Schepel (n 155) 89 seq, 95 regarding convergence with internal market 
reasoning.  
180 See Communication SGEIs in Europe (n 178) Annex II. 
181 For more on terminology see Hatzopoulos (n 179) p. 225 seq, Jones and Sufrin (n 155) p. 568 seq, 
Neergaard (n 147) p. 175 seq, Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (n 176) § 34, paragraph 17 seq, Sau-
ter (n 155) p. 181. 
182 See, U Neergaard, 'The Concept of SSGIs and the Asymmetries between Free Movement and 
Competition Law' in U Neergaard et al (eds), Social Services of General Interest in the EU 
(T.M.C. Asser, The Hague 2013) p. 206 who spotted the first use of the term SSGIs in the 
Commission‟s Report to the Laeken European Council COM(2001) 598 final, where the term is, 
however, only mentioned and not further elaborated upon.  
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SSGIs is still rather disputed. In its Communication from 2006, the Commission 
states that „in addition to health services, which are not covered by this communica-
tion, we find two main categories of social services‟. These categories are, according 
to the Commission, social security schemes and „other essential services provided 
directly to the person‟. In a footnote to the latter category the Commission explains 
that „education and training, although they are services of general interest with a 
clear social function, are not covered by this Communication‟.183 This vague defini-
tion has led to different interpretations in the literature; whilst some believe health 
and education are included in the definition others argue in favour of separate cate-
gories, namely health services of general interest (HSGIs) and education and training 
services of general interest (ETSGIs).184 Either way, it seems that SSGIs (and, if 
separate categories, also HSGIs and ETSGIs), comprise services which have a social 
aim in the broader sense. In them, Member States have primary competences and 
they are often traditionally regarded as non-economic, but have recently also some-
times been categorised as economic. These services thus seem to contain the unclear 
cases and seem to be situated somewhat in the middle of SGEIs and non-economic 
services with overlaps into both. The question of whether or not such services fall 
under the competition law regime, however, still seems to depend on their classifica-
tion as economic in nature.185  
3.2.3.2. The development of SGEIs 
Whilst Article 106 (2) TFEU has been part of EU law from the very beginning, 
(then Article 90 EEC), it gained in importance when public services were increas-
ingly subjected to the competition law regime as mentioned above.186 Neergaard thus 
describes the provision as being directly in the middle of the diverging interest of 
                                                 
183 Commission Communication „Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Social Services 
of General Interest in the European Union‟ COM (2006) 177 final p. 4.  
184 See Neergaard (n 182) p. 210 seq. A useful diagram is also provided in U Neergaard, 'Services of 
general economic interest: the nature of the beast' in M Krajewski, U Neergaard and J van de 
Gronden (eds), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Economic Interest 
(T.M.C. Asser, The Hague 2009) p. 20. Explanations of SGIs, SGEIs, non-economic services, 
market service and the disputed categories of SSGIs, HSGIs and ETSGIs are provided on the 
following pages. 
185 See further Neergaard (n 182) p. 210 seq, 239 seq, Neergaard (n 184) p. 19 seq. 
186 Neergaard (n 147) p. 176. 
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market rules and social objectives.187 With the Treaty of Amsterdam Article 14 
TFEU (then 16 EC), the requirement that Member States and the Union ensure that 
SGEIs are enabled to „fulfil their missions‟, has been inserted into the Treaty princi-
ples even though the scope of this insertion seems to have been limited.188 The 
Treaty of Lisbon broadened Article 14 TFEU by the insertion that the „economic and 
financial conditions‟ for the provision of such services need to be ensured and a leg-
islative competence in this respect was given to the EU legislator.189 The latter, how-
ever, has to be used „without prejudice to the competence of the Member States‟ and 
Protocol 26 stresses the wide discretion of the Member States regarding SGEIs (Ar-
ticle 1) and their exclusive competence regarding non-economic services (Article 2). 
Additionally, SGEIs also found mentioning in Article 36 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (Charter), which became legally binding with 
the Treaty of Lisbon.190 Aside from the developments in primary law, there have also 
been (limited) harmonisation efforts for certain fields of SGEIs in secondary law.191 
3.2.3.3. The application of Article 106 (2) TFEU  
In order for a measure to be exempted by Article 106 (2) TFEU, three condi-
tions have to be fulfilled. Firstly, the undertaking in question must have been en-
trusted with an SGEI by the Member State. The Member States have a wide margin 
of discretion regarding what they consider to be a SGEI, but, as it is an EU concept, 
the Commission and the Court can review their decisions for manifest errors.192 
                                                 
187 Neergaard (n 147) p. 175, U Neergaard, 'Services of General (Economic) Interest: What Aims and 
Values Count?' in U Neergaard, R Nielsen and L Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions 
into EU Law - From Rome to Lisbon (DJØF Forlag, Copenhagen 2009) p. 195, Neergaard (n 
184) p. 17. Similar Sauter (n 155) p. 167. 
188 See Neergaard (n 187) p. 196 seq, Neergaard (n 147) p. 177 seq, Sauter (n 155) p. 168 seq, 171 
seq.  
189 This competence is, however, limited to passing regulations, in contrast to the proposed provision 
in the Constitution, which, in Article III-122, referred to „European laws‟ in general. The legisla-
tive competence of Article 14 TFEU is an addition to the competence of the Commission to is-
sue directives and decisions according to Article 106 (3) TFEU). See Neergaard (n 147) p. 179, 
Sauter (n 155) p. 169 seq, 172. 
190 See Neergaard (n 187) p. 196 seq, Neergaard (n 147) p. 178 seq, Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 
147) p. 1035 seq, 1048, Sauter (n 155) p. 171 seq. 
191 For more see Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1038 seq, 1048.  
192 10/71 Muller paragraph 13 seq, C-67/96 Albany (n 159) paragraph 103 seq and T-17/02 Olsen 
paragraph 216. 
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Generally it seems that the service needs to be associated with public duty and be 
provided in the general, rather than satisfying only particular, interests. Additionally, 
a „uniform‟ and „binding nature‟ of the service seems to be required.193 These criteria 
are, however, not interpreted strictly. The „uniform nature‟, does not mean that the 
service has to be supplied in the whole territory of the Member State or be applicable 
to the whole of the population and the „binding nature‟ does not require prescribing 
the details of service to the provider.194 In particular, utilities, telecommunications 
and transport services are considered to be SGEIs.195 If they are seen as economic 
services in the first place, services such as health insurance,196 pension schemes or 
services including elements of environmental protection have also been regarded as 
SGEIs.197 The undertaking has to be entrusted with the SGEI by the Member State in 
an official act (for example, by legislation)198 which also should include a descrip-
tion of the SGEI.199 The classification of an undertaking as being entrusted with a 
SGEI is, as when deciding if an entity is an undertaking in the first place, relative.200 
It might therefore be that an undertaking provides an SGEI in one market, but is not 
exempted from the application of competition law in another.201 
                                                 
193 T-289/03 BUPA paragraph 172 seq. 
194 Ibid paragraph 186 seq.  
195 Communication SGEIs in Europe (n 178) Annex II. 
196 On the problematic classification of health care see J van de Gronden, 'Purchasing care: economic 
activity or service of general (economic) interest?' (2004) 25 European Competition Law Re-
view 87, Prosser 2010 (n 147). 
197 See, for example, case T-289/03 BUPA. 
198 10/71 Muller (n 192) paragraph 10 seq. 
199 Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Article 
4. The Commission refers, in its preliminary observations (recital 4) of this decision, to the 
Altmark judgment (C-280/00) in which the Court required inter alia that a public service obliga-
tion must be clearly defined for the compensation of such a service not to constitute state aid. 
See also Sauter (n 155) p. 190 seq. 
200 See, for example, 18/88 RTT paragraph 22 where the network company was not regarded as pro-
viding a SGEI in the telecommunication equipment market.  
201 On the first criterion see Neergaard (n 187) p. 211 seq, 219 seq, Neergaard (n 147) p. 185, 191 
seq, Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1030 seq, Prosser 2005 (n 147) p. 550, Sauter (n 
155) p. 174 seq, 178 seq (in particular, on the universal service obligation as part of SGEIs), 183 
seq, 192 seq. For a different take on the first criterion see Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (n 176) § 
34, paragraph 17 seq who argue in favour of a strict European definition and a tight margin of 
discretion for the Member States. 
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Secondly, according to Article 106 (2), the application of competition rules 
would have to „obstruct the performance, in law or fact, of the particular tasks as-
signed‟ to the undertaking and the setting aside of the competition rules would have 
to be proportional to the aim pursued. Concerning the criterion of „obstruction‟ it 
appears that the Court has become much more lenient. Whilst in the initial judgments 
on the issue the viability of the undertaking had to be threatened in order for its per-
formance to be „obstructed‟202, the Court, in more recent judgments, deems an „ob-
struction‟ to be present if it would not be possible for the undertaking to perform the 
particular tasks entrusted to it under „economically acceptable conditions‟.203 Whilst 
the Court occasionally conducts a strict proportionality test focussing on necessity,204 
such a strict test is not undertaken in every case. Sometimes the Court does not ex-
plicitly conduct a proportionality test at all and sometimes it seems to focus rather on 
overall proportionality than on strict necessity.205 Neergaard assumes this might be 
the case because of the controversial nature of such a strict test and Sauter concludes 
that the question of EU „pre-emption‟ in the field might play a role here.206  
Finally, the development of trade must not be affected in such a way that it 
would be contrary to the EU‟s interests. Obviously, this condition requires more than 
an „effect on trade between Member States‟ since the cross border element is gener-
ally necessary for there to be an infringement of the Treaty provisions in the first 
                                                 
202 See, for example, 155/77 Sacchi paragraph 15 and C-41/90 Höfner paragraph 24 both referring to 
the „incompatibility‟ of the undertaking to comply with competition rules and to fulfil its tasks.  
203 See, for example, C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner paragraph 57.  
204 See, for example, C-203/96 Dusseldorp paragraph 67 where the Court held that the national gov-
ernment had to show that the SGEI mission, if given at all , „cannot be achieved equally well by 
other means‟ for the measure to be proportional. 
205 See, for example, C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner paragraph 62 seq. Whilst the Court does not ex-
plicitly conduct a proportionality test, and, even if it does, it is not a very strict one focussing on 
necessity, it seems to come to the conclusion that the extension of a right into a connected mar-
ket would be disproportionate if demand in the connecting market could not be satisfied.  
206 See, for a more detailed analysis of the second criterion, Neergaard (n 187) p. 211 seq and Neer-
gaard (n 147) p. 185 seq, 190 seq, who evaluates the question of whether the application of 
competition rules would obstruct the performance of the SGEI and the proportionality test as 
two separate conditions. Generally on the second criterion also see Chalmers, Davies and Monti 
(n 147) p. 1030, 1032 seq, Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (n 176) § 34, paragraph 19, Prosser 2005 
(n 147) p. 550, Prosser 2010 (n 147) p. 325. See also Sauter (n 155) p. 171, 178, 180 seq (relat-
ing the proportionality test to market failure), 186 (relating the proportionality test to pre-
emption), 189 seq, 193 who also divides the second criterion into two steps; the questions of ob-
struction and proportionality being one and the question of necessity of extended rights („ancil-
lary constraints‟) as another.  
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place as will be discussed below. Thus, if any effect on trade between Member States 
meant that the exemption could not be applied, this would render the exemption use-
less.207 What exactly this condition pertains to is, thus far, not entirely clear.208 
3.2.3.4. Interim conclusion on SGEIs 
Generally it appears that the Court‟s approach to SGEIs has become less strict 
in recent years. This might be connected to the fact that the Court seems to have 
been stricter regarding the question whether a situation falls under a certain EU law 
provision (here; whether an entity is an undertaking) in the first place. If EU law is 
more frequently held to be applicable, the exemption becomes more relevant and 
needs to be interpreted less strictly to allow, at least, a certain balance between eco-
nomic and public interests. As Neergaard points out, however, this field of law is not 
yet fully developed, but is still under construction, so changes in this respect might 
occur.209 
3.2.4. HEIs 
Traditionally public HEIs have not been regarded as undertakings. Instead they 
were seen as state institutions conducting typical government activities because HEIs 
were basically administering a scheme funded by general taxation to provide educa-
tion and research in the public interest.210 The students were not deemed to be con-
                                                 
207 See C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands paragraph 67. In this case a Dutch company‟s exclusive 
right of electricity imports had been challenged by the Commission. A potential effect on trade 
between Member States was given, as it would have been theoretically possible that the exclu-
sive right led to reduced imports compared to a situation where every potential customer could 
have imported electricity directly. As the Commission had not shown, however, that „the devel-
opment of intra-Community trade in electricity had been and continued to be affected to an ex-
tent contrary to the interests of the Community‟ the Court dismissed the case. 
208 For more on the final criterion see Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 1030, Neergaard (n 
187) p. 211 seq, Neergaard (n 147) p. 185. 
209 See Neergaard (n 187) p. 223 seq, Neergaard (n 147) p. 184, 194 seq. 
210 See Commission Communication on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest OJ [2012] C 
8/02 paragraph 26 seq and Commission Decision 2006/225/EC on the aid scheme implemented 
by Italy for the reform of the training institutions OJ [2006] L 81/13 paragraph 41 seq. In both 
instances, the Commission explicitly imported the reasoning from internal market law in the 
field of education into competition and state aid law. On the reasoning in internal market law, 
which established the principle that education is generally not a service in the meaning of the 
Treaty see C-263/86 Humbel and C-109/92 Wirth discussed above in chapter 2, C Barnard, The 
substantive law of the EU (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 2010) p. 368. See the Research Framework (n 
8) paragraph 3.1.1. where it establishes the principle that research in the public interest in public 
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sumers, they did not pay fees (or at least not significant ones) and research was not 
conducted for a customer but was, as the Research Framework phrases it „independ-
ent R&D for more knowledge and better understanding‟. However recent develop-
ments suggest that this might be changing.211 
Universities would be conducting an economic activity if they provided re-
search or education (or additional activities, such as offering accommodation or sell-
ing certain products) on a market. The mere aim of increasing student numbers as 
such is not significant to show that there is an economic activity occurring. Instead a 
service would have to be provided in the interest of the consumer by a potentially 
profit-oriented entity.212 Whilst the absence of profit could be an indicator that a 
given entity does not operate on a market, it is insufficient in itself. Similarly, cross-
subsidy of possible profits into other charitable parts of its activities would not hin-
der the classification as an undertaking. Thus non-profit and not-for-profit entities 
can be included in the definition if the services they provide could theoretically be 
conducted in a market setting. Likewise, as has been seen above, the public character 
of an entity does not hinder the categorisation as undertaking. Instead, the classifica-
tion solely depends on the activities‟ (potentially) economic character. Whether or 
not that is the case has to be evaluated on a case by case basis and might differ sig-
nificantly depending on the way the systems are constructed.213 
                                                                                                                                          
HEIs is usually not an economic activity. This has been reinforced by the Communication on 
state aid and SGEIs mentioned earlier in this note in paragraph 29. 
211 For more on recent developments in the HEIs sector see chapter 1. On the classification of HEIs, 
see also Steyger (n 3) p. 275 seq, 277 seq, ETUCE (n 178) p. 4 seq, Swennen (n 3) p. 265, 268, 
279.  
212 In the field of the free movement provisions, the emphasis is more on the aspect of remuneration 
while in competition law the potential profit-making ability is the key factor (see O Odudu, 'Are 
State-owned health-care providers undertakings subject to competition law?' (2011) 32 European 
Competition Law Review 231, p. 235). However, the changing definition in the field of the free 
movement provisions and the fact that remuneration was found there can be an indicator that 
there is the potential to make a profit and that the service is thus of an economic nature. In C-
109/92 Wirth, for example, the Court suggested that essentially private education, which the re-
cipients pay for, would be a service in internal market law and in C-153/02 Neri paragraph 39 
the Court explicitly stated that the „organisation for remuneration of university courses is an 
economic activity‟. For more see chapter 2 above. See also Barnard (n 210) p. 368.  
213 See also Steyger (n 3) p. 277 seq, Swennen (n 3) p. 265 seq, 268 seq, 275, 279 seq, ETUCE (n 
178) p. 5 seq. For an analysis of the question as to whether an entity is an undertaking in the 
field of health care (as a similar field of public service provisions), see Odudu (n 212). See also 
Prosser 2010 (n 147) p. 335. 
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Whilst the classification as undertaking might, in many HEI settings, presently 
still be exceptional, it might become more common with further commodification. 
The Commission stated in Decision 2006/225/EC that 
‘[...] recent case law also shows that the concept of economic activity is an 
evolving concept linked in part to the political choices of each Member State. 
Member States may decide to transfer to undertakings certain tasks tradition-
ally regarded as falling within the sovereign powers of States. Member States 
may also create the conditions necessary to ensure the existence of a market 
for a product or service that would otherwise not exist. The result of such state 
intervention is that the activities in question become economic and fall within 
the scope of the competition rules.’214  
With regards to research, the Commission, in paragraph 3.1.2. of the Research 
Framework, assumes that research organisations such as HEIs might be conducting 
„economic activities, such as renting out infrastructure, supplying services to busi-
ness undertakings or performing contract research‟. In the Issue Paper on the revi-
sion of the Research Framework215 the Commission clarifies this by, inter alia, point-
ing out that exploitation of IPRs can amount to an economic activity if exclusive or 
arising from work outside the „primary non-economic activities‟. It also specifically 
mentions that the simple „labelling‟ of an activity as „collaborative research‟ does not 
make it non-economic, but that it depends on the actual activity conducted. Regard-
ing education the Commission in its Communication on state aid and SGEIs states 
that „in certain Member States public institutions can also offer educational services 
which, due to their nature, financing structure and the existence of competing private 
organisations, are to be regarded as economic‟.216  
                                                 
214 See Decision 2006/225/EC paragraph 50.  
215 The Research Framework was due to expire on 31
 
December 2013, however, in Commission 
Communication concerning the prolongation of the application of the Community framework 
for State aid for research and development and innovation OJ [2013] C 360/1 the Commission 
extended its applicability until 30 June 2014. Whilst the Commission in a reply to a request for 
information on the state of the revision process has stated that a proposal of the revised frame-
work would be expected before the end of 2013, this has not been made available as of 18
 
De-
cember 2013. The latest document in the review process is the Issue Paper „Revision of the state 
aid rules for research and development and innovation‟ from 12
 
December 2012 available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/rdi_issues_paper.pdf.  
216 Communication on state aid and SGEIs (n 210) paragraph 28. In paragraph 30 the potentially eco-
nomic nature of research services has equally been reinforced. 
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An indicator that an economic activity is being conducted could therefore be 
seen in the fact that private for-profit HEIs or research institutes are operating in a 
specific market. Public HEIs providing services on such a market could then be con-
sidered to compete in a market place and thus might be regarded as undertakings. 
For example, a business school in a university could be seen as competing with pri-
vate business schools and a research institute in a university providing research for a 
private business would compete with private research institutes. In such cases the 
services are mainly provided for the consumer rather than in the general interest and 
a profit could be achieved. As the relative concept of „undertaking‟ allows a func-
tional definition of the character of the entity as an undertaking according to the 
tasks it conducts, the HEI could therefore be regarded as an undertaking for these 
parts of its activities and would have to comply with competition law.217  
Changes in the way in which a Member State organises its HEI system (namely 
by integrating more market like structures) might lead to a more general classifica-
tion of HEIs as undertakings. For example, in the UK students are paying around 
£9000 a year in public universities and the very aim of the Browne report218 is to 
make them customers and to create a marketplace for higher education.219 Taking 
this into consideration, it seems conceivable that HEIs of such systems will be more 
generally regarded as undertakings. Research funding from private firms is also in-
creasingly encouraged and commercial research co-operations are becoming more 
                                                 
217 See also Swennen (n 3) p. 266, 268, 275 seq with examples of national cases, 279 seq, Steyger (n 
3) p. 278 seq (who, however, differs in the point that the concept of undertaking is relative; „Un-
der community law, the entity as a whole will be seen as such undertaking. Contrary to national 
law, there is no separation of the commercial activity from the government activity.‟ Quote p. 
278). 
218 J Browne et al, 'Securing a sustainable future for higher education' (Independent Review, 2010) 
available on 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/hereview.independent.gov.uk/hereview/report/.  
219 For more on the developments in England see M Robb, 'Here be treasure, but sector unprepared 
for private raiding parties' THE (12 May 2011) 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=416122 accessed 31 May 2011. 
Robb suggests that more private providers will enter the higher education „marketplace‟ and this 
will require more business style operation of the public sector institutions. See also, on the sug-
gested fully paid additional places at universities, H Mulholland and V Jeevan, 'Willetts forced 
on to back foot over premium rate university places' guardian.co.uk (10 May 2011) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/may/10/plan-rich-pay-extra-university-places-
entrech-privilege accessed 20 May 2011.  
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common in many Member States.220 Such research would then no longer solely be 
„independent R&D for more knowledge‟. All this strengthens the foreboding that EU 
competition law will have to be applied more generally to public HEIs in the fu-
ture.221  
If this becomes the case and HEIs are in danger of infringing competition law, 
one would have to raise the question of whether they could be exempted under Arti-
cle 106 (2) TFEU. That would mean that the specific task would still fall under their 
general interest obligation (research in the public interest and teaching) and could not 
be achieved under economically acceptable conditions if the competition rules were 
to be enforced. This would, however, depend on the individual case. It would not be 
possible for a Member State to simply declare all tasks undertaken by HEIs as 
SGEIs. Additionally, the proportionality requirement might necessitate questioning 
whether less severe measures could have been used and the demand also has to be 
met in markets for which exclusive rights are granted. Finally, intra-union trade must 
not be affected to an extent contrary to the Union‟s interest. It is, however, thus far 
not quite clear what the latter criterion entails.222 
3.2.5. Interim Conclusion 
With the liberalisation of ever more public services, an increasing number of 
activities have been classified as economic activities and competition law has there-
fore been applied to them. This led to the exemption in Article 106 (2) TFEU playing 
a more significant role and the Court now only requires, for exemption, that a meas-
ure allows an undertaking to conduct its task under „economically acceptable condi-
tions‟ rather than requiring the viability of the undertaking to be threatened.  
Neither research in the public interest in public HEIs nor education has tradi-
tionally been regarded as an economic service. However, the Court has, in more re-
cent judgments regarding the free movement provisions, declared primarily privately 
financed education to be a service. In Decision 2006/225/EC and the recent Commu-
                                                 
220 See also Swennen (n 3) p. 271, 275 with further references (for example, on the co-operation 
„Leuven Research and Development‟,  elgium). On commodifcation in HEIs in general see 
chapter 1 and on further developments in the Member States under scrutiny see chapter 4. 
221 See also Gideon (n 144) p. 173. 
222 Also on SGEIs and HEIs Swennen (n 3) p. 266, Steyger (n 3) p. 278 seq, ETUCE (n 178) p. 2. 
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nication on state aid and SGEIs, the Commission imported the reasoning developed 
in internal market law into competition law and stated that the classification of an 
educational activity as economic or not, is not a fixed definition. Instead it is linked 
to the way in which the Member States organise their systems. If market mechanisms 
are introduced, the activities can become economic activities. A very similar distinc-
tion is made for research in the Research Framework clarified by the Issue Paper. If, 
therefore, HEIs can be regarded as undertakings for certain activities, they have to 
comply with the competition rules unless they can be exempted by Article 106 (2) 
TFEU. The ongoing commodification of higher education and research in many 
Member States makes it seem likely that certain activities in public HEIs could al-
ready be regarded as economic and that this will increase in the future. HEIs would 
then have to be prepared to take competition law into account. In the following, po-
tential consequences from the application of the competition law provisions on HEIs 
shall be evaluated.  
3.3. Consequences resulting from the application of EU competition 
law on HEIs 
The aim of competition law is to protect the consumer and competition, which 
sometimes means protecting competitors. In the EU context, it should also work 
against the partitioning of the internal market.223 However, when it comes to public 
service provision, the application of competition law can have negative conse-
quences. The aim of this subchapter is to explore possible consequences for HEIs.  
Competition and state aid law are located in Title VII, chapter 1, Articles 101-
109 TFEU. The substantive provisions are Article 101 TFEU (prohibiting any collu-
sion between undertakings which negatively impacts on competition), Article 102 
TFEU (forbidding the abuse of a dominant market position) and Article 107 TFEU 
(disallowing state aid). Furthermore, mergers between undertakings are subject to 
EU merger control if they have a Union dimension. In the following these provisions 
will be explored further with regards to potential constraints for HEIs. This does not 
                                                 
223 See Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 15. For a critical assessment of the market integration aim of 
EU competition law see O Odudu, 'The last vestiges of overambitious EU competition Law ' 
(2010) 69 The Cambridge Law Journal 148. 
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entail that the application of competition law could not also have positive effects in 
some cases, for example, when HEIs fix prices at an unreasonably high level. How-
ever, these are consequences envisaged by competition law, while this subchapter is 
aiming at illuminating potential unforeseen negative consequences.  
3.3.1. Market Definition 
As will be seen below, the application of both the competition rules and certain 
exemptions often depends on the undertakings holding a certain market share. There-
fore, before moving on to the competition law provisions, it is necessary to briefly 
sketch the subject of market definition in this respect.224 
To determine the relevant market, one has to evaluate both the product and the 
geographical market.225 The product market is defined by examining product inter-
changeability and the concept of the geographical market is based on homogeneity of 
the conditions of competition.226 When evaluating the relevant market the Commis-
sion mainly examines „demand substitution‟.227 „Supply substitution‟ might be con-
sidered only in specific cases where an undertaking can easily produce a variety of 
products which from a demand perspective are not interchangeable.228 The third 
competitive constraint, „potential competition‟, will only be evaluated at a later stage 
if necessary.229 In order to assess demand substitution, the SNIP (small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory increase in price) test is used. This test asks whether the con-
sumers would switch to a different product or receive the same product from a dif-
ferent region if the price of the original product is increased.230 All products which 
                                                 
224 See also Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 8 seq, Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 16.  
225 Commission Notice „on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community 
Competition law‟ OJ [1997] C 372/5 paragraph 9. 
226 Ibid paragraph 7 seq. 
227 Ibid paragraph 13 seq. If the concentration is on the side of the buyer the same test is used to find 
out alternative supply routes (paragraph 17). 
228 Ibid paragraph 20 seq. 
229 Ibid paragraph 24 seq. 
230 Ibid paragraph 15 seq. 
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would be bought as an alternative and all regions, from which the products would be 
received, would be part of the same market.231 
Regarding the product market from a demand perspective this would mean for 
HEIs that the market for research would have to be separated from the higher educa-
tion market. Furthermore, undergraduate education, taught postgraduate and post-
graduate research education would all constitute separate markets. One would also 
assume that education taking place in different languages is not interchangeable and 
thus that every language forms an independent market. Additionally, every subject 
will constitute a separate market since a course or research in electrical engineering, 
for example, is hardly interchangeable with those activities in philosophy. However, 
aside from these obvious considerations, it is difficult to determine the product mar-
ket. The question could, for example, be if courses in electrical engineering form an 
individual product market or if they are part of the market for higher education in 
engineering in general. For research this is complicated even more by increasing 
specification, since every level of specification could potentially be regarded as a 
separate market. With regards to higher education, the type of institution might also 
play a role. In Germany, for example, the Fachhochschulen (a more vocational type 
of HEI) might not be considered to be in the same market as universities, inter alia, 
as their degrees do not necessarily allow postgraduate studies.232 This might be simi-
lar in other Member States where such a division exists. Even in England, where the 
distinction has been abandoned,233 universities might still not necessarily be regarded 
as interchangeable due to questions of prestige.234  
Market definition becomes even more complicated when defining the relevant 
geographical market. In particular regarding the education of undergraduates who 
might prefer to stay close to their parents‟ homes, one might wonder if the geo-
graphical market might be limited to one city, one area or at least one Member State. 
                                                 
231 On market definition see also Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 9 seq, S Weatherill, EU Law (9th edn, 
OUP, Oxford 2010) p. 523 seq, 529 seq. 
232 In the German federalist system this is a matter of the federal German states and thus provisions 
concerning this will be found in state laws. See, for example, §65 Bremisches Hochschulgesetz 
(Bremen HEIs Act). 
233 See chapter 4 below. 
234 See also on the product market in respect to HEIs Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 9 seq, Gideon (n 
144) p. 176 seq. 
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The cases of Belgium and Austria235 have, however, shown that at least in the mar-
kets for medical education in the German and French languages, the geographical 
market went beyond the borders of the Member States. With the encouragement of 
educational mobility, the harmonisation of degree structures and a growing number 
of courses being offered in English, it is likely that markets will increasingly exists 
across borders. On the other hand, considerations such as the prestige of the higher 
education systems in some Member States might play a limiting role in defining the 
geographical market. Regarding research, markets are even more likely to exist 
across borders, as only feasibility of transport, as well as the price and quality of the 
services play a role rather than emotional considerations.236  
If one considers supply substitution (the question of how easily an HEI could 
switch between different „products‟ even if they are not interchangeable from a de-
mand side perspective), this might lead to undergraduate and postgraduate taught 
education being considered as one market, as it might be easily possible for HEIs to 
switch between them. Postgraduate research studies, on the other hand, would 
probably, have to be regarded separately due to the special position between student 
and researcher inherent in PhD students.237 Additionally, postgraduate research edu-
cation requires a higher staff-student ratio and in some Member States only specific 
members of academic staff are allowed to supervise such students at all. Finally, in 
certain subjects, more laboratories could be required. Therefore it would be less easy 
to switch „production‟ in this respect. It might also be possible that from a supply 
substitution perspective, sub-subjects which are not interchangeable for the „con-
sumer‟ (student or research client), are, however, easily interchangeable for the „pro-
ducer‟ and could thus be regarded as one market. Finally, the geographical extent of 
supply might be easily broadened, for example, through distance learning options 
                                                 
235 See chapter 2 above. 
236 See also Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 9 seq, Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 20 seq. 
237 In some Member States, such as the Netherlands, postgraduate research students are regarded and 
treated as staff and earn a salary. See VSNU (vereniging van universiteiten - association of uni-
versities in the Netherlands), 'Doctoral education' (2011) http://www.vsnu.nl/Focus-
areas/Research/Doctoral-education-.htm accessed 20 September 2011. In other Member States, 
such as England, they are regarded as more like students. 
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which could lead to a bigger market even if the „consumer‟ feels more bound to a 
certain area.238 
To make this more accessible, an attempt should be made to illustrate this with 
a few hypothetic scenarios from the HEI sector. Very specialised research in the 
medical field might, for example, be regarded as a market independent from general 
medical research. This market might thus just consist of a very limited number of 
HEIs and/or research institutes which then would each have a very large market 
share. To illustrate the point further, postgraduate research degree studies in oriental 
philology in the Dutch language shall be considered as another example of a small 
market. Higher education in the Dutch language is only provided by HEIs in the 
Netherlands and Flemish HEIs in Belgium, not all of which are necessarily able to 
provide doctorates. This would reduce the number of potential providers to a small 
number of universities, not all of which necessarily teach oriental philology. These 
universities are, therefore, also likely to have big market shares. On the other hand, 
subjects such as business administration at Masters level are widely taught and often 
in English. Educational mobility at the masters level is considered to be generally 
higher than at the undergraduate level. Such a market is, therefore, expected to be 
rather big and the market shares of individual HEIs relatively small. As these exam-
ples show, what exactly the market is depends very much on the individual case. 
3.3.2. Article 101 TFEU  
Under Article 101 (1) TFEU undertakings239 are prohibited to engage in any 
collusion (enter into an agreement, make a decision to coordinate behaviour in an 
association or conduct tacit collusion)240 which has as its „object or effect[241] the 
                                                 
238 See also Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 10. 
239 See above on the notion of „undertaking‟ and on the fact that in conjunction with other Treaty 
provisions, Article 101 TFEU can also apply to state action.  
240 Tacit collusion takes place if there is some indication that there is an understanding between the 
undertakings involved concerning their market conduct without them having formed an agree-
ment. Whilst parallel behaviour is an indicator for a concerted practise it does not in itself estab-
lish it (48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries paragraph 8). See further on tacit collusion S Bishop 
and M Walker, The economics of EC competition law (Sweet&Maxwell, London 2010) p. 164 
seq, M Horspool and M Humphreys, European Union Law (OUP, Oxford 2010) p. 482 seq.  
241 As the provision states, the collusion must have as its object or effect the negative impact on com-
petition. It is not necessary that both can be established. This was reinforced by the Court in C-
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prevention, restriction or distortion of competition‟. The list of examples of anti-
competitive behaviour in Article 101 (1) TFEU is not exhaustive, but a broad range 
of behaviour can fall under the provision.242 Whilst collusion with an anti-
competitive object is always illegal the Courts seem to be slightly more flexible as it 
comes to the effects of a collusion. The General Court, however, rejected the thought 
that this establishes a rule of reason in EU competition law. Instead it stated that the 
actual weighing of pro-and anti-competitive aspects should only take place under 
Article 101 (3) TFEU.243 Finally, such coordination has to „affect trade between 
Member States‟ in order to fall under Article 101 (1) TFEU, which means that there 
must be a cross-border element. This, though, has also been widely interpreted; the 
closing of a national market244 and even potential effects245 on intra-EU thus fall un-
der this criterion.246 In addition to the elements inherent in the provision itself, any 
effect on competition must be appreciable.247 This is, according to the Commission‟s 
De Minimis Notice,248 only the case if the undertakings in question hold a market 
                                                                                                                                          
501, 513, 515 and 519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline paragraph 55. See also Horspool and Humphreys 
(n 240) p 488. 
242 See further Lübbig T, „§ 7 Rechtsgrundlagen‟ in Wiedemann G (ed), Handbuch des Kartellrechts 
(2nd edn, Beck, Munich 2008) paragraph 20 seq. 
243 T-112/99 Métropole paragraph 72 seq. In this respect it is also worth mentioning that certain po-
tentially anti-competitive clauses which are essential for the main agreement (ancillary re-
straints), are to be considered together with the latter under Article 101 (1) and, if necessary, (3) 
TFEU rather than individually (ibid paragraph 104 seq, in particular 104, 115 seq). See also 
Horspool and Humphreys (n 240) p 488 seq. 
244 8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren paragraph 29 „an agreement extending over the whole 
territory of a Member State by its very nature has the effect of reinforcing the compartmentalisa-
tion of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the 
Treaty is designed to bring about and protecting domestic production‟. 
245 56/65 Maschinenbau Ulm p. 249 „it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of prob-
ability [...] that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or po-
tential, on [...] trade between Member States‟. 
246 For more on the criterion of effect on intra-Union trade see Commission Notice „Guidelines on the 
effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty‟ OJ [2004] C 101/81. In 
particular the effect on trade must be appreciable (paragraph 44 seq of the Notice). This is, how-
ever, not to be confused with the concept of appreciability regarding the impact on competition 
mentioned below. See also on the effect of trade concept Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 147) p. 
966, Horspool and Humphreys (n 240) p. 492.  
247 First established by the Court in 5/69 Völk paragraph 7. 
248 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict compe-
tition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) OJ 
[2001] C 368/07 section II 7 seq. 
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share of at least 10% as regards horizontal and 15% as regards vertical249 collu-
sions250 unless they are engaging in certain hardcore restrictions.251  
A collusion prohibited by Article 101 (1) TFEU is, according to Article 101 (2) 
TFEU, automatically void,252 unless it falls under the exemption of Article 101 (3) 
TFEU.253 A collusion can be exempted if it involves efficiency gains („improving the 
production or distribution of goods‟ or „technical or economic progress‟) of which 
the consumer receives „a fair share‟ (they at least must not be worse off), is neces-
sary for these gains to be achieved and does not completely prevent competition. Ac-
cording to Regulation 1/2003,254 Article 101 (3) TFEU has become directly applica-
ble overcoming the necessity of prior notification. It also decentralised competition 
law giving more investigative and decisive powers to national competition authori-
ties (NCAs). Nevertheless, the Commission‟s approach still is the major guideline 
for the application of Article 101 (3) TFEU. In its approach the Commission seems 
to strictly interpret the above mentioned criteria, focussing mainly on economic con-
siderations.255 There thus seems to be little chance of exempting collusions in the 
                                                 
249 Horizontal collusion is collusion between competitors, while vertical collusion is collusion be-
tween undertakings operating on different levels of production. In the latter the concern is rather 
the portioning of the internal market than consumer welfare which is why the threshold regard-
ing such collusion is higher. See Horspool and Humphreys (n 240) p. 486 seq. 
250 See the De Minimis Notice for further details as regards markets share thresholds in specific cir-
cumstances such as cumulative foreclosure effects. 
251 On Article 101 (1) TFEU see Horspool and Humphreys (n 240) p. 476 seq, Bishop and Walker (n 
240) p. 158, 160 seq, 163 seq, I Ward, A Critical Introduction to European Law (3rd edn, CUP, 
Cambridge 2009) p. 130 seq. With a focus on HEIs see Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 15, 20, 
Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 8 and Gideon (n 144) p. 175. 
252 This applies only to the anti-competitive parts of the collusion, other parts might retain validity. 
See Horspool and Humphreys (n 240) p. 476, 493. 
253 As regards public undertakings or undertakings with special or exclusive rights there is, of course, 
also the exemption provided in Article 106 (2) TFEU as discussed above. 
254 Regulation 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty OJ [2003] L 1/1 Article 1 (2). 
255 See, for example, Commission White Paper on the modernisation of the rules implementing Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty Programme No 99/027 OJ [1999] C 132/01 paragraph 57 de-
scribing the purpose of Article 101 (3) TFEU (then Article 85 (3) EC) as „to provide a legal 
framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow application of 
the competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations‟. Also, see Commission 
Communication „Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty‟ OJ [2004] C 
101/08 paragraph 42 stating that „the four conditions of Article 81(3) [now Article 101 (3) 
TFEU] are also exhaustive. When they are met, the exception is applicable and may not be made 
dependent upon any other condition. Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into 
account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 81 (3) [now 
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HEI sector on grounds of public policy considerations under Article 101 (3) 
TFEU.256 
Exemptions are often provided for a specific kind of coordination in block ex-
emptions regulations (BERs).257 Regarding HEIs, three BERs in particular, could be 
useful. The Specialisation BER exempts specialisation agreements with a combined 
market share of below 20%, unless they contain the hardcore restrictions price fix-
ing, limitation of outputs or market division.258 HEIs might utilise this BER for joint 
course agreements or joint research programmes. The Research and Development 
BER exempts vertical research cooperation agreements as well as horizontal ones 
with a combined market share which does not exceed 25%, unless they contain cer-
tain hardcore restrictions and only if „the parties have full access to the final re-
sults‟.259 Finally, the Technology Transfer BER exempts technology transfer agree-
ments related to the production of contractual goods and services, unless they con-
tain certain hardcore restrictions or other excluded restrictions, if the common mar-
ket share does not exceed 20% in horizontal cases and the market share of each party 
does not exceed 30% in vertical cases.260 Additionally, the vertical agreement 
                                                                                                                                          
Article 101 (3) TFEU]‟. See also G Monti, EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge 2007) chap-
ter 4 in particular p. 89 seq, 102 seq and 122 seq and Jones and Sufrin (n 155) p. 244 seq. Espe-
cially on HEIs in this respect see Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 20. 
256 On Article 101 (2) and (3) TFEU see Horspool and Humphrey (n 240) p. 476, 490, 493 seq, 
Bishop and Walker (n 240) p. 158 seq, Ward (n 251) p. 130 and, specifically on HEIs, Greaves 
and Scicluna (n 3) p. 16, 19 seq and Gideon (n 144) p. 179. 
257 For a critical analysis of BERs in the system of competition law after Regulation 1/2003 see F 
Marcos and A Sánchez Graells, 'A Missing Step in the Modernisation Stairway of EU Competi-
tion Law - Any Role for Block Exemption Regulations in the Realm of Regulation 1/2003?' 
(2010) 6 Competition Law Review 183.  
258 Commission Regulation 1218/2010/EU on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements OJ [2010] 
L 335/43. A specialisation agreement requires that one or more competing undertakings special-
ise in one area and therefore receive goods or services from competing undertakings in this area 
which they would have normally provided themselves (Article 2 (1)). The BER also covers cer-
tain aspects of intellectual property rights related to specialisation (Article 2 (2)).  
259 Commission Regulation 1217/2010/EU on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development agreements OJ 
[2010] L 335/36.  
260 Commission Regulation 772/2004/EC on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to catego-
ries of technology transfer agreements OJ [2004] L 123/11. This BER is currently being re-
viewed (updates on the process can be found on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2012_technology_transfer/index_en.html).  
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BER261 exempts all vertical collusions below a market share of 30% of the buyer and 
the seller respectively, except for certain hardcore restrictions.262 
In the following a few scenarios will be discussed in which HEIs might come 
into conflict with Article 101 TFEU. These are by no means exclusive; there may 
well be other scenarios where constraints arise from this provision aside from the 
ones discussed here. In individual cases there might, of course, always be the possi-
bility of exemption. 
3.3.2.1. Price fixing 
Any kind of cooperation between HEIs regarding prices for higher education or 
research263 could be regarded as price fixing. This seems less problematic when it 
comes to research. As has been said above, HEIs only fall under the competition 
provision if they conduct research of an economic nature. In that case they must not 
fix prices. This fact does not generally seem to result in any unforeseen detrimental 
consequences for HEIs. On the other hand, the prohibition of price fixing might in-
deed cause problems for HEIs regarding tuition fees. If governmental regulations set, 
or put a cap on, tuition fees, this could still constitute price fixing, in cases where 
government rules allow scope for price competition and HEIs collaborate within this 
margin. Additionally, governmental measures demanding or encouraging price fix-
ing could equally be anti-competitive according to Article 4 (3) TFEU in conjunction 
with Article 101 TFEU.  
Whilst there is no case law by the Court yet, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 
the UK‟s competition authority) has already investigated educational institutions and 
has found a group of private schools to have been engaged in anti-competitive collu-
                                                 
261 Commission Regulation 330/2010/EU on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
OJ [2010] L 102/1. 
262 On BERs regarding HEIs see also Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 16, 19 seq, Amato and Farbmann 
(n 3) p. 8 seq, Gideon (n 144) p. 180. On BERs generally see Horspool and Humphrey (n 240) p. 
494 seq, Bishop and Walker (n 240) p. 158 seq. 
263 Any additional activities conducted by HEIs, such as housing for students, selling of clothes with 
the university logo etc, shall be left aside in the following, as they are not the main purposes of 
an HEI. 
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sion.264 The schools had conducted a „survey‟ each year from 2001 to 2003 regarding 
each other‟s future pricing. The sharing of confidential information, such as the 
prices for the coming academic year, is regarded as an infringement of competition 
by its object, if it is conducted on a regular basis, relates to future conduct and the 
information is not available to the public. The OFT, therefore, did not evaluate the 
question whether this actually had any effect on the price levels. Instead it found the 
schools guilty of „participating in an agreement and/or concerted practice having as 
its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the relevant mar-
kets for the provision of educational services‟. The schools each had to pay a fine of 
£10,000.265 Another possible price fixing incident occurred in the Netherlands. Due 
to newer legislation (Wet Versterking Besturing, Strengthening Administration Act 
2010), Dutch universities can now set tuition fees independently. It appears from 
media coverage that after the government discontinued funding for second degrees 
and the universities had therefore introduced higher fees for such degrees, a student 
organisation (Stichting Collectieve Actie Universiteiten, Foundation Collective Ac-
tion Universities) initiated legal proceedings against eight Dutch universities for 
charging excessive prices.266 The writ for these proceedings apparently also included 
minutes of common discussions between the Universiteit Amsterdam and the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam agreeing on prices for second Masters degrees. This has 
then led to investigations by the Dutch competition authority (Nederlandse Meded-
ingsautoriteit, NMa) into a possible cartel between these universities fixing prices for 
                                                 
264 OFT Decision CA98/05/2006 from 20
 
November 2006 available on 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/cartels-and-competition/ca98/decisions/schools. The OFT ap-
plied the prohibition of section 2 (1) Competition Act 1998, the equivalent to Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. For more on the case see Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 13, 21 seq, Amato and Farbmann 
(n 3) p. 10 seq, Swennen (n 3) p. 277, Gideon (n 144) p. 175. 
265 Certain exception where applicable for example, because of Crown immunity. Ibid.  




prijsafspraken.dhtml accessed 14 October 2011, JP Myklebust and   O‟Malley, 
'NETHERLANDS: Dawn raids over 'illegal' tuition fees' University World News (7 September 
2011) http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20110907191951868 accessed 23 
September 2011, Dijkstra, 'Amsterdam Universities fix prices: how to prevent this from happen-
ing?' (2011) Knowledge Debate 
 http://www.rug.nl/kennisdebat/onderwerpen/actueel/universitiesFixPrices accessed 14 October 
2011. 
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second Bachelor and/or Masters degrees except for medical subjects.267 The investi-
gation was closed when the universities offered to discontinue fixing prices with 
each other or other universities.268 
These examples illustrate that educational institutions are not beyond the reach 
of the competition provisions. The prohibition of price fixing is, inter alia, intended 
to protect the consumer. In the cases reported above, the application of competition 
law would presumably achieve that aim. However, currently, with governmental 
funding still prevailing and higher education still considered as being in the general 
interest, one could imagine cases where such a collusion would be to the advantage 
of the students, encouraging fair pricing and equal access. Challenging this could 
thus be harmful to the general interest involved. This can be illustrated in a German 
case regarding public music schools.269 The music schools entered into contracts 
with self-employed teachers, requiring them not to charge prices higher than 85 
German Marks per hour of tuition. In return, the teachers were allowed to use the 
facilities of the music schools for their lessons and the school would arrange their 
contracts. The school fixed the price with the teachers in order to allow equal and 
low pricing, so that everybody could have access to music education. The arrange-
ment was challenged by a music teacher, who wanted to charge higher prices for her 
lessons. The German Court regarded the music school, as well as the self-employed 
teachers, as undertakings and the contract terms of the music school as price fixing. 
This case nicely illustrates how in such cases the prohibition of price fixing could be 
to the detriment of the consumer. Additionally, the constellation of the case makes 
one wonder whether, in the final consequence of the thought, even governmental 
regulation regarding tuition fees could be challenged under Article 4 (3) TEU in con-
junction with Article 101 (1) TFEU.  
                                                 
267 See NMa, 'Bedrifsbezoeken NMa bij Amsterdamse universiteiten' (2011) 
http://www.nma.nl/documenten_en_publicaties/archiefpagina_nieuwsberichten/webberichten/20
11/20_11_bedrijfsbezoeken_nma_bij_amsterdamse_universiteiten.aspx accessed 12 October 
2011. For more on the case see Gideon (n 144) p. 175. 
268 NMa, 'NMa accepteert maatregelen van UvA en VU' (2012) 
https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/10780/NMa-accepteert-maatregelen-van-UvA-en-
VU/ accessed 16 October 2012.  
269 BGH Judgement 23.10.1979 in (1980) 82 GRUR 249. For more on the case see H Kroitzsch, 
'Anmerkungen BGH 23.10.1979 KZR 22/78 "Berliner Musikschule"' (1980) 82 GRUR 249 p. 
251 seq, Swennen (n 3) p. 277, Gideon (n 144) p. 178. 
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Another example where price fixing could have positive effects for students 
can be derived from a case in the US. The Department of Justice has investigated 
HEIs for price fixing violating the Sherman Act (US American Competition Law 
Act) in the early 1990s.270 HEIs had agreed on a policy according to which they 
would discuss what they believed an applicant who had applied to a variety of HEIs 
could pay. They would then offer financial aid to this applicant accordingly, so that 
the student‟s financial burden would remain unchanged, regardless of which offer he 
or she accepted, although the level of tuition fees differed between universities. The 
aim of the scheme was to ensure that students would pay a price they could afford 
and that financial help would only be given as to the shortfall. In this way, HEIs 
would not compete on the basis of financial aid allowing more students to profit. In-
stead, HEIs would compete on the quality of their services.271 Whilst some HEIs 
ended the dispute in a settlement agreeing to discontinue the allegedly anti-
competitive behaviour,272 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology continued the 
trial and was found guilty of price fixing in the first instance.273 In the appeal deci-
sion, the Third Circuit decided that the rule of reason in US American Antitrust law 
requires a more thorough weighing of pro- and anti-competitive effects and referred 
the case back.274 Before a final decision could be reached, a compromise was found 
and the dispute ended in a settlement the terms of which were then to be applicable 
                                                 
270 Complaint, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91-CV-3274 (E.D. Pa., filed May 22, 1991). For 
more on the case see SC Salop and LJ White, 'Antitrust goes to college' (1991) 5 Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 193, DR Carlson and GB Shepherd, 'Cartel On Campus: The Economics and 
Law of Academic Institutions' Financial Aid Price Fixing' (1992) 71 Oregon Law Review 563, 
TJ Stachtiaris, 'Antitrust in need: undergraduate financial aid and United States v. Brown Uni-
versity' (1993-1994) 62 Fordham Law Review 1745, MC Petronio, 'Eliminating the Social Cost 
of Higher Education: The Third Circuit Allows Social Welfare Benefits to Justify Horizontal 
Restraints of Trade in United States v. Brown University' (1994-1995) 83 Georgetown Law 
Journal 189.  
271 See Stachtiaris (n 270) p. 746 seq, Scalop and White (n 270) p. 198 seq who, however, doubt that 
such arguments would stand up in Court under Antitrust law (the article was written before the 
actual proceedings had been started) and Carlson and Shepherd (n 270) who, however, oppose 
the scheme, as they believe it was economically inefficient. 
272 Stipulation, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91-CV-3274 (E.D. Pa., filed May 22, 1991). 
273 Decision and Order, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91-CV-3274 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 2, 
1992). 
274 Opinion of the Court, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 92-1911 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 1993). 
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to all HEIs.275 This settlement, inter alia, provides that HEIs are allowed to give fi-
nancial aid according to need, to agree on methods to determine need and to involve 
a third party to gather financial background information on applicants which will 
then be provided to all HEIs involved. It prohibits, however, agreement on common 
fees.  
Whilst, thus, in the end, a compromise was reached which was actually very 
close to the original scheme, the case nevertheless shows the possible threats arising 
from competition law for the public service character of HEIs.276 At the same time, it 
also shows the possibility of compromise in this regard and could serve as an exam-
ple for European HEIs should competition law become more generally applicable to 
them. It could even be used as a blue print for future secondary legislation. Whilst 
there is no rule of reason in EU competition, Article 106 (2) TFEU might be utilised 
to achieve a similar result.  
3.3.2.2. Market foreclosure or disturbance  
Another example where HEIs might infringe Article 101 (1) TFEU is if they 
cooperate in bodies which essentially define who can enter (a significant part of) the 
market such as accreditation or quality assurance agencies for teaching and research 
or bodies distributing study places. These could, if consisting mainly of experts from 
within HEIs, be regarded as making a decision by an association of undertakings 
foreclosing (parts of) the market and preventing access to newcomers. If such bodies 
themselves conducted an economic activity and are thus undertakings, this could be 
regarded as a vertical cartel.277 Even if such bodies are foreseen in national law, this 
could still fall under the prohibition of Article 101 (1) TFEU if read in conjunction 
with Article 4 (3) TEU. 
                                                 
275 Letter of 22 December 1993 by the US Department of Justice – Antitrust Division, available on 
http://www.appliedantitrust.com/06_reasonableness/brown/litan_thane_settlement12_22_1993.p
df. 
276 Similar Stachtiaris (n 270), who argues that therefore HEIs should not fall under Antitrust law in 
the first place. 
277 For example, see 107/82 AEG paragraph 35 seq. The case concerned a distribution network which 
is, as such, not incompatible with Article 101 (1) TFEU, if any undertaking, which wishes to do 
so and which fulfils objective qualitative criteria, can enter the network. However, if undertak-
ings which meet the qualitative criteria are prevented from entering, this does constitute an in-
fringement. This is regarded as collusion as the acceptance of the conditions by the participating 
undertakings is regarded as approval. See Horspool and Humphreys (n 240) p. 479 seq.  
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A body distributing university places could, for example, be regarded as an as-
sociation of undertakings. If this association only allows certain HEIs to be regis-
tered within it (for example, only national ones) and thus only allocates places to 
them, this forecloses the market to newcomers. The case of Maastricht University 
applying for registration in the British Universities and Colleges Admission Service 
(UCAS) has, for example, been discussed in the press.278 The request was, according 
to the Sunday Times, turned down because Maastricht University is not British. The 
article further reported that Maastricht University planned to challenge the decision 
under EU law, as it constitutes discrimination.279 It might also be conceivable, 
though difficult to specify without knowing the details of this case, that such ar-
rangements could be challenged under Article 101 (1) TFEU or Article 4 (3) TEU in 
conjunction with Article 101 (1) TFEU, if bodies such as UCAS are required by a 
state measure.280  
In the USA the accreditation of, in particular legal, education has been dis-
cussed widely in the context of its compatibility with the Sherman Act.281 Indeed, 
there have been some privately initiated cases against legal and other educational 
accreditation agencies, which have, however, not been successful.282 A case by the 
US Department of Justice against the American Bar Association (ABA),283 however, 
                                                 
278 See J Grimston and J Winch, 'Maastricht University is fighting for a listing in order to attract Brit-
ish students' The Sunday Times (24 October 2010) News 4. There does not seem to be anything 
available on the case since initial press coverage. 
279 This might probably have referred to the free movement of services, but the article is not very 
precise here and also talks about effects on competition. A challenge under the free movement 
provisions would imply that UCAS would be regarded as part of the Member State (the UK) 
which discriminates against foreign service providers. Higher education would thus have to be 
regarded as a service in the meaning of the free movement provisions. 
280 On the market foreclosure scenario see Gideon (n 144) p. 179. 
281 For an evaluation of accreditation agencies under US American antitrust law see CC Havighurst 
and PM Brody, 'Accrediting and the Sherman Act' (1994) 57 Law and Contemporary Problems 
199. For an evaluation of legal education accreditation under the Sherman Act see H First, 
'Competition in the legal education industry (II): an antitrust analysis' (1979) 54 New York Uni-
versity Law Review 1049, M Lao, 'Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education' 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 1035, J Areen, 'Accreditation Reconsidered' 
(2011) 96 Iowa Law Review 1471. 
282 See those discussed in Havighurst and Brody (n 281) p. 201, 203, in First (n 281) p. 1062, p. 1080 
and in Lao (n 281) p. 1037. 
283 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v American Bar Association, No. 95-1211(CR) (D. 
D. C. 1996). In this case the fixing of salaries and working conditions had also been challenged 
and was amongst the conduct the ABA had to agree to stop in the consent decree (section I A). 
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ended in a consent decree in which ABA consented to refrain from specific accredi-
tation practices. In particular they consented to accredit for-profit institutions on 
equal terms. In England, for example, there is also some support for applying stricter 
rules to for-profit providers of higher education, in order to „mitigate the extra risk 
posed by for-profit corporate forms‟.284 The US case implies that accreditation prac-
tices are not beyond the reach of competition law in principle, potentially also for 
European institutions. Again, even if accreditation is foreseen by national law, this 
might, in EU law, be challengeable under Article 4 (3) in conjunction with Article 
101 (1) TFEU. 
However, such bodies might disturb the market beyond preventing access 
completely. UCAS has recently made it into the press again when it decided not to 
publish university application figures believing this to be anti-competitive.285 It was 
alleged that publishing the figures would lead to a competitive disadvantage for 
some HEIs since the figures „could be overinterpreted by both institutions and appli-
cants, and give rise to unintended markets effects‟.286 Whilst publishing such infor-
mation might indeed have a negative effect on certain institutions, it might also, as a 
student organisation has argued, enhance consumer welfare to have the relevant in-
formation available.  
Competition law can thus have potential effects on the bodies regulating teach-
ing or research activities. The opening of such institutions to every interested HEI 
from every Member State could put a significant strain on the national systems. This 
would particularly cause problems if such institutions are publicly funded. Addition-
ally potential judicial reviews of accreditation standards might lead to lower quality 
and a further opening of education systems to private providers. Finally, if UCAS 
                                                                                                                                          
In Europe such problems seem less likely due to different labour law traditions and a reluctant 
approach by the European judiciary in this respect (see Monti (n 255) p. 96 seq). For more on 
United States v American Bar Association see Lao (n 281) p. 1037 seq, Areen (n 281) p. 1487 
seq. 
284 UCU, 'UCU politics monthly - March 2013 - Westminster' (2013) 
http://www.ucu.org.uk/index.cfm?articleid=6653#wmin accessed 15 April 2013. 
285 J Morgan, 'Ucas withholds 2013-14 application data' THE (14 February 2013) 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/ucas-withholds-2013-14-application-
data/2001543.article accessed 17 April 2013. 
286 Ibid.  
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was right in its assumption that publishing certain figures was anti-competitive, sys-
tems could become less transparent. 
3.3.2.3. Market division 
It might also be conceivable that HEIs, whether by agreement or by tacitly co-
ordinating their behaviour, divide the subject market. This would be the case if they 
decide to offer a certain variety of subjects in coordination with what other HEIs in 
the area are offering. Whilst orienting their behaviour around others in an economi-
cally reasonable way would not amount to collusion, actual coordination on the mat-
ter could do so.287 HEIs could then be regarded as dividing the market into segments 
of subjects which are only offered by few HEIs which are geographically distant and 
thus not in direct competition. This might create local monopolies regarding teaching 
and research at the same time, if one considers the history of the university with the 
aim of teaching and research going hand in hand.288 Considering the fact that most 
students still study in their home state289 and that small and medium size undertak-
ings often also seek partners locally, this would limit their choices and they might be 
encouraged to challenge such coordination. With decreasing public funding, how-
ever, it might no longer be possible for every HEI to offer every subject and (local) 
collaboration dividing the subjects (joint course agreements) between them might be 
the only solution for HEIs. If, at the same time, they cooperate by consulting primar-
ily with each other in areas in which they do not themselves conduct research and 
teaching, this might be regarded as a cartel with the aim of driving a competitor out 
of the market. Of course, HEIs might be able to utilise the previously mentioned 
BER on specialisation agreements in this respect.290  
                                                 
287 If the collaboration goes as far as creating a new organisation this might have to be considered as 
a merger, which is discussed below. 
288 See chapter 1 above. 
289 For more on student mobility see Lanzendorf U, „Foreign students and study abroad students‟ in 
Kelo M, Teichler U and Wächter B (eds), Eurodata - Student mobility in European higher edu-
cation (Lemmens, Bonn 2006) p. 8 seq. According to the data given here, on average only 3% of 
students in the Eurodata countries study abroad with Iceland having the highest quota of students 
studying abroad with more than 10%. The Eurodata countries comprise the EU-27 as well as 
Turkey, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. See Kelo M, Teichler U and Wächter 
 , „Introduction‟ in Kelo M, Teichler U and Wächter   (eds), Eurodata - Student mobility in 
European higher education (Lemmens, Bonn 2006) p. 5. 
290 See above text n 258. 
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Another example of potential market division might be seen in practices such 
as UCAS‟ practice of allowing applications to only five courses at a time and usually 
to only one of either Oxford or Cambridge.291 Through such practices HEIs ensure 
that the education market is divided (more or less equally) between them as regards 
student numbers. At the same time, however, it might be unfeasible to allow unlim-
ited applications, since the relevant bodies might not be able to process them. Public 
regulation requiring or encouraging market division in these (or other) scenarios 
could potentially be challenged according to Article 4 (3) TFEU in conjunction with 
Article 101 TFEU.  
3.3.2.4. Research co-operation 
Research cooperation could be regarded as collusion if two or more HEIs or 
HEIs and other research undertakings conduct research together with a view to ex-
ploiting the results. Such cooperation may conflict with Article 101 (1) TFEU if it 
restricts competition. This could, for example, be the case if the cooperation limits 
the activities of the parties beyond the research, if the parties were not far from 
achieving the research result individually and thus competition is limited or if the 
collusion comprises constraints on the parties regarding exploitation of the re-
search.292 It might also be conceivable that vertical cooperation between HEIs and 
research users, could be regarded as a vertical cartel when the research users do not 
pay a representative price and/or different prices are charged to different users. This 
might cause problems for HEIs in the future, given that cooperation with non-
academic partners is increasingly encouraged, if, for example, a vertical cooperation 
is limited to a certain region or favourable prices are charged regarding undertakings 
from that region. If they infringe Article 101 (1) TFEU through a research collabora-
tion, HEIs might in some cases, however, be able to utilise the previously mentioned 
Research and Development BER.293 
                                                 
291 On UCAS‟ practise and its potential anti-competitiveness see Morgan (n 285).  
292 For more on research and development agreements see Lübbig T and Schroeder D, „§ 8 
Einzelfragen‟ in Wiedemann G (ed), Handbuch des Kartellrechts (2nd edn, Beck, Munich 2008) 
paragraph 120 seq. 
293 See above n 259.  
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3.3.2.5. Limiting markets 
Article 101 (1) TFEU also prohibits the limitation of markets. In this respect 
one might wonder whether restrictions on education places through a collusion of 
HEIs could be regarded as such. With regards to higher education places, demand is, 
in general, higher than supply, particularly in certain subjects.294 If HEIs were to be 
considered as undertakings it is imaginable that students, who have been turned 
away, challenge such limitations. This would also be the case if HEIs decide to limit 
their private research output to a certain number of contracts or if governmental 
regulations require it. The limit on student numbers, might, however, be necessary to 
retain the public (or, in some Member States, even free of charge) character of higher 
education and limitations to research contracts might be necessary to ensure enough 
capacity for public interest research. Therefore, such limitations, depending on the 
individual case, might be able to benefit from Article 106 (2) TFEU.  
3.3.3. Article 102 TFEU  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position. Accord-
ing to the Court an undertaking holds a dominant position if it enjoys „a position of 
economic strength [...] which enables it to prevent competition being maintained on 
the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent inde-
pendently of its competitors, customers and ultimately its consumers‟.295 Usually, the 
dominance of an undertaking is established according to its market share and barriers 
to entry. Whilst a market share of more than 50% in the relevant market normally 
leads to the presumption of dominance, the undertaking is, nevertheless, not consid-
ered dominant if market entry is easy.296 At the same time, depending on the market, 
                                                 
294 See, for example, chapter 2 above on the high number of students in the medical field who cannot 
gain a study place in their home state and thus emigrate to other Member States, thus meaning 
demand can also not be met in the states anymore. On the re-occurring problem that demand for 
study places cannot be met in England see for example, H Richardson, 'Thousands “to miss out 
on university degree”' BBC News (1 February 2010)  
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/8487354.stm accessed 9 February 2010. It is currently be-
ing discussed to force private higher education providers in England to control student numbers. 
See S Malik, R Adams and Ó Ryan, 'Poorest students face £350m cut in grants' The Guardian 
(22 November 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/nov/22/poorest-students-face-
350m-cuts accessed 29 November 2013. 
295 27/76 United Brands paragraph 65. 
296 62/86 Akzo paragraph 60. 
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undertakings with lower market shares could also be regarded as dominant. The 
dominant undertaking is abusing its dominance if its actions are regarded as having 
an anti-competitive effect297 which goes beyond the non-exhaustive list of examples 
in Article 102. Whilst dominance as such is not prohibited, the concept of abuse is 
influenced by the established dominance; a behaviour which is regarded as competi-
tive if conducted by a non-dominant undertaking, can be classified as an abuse if 
conducted by a dominant one. Unlike under Article 101 TFEU, there are no exemp-
tions for the abuse of a dominant position foreseen in the Treaty.298 However, as part 
of the concept of abuse, the Court sometimes assesses inherent objective justifica-
tions.299 The Commission, similarly to its approach under Article 101 (1), also re-
cently developed a more economic approach towards Article 102 which would lead 
to those exclusionary practices which can be proven to be economically efficient, not 
being considered as abuse.300 As under Article 101 (1) TFEU, the abuse must have 
an effect on intra-Union trade.301  
In the following some examples will be explored. Obviously, these require a 
HEI to be an undertaking and to be in a dominant position or for a few HEIs to be in 
a position of collective dominance, which depends on market definition. It is not 
unimaginable, however, that for subjects which are less common, HEIs hold a domi-
nant position or that they do so in an area of specialised research.302 Generally, the 
strong position of public HEIs, due to their long-term (near) monopoly status in 
                                                 
297 This question is closely linked to the aims of competition law, a detailed discussion of which 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis (on the aims of competition law see briefly above text 
accompanying n 223). For more on the concept of abuse see Monti (n 255) p. 160 seq, C Jung, 
'EGV Art. 82 Missbrauch einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung (Nizza Fassung)' in E Grabitz, M 
Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union (40th edn, Beck, Munich 
2009) para101 seq, Weatherill (n 231) p. 534 seq. 
298 Except for SGEIs under Article 106 (2) TFEU (see above). 
299 C-95/04 P British Airways paragraph 86. For more see Monti (n 255), p. 162 seq, in particular p. 
171 on the British Airways case and p. 203 seq on justifications, Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 
147) p. 1004. 
300 See Commission Communication „Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in apply-
ing Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings‟ OJ 
[2009] C 45/02 paragraph 19. See also Weatherill (n 231) p. 543. 
301 See further on Article 102 TFEU Monti (n 255) p. 160 seq, Jung (n 301), Chalmers, Davies and 
Monti (n 147) p. 98 seq, Weatherill (n 231) p. 522 seq, Ward (n 251) p. 131. With a focus on 
HEIs see Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 15, Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 9. With a focus on 
health care provision as a similar area see Wendt and Gideon (n 154) p. 270 seq. 
302 See above section 3.3.1. Market Definition. 
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many Member States, makes them susceptible to challenge by private providers en-
tering the market and this might not always be to the advantage of students or in the 
interest of public research.303 As will be seen, some behaviour discussed above for 
Article 101 TFEU, could also fall under Article102 TFEU if conducted by a domi-
nant undertaking unilaterally rather than by a collusion of undertakings. This might 
be more detrimental to HEIs, because, as has been mentioned above, there are no 
exemptions to Article 102 TFEU.  
3.3.3.1. Exploitative abuses  
Article 102 TFEU is, in particular, intended to restrict exploitative monopoly 
behaviour by dominant undertakings. This includes abuses such as setting excessive 
prices if the undertaking in question is the provider and requiring abusively low 
prices if it is the buyer. Furthermore, the dictation of unreasonable contract condi-
tions, artificially limited out-puts, the refusal to enter into contractual relations, the 
refusal to provide licenses or the requirement of unreasonably long license duration, 
would fall under this kind of abuse. The abuses could take place indirectly if the 
dominant undertaking is not dealing directly with the consumer, but requires the 
passing-on of the abuse.304  
Whilst the elimination of exploitative abuses is obviously intended to protect 
the consumer, the application of this to public HEIs might cause problems with their 
public service character. Similarly to what is mentioned above regarding collusion, 
one might, for example, wonder if the limitation of study places could be regarded as 
limiting outputs under Article 102 b) TFEU. In England, for example, plans were 
aired that additional places for students willing and able to pay higher fees could be 
created,305 seeming to suggest that the limitation of study places thus far is not a 
business necessity from the point of view of the HEI. If places are limited artificially, 
                                                 
303 For this argument in a reversed fashion, namely regarding the use of Article 102 TFEU to the ad-
vantage of third sector providers in their relationship towards established NHS providers in 
health care „markets‟ see Wendt and Gideon (n 154) p. 271. 
304 See Jung (n 301) paragraph 143 seq. 
305 See J Vasagar, 'Richest students to pay for extra places at Britain's best universities' The Guardian 
(9 May 2011) http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/may/09/universities-extra-places-
richest-students accessed 11 July 2011. The plans were not taken over into the government white 
paper as such, but the white paper still includes the possibility of such extra prices being funded 
by business and charities. See BIS, HIGHER EDUCATION - Students at the Heart of the System 
(The Stationary Office, Norwich 2011) p. 51 paragraph 4.22 seq. 
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this could enable students to challenge such behaviour under Article 102 TEU if 
conducted by a dominant HEI. Article 106 (1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 
TFEU would also allow challenges to government regulations which enable domi-
nant undertakings to abuse their position. As the citizenship cases of Belgium and 
Austria discussed in chapter 2 have shown, the equilibrium of public finances might, 
however, not necessarily allow the offering of publicly financed places for every-
body, particularly if one considers that all EU students have to be granted equal ac-
cess.306 Additionally, in the field of research, there could equally not be artificial lim-
its placed on output, which could possibly lead to an increase in commercial research 
in comparison to public service research. 
With regards to education, a student in Ireland has, indeed, already attempted 
to challenge the limitation of study places for medicine for European students in that 
country inter alia under Article 102 TFEU.307 Whilst publicly subsidised European 
students had to fulfil very high entrance criteria, international students who paid full 
cost prices did not. The student in question had offered to equal the full cost price, if 
he would then be admitted with his lower grades, which was denied. The national 
court dealt at length with the issues of national law, but only discussed EU competi-
tion law in two short paragraphs which are not overly clear. It appears that the na-
tional court assumed that because medical schools could, in theory, opt out of gov-
ernment subsidies and offer private education at full cost rates and because medical 
education is expensive for the government to subsidise „that there is nothing wrong 
in competition terms‟. However, the medical schools offered medical education as a 
market service at least for international students, it appears from this case that there 
are only five medical schools in Ireland which therefore all hold positions of eco-
nomic strength and it might also be assumed that barriers to entry are rather high in 
the medical education market. It, thus, seems possible to regard the individual medi-
cal schools as undertakings in a dominant position which abuse that position by lim-
iting outputs for certain consumers. A reference for a preliminary ruling might have 
been indicated in this case.  
                                                 
306 See chapter 2 above. 
307 Prendergast v Higher Education Authority & Ors [2008] IEHC 257. 
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Furthermore, if governments were to adopt a strategy of different prices for dif-
ferent students based on their financial background, as has been explored by the Brit-
ish Government,308 this could be regarded as price discrimination and could therefore 
also be an abuse of a dominant market position. Similarly, excessive prices for re-
search, favourable purchase prices or contract conditions regarding supplies for re-
search or discounts for certain undertakings (for example for local undertakings) 
could be challenged. It might, in particular, cause problems to charge undertakings 
from other Member States more than national ones because this would cause parti-
tions in the internal market. Whilst price discrimination, particularly the originally 
envisaged price strategy for tuition fees in England, is generally debatable, it could 
theoretically also be used to enhance equality (for example, higher prices for better-
off students could cross-subsidise places for less well-off students). Price reductions 
for local undertakings regarding research could help to promote a certain region. 
Furthermore, high priced private research could be utilised to cross-subsidise teach-
ing and research in the public interest. The application of Article 102 TFEU would 
also take away the opportunity to attach additional contract conditions which are not 
economically justified to the contracts. The behaviour of some HEIs in demanding 
that students not only prove that they can pay the fee, but also prove in advance that 
they can cover their living costs for the time of the study309 might potentially be re-
garded as such. Whilst, as mentioned above, there are no exemptions for Article 102 
TFEU, an exemption under Article 106 (2) TFEU might be possible if the applica-
tion of competition law would obstruct the public service obligation of an HEI.  
3.3.3.2. Exclusionary abuses 
Exclusionary abuses are aimed at driving competitors out of the market and re-
taining or strengthening the dominant position. Such abuses could lie in technical 
restrictions, predatory pricing, refusal to issue licenses to competitors, refusal to sup-
                                                 
308 See n 305 above. 
309 Such a policy at the University of Oxford has been challenged by a student under the British Hu-
man Rights Act 1998. See BBC News, 'Judgement reserved over Oxford University student dis-
crimination row' BBC News (15 February 2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
21465879 accessed 17th February 2013. 
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ply competitors and abusing a monopoly (for example, excluding competitors de-
spite not being able to fulfil demand).310  
With regards to HEIs it would be possible that problems arise concerning low 
tuition fees or low prices for research contracts. Such low prices could be regarded 
as predatory pricing which is aimed at driving (or keeping) competitors out of the 
market. Due to their financial support from the state, public HEIs are in a position to 
provide research for lower prices than their competitors and to hold tuition fees at a 
low level. Disregarding for now what that could entail in state aid terms,311 this 
might cause a problem with Article 102 TFEU.312  
The Dutch NMa had already had to deal with a case in this respect involving 
music schools.313 In contrast to the German music school case, wherein a vertical 
cartel between the self-employed teachers and the music school was in question, this 
case involved a collective dominant position of public music schools. The schools 
were accused of predatory pricing by a competitor. As the schools were bound to 
certain prices by law and had no free choice the NMa could not find an abuse on the 
side of the schools. Furthermore, it was not in the authority of the NMa to review 
national legislation. This would sit differently with regards to EU law. If, in a similar 
situation, HEIs would be challenged for predatory pricing considering their dominant 
position in the higher education market or in a specific research market in question, a 
law binding them to such pricing could, as mentioned above, be challenged under 
Article 102 in conjunction with 106 (1) TFEU. This example might, were HEIs con-
sidered to be dominant undertakings, pose a threat to a cap on tuition fees. HEIs 
would equally not be able to use their public position to offer research services for 
lower prices than their competitors.  
As in the scenario under Article 101 TFEU, any agencies, such as UCAS, 
which have a significant influence on market access for study places, could get into 
conflict with Article 102 TFEU. It would depend on whether the collusion aspect is 
                                                 
310 See Jung (n 301) paragraph 186 seq. 
311 On state aid see below. 
312 Similar Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 18. 
313 Besluit bk005-9801available on www.nmanet.nl/Images/0005BEMP_tcm16-97472.pdf. On the 
case see also Swennen (n 3) p. 275, Gideon (n 144) p. 177. 
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more pronounced or whether the case concerns unilateral conduct to determine 
which provision would be applicable. Under Article 102 TFEU such agencies could 
potentially abuse their dominant position as such, if they are regarded as undertak-
ings themselves, while a group of HEIs acting together in such a body might be seen 
as abusing collective dominance. The abuse could lie in not allowing newcomers any 
access to the distribution network, as this could be regarded as controlling market 
access. If the entry criteria to the distribution network are based on the the HEI‟s 
home Member State this seems particularly problematic given that it contributes to 
the partitioning of the internal market. If the HEIs in question cannot fulfil demand, 
this would be especially abusive conduct. Again, it does not play a role if national 
law prescribes such practices as the national law can also be challenged according to 
Article 106 (1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU. Such challenges might 
be more severe under Article 102 TFEU, as it contains no exemptions and exemp-
tions are thus only possible under Article 106 (2) TFEU.  
3.3.4. Mergers 
Merger control is not regulated in the Treaty itself, but in the Merger Regula-
tion.314 The regulation subjects concentrations315 of undertakings316 to merger control 
by the Commission if these have a Union-dimension.317 Undertakings planning to 
                                                 
314 Council Regulation 139/2004/EC on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC 
Merger Regulation) OJ [2004] L 24/1. Before the first Merger Regulation (Council Regulation 
4064/89/EEC on the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ [1989] L 395/01) was 
passed, the Court had assessed mergers through Article 102 TFEU. For example, see 6/72 Con-
tinental Can. See further M Furse, Competition Law (OUP, Oxford 2008) p. 382 seq, Ward (n 
251) p. 131. The Commission has started a review procedure of Regulation 139/2004/EC the lat-
est document of which is „Communication from the Commission to the Council „Report on the 
functioning of Regulation No 139/2004‟ COM(2009) 281 final. Updates on the review process 
can be found on http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/regulations.html.  
315 These can be mergers of undertakings, the acquisition of undertakings and permanent joint ven-
tures (Article 3 Merger Regulation). The term acquisition is broadly defined to include all means 
by which „decisive influence‟ over an undertaking can be obtained. For more see Furse (n 314) 
p. 385 seq, 410 seq. 
316 The Merger Regulation also applies to „persons‟ holding interests in undertakings and thus execut-
ing the relevant control. „Persons‟ in this respect can be individuals and even Member States if 
they are acting in a commercial manner. See Furse (n 314) p. 386.  
317 According to Article 1 (2) Merger Regulation, a merger has a Union dimension if it either has at 
least a combined world turnover of 5000 million Euros and an individual Union turnover of at 
least 250 million Euros in at least two involved undertakings unless the undertakings involved 
achieve two-thirds of their Union turnover in only one Member State or if it has at least a com-
bined world turnover of 2500 million Euros, a combined turnover of at least 100 million Euros 
in at least three Member States, in at least three of these Member States the individual turnover 
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conduct a merger need to notify this (Article 4 (1)). The merger can be prohibited318 
if it would appreciably319 impede competition (Article 2), particularly by acquiring 
(collective) dominance320 in respect of the merging undertakings. Executed mergers 
might have to be disentangled or restorative measures can be imposed.321 Whilst 
there are no justifications for mergers that are found to impede on competition, the 
Commission can take inherent justifications322 into consideration when making its 
decisions on whether or not a merger impedes competition (Article 2 (1)). When as-
sessing a merger the Commission also assesses all related restrictions in one decision 
(Article 6 (1) (b) Merger Regulation). Differing from the regime under Articles 101 
                                                                                                                                          
of at least two undertakings is at least 25 million Euros and the individual Union turnover of at 
least two undertakings is at least 100 million Euros unless the undertakings involved achieve 
two-thirds of their Union turnover in only one Member State. The actual seat of an undertaking 
or the question of where their main activities take place is irrelevant. In addition, mergers of un-
dertakings which do not have a Union dimension, but would need to be reviewed under the na-
tional competition law of at least three Member States, can be reviewed by the Commission if 
the undertakings in question apply for the Commission to do so and the Member States do not 
object (Article 4 (5) Merger Regulation). Member States may also request the Commission to 
investigate a merger if they feel it has an effect on competition and trade between Member 
States (Article 22 Merger Regulation). On the other hand, mergers which do have a Union di-
mension can also be referred back to the Member States, if appropriate (Articles 9, 4 (4) Merger 
Regulation) and Member States can take necessary actions if legitimate national interest are at 
stake (article 21 (4) Merger Regulation and Article 346 TFEU.  
318 The Commission can also ask for modifications or impose conditions (Article 8 (2) Merger Regu-
lation).  
319 This is not deemed to be the case if the undertakings concerned have a market share below 25% 
(recital 32 Merger Regulation).  
320 Article 2 (3) Merger Regulation. A merger can lead to an undertaking achieving individual domi-
nance, undertakings achieving collective dominance (this would be given if the actors would not 
be able to execute independent market strategies without the other market players copying such 
strategies) or a merger can cause an oligopoly in a market in which unilateral effects of the 
merger can restrict competition. See further Furse (n 157) p. 391 seq, S Simon, '9. Teil. 
Fusionskontrollverordnung' in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff (eds), 
Kartellrecht (Beck, Munich 2009) paragraph 53 seq. 
321 See Furse (n 157) p. 402 seq. In this respect also see Furse (n 157) p. 401 seq on the problems 
which a wrongful Commission decision (whether clearance or prohibition) could cause, as dis-
entanglement or lost opportunities can cause high costs for the undertakings involved. 
322 See recital 29 Merger Regulation. See also Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ [2004] 
C 31/03 paragraph 76 seq, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ [2008] C 265/07 
paragraph 53 referring to the relevant section in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. For more on 
the weighing of pro- and anti-competitive effects see Furse (n 157) p. 398 seq. 
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and 102 TFEU, merger control does not fall under Regulation 1/2003 (Article 1 (2)), 
but the Merger Regulation sets out its own procedural rules.323  
Due to the requirement of a high common world turnover in EU merger con-
trol, HEI mergers will probably only exceptionally fall under the EU merger control 
regime.324 However, HEIs might more frequently be evaluated under national com-
petition law. Indeed, the OFT has already twice checked educational institutions in 
England, both times in Manchester. The merger between the City College Manches-
ter and the Manchester College of Arts and Technology has not been further investi-
gated as the relevant market shares were not met.325 The merger of the University of 
Manchester, the Victoria University of Manchester and the University of Manchester 
Institute of Science and Technology, however, was investigated further by the 
OFT.326 The OFT came to the conclusion that these institutions were, for the most 
part not competitors and, for those parts in which they were, there was still enough 
competition available and market entry would still remain possible. It therefore al-
lowed the merger. More generally one might assume, however, that an oligopolistic 
nature of the market might easily be given in certain scenarios depending on how the 
market is defined and that, in other cases, mergers could be prohibited (for example, 
ancient languages might be provided by only few universities, a merger of which 
then could be prohibited). With the further commodification of HEIs, the desire to 
join forces might increase and the application of EU or (more likely) national com-
petition law might then cause problems.  
3.3.5. State aid law  
 Article 107 (1) TFEU prohibits Member States from granting any aid involving 
state resources selectively to undertakings if this distorts competition and affects 
                                                 
323 For more on merger control see Furse (n 314) p. 380 seq, Horspool and Humphrey (n 240) p. 503, 
516 seq, Weatherill (n 231) p 534, Ward (n 251) p. 131, Amato and Farbmann (n 3) p. 9. 
324 The annual turnover of UK HEIs, for example, varies between less than £9 million and over £600 
million according to U Kelly, D McLellan and I McNicoll, The impact of universities on the UK 
economy (Fourth Report, Universities UK, London 2009) p. 7. Taking this as indicative for 
HEIs‟ annual turnovers, there would need to be at least five HEIs with a relatively high annual 
turnover each in a merger to meet the world turnover requirement. 
325 Case ME/3080/07 available on http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/2007/City. On 
the case also see Swennen (n 3) p. 277.  
326 Case ME/1613/04 available on http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/mergers_ea02/uompublish.pdf. 
On the case also see Swennen (n 3) p. 277, Gideon (n 144) p. 181. 
- 80 - 
 
trade between Member States. In addition to these elements of Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
the Commission requires a certain amount of appreciability thereby excluding de 
minimis aid of €200,000 over any period of three fiscal years from the scope of Arti-
cle 107 (1) TFEU.327 The concept of „aid‟ is much broader than direct subsidies in-
volving a wide spectrum of benefits for undertakings. The Court has taken an „ef-
fects based approach‟ which focuses solely on the effects on competition rather than 
analysing aims or causes of a certain measure.328 The criterion „transfer of public re-
sources‟ is, according to the Court, necessary to distinguish state aid from a mere 
advantage that an undertaking might have.329 Regarding the criterion of „selectivity‟ 
the aim of a measure, different from when determining whether or not a measure 
constitutes „aid‟, can be taken into consideration; if different treatments of undertak-
ings are justified by the general nature of a scheme, the measure is not regarded as 
selective.330 The criterion of „effects on intra-Union trade‟ is, as under the competi-
tion law provisions discussed above, a very broad concept.331 The Commission is-
sued a draft communication in this respect,332 providing for a simplified assessment 
procedure for certain activities including education, which, however, has never been 
followed up by a final document.333  
Member States are, however, allowed to invest their money, as long as this is 
not disguised state aid as well as to „buy‟ public services for their citizens. Accord-
                                                 
327 Commission Regulation 1998/2006/EC on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de 
minimis aid‟. The Regulation is due to expire at the end of 2013 and will be replaced by Regula-
tion XXXX/2013/EU on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union to de minimis aid (publication in the Official Journal foreseen on 24 
December 2013). The new De Minimis Regulation will retain the current de minimis ceiling.  
328 173/73 Italy v COM paragraph 13. 
329 E.g. C-189/91 Kirsammer-Hack paragraph 17 seq. The Commission also emphasises this in 
Communication on state aid and SGEIs (n 210) paragraph 31. 
330 173/73 Italy v COM paragraph 15. 
331 See, for example, T-55/99 CETM paragraph 86. 
332 Draft Commission Communication (2004) „A new framework for the assessment of State aid 
which has limited effects on intra-Community trade‟ available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/sit_let_en.pdf.  
333 On the state aid criteria see A Biondi and L Rubini, 'Aims, Effects and Justifications: EC State Aid 
Law and Its Impact on National Social Policy' in M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds), Welfare and 
EU Law (Hart, Oxford/Portland 2005) p. 80 seq, 102 seq, G von Wallenberg, 'Abschnitt 2. 
Staatliche Beihilfen' in E Grabitz, M Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen 
Union (Beck, Munich 2009) paragraph 35 seq. 
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ing to the „private investor principle‟ the former is not state aid, if the state acts as a 
private investor would have done. After some contradictory earlier judgements,334 
the approach towards public service compensation was clarified in the Court‟s 
Altmark335 decision. Four conditions need to be fulfilled for public service compen-
sations not to be regarded as state aid: The public service obligations must be clearly 
defined, the parameters on which the compensation is calculated must be transparent 
and must have been established in advance, the compensation must not be excessive 
and the costs included in the calculation of the compensation must themselves be 
reasonable. In order to establish the latter a public procurement procedure or an 
analysis of the normal price of such a service in this particular sector would have to 
be undertaken. Whilst the Altmark conditions have been applied strictly in fields such 
as transportation or energy, the General Court in BUPA336 followed a more indulgent 
approach regarding the establishment of a „public service obligation‟. Hatzopoulos337 
sees in this the possibility that the Union‟s judicial bodies only check for manifest 
errors in areas which concern the primary responsibility of the Member States which 
then might also affect HEIs.338 
                                                 
334 The Court initially did not regard public service compensation as state aid (240/83 ADBHU). The 
General Court then took a different approach and did consider such compensation as state aid, 
but then exempting it under Article 106 (2) TFEU (T-106/95 FFSA and T-46/97 SIC). The Court 
in C-53/00 Ferring upheld its original approach deeming public service compensation not as 
state aid unless exceeding the actual costs borne by the public service provision in which case 
the aid could then also not be exempted under Article 106 (2) TFEU, as it would not meet the 
proportionality requirement. This judgement received fierce criticism because it was felt that 
such an approach would move away from the effects based approach, that Article 106 (2) TFEU 
would lose its meaning, that the discretionary powers of the Commission to exempt certain aid 
under Article 107 (3) and 106 (2) TFEU would be severely limited and that the actual link be-
tween the public service obligation and the financing by the state was not sufficiently investi-
gated. It was also found that this approach makes it difficult to assess whether or not the com-
pensation exceeds the costs, as there was no necessity for the undertakings to keep the costs low. 
For more see further Biondi and Rubini (n 333) p. 93 seq, von Wallenberg (n 333) paragraph 17 
seq, Prosser 2005 (n 147) p. 554 seq. 
335 C-280/00 Altmark. 
336 T-289/03 BUPA. 
337 Hatzopoulos (n 179) p. 236 seq. 
338 On the „private investor principle‟ and public service compensation see Biondi and Rubini (n 333) 
p. 80 seq, 89 seq, von Wallenberg (n 333) paragraph 12 seq, Hatzopoulos (n 179) p. 228 seq, 
Gideon (n 144) p. 182 seq, Wendt and Gideon (n 154) p. 272, Huber and Prikoszovits (n 3) p. 
171. 
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The Commission followed up on the Altmark judgement by issuing clarifying 
legislation and communications. Directive 2006/111/EC339 requires separate ac-
counting for the public service obligations and Decision 2012/21/EU provides a 
block exemption for compensation below €15M per annum for SGEIs (except in the 
field of transport), for smaller air and sea ports, for hospitals and for SGEIs „meeting 
social needs as regards health and long term care, childcare, access to and reintegra-
tion into the labour market, social housing and the care and social inclusion of vul-
nerable groups‟.340 A Union Framework341 sets out guidelines of the Commission‟s 
position regarding exemptions under Article 106 (2) TFEU for state aid which is not 
covered by Decision 2012/21/EU and a Communication342 sets out the „key concepts 
underlying the application of the state aid rules to public service compensation‟. Ad-
ditionally, the Commission issued a de minimis Regulation for SGEIs which takes 
aid below €500,000 „over any period of three fiscal years‟ out of the scope of Article 
107 (1) TFEU.343  
Illegally granted state aid has to be paid back unless it can be exempted by Ar-
ticle 107 (2) and (3) TFEU. The Commission has the power to decide upon this. The 
approach towards these paragraphs is different from that taken towards Article 107 
(1) TFEU, which solely relies on economic analysis, since it involves broader as-
sessments of diverging factors.344 Article 107 (2) TFEU exempts aid with a social 
character for individual consumers, aid for recovery after natural catastrophes and 
aid for the German states affected by the division of Germany, none of which is of 
particular relevance for HEIs in general. Article 107 (3) provides for exemptions for 
aid for a) economically deprived regions, b) „an important project of common European 
                                                 
339 Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member 
States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings 
OJ [2006] L 318/17.  
340 SGEI Decision (n 199). This, however, only applies to public service compensation if the under-
taking has been entrusted with the public service for a maximum period of ten years.  
341 Commission Communication „European Union framework for State aid in the form of public ser-
vice compensation‟ OJ [2012] C 8/03. 
342 Communication on state aid and SGEIs (n 210) paragraph 3.  
343 Regulation 360/2012/EU on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of gen-
eral economic interest OJ [2012] L 114/12. 
344 See Biondi and Rubini, (n 333) p. 79 seq. 
- 83 - 
 
interest‟ or economic disturbances, c) the facilitation in the development of „certain eco-
nomic activities‟ or „certain economic areas‟, d) „culture and heritage conservation‟ and 
e) „other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council‟. Of these b)-
d), might in particular be helpful in exempting state aid for HEIs.345  
 The Commission has also issued secondary legislation providing for exemp-
tions.346 For HEIs, the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)347 might be help-
ful, as it contains an exemption for basic research348 of up to €20M per project with 
100% aid intensity, for applied research of up to €10M per project with 50% aid inten-
sity and for experimental research of up to €7.5M with 25% aid intensity.349 According 
to Article 5 of the General BER only transparent aid is exempted, however. The exemp-
tions provided for training activities in the General BER are not applicable to HEIs be-
cause they concern training for employees rather than the education of students.350 Most 
HEIs will also not be able to utilise the exemption for small and medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs), since SMEs, according to the definition in the GBER, are undertakings 
with 250 or less employees; usually too low a threshold for HEIs. As mentioned above, 
Decision 2012/21/EU provides an exemption for aid below €15M per annum for SGEI 
provision. Aid that does not fall under the named exemptions would have to be notified. 
With regards to the application of Article 107 (3) (b) and (c), the Research Framework 
provides some guidance on how the Commission will apply these to research and devel-
                                                 
345 See Gideon (n 144) p. 183 seq. 
346 A „Compilation of State aid rules in force‟ is available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/compilation/index_en.html.  
347 Commission Regulation 800/2008/EC declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common 
market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) OJ 
[2008] L 214/3. The GBER was due to expire at the end of 2013, but has been extended until 30
 
June 2014 (see Regulation 1224/2013/EU amending Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 as regards its 
period of application OJ [2013] L 320/22). The exemptions proposed in the draft for a revised 
GBER are similar to the guidance on applying the exemptions of Article 107 (3) currently con-
tained in the Research Framework mentioned below. The draft is available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_gber/gber_draft_regulation_en.pdf. 
348 The Commission uses the terms „fundamental research‟, „industrial research‟ and „experimental 
research‟. The definitions provided in the Research Framework (section 2.2.) for these terms 
lead to the conclusion that they are used in the same way as the terms „basic research‟, „applied 
research‟ and „experimental development‟ as defined by the OECD which are used for this thesis 
(n 35).  
349 GBER Articles 6, 30 seq. The amounts double if the project in question is a EUREKA project 
(Article 6 (e) (iv)). There are special provisions in the GBER for agricultural research and re-
search in the fisheries sector.  
350 Ibid Article 38.  
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opment activities in sections 4 and 5. The latter in particular removes the ceilings of the 
GBER for research and development if the aid intensities are adhered to, the other condi-
tions of that section are fulfilled and the aid has an incentive effect (section 6). The in-
centive effect must, according to the Framework, also be generally fulfilled for any 
aid to be exempted and the negative effects of the aid must not outweigh this incen-
tive effect (section 7).351  
3.3.5.1. Hidden aid 
 HEIs could get into conflict with Article 107 (1) TFEU if they conduct re-
search, teaching or knowledge transfer on a market and do not charge the full price 
for these services. This would thus require HEIs to use full costing for all such ac-
tivities since all unaccounted use of state facilities would constitute state aid either to 
the HEI itself or to the undertaking the HEI is providing the services for.352 Whilst 
there have been no cases regarding HEIs yet, the General Court had to deal with an 
action to annul a Commission decision regarding aid from a public research organi-
sation.353 Here 
‘the aid had come about as a result of the existence of commercial subsidiaries 
and the concurrent conclusion of exclusive agreements between those subsidi-
aries and the parent company, in so far as those subsidiaries did not guarantee 
total coverage of the costs of work carried out by […] [the public research or-
ganisation] on behalf of […] [the commercial subsidiaries]’.354 
The Commission had, however, exempted the measure, as it fulfilled the criteria for 
exemption under Article 107 (3) (c) TFEU as set out in an earlier version of the Re-
search Framework.355 In this case a competitor had challenged the decision which 
had been dismissed because the competitor was found not to have standing. The case 
shows, however, that public research organisations such as HEIs can come into the 
ambit of state aid law if they do not apply full costing to economic activities. To 
                                                 
351 See also on exemption for HEIs from the state aid provision Gideon (n 144) p. 183 seq, Huber and 
Prikoszovits (n 4) p. 172. 
352 See Gideon (n 144) p. 183 seq, Huber and Prikoszovits (n 4) p. 171 seq. In respect to hospitals see 
Hatzopoulos (n 179) p. 244 seq. 
353 T-198/09 UOP. 
354 Ibid paragraph 8. 
355 Community framework for State aid for research and development OJ [1996] C 45/5. 
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avoid this, a more economic mode of operation with separate accounting of eco-
nomic and non-economic activities and a full cost methodology would be necessary 
and the Research Framework indeed required implementation of such measures until 
January 2009 for research organisation to comply with it. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, this has still not necessarily entirely happened. Aside from this, full costing 
systems in themselves are not sufficient, but full cost plus reasonable profit would 
actually need to be charged for economic activities.  
3.3.5.2. Applying the Altmark criteria 
 If a market system is introduced in a Member State and therefore most of the 
services a HEI conducts need to be regarded as economic in nature, the Member 
State would also have to follow the Altmark356 criteria for these services. This would 
mean that if the Member State aims to pay certain providers to conduct these ser-
vices for the public, the Member State would normally need to commission these 
services in a public procurement procedure. If the Member State aims at having a 
system where it leaves the choice to the consumer and just pays the bill or gives out 
vouchers or other financial help to consumers to buy these services themselves, the 
consumer must also be able to choose the provider freely or choose from a range of 
providers which have been established according to objective criteria, normally in a 
public procurement procedure.  
 It has, for example, been recently reported that the UK government might be 
stepping back from making publicly funded student loans available to private pro-
viders of higher education due to those providers having recruited too many students 
and thus having brought the government in financial difficulties.357 After having, 
however, introduced a market system into higher education, it seems doubtful 
whether giving student loans only to students attending selective institutions does not 
constitute state aid under the EU state aid rules. The dangers of funding private pro-
viders have been widely discussed, though, and appear to be highlighted by the fi-
nancial difficulties now occurring.358  
                                                 
356 See text surrounding n 335 above. 
357 Malik, Adams and Ryan (n 294).  
358 Ibid. On the argument that economic services of HEIs need to be commissioned according to the 
Altmark rules see also Gideon (n 144) p. 183.  
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 The same is true for research services. If a research service can be classified as 
economic in nature, it must be commissioned according to objective criteria and it 
must be possible for public, private, third sector and foreign providers to apply. One 
might wonder if certain governmental funding programmes could fall under this 
category and whether they thus must be open for all undertakings to apply for them. 
This could then create a very different, more commercial character out of certain 
publicly funded research.  
3.3.5.3. Other possible forms of state aid 
 Another possibility where HEIs could get into conflict with the state aid rules 
might be given if students write their Masters or PhD theses with a private firm. In 
such cases a student writes his or her dissertation on a subject that interests the com-
pany and normally has a supervisor in the company as well as in the HEI.359 If the 
student is not or only marginally paid by the firm or even receives state funding, this 
could possibly be regarded as state aid. Furthermore, tax incentives provided only for 
some HEIs could be regarded as state aid. In England, for example, it has been dis-
cussed not to extend VAT exemptions to private providers due to the comprehensible 
reason that they are working for profit and do not reinvest resources into public in-
terest activities.360 Nevertheless, in a market based set-up this might amount to state 
aid, although it might be possible to employ the exemption of Article 106 (2) in such 
cases.  
3.3.6. Interim conclusion 
It has been shown that many activities conducted by HEIs could potentially be 
in conflict with EU competition and state aid law. The result would not only be that 
the actions would have to be discontinued, but, according to Article 23 and 24 of 
Regulation 1/2003, fines and periodic penalty payments until the infringement is 
stopped can be imposed. Additionally, the infringement of competition law could 
constitute a tort under national law and give rise to actions for damages. Thus, aside 
                                                 
359 This is, for example, increasingly popular in Germany. See Zander H, „Starthilfe‟ Der 
Tagesspiegel (26 April 2009) http://www.tagesspiegel.de/studium-starthilfe/1797792.html 
accessed 28 February 2012, Studieren.net, „Abschlussarbeit Teil 4‟ (2012) 
http://www.studieren.net/studienphase/studienabschluss/abschlussarbeit-teil-4.html accessed 28 
February 2012. 
360 UCU (n 284).  
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from the question of whether the application of EU competition law leads to the de-
struction of national policy concepts, it might also lead to financial problems. Facing 
an imposed fine the HEIs would have to cut back on their resources or increase 
prices (tuition fees, research costs and prices of other activities such as student ac-
commodation or meals) which would, either way, endanger their mission of provid-
ing high quality and equally accessible teaching and research in the public interest.361  
Of course, there might still be a possibility of exemption according to Article 
101 (3) and 107 (3) and secondary legislation or as SGEIs according to Article 106 
(2) TFEU. However, these might not apply in all cases. In particular, with regards 
SGEIs, the performance of the SGEI might not be seen as obstructed by the competi-
tion rules. Especially in systems such as the English one (which is consciously being 
turned into a market system) it might be difficult to then rely on Article 106 (2) 
TFEU.362 Even if the EU institutions might adopt a more careful approach regarding 
higher education, since this area is mainly the responsibility of the Member States, 
they might be stricter regarding research considering that, since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
this area is a shared responsibility, as has been explained in chapter 2. Additionally, 
since Regulation 1/2003 the enforcement of competition law is decentralised and 
therefore much depends on the NCAs. As the national case law examined in this 
chapter has shown NCAs were less reluctant to apply competition law to educational 
institutions.363  
3.4. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to conduct an in-depth legal doctrinal assessment 
of potential competition law constraints on HEIs. It has been shown that the main 
activities of HEIs, teaching and research, could, especially with increasing commodi-
fication, be regarded as economic in nature. This would then mean that HEIs would 
have to be regarded as undertakings and would have to comply with EU competition 
and state aid rules. Whilst this can potentially lead to positive results, especially in 
cases where a high degree of marketisation is already achieved and HEIs are actually 
                                                 
361 Similar Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 21, 24. 
362 Similar regarding health care markets see Wendt and Gideon (n 154) p. 274. 
363 Similar Greaves and Scicluna (n 3) p. 24. 
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acting in commercial way (as demonstrated in the price fixing case of the two Am-
sterdam universities), the application of competition law can also lead to detrimental 
effects in cases where the public service character of the services performed by HEIs 
still prevails. The analysis of individual competition provisions has shown that this 
can cause potential problems because the economic competition and state aid law 
provisions might clash with the public service nature of the teaching and research 
activities of HEIs. To avoid conflict HEIs would have to operate even more eco-
nomically by separating accounts for economic and non-economic activities, adher-
ing to full costing for teaching and research, refraining from price fixing even if it is 
to the advantage of the consumer and private providers would have to be treated 
equally. 
Additionally, fines for competition law infringements could be imposed and the 
question would arise of how or by whom these would be paid. With the decentralisa-
tion of competition law, NCAs would have to investigate cases regarding HEIs and 
they might be less reluctant to apply competition rules to them than EU institutions. 
As the BUPA case illustrates, EU institutions might treat HEIs cautiously, consider-
ing that higher education is still the main responsibility of the Member States. How-
ever, EU institutions might refrain from using caution when it comes to research 
which is now a shared responsibility as explained in chapter 2. While there are ex-
emptions for competition law infringements, these might not always apply. Even if 
they are applicable, they might require a more commercial way of operation for a 
measure to be proportionate. 
The legal doctrinal analysis of potential competition law constraints on HEIs in 
general provided in this chapter will serve as the basis for examining competition 
law constraints on research in HEIs in three Member States in more detail by em-
ploying socio-legal methods in the subsequent chapters. The next chapter will begin 
this examination by exploring the research systems of the three countries under scru-
tiny.  
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Chapter 4 
The structure of research funding in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK  
4.1. Introduction 
The last chapter concluded that HEIs may be classified as „undertakings‟ under 
EU competition law if they conduct services on a market. It has also been shown that 
requiring compliance from HEIs with the EU competition law regime may impact 
negatively on their public interest commitments. The final chapters of the thesis are 
dedicated to empirically examining university practices as well as the perceptions of 
key officers. By this research design the thesis aims to answer the questions of 
whether there is indeed increased exposure to EU competition law in countries where 
commodification of HEIs364 is further developed, what consequences such exposure 
might have and also whether professional actors in the field are aware of the risks.  
 Obviously, it is only possible to empirically analyse a small sample within the 
limited scope of a PhD thesis. The sample chosen here is research in (public) HEIs in 
Germany, England and the Netherlands. Research has been chosen as the area of 
analysis, because it is a particularly competitive field;365 not only do private and/or 
public HEIs compete with each other, but also other private and public research or-
ganisations conduct research. It is, therefore, to be expected that some research is 
conducted in a market setting, meaning that competition law can be applied. The 
three national systems chosen for comparison differ in terms of their welfare state 
models, which makes it likely that the degree to which university research has been 
commodified also differs. These differences will be relevant to the analysis of how 
EU competition law, which is analysed as an important element of EU economic 
law, impacts on the systems.  
                                                 
364 On commodification of HEIs see above section 1.3.3. Gradual commodification of European 
HEIs. 
365 See Enders, 'Reform and Change of German Research Universities' (2007) 4 Higher Education 
Forum 19 p. 19, B Candemir and M Meyer, 'Grossbritannien' in D Simon, A Knie and S Horn-
bostel (eds), Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010) p. 511. 
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In Esping-Andersen‟s categorisation of welfare states, which is based on the 
questions of how far they de-commodify, socially stratify and rely on the market and 
the family,366 Germany is categorised as conservative, the Netherlands as social de-
mocratic and the UK as liberal.367 A liberal system relies highly on the market with a 
low-degree of de-commodification and enables social stratification. A conservative 
system has a higher degree of de-commodification, but due to its conservative values 
it relies more on the family and retains social stratification. Finally, a social democ-
ratic system has a high degree of de-commodification, decreases social stratification 
and has no particular reliance on either the market or the family.368 Whilst in further 
research these categorisations have been confirmed, overwhelmingly for Germany 
and to a large extent for the UK, the Netherlands have been categorised in many dif-
ferent ways within and beyond Esping-Andersen‟s original categories.369 It has even 
been suggested that the Netherlands are uncategorisable.370  
If one turns towards the commodification of HEI systems, one can observe that 
each of these countries have been increasingly developed to react to market pressures 
and compete with commercial sector entities. Yet, the degree to which this com-
modification has progressed differs; England has progressed furthest along the path 
to commercialisation of the activities of its HEIs,371 whilst in Germany only the first 
steps have been taken in this direction.372 This positioning is also mirrored in the re-
actions of these Member States to the financial crisis. While Germany is amongst 
those states which have, inflation considered, increased spending on HEIs by 10% or 
more since 2008, the Netherlands are located amongst those having increased spend-
ing by only 1-5% and the UK is amongst the states which decreased spending by 
                                                 
366 Esping-Andersen 1990 (n 34) p. 26 seq. 
367 Ibid p. 52. 
368 Ibid p. 26 seq.  
369 For an overview see E Ferragina and M Seeleib-Kaiser, 'Welfare regime debate: past, present, 
futures?' (2011) 39 Policy & Politics 583.  
370 Ibid p. 591 with further references. 
371 Candemir and Meyer (n 365) p. 511. 
372 See D Jansen, 'Von der Steuerung zur Governance: Wandel der Staatlichkeit?' in D Simon, A Knie 
and S Hornbostel (eds), Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010) p. 43, J 
Enders (n 365) p. 19.  
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10% or more and is relying on high tuition fees for funding the HEI sector instead.373 
The different degrees of commodification might have different consequences as to 
the assessment of HEIs as „undertakings‟ and thus on the threats that might arise 
from competition law.  
At the same time, these Member States also represent very different govern-
ance structures. Germany is a federal republic and for this reason the organisation of 
research funding can vary between the federal states. Specific attention will be paid 
to the states of Bremen, Berlin, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, as these are the 
states in which the universities selected for the empirical study are located.374 The 
Netherlands, on the other hand, are governed in a centralised manner. Finally, the 
UK is a devolved state with four separate countries each with largely independent 
structures.375 As it would not be possible to analyse all four devolved countries here 
and since England has the highest degree of commodification regarding HEIs, only 
England, which itself has a rather centralised system of governance, will be ana-
lysed.  
In order to assess the relevance of competition law for HEI research in the 
three countries, it is necessary to provide an overview of their research systems 
which is the aim of this chapter. The subchapters will start with a general overview 
of the systems; the general funding streams and which entities conduct research will 
be introduced. They will proceed to a more in-depth examination of research in 
HEIs. Firstly, how far research in HEIs is an official public task and if there are any 
limitations as to privately funded research in HEIs will be assessed. Secondly, public 
funding of HEI research will be evaluated and the extent to which it is provided gen-
erically or on a project related basis will be identified. Thirdly, an overview of fund-
ing from non-public sources will be provided. Finally, how far full costing for re-
search is applied will be examined. The subchapters will end with an interim conclu-
sion integrating the results. The country specific subchapters will be followed by a 
                                                 
373 EUA, EUA's Public Funding Observatory (Spring 2013) (EUA, 2013) available on  
http://www.eua.be/Libraries/Governance_Autonomy_Funding/EUA_PFO_report_2013.sflb.ash
x p. 5, 7.  
374 On the selection of the universities see below chapter 5.  
375 It would go beyond the scope of the PhD to discuss differences and similarities between devolu-
tion and federalism. See further DL Horowitz, 'The Many Uses of Federalism' (2006-2007) 55 
Drake L. Rev 953.  
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tentative competition law analysis which will focus on research funded by national 
public, private and third sources (rather than by EU or international funding), as the 
thesis investigates EU competition law constraints on research in public HEIs as an 
example of tension between EU law and national public service concepts more gen-
erally. The chapter conclusion will then bring together the results for all three coun-
tries. 
4.2. England 
Among the three countries compared in this study, the UK is the one with the 
lowest expenditure on R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP); in 
2012 UK expenditure amounted to only 1.77% of its GDP. This expenditure has 
been relatively stable over the last ten years with the lowest (1.67% GDP) in 2004 
and the highest (1.82% GDP) in 2009.376 The system has been in state of reformation 
since the early 2000s.377 The relatively low spending (compared to the 3% target of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy)378 has been identified as a problematic area in the UK re-
search system, as have an insufficient capacity for attracting researchers and generat-
ing knowledge transfer between academic and commercial sectors, particularly with 
an eye on innovation.379 However, as a result of devolution, the governments of the 
devolved countries have significant freedom in devising their policies and budgets in 
devolved policy areas.380 As mentioned above, the focus here will be on England 
                                                 
376 EUROSTAT, 'Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD)' (2013)  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode
=t2020_20 accessed 8 December 2013. GERD is defined as the „total intramural expenditure on 
R&D performed within a country [from all sectors], funded nationally and from abroad but ex-
cludes payments for R&D performed abroad‟. See accompanying notes available on 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/t2020_20_esmsip.htm. Eurostat is, ac-
cording to these notes, following the OECD guidelines laid down in the Frascati Manual (n 35). 
The latter defines R&D as comprising basic and applied research as well as experimental devel-
opment (on these terms see n 35) conducted formally in R&D units and informally or occasion-
ally in other units (Frascati Manual p. 30).  
377 Candemir and Meyer (n 371) p. 496. 
378 See chapter 2 above.  
379 Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 496, Elsevier, International Comparative Performance of the UK 
Research Base - 2011 (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011) available on 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/science/docs/i/11-p123-international-comparative-
performance-uk-research-base-2011.pdf p. 5.  
380 Directgov, 'Devolved government in the UK' 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/governmentcitizensandrights/ukgovernment/devolvedgovernment/d
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where the trend has been towards less public funding and more commodification, 
especially after the change in government in 2010.381  
4.2.1. General overview 
The private sector is the most important research funder in the UK and its fund-
ing input increased steadily in real terms from 2000 to 2011 with only slightly lower 
spending in 2009 and 2010. The public sector (government, research councils, the 
higher education funding council and HEIs) is the second most important funder 
(32%), but foreign funding also plays a significant role (18%). The third sector con-
tributes about 5%.382 The private sector is also the most important research provider 
conducting an even higher share of the research than it finances (almost two thirds of 
all research) as the private sector receives significant foreign contributions and some 
public funding. HEIs are the second most important research provider, whilst less 
than 9% of all research is conducted by government institutions and research coun-
cils and only 1.8% by the third sector.383 Traditionally, military research has been 
very strong in the UK. While this has dropped considerably from 52% in 1960384 to 
7.5% in 2011385 the proportion of all research spending used on defence is still sig-
nificant. 
4.2.1.1. Public research 
The UK has a relatively long tradition of close links between public and private 
sector research and commercial use of publicly funded research.386 With decreasing 
                                                                                                                                          
g_073306 accessed 20th May 2012, HEFCE, Higher Education - Business and Community In-
teraction Survey 2010-11 (HEFCE, Bristol 2012) p. 8. 
381 UCU, 'Funding' (2012) http://www.ucu.org.uk/index.cfm?articleid=2088 accessed 20 May 2012. 
382 For a definition of the third sector see above n 153. 
383 Office for National Statistics, UK Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development, 
2011 (2013) available on http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_302928.pdf table 1, table 4. 
The Office for National Statistics is following the guidelines of the Frascati Manual (ibid p. 1 
seq).  
384 Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 496. 
385 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. For an overview of the decrease in defence spending 
since 2000 see ibid table 3 and 5. 
386 Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 505, 511. 
- 94 - 
 
public research funding since 2010 (in real terms),387 public research organisations 
are increasingly encouraged to attract external funding and to cooperate with indus-
try. Furthermore, research policy planning considers the needs of industry and the 
commercial sector also receives public support for research.388 
4.2.1.1.1. The governmental structure 
The main accountability for research policy lies with the Department for Busi-
ness, Innovation and Skills (BIS) within which the Minister of State for Universities 
and Science is responsible for UK research and English HEIs, as the latter is a de-
volved policy area.389 Alongside the BIS, other departments might issue research 
policies concerning their remit. Advice for the government is provided by the Gov-
ernment Office for Science through the Government Chief Scientific Advisor and 
independent advice can be obtained from the Council for Science and Technology. 
Policy review is undertaken by the relevant parliamentary select committees in both 
houses. The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology as well as all-
parliamentary groups function as sources of information.390  
Public sector funding is also provided directly through research councils, 
through higher education funding councils and HEIs themselves contribute their own 
resources for research activities. The majority of direct governmental funding goes to 
the private sector and governmental research institutions. The research councils 
mainly fund HEIs and research in own institutes. The higher education funding 
councils only funds research in HEIs. HEIs use their own resources to support the 
research they conduct, but they also, to a limited extent, contribute to research by 
councils, the third sector and governmental institutions.391 Whilst direct governmen-
tal funding for research has decreased since 2000, funding provided by research 
                                                 
387 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 4, Research Information Network, Government and 
research policy in the UK: an introduction - A guide for researchers (Research Information 
Network, London 2010) p. 4. 
388 See Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 505 seq. 
389 Research Information Network (n 387), BIS, 'History' (2012) http://www.bis.gov.uk/about/who-
we-are/history accessed 21 May 2012, Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 500 seq. 
390 Research Information Network (n 387) p. 6 seq, 14 seq. 
391 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. 
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councils, higher education funding councils and HEIs has increased. However, since 
2010, this situation has been reversed.392 
Most public funding in England is administered by the Higher Education Fund-
ing Council for England (HEFCE) and the seven research councils. The HEFCE 
provides generic funding and the research councils (organised into Research Coun-
cils UK (RCUK)) provide competitive public funding. The Technology Strategy 
Board is responsible for technology and innovation and the National Endowment for 
Science, Technology and the Arts for long term strategy.393 Finally, academies and 
learned societies such as the British Academy and the Royal Society also play roles 
in the research system. Despite being partly publicly funded, they are independent 
scholarly institutions which offer advice to government and provide funding for re-
search.394  
4.2.1.1.2. Public research organisations 
The 166 UK HEIs, almost 80% of which are located in England,395 are the 
most important public research providers and the amount of research conducted by 
them has increased steadily since 2000.396 Whilst there are a number of specialised 
HEIs, England, unlike the other two countries under scrutiny, no longer maintains a 
binary HEI system. The separation between vocational HEIs and universities was 
abolished in the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 (FHEA). The HEI sector is 
rather heterogeneous with regards to student numbers, income397 and research-
teaching focus.398 Unlike many continental HEIs, English public HEIs „are legally 
                                                 
392 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 4.  
393 Research Information Network (n 387) p. 10 seq, HEFCE, 'Our relationship to Government' 
(2012) http://www.hefce.ac.uk/about/intro/wip/ourrelationshiptogovernment/ accessed 23 May 
2012.  
394 Research Information Network (n 387) p. 13. 
395 Kelly, McLellan and McNicoll (n 324) p. 7.  
396 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 2. 
397 See further Universities UK, Higher education in facts and figures (Universities UK, London 
2012) p. 16.  
398 On HEIs in the UK see Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 500, 505, 509 seq, Kelly, McLellan and 
McNicoll (n 324) p. 7 seq, Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 1.22, P Zoontjes, 'Protecting 
'university' as a designation - analysis and comparison of the legal position in several countries' 
(2010) 11 Education Law Journal 117 p. 123, P Scott, 'Structural Changes in Higher Education - 
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independent entities and are classified [traditionally] as non-profit institutions‟.399 
However, Privy-Council involvement is required for their creation and government 
influence is asserted to a large extent through the public funding they receive. De-
spite officially being completely independent, English HEIs therefore, as Palfreyman 
puts it, „are in practice [...] closely Government-regulated via its Higher Education 
Funding Council “quango” and are depressingly weak in terms of asserting their po-
tential independence‟.400  
Before the move towards privatisation during the Thatcher government, there 
were a variety of other public research organisations, especially in the field of mili-
tary research.401 Today there are only a limited number of other public institutions 
conducting research. Among them are research institutes in research councils which 
carry out 3.8% of all research in the UK.402 All the remaining public research institu-
tions together conduct just 4.8% of all UK research.403  
4.2.1.2. Non-public research  
The private sector is the largest funding contributor and conducts the most re-
search. For this, the sector receives significant overseas funding. The funding pro-
vided by the sector finances (in order of relevance) their own research, HEI research, 
governmental research, research in the third sector and research in research coun-
cils.404  
International and third sector funding contributions altogether amount to almost 
a quarter of all research funding in the UK. Funding from both sources has increased 
since 2000. Most third sector funding is used for research in HEIs. The third sector 
plays a less significant role as a provider of research services with just 1.8% of all 
research in the UK being conducted by the sector. International funding is mainly 
                                                                                                                                          
The Case of the United Kingdom' in D Palfreyman and T Tapper (eds), Structuring Mass Higher 
Education (Routledge, New York/London 2009) p. 42 seq. 
399 Kelly, McLellan and McNicoll (n 324) p. 8.  
400 D Palfreyman, 'The English chartered university/college: how 'autonomous', how 'independent' 
and how 'private'?' (2003) 15 Education and the Law 149. 
401 Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 506.  
402 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1.  
403 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1, p. 6 seq. 
404 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. 
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received by the private sector, followed by HEIs.405 The utilisation of international 
funding has been identified as a government priority406 and there is a special unit 
dedicated to this within the Government Office for Science.407 The importance of EU 
funding has recently been highlighted by the British Academy who have warned the 
government that its current negative EU policy and the connected potential loss of 
funding from this source could have very damaging consequences for the UK‟s re-
search base.408 
4.2.2. Research in public HEIs 
As has been mentioned above, English HEIs are not public institutions in the 
same way as many of their continental counterparts. The complicated relationship 
between the public and the private in English HEIs has become even more difficult 
with English policy on HEIs increasingly leaning towards commercialisation and 
internationalisation. The increase of business style administration in governance and 
the encouragement of financial independence in recent years also contributes to these 
difficulties.409  
4.2.2.1. Research as a statutory task of HEIs 
The law governing HEIs in England is to be found within a vast variety of 
sources.410 Most important among these are the Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA), 
the FHEA, the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998, the Higher Education Act 
2004 and the Education Act 2011 which changed/amended some of the earlier 
Acts.411 ERA states in s 124 that „a higher education corporation shall have the 
                                                 
405 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1, 4.  
406 Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 507. 
407 Research Information Network (n 387) p. 6. 
408 British Academy, 'British Academy raises concerns over the future of EU research funding' (2013) 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/news/news.cfm/newsid/860 accessed 8 February 2013.  
409 Kelly, McLellan and McNicoll (n 324) p. 3, 7 seq, Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 1.01 
seq, 3.01, 4.01 seq, Zoontjes (n 398) p. 123 seq. 
410 For an overview see Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 1.04. 
411 The latest policy changes for HEIs will, apparently, not be introduced by a comprehensive act, but 
by executive measures only. See University and College Union, 'UCU politics monthly - June 
2012 - Response to HE consultation' (2012) 
http://www.ucu.org.uk/index.cfm?articleid=6194#wmin accessed 29 June 2012. 
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power [...] to carry out research and to publish the results of the research‟. FHEA 
states in s 65 that  
‘activities eligible for funding [...] [by the HEFCE] are (a) the provision of 
education and the undertaking of research by higher education intuitions in 
the council’s area, (b) the provision of any facilities, and the carrying on of 
any other activities […] for the purpose of or in connection with education or 
research, [...] (d) the provision by any person of services for the purposes of, 
or in connection with, the provision of education or the undertaking of re-
search’. 
 Research thus appears to be an activity which HEIs may carry out and receive 
funding for, but not a statutorily required task. Indeed, conducting of research does 
not appear to be part of the definition of a public HEI or even of a university.412  
According to s 68 (1) FHEA the „Secretary of State may make grants to [...] 
[the HEFCE] of such amounts and subject to such terms and conditions as he may 
determine‟. The HEFCE then, if applicable, passes the latter on to HEIs and can at-
tach its own terms and conditions (s 65 (3) FHEA).413 However, s 68 (3) provides 
that the terms and conditions imposed upon the HEFCE by the Secretary of State 
„may not be framed by reference to particular courses of study or programmes of re-
search (including the contents of such courses or programmes and the manner in 
which they are taught, supervised or assessed)‟. Furthermore, s 202 (2) ERA requires 
University Commissioners „to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the 
law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and contro-
versial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their 
jobs or privileges‟. These provisions seem to limit external steering of research in 
favour of academic freedom. Quantitative restrictions of research do not seem to ex-
ist by statute. 
4.2.2.2. Public research funding  
There are three main research funding streams for English HEIs; they receive 
generic funding from the HEFCE, project/programme related funding from research 
councils and funding from other sources. The first two are public funding streams 
                                                 
412 See on these definitions Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 3.01 seq, 3.05 seq. 
413 On the powers of the government and HEFCE see further Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 
4.16 seq. 
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and known as the „dual support system‟. They comprise the majority of research 
funding for HEIs.414 Funding allocation through the dual support system contains 
competitive elements tending to concentrate funding in a small number of institu-
tions. While this seems to have improved the competitiveness of UK HEIs, it has 
also been criticised for potentially overlooking high quality research in those HEIs 
which are not generally regarded as research intensive institutions.415 Funding from 
outside the dual support system is also increasingly gaining in importance. It com-
prises additional competitive public (e.g. specific programmes from the HEFCE in 
addition to the generic HEFCE funding)416 as well as private, third sector and inter-
national (especially EU) funding.417 
4.2.2.2.1. Public generic funding (HEFCE) 
Higher education funding council funding amounts to less than a third of all re-
search funding for HEIs in the UK.418 It receives its budget, and directions on how to 
distribute it directly from the BIS. HEIs funded by the HEFCE need to comply with 
the requirements set out in the HEFCE‟s financial memoranda which inter alia set 
out rules on transparency, efficiency and accountability (including the use of full 
costing for all activities) as well as requiring the institutions to follow statutes and 
comply with quality assurance standards.419  
Even the generic funding the HEFCE distributes (also referred to as „recurrent 
funding‟) is calculated using partly competitive parameters. In the „main research 
funding method‟ (or „mainstream quality-related research funding‟, for short „main-
stream QR‟) it is first determined how much money will be spent on a certain subject 
in general. The amount to be given to an individual HEI is then calculated on the ba-
sis of research volume, costs, governmental priorities and research quality. The latter 
                                                 
414 Higher education funding council funding and research council funding amount to 59.5% of all 
research funding for HEIs in the UK. Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1.  
415 J Adams and K Gurney, 'Funding selectivity, concentration and excellence - how good is the UK's 
research?' (Higher Education Policy Institute, Oxford 2010) p. 1 seq. 
416 E.g. for knowledge transfer. See further HEFCE (n 380) p. 24. 
417 See on the funding streams Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 509, Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) 
para 1.01, Kelly, McLellan and McNicoll (n 324) p. 8 seq, 21, Adams and Gurney (n 415) p. 1. 
418 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. 
419 See HEFCE (n 393), Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 4.22 seq, 4.30 seq. 
- 100 - 
 
is estimated on the basis of a peer review mechanism called Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE). From 2015/2016 onwards, the outcomes of a new mechanism, the 
Research Excellence Framework (REF), will be used to inform generic funding dis-
tribution.420 The REF will, next to quality of output and environment (measured in 
vitality and sustainability), also take research impact into consideration.421 HEIs can 
freely administer generic funding. In addition to „mainstream QR‟, the HEFCE allo-
cates recurrent funding for PhD supervision based numbers, supports charity funded 
research by paying overhead costs, rewards private sector research and supports na-
tional research libraries. Previously, funding had been provided for HEIs which 
faced significant changes in recurrent funding, but this will now only be provided in 
very exceptional cases.422 Finally, the HEFCE runs additional programmes such as 
the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF, also referred to as Third Stream Fund-
ing), which aims at encouraging knowledge transfer,423 and non-recurrent „special 
funding and earmarked capital grants‟.424 
4.2.2.2.2. Public competitive funding 
27.8% of funding of research carried out in HEIs in the UK is contributed by 
the research councils.425 They are increasingly under pressure to justify the research 
they fund with public money. National priorities determined by government can, 
                                                 
420 REF, 'Research Excellence Framework' (2012) http://www.ref.ac.uk/ accessed 23rd May 2012. 
421 REF, 'Assessment criteria and level definitions' (2012) 
 http://www.ref.ac.uk/panels/assessmentcriteriaandleveldefinitions/ accessed 16 December 2012. 
The inclusion of impact into the assessment has been strongly criticised by academics (BBC 
News, 'Top scientists attack funding plan' BBC News (4 December 2009) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/8392817.stm accessed 4 December 2009). A recent survey 
also reveals employment issues as well as general concerns about the suitability of the REF 
(UCU, The Research Excellence Framework (REF) - UCU Survey Report (UCU, 2013) avail-
able on http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/0/q/REF-survey-report-September-2013.pdf).  
422 HEFCE, Recurrent grants and student number controls for 2012-13 (HEFCE, Bristol 2012) p. 6, 
21 seq. 
423 See further PACEC and the Centre for Business Research (University of Cambridge), Evaluation 
of the effectiveness and role of HEFCE/OSI third stream funding (HEFCE, Bristol 2009).  
424 See on HEFCE funding HEFCE, Guide to funding - How HEFCE allocates its funds (HEFCE, 
Bristol 2010) p. 10, 41 seq, 49, HEFCE (n 393), HEFCE (n 380) p. 23, Farrington and Palfrey-
man (n 10) para 4.22 seq, 4.30 seq. 
425 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. 
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therefore, play a role in research councils establishing their funding priorities.426 Re-
search councils funding is project/programme specific and distributed on a competi-
tive basis. The assessment of which projects will receive funding is undertaken by 
peer review. Funding through research councils has gained in importance in the last 
twenty years in comparison to HEFCE funding.427 As mentioned above, HEIs also 
receive limited governmental funding from other institutions including ministries, 
local authorities and the NHS. Funding from these bodies is often more similar to 
research contracts.428  
4.2.2.3. Non-state funding 
Funding from outside the dual support system is gaining in importance and 
comprises of mainly third sector and foreign (especially EU) funding, but also pri-
vate sector funding and the additional specific public competitive funding streams 
mentioned above.429 Third sector funding in particular has increased in recent 
years,430 but also private sector funding, though it currently makes up a smaller 
share,431 has gained in importance432 and „looks to be permanently embedded within 
many HEIs‟.433 Strategic aims such as „local partnerships‟ and „supporting SMEs‟ 
                                                 
426 In this respect the academic furore following the „order‟ that the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council study the government‟s „big society‟ policy made the news ( offey D, „Academic fury 
over order to study the big society‟ guardian.co.uk (27th March 2011) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/mar/27/academic-study-big-society accessed 29th 
March 2011).  
427 On the research councils see RCUK, 'Government Funding' (2012) 
 http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/about/Aboutrcs/Pages/Governmentfunding.aspx accessed 23 May 2012, 
Department of Finance, 'How finance works ... in the Higher Education Sector' (University of 
Sheffield 2012)  
http://www.shef.ac.uk/finance/staff-
information/howfinanceworks/higher_education/funding_of_research accessed 30 November 
2012, Candemir and Meyer (n 377) p. 510, DC Berry, Gaining Funding for Research (Open 
University Press, Berkshire 2010) p. 5, 27, 31. 
428 Department of Finance (n 427).  
429 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. 
430 HEFCE (n 380) p. 3.  
431 Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1. 
432 HEFCE (n 380) p. 2 seq.  
433 PACEC, Strengthening the Contribution of English Higher Education Institutions to the Innova-
tion System: Knowledge Exchange and HEIF Funding (PACEC, Cambridge 2012) p. 2.  
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are partly supported by government or EU funding. HEIs sometimes also form asso-
ciations in order to encourage and facilitate private sector interaction.434 
Private sector funding reaches HEIs in a variety of ways. In research co-
operations, the partners commonly explore a topic on a long term basis. This form of 
collaboration in particular has gained in importance and is popular, since it can lead 
to the generation of new ideas and directions of research for both sides. Contract re-
search and consultancy services have also gained in importance. Here the work is 
commissioned by the external partners who specify the aim to be achieved. It is 
therefore a plain business transaction rather than a mutual relationship. HEIs also 
rent out infrastructure such as specialised laboratories, equipment or prototypes to 
the private sector. Whilst this form of collaboration is less common, it is an eco-
nomically efficient way to use infrastructure and it is claimed that such transactions 
can also help with „relationship building‟.435 
Another form of private sector collaboration is the commercial use of IPRs. In-
come from this source has risen significantly in recent years, even though it is not as 
high as that from research in the previously mentioned forms of collaboration.436 The 
details of who owns rights depend on the contractual relations between, for example, 
the HEI and its staff or between the HEI and an external collaborator. Regarding the 
former, if no terms in the employment contract explicitly specify the question, it is 
usually assumed that implied contract terms grant the IPR to the employer. For pat-
entable inventions the same is specified in the Patents Act, but it seems that staff are 
commonly rewarded for patentable inventions.437 Regarding copyright, it is general 
practice that HEIs leave these to the academics.438 When it comes to external col-
laborations, the assumption is that the external party retains the rights. This is also 
the general assumption for students creating IPRs. HEIs usually do not exploit the 
                                                 
434 HEFCE (n 380) p. 9, 11. Howells J, Nedeva M and Georghiou L, Industry-Academic Links in the 
UK (HEFCE/University of Manchester, Manchester 1998) p. 92, 96.  
435 On these collaborative forms see HEFCE (n 380) p. 4 seq, 12 seq, Howells, Nedeva and Geor-
ghiou (n 434), M Abreu et al, Universities, Business and Knowledge Exchange (The Council for 
Industry and Higher Education and the Centre for Business Research (University of Cambridge), 
London 2008), Kelly, McLellan and McNicoll (n 324) p. 8.  
436 HEFCE (n 380) p. 5 seq. 
437 According to HEFCE (n 380) p. 11 this is true for 84% of HEIs. 
438 Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 14.36. 
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IPRs themselves, but sell them or a license for them to external parties. Some HEIs 
involve private parties to assist them in this process, set up exploitation companies or 
cooperate with other HEIs for this purpose. It has also become increasingly popular 
to exploit IPRs through spin-offs for a certain kind of research. External investors are 
also sometimes involved in spin-offs and these might, at a later stage, be sold.439  
HEIs might also set up new companies beyond spin-offs. Such companies are 
usually external to the HEI, but, depending on the individual case, they might be 
more or less controlled by it. Sometimes these companies can also be joint ventures 
with other partners. Income generated through such companies has increased in re-
cent years. Though less common, HEIs also collaborate with the private sector 
through staff exchanges. The partner in such an exchange might also be a start-up 
grown out of the university, particularly if it was the entrepreneurial activity of a 
member of research staff which led to setting up the company in the first place. An-
other form of interaction is taking place through private sector funding for chairs or 
fellowships/lectureships.440 
Science parks are spaces dedicated to certain research fields in which relevant 
institutions can establish themselves, allowing easier access between institutions. 
Synergies are facilitated in such parks and they might function as incubators for new 
companies. Science parks are most often owned by HEIs or local authorities and 
only occasionally by private sector companies. Another form of interaction is 
through research clubs or networks. These can merely be dissemination and ex-
change platforms, clubs which are free for academic members who can bring pro-
posals to the attention of the private sector and for which private sector companies 
                                                 
439 On exploitation of IPRs by HEIs see Farrington and Palfreyman (n 10) para 14.31 seq, Kelly, 
McLellan and McNicoll (n 324) p. 8, HEFCE (n 380) p. 3 seq, 10 seq, 14 seq, Howells, Nedeva 
and Georghiou (n 434) p. 12, 35 seq, 79, Elsevier (n 379) p. 72 seq, Abreu et al (n 435). See also 
on IPR exploitation and recommendations to streamline this P Wellings, Intellectual property 
and research benefits (Lancaster University, 2008) available on 
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/HE-int-property-research-benefits.pdf.  
440 See on these interaction forms HEFCE (n 380) p. 6, 11, 17, Howells, Nedeva and Georghiou (n 
434) p. 35 seq, 52 seq, 79, Elsevier (n 379) p. 72, 76 seq, Abreu et al (n 435) p. 12, 15, 57, 
PACEC (n 433) p. 5. 
- 104 - 
 
have to pay, or clubs which uphold a limited number of research facilities for spe-
cific projects.441 
4.2.2.4. Full costing 
Due to rising non-generic funding, sustainable costing of research became im-
portant in the 1990s and the Transparent Approach to Costing (TRAC) was estab-
lished centrally in England.442 It includes an annual reporting process (annual 
TRAC) and a full costing approach (TRAC fEC, introduced in 2004) as well as a 
special approach for FP7 projects (TRAC EC-FP7). TRAC fEC adds indirect costs 
on the basis of what has been reported through annual TRAC to the calculation of 
direct and directly allocated costs, thus allowing researcher time, support staff time 
and infrastructure costs to be included in project calculations. Having arrived at the 
full costs this way, these are, in a final step, „adjusted for pay increments and infla-
tion‟.443 
Research councils fund at a rate of 80%, while other public non-generic fund-
ing is provided at 100% of full cost. With regards to non-public funding, prices are 
negotiated individually or the funders have their own funding rules. However, TRAC 
fEC provides HEIs with knowledge about the full costs which they can take into 
consideration.444 Since the introduction of TRAC has already led to more sustainable 
financial arrangements, a next step of using the information achieved through it to 
cut costs is planned.445 However, there has also been criticism from research councils 
                                                 
441 On these interaction forms see HEFCE, A guide to UK higher education (HEFCE, Bristol 2009) p. 
30, Howells, Nedeva and Georghiou (n 434), Abreu et al (n 435) p. 15, 54, 57. 
442 J M Consulting Ltd, 'Transparent Approach to Costing (TRAC) Guidance' (Joint Costing and Pric-
ing Steering Group, 2005 (last updated 2012)) http://www.jcpsg.ac.uk/guidance/index.htm ex-
ecutive summary para 2 seq, part I, section A para 1 seq, T Estermann and A-L Claeys-Kulik, 
Financially Sustainable Universities - Full Costing: Progress and Practice (EUA, Brussels 
2013) p. 51 seq, HEFCE, 'Background to financial sustainability' (2012) 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/lgm/trac/background/ accessed 13 September 2012. 
443 J M Consulting Ltd (n 442) executive summary para 4 seq, 10 seq, 19 seq, part I, section A para 1, 
3 seq, 15 seq, 26, HEFCE (n 442). For more detail on the calculation of „TRAC fEC‟ see J M 
Consulting Ltd (n 442) part V. 
444 See HEFCE (n 442), J M Consulting Ltd (n 442) executive summary para 5, 8, 10 seq, part I, sec-
tion A para 21 seq, 38, Department of Finance (n 427). 
445 RCUK/UUK Task Group, Financial Sustainability and Efficiency in Full Economic Costing of 
Research in UK Higher Education Institutions (UUK, London 2010), in particular, p. 4 seq and 
annex C. On the increased sustainability of finances through TRAC see also J M Consulting Ltd 
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pointing out that projects become much more expensive than predicted and academ-
ics complaining that their projects themselves do not seem to be better supported, but 
that the additional funding is „disappearing into the university‟.446 Third sector or-
ganisations simply refer to their mission statements in denying paying full costs and 
private sector companies try to use their negotiating power to cut prices.447 There is 
thus a real, if residual, danger that private research is not funded at least at full cost 
levels and that public resources are, therefore, used to make up the difference.  
4.2.3. Interim conclusion on England 
Neither the Lisbon/Europe2020 target of 3% GDP nor the economic crisis ap-
pear to have had a significant influence on overall research spending in the UK 
which has neither significantly increased nor decreased over the last ten years. Gen-
erally, the private sector is providing the majority of the funding, even though the 
difference with other funders is not very significant. Government is the second larg-
est funder and foreign funding also plays an important role. The private sector con-
ducts most of the research for which it receives significant foreign funding. Govern-
mental research is mainly taking place in HEIs; other public research organisations 
play a smaller role. While the third sector has a role to play as a funder, it only con-
ducts a small percentage of the overall research in the UK. The lack of knowledge 
transfer and innovation has been identified as a cause for concern and the system is 
constantly being reformed.  
The English system of funding HEI research is very competitive. Even the ge-
neric funding provided through the HEFCE is based on competitive assessment448 
which, in the future, will include the impact of research as a condition for funding. 
The HEFCE also rewards HEIs who attract external funding. Furthermore, generic 
                                                                                                                                          
(n 442) executive summary para 8 seq, part I, section A para 5 seq, Estermann and Claeys-Kulik 
(n 442) p. 52.  
446 Z Corbyn, 'Cheques and balances' THE (19 June 2008)  
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=402420 accessed 2 May 2009. 
447 Ibid. Some of these problems had already been foreseen shortly before the introduction of fEC. 
See, for example, N Williams, 'Research costing plans raise fears' (2004) 14 Current Biology 73. 
448 For an analysis of the „relationship between the state, the funding councils and the universities‟ in 
the current system see O Filippakou, B Salter and T Tapper, 'Compliance, resistance and seduc-
tion: reflections on 20 years of the funding council model of governance' (2010) 60 Higher Edu-
cation 543.  
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funding constitutes less than a third of all research funding for HEIs in the UK. The 
research councils provide less than 30% and involve governmental steering.449 Other 
public research funding is received from government institutions, often taking the 
form of research contracts. Therefore, unless they have own resources,450 HEIs need 
to seek the rest of their research funding from private, third sector and foreign 
sources. It might be assumed that such funds focus on the particular interests of these 
funders. The academic freedom of the researcher to research into any area of his or 
her choice seems to be somewhat limited by this and a fierce competition for limited 
resources takes place.451 Due to this competitive approach TRAC fEC has been in-
troduced early, but there nevertheless still seems to be some ambiguity in costing. 
4.3. The Netherlands 
Research spending in the Netherlands is, at 2.16% of its GDP in 2012, slightly 
higher than in England. Spending has fluctuated over the last ten years with 1.77% 
its lowest point in 2007 and its highest point in 2012.452 The Netherlands research 
system is a consociational system, characterised by involvement of a wide variety of 
actors in policy setting processes. On the one hand, this allows using synergies. On 
the other hand, it can result in slow decision making processes.453 Despite the fact 
that research in the Netherlands is doing well when it comes to performance indica-
tors such as the number of publications and citations and general attractiveness of the 
                                                 
449 According to PACEC (n 433) 80% of HEIs stated they are „taking steps to align with key national 
priorities of research councils‟.  
450 HEIs own contributions amount to about 4% (Office for National Statistics (n 383) table 1) and 
are assumably mainly making up for funders not providing full costs.  
451 For an early critical voice on this see H Willmoth, 'Managing the academics: Commodification 
and control in the development of university education in the UK' (1995) 48 Human Relations 
993.  
452 EUROSTAT (n 376). 
453 B van der Meulen, 'The Netherlands' in D Simon, A Knie and S Hornbostel (eds), Handbuch Wis-
senschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010) p. 516 seq, 526, B Jongbloed, 'The Netherlands' 
in DD Dill and FA van Vught (eds), National innovation and the academic research enterprise: 
public policy in global perspective (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2010) p. 287, M 
Braun, Country Profile: The Netherlands (Private Sector Interaction in the Decision Making 
Process of Public Research Policies, proneos, Bad Camberg 2006) p. 5 seq, L Leisyte, 'Univer-
sity commercialisation policies and their implementation in the Netherlands and the United 
States' (2011) 38 Science and Public Policy 437 p. 441, 446. 
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system,454 a number of challenges have been identified. These include the lack of 
elite institutions, the need to strengthen private sector research, to set research priori-
ties with practical relevance, to coordinate policies, to increase innovation and use 
European funding streams.455 The Dutch research system has, therefore, recently un-
dergone some changes towards creating excellence, impact agendas, commercialisa-
tion and strengthening of institutional autonomy combined with external steering.456 
4.3.1. General overview 
About 50% of research conducted in the Netherlands is financed by the private 
sector, 36% by the public sector, 11% from abroad and 3% from the third sector.457 
Whilst there was a dip in private sector funding in 2009, attributed to the financial 
crisis,458 private sector funding has been on the highest level since 1999 in 2011. 
Public funding has continuously increased.459 Measured in funding received, the pri-
vate sector also conducts most of the research (56%), followed by HEIs (33%). The 
latter‟s funding has gone down slightly from 2009. All other institutions (public and 
third sector) put together only conduct 11% of all research in the Netherlands.460  
                                                 
454 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 515, Euraxess, 'The Netherlands - Research' (2010) 
http://www.euraxess.nl/research accessed 5 March 2013 section „Excellent reputation‟, B 
Mostert, Country Fiche Netherlands (ERAWATCH, 2012) available on 
http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/information/country_pages/nl/country?tab=c
ountry&country=nl (n 452) p. 1, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 312 seq.  
455 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 515, 518, 525, Mostert (n 454), Jongbloed (n 453) p. 293, 314, 318 seq, 
Braun (n 453) p. 5.  
456 L Leisyte, J Enders and H De Boer, 'The Freedom to Set Research Agendas - Illusion and Reality 
of the Research Units in the Dutch Universities' (2008) 21 Higher Education Policy 377, p. 377, 
Mostert (n 454) p. 4 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 318 seq. 
457 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Research en development; financiering uitgaven per sector 
van uitvoering (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen 2013). According to the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (official English name: Statistics Netherlands) R&D includes 
basic and applied research as well as development defined similar to the definitions in the Fras-
cati Manual (explanatory note belonging to the table section 2). 
458 Mostert (n 454) p. 3. 
459 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457), Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek, Herkomst en bestemming middelen voor Research en development (R&D) 
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen 2011). 
460 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). 
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4.3.1.1. Public research 
In line with the nature of a consociational system, public research in the Neth-
erlands is characterised by a multiplicity of actors involved in both policy setting and 
conducting research. Most public funding goes to research in HEIs (72%), but the 
public sector also contributes to research in other institutions.461 Whilst the public 
sector still provides most funding generically,462 there is also a large variety of com-
petitive project funding streams. Furthermore, there have been quite a few competi-
tive institutional funding schemes which have led to the creation of new research 
performing entities.463  
4.3.1.1.1. The governmental structure 
Research policy is mainly coordinated by the Ministry for Education, Culture 
and Sciences (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, OCW) and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, EZ). The former 
is focussed on basic research and is responsible for the research system in general 
and for funding universities and various other research organisations. The EZ‟s in-
volvement, which has increased over recent years, lies mainly in the areas of tech-
nology, innovation and agricultural research where it follows a more „hands-on‟ ap-
proach. Other ministries might be involved as concerns their remit. Ministers coordi-
nate their efforts in the Council for Economic Affairs, Infrastructure and Environ-
ment (Raad voor Economische Zaken, Infrastructuur en Milieu) and parliament is 
reviewing the government‟s policy for which purpose both houses have dedicated 
commissions.464 Advice on research policies is provided by a number of advisory 
bodies, particularly by the Advisory Council for Science and Technology Policy 
                                                 
461 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). 
462 This is also increasingly the case in innovation policy where public funding is generically pro-
vided through tax incentives. See Mostert (n 454) p. 3 seq, 13, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 321, P den 
Hertog et al, Science, Technology & Innovation Indicators 2012 (OCW, Utrecht 2012) p. 14 seq, 
Rathenau Instituut, 'The Dutch Science System' (2013) http://www.rathenau.nl/en/web-
specials/the-dutch-science-system/home.html accessed 10 April 2013 section „Innovation pol-
icy‟. 
463 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 524 seq, Euraxess (n 454) section „Dutch research policy‟, Mostert (n 
454) p. 9. 
464 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 516 seq, 523 seq, Euraxess (n 454) sections „Dutch research policy‟ and 
„Dutch research funding‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 2 seq, 8 seq, 11, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 287 seq, 
Braun (n 453) p. 1, 5 seq, Leisyte (n 453) p. 439, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „politicians 
and government‟. 
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(Adviesraad voor het Wetenschaps- en Technologiebeleid) and the Royal Nether-
lands Academy of Arts and Sciences (Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van 
Wetenschappen, KNAW).465 
Several intermediate organisations, most significantly the Netherlands Re-
search Council (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, NWO), 
NL Agency (Agentschap NL) and the Technology Foundation (Stichting voor de 
Technische Wetenschappen, STW), are responsible for implementing government 
policy and for acting as research councils offering a variety of competitive funding 
opportunities sometimes leading to the creation of new co-operations or institu-
tions.466 The NWO focuses on basic research in all fields of enquiry in universities, 
their own institutes and other organisations. It funds researchers, research infrastruc-
ture and whole research institutes and receives its budget mainly from the OCW.467 
Agentschap NL is part of the EZ and is responsible for innovation and sustainability 
policy utilising synergies between public research organisations, the private sector 
and government. Its main awarding authorities are, next to the EZ, the Ministry for 
Infrastructure and Environment (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu) and the 
Foreign Ministry (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken).468 The STW is mainly fund-
ing applied research and knowledge transfer in technical sciences. It receives its 
budget mainly from the NWO, EZ and OCW.469 Aside from these main intermediate 
                                                 
465 On the advisory bodies see Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Advisory bodies‟, „Intermediary 
organisations‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 3 seq, 9, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 290, Braun (n 453) p 2 seq, 
Rijksoverheid, 'Financiering wetenschap' (2012) 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/wetenschap/financiering-wetenschap accessed 1 Oc-
tober 2012, van der Meulen (n 453) p. 516, Euraxess (n 454) section „Where does Dutch re-
search take place – Research institutes‟. 
466 Rijksoverheid (n 465), van der Meulen (n 453) p. 524 seq, 527, Euraxess (n 454) section „Dutch 
research funding‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 2 seq, 10, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 289. 
467 Mostert (n 454) p. 3, 10, 18 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 288, Rijksoverheid (n 465), Euraxess (n 
454) section „Dutch research funding‟, E De Weert and P  oezerooy, Higher Education in the 
Netherlands (International higher education monitor, CHEPS, Enschede 2007) p. 45, Braun (n 
453) p. 3, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Intermediary organisations‟, E Arnold, J Deuten 
and P Zaman, Four Case Studies in University Modernisation: KU Leuven, Twente, Manchester 
and Loughborough' (Technopolis, 2006) available on http://www.technopolis-
group.com/resources/downloads/reports/595_Final_060315.pdf p. 30, Leisyte (n 453) p. 440. 
468 Mostert (n 454) p. 3, 10, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Intermediary organisations‟, 
Rijksoverheid (n 465).  
469 STW, 'De Organisatie' (2013) http://www.stw.nl/nl/content/de-organisatie accessed 8th April 
2013, Euraxess (n 454) section „Dutch research funding‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 4, 10, Braun (n 453) 
p 3. 
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organisations in the field of research, other organisations might act as intermediaries 
for research policy and funding for the ambit of their action, for example the Nether-
lands Organisation for Health Research and Development (Zorgonderzoek Neder-
land en Medische Wetenschappen, ZonMw).470 In addition to intermediate organisa-
tions, there are a few important research facilitating organisations providing access 
to scientific materials such as the Royal Library (Koninklijke Bibliotheek, KB).471 
4.3.1.1.2. Public research organisations 
Most public research is conducted by the 14 research-intensive universities 
which cooperate in the VSNU. Three of these are technical universities additionally 
organised in the 3TU.Federation (3TU.Federatie). Wageningen University focuses 
on agricultural research and the Open University offers distance learning. The Neth-
erlands maintain a binary system; next to the universities there are roughly 40 more 
vocational HEIs called Hogescholen (in English usually referred to as universities of 
applied sciences) which are organised in the Hoger Beroepsonderwijs Raad. Finally, 
there are other, more specific (e.g. belief focussed) public and private HEIs.472  
In addition to their other tasks, the NWO and KNAW also maintain institutes 
in which research is being conducted.473 Furthermore, there are a (decreasing) num-
ber of research institutes affiliated with ministries. Whilst some of these are directly 
linked to ministries, others are more autonomous organisations.474 There are also re-
search organisations which receive public funding and focus on more applied re-
search such as the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (Neder-
                                                 
470 See ZonMw, 'Over ZonMw' (2013) http://www.zonmw.nl/nl/over-zonmw/over-zonmw/ accessed 
21 April 2013. 
471 Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Auxiliary organisations‟, Directie Kennis, 'Trends in Beeld' 
(OCW, Kelpen 2012) p. 114.  
472 See on HEI research, van der Meulen (n 453) p. 515 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 287, 290, 293, 
Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 2 seq, Mostert (n 454) p. 7, 15, de Weert and Boezerooy (n 467) p. 37, 
Rijksoverheid (n 465), Euraxess (n 454) section „Where does Dutch research take place – Uni-
versities‟, Arnold, Deuten and Zaman (n 467) p. 30, Braun (n 453) p 3, Leisyte (n 453) p. 440. 
473 Rijksoverheid (n 465), van der Meulen (n 453) p. 516, Euraxess (n 454) section „Where does 
Dutch research take place – Research institutes‟, „Dutch research funding‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 
16, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 288, 290, Arnold, Deuten and Zaman (n 467) p. 30, 42, Braun (n 453) p 
3, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „NWO and NWO Institutes‟. 
474 Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Ministerial Research Institutes‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 17, 
Jongbloed (n 453) p. 282 seq, Euraxess (n 454) section „Where does Dutch research take place – 
Research institutes‟. 
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landse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek), agricultural 
research institutes and large technology institutes.475 In addition to these physical 
institutions, the Dutch government has, since the 1990s, begun initiatives for col-
laborative research organisations. These include the „Top Technological Institutes‟ 
(TTIs) focusing on industrially relevant research,476 the „Top Societal Institutes‟ 
(Maatschappelijk Top Instituten, MTIs) focussing on societal research477 and, most 
recently, the Top Consortia for Knowledge and Innovation (Topconsortia voor Ken-
nis an Innovatie, TKI) focussing on research in nine sectors (horticulture and propa-
gating stock, agriculture and food, water, life sciences and health, chemistry, high 
tech, energy, logistics and creative industries) which have been identified as the par-
ticular strengths of the Netherlands (topsectoren).478 Research organisations are 
regularly evaluated on the basis of the Standard Evaluation Protocol (SEP)479 which 
has been established by VSNU, NWO and KNAW.480  
4.3.1.2. Non-public research 
Most research in the Netherlands is conducted by the private sector, mainly in 
large enterprises which focus on product development. Private sector entities are or-
ganised in a variety of industry organisations which partly have separate research 
                                                 
475 Mostert (n 454) p. 12, 16, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 290, Rijksoverheid (n 465), Euraxess (n 454) sec-
tion „Where does Dutch research take place – Research institutes‟. 
476 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 520 seq, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „TTIs and MTIs‟, Euraxess 
(n 454) section „Where does Dutch research take place – Research institutes‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 
16, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 292 seq, 307 seq, Arnold, Deuten and Zaman (n 467) p. 30, Braun (n 
453) p. 4, 8. 
477 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 521, Mostert (n 454) p. 16, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 308, Rathenau 
Instituut (n 462) section „TTIs and MTIs‟. 
478 Rijksoverheid, 'Topconsortia voor Kennis en Innovatie (TKI)' (2012) 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ondernemersklimaat-en-innovatie/investeren-in-
topsectoren/topconsortia-voor-kennis-en-innovatie-tki-s accessed 11 April 2013, Mostert (n 454) 
p. 5 seq, 20, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Innovation policy‟. 
479 KNAW, VSNU and NWO, Standard Evaluation Protocol 2009-2015 (KNAW, 2009 (updated 
2010)) available on http://www.knaw.nl/Content/Internet_KNAW/publicaties/pdf/20091052.pdf.  
480 RFJ Becker, 'States, Markets and Higher Education Reform: The Netherlands and England' in JI 
Zajda and VD Rust (eds), Globalisation, policy and comparative research (Springer, Dordrecht 
2009) p. 162, van der Meulen (n 453) p. 518, Mostert (n 454) p. 7, 9, 19, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 
301 seq, C Chiong Meza, 'De Nederlandse universiteiten' (Science System Assessment - Feiten 
en Cijfers, Rathenau Instituut, The Hague 2012) p. 21 seq. 
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and technology commissions.481 Research conducted by the private sector is fi-
nanced, for the vast majority, by the private sector itself, but the sector also receives 
overseas and governmental contributions. Aside from funding its own research, the 
private sector invests in research abroad and, to a lesser extent, in research in HEIs 
and other institutions.482 The government, in order to encourage private sector in-
vestment into R&D, initiated a number of general (tax incentives) and specific fund-
ing programmes. The latter includes the Regional Attention and Action for Knowl-
edge Circulation programme (Regionale actie en aandacht voor kennisinnovatie) 
focussing on cooperation between regional SMEs and hogescholen.483 
At less than 15%, funding from abroad and from the third sector plays a 
smaller role in the Netherlands than in England. Foreign funding, however, has con-
stantly increased. It is mainly received by the private sector and to a much lesser ex-
tent by HEIs and other organisations.484 The main sources of foreign funding are for-
eign companies and the EU. The latter was originally somewhat disregarded, but has 
increasingly gained in importance. Today the Dutch research sector receives signifi-
cantly more than the Netherlands contribute. The government currently tries to fur-
ther encourage international cooperation, particularly to attract more foreign firms to 
invest into research in the Netherlands.485 Whilst the third sector plays a small role as 
a funder, it is hardly distinguishable as a research provider.486 The funding provided 
by the third sector mainly comes from charities engaged in the medical field487 and 
is, for the vast majority, received by HEIs.488  
                                                 
481 Mostert (n 454) p. 13 seq, 17 seq, Braun (n 453) p. 4, 7, Euraxess (n 454) section „Where does 
Dutch research take place – Commercial enterprise‟, Leisyte (n 453) p. 440. 
482 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). 
483 Mostert (n 454) p. 3, 6 seq, 13. 
484 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, (n 459). 
485 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 522 seq, Mostert (n 454) p. 6, 14, 21 seq, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) 
section „Foreign funding sources‟, Directie Kennis (n 471) p. 122. 
486 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, (n 459) 
explanatory note section „Door instellingen‟, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „Organisations‟. 
487 Euraxess (n 454) section „Dutch research funding‟, Mostert (n 454) p. 15. Further on the health 
funds see also Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „health funds‟. 
488 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). 
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4.3.2. Research in public HEIs 
Most of the 14 research-intensive universities are public organisations. Only 
the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Radbound Universiteit Nijmegen and Tilburg 
University were, despite now being publicly funded, originally not set up by the 
government and thus have a different legal form (association or foundation). Univer-
sities in the Netherlands focus especially on research in health, natural sciences and 
engineering. These subject areas together amount to almost 70% of all university re-
search in the Netherlands measured in personnel. Legal research, on the other hand, 
features at the bottom end of the scale with only 3.1%.489  
4.3.2.1. Research as a statutory task of HEIs 
In the Netherlands, HEIs are regulated in the Higher Education and Research 
Act (Wet op het hoger onderwijs en wetenschappelijk onderzoek, WHW). The WHW 
provides a task description for four different kinds of HEIs in Article 1.3; the 13 uni-
versities, the Open University, additional universities dedicated to certain religions 
or beliefs (levensbeschouwelijke universiteiten) and hogescholen. Accordingly, the 
universities have as their task the provision of higher education, the execution of sci-
entific research, the education of researchers and innovators and the transfer of 
knowledge for the benefit of society.490 The Open University‟s task is to provide 
higher education and higher vocational education via distance learning methods, to 
conduct scientific and practical research in accordance with its profile and to con-
tribute to the renewal of higher education.491 The levensbeschouwelijke universiteiten 
aim to provide higher education for an office or profession within a certain belief 
system, conduct research in the area of a belief system, educate researchers and 
                                                 
489 Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 2 seq, 15. 
490 Article 1.3 (1) WHW: „Universiteiten zijn gericht op het verzorgen van wetenschappelijk 
onderwijs en het verrichten van wetenschappelijk onderzoek. In elk geval verzorgen zij initiële 
opleidingen in het wetenschappelijk onderwijs, verrichten zij wetenschappelijk onderzoek, 
voorzien zij in de opleiding tot wetenschappelijk onderzoeker of technologisch ontwerper en 
dragen zij kennis over ten behoeve van de maatschappij.‟  
491 Article 1.3 (4) WHW: „De Open Universiteit is gericht op het verzorgen van wetenschappelijk 
onderwijs en hoger beroepsonderwijs, het, in overeenstemming met het profiel van de Open 
Universiteit, verrichten van wetenschappelijk onderzoek en onderzoek gericht op de 
beroepspraktijk, alsmede het leveren van een bijdrage aan de vernieuwing van het hoger 
onderwijs.‟ 
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transfer knowledge for the benefit of society.492 Finally, Hogescholen are focussed 
on providing higher professional education, conducting professionally oriented de-
sign, development and research activities, transferring knowledge for the benefit of 
society and contributing to the development of the occupations in which they provide 
education.493 Research is thus a statutory task of all four kinds of HEIs. 
Article 1.9 (1) WHW prescribes that universities receive public funding for re-
search. With regards to Hogescholen, research is considered as part of education 
provision and is funded as such.494 According to paragraph (3) the condition for 
HEIs to receive funding is that they take into account the provisions in the WHW.495 
Article 2.5 (2) and 2.6 (4) WHW specify this by allowing the relevant minister to 
attach conditions to research funding relating to quality assurance and making the 
criteria for determining research funding at universities conditional upon the social 
and scientific need for the research taking into account the profile of the institutions 
and the research quality.496 However, Article 1.6 WHW declares that the academic 
freedom shall be observed in HEIs.497 These provisions thus seem to constitute some 
weighing of external factors in determining the lump sums for research funding 
                                                 
492 Article 1.3 (2) WHW: „Levensbeschouwelijke universiteiten zijn gericht op het verzorgen van 
wetenschappelijk onderwijs voor een levensbeschouwelijk ambt of beroep. Zij verrichten 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek op levensbeschouwelijk terrein, voorzien in de opleiding tot 
wetenschappelijk onderzoeker en dragen kennis over ten behoeve van de maatschappij.‟  
493 Article 1.3 (3) WHW: „Hogescholen zijn gericht op het verzorgen van hoger beroepsonderwijs. 
Zij verrichten ontwerp- en ontwikkelactiviteiten of onderzoek gericht op de beroepspraktijk [...] 
en zij dragen in elk geval kennis over ten behoeve van de maatschappij. Zij dragen bij aan de 
ontwikkeling van beroepen waarop het onderwijs is gericht.‟ 
494 Article 1.9 (1) WHW: „Ten behoeve van het verzorgen van initieel onderwijs en, voorzover het 
universiteiten betreft, mede ten behoeve van het verrichten van wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
hebben de [...] instellingen [voor hoger onderwijs] [...] aanspraak op bekostiging uit ‟s Rijks kas 
[...]. Voor de toepassing van dit lid worden de ontwerp- en ontwikkelactiviteiten en onderzoek 
gericht op de beroepspraktijk, aan hogescholen gerekend tot het daarop betrekking hebbende 
onderwijs.‟ 
495 Article 1.9 (3) WHW: „Voorwaarde [...] is dat de desbetreffende instelling in acht neemt hetgeen 
bij of krachtens deze wet is bepaald [...].‟  
496 Article 2.5 (2) WHW: „Onze minister kan aan de bekostiging van onderzoek aan universiteiten 
voorwaarden verbinden, verband houdend met de kwaliteitszorg.‟ Article 2.6 (4) WHW: „De 
maatstaven voor bekostiging van het wetenschappelijk onderzoek aan de universiteiten hebben 
in ieder geval betrekking op de maatschappelijke en wetenschappelijke behoefte aan het 
onderzoek, waarbij rekening wordt gehouden met het profiel van de instellingen alsmede op de 
kwaliteit van het onderzoek.‟ Further on the funding of universities (including teaching) accord-
ing to Article 1.9, 2.5 and 2.6 WHW see H Schneider et al, Crossing Borders - Frontier Knowl-
edge (Maastricht University, Maastricht 2009) part IV p. 1 seq. 
497 Article 1.6 WHW: „Aan de instellingen wordt de academische vrijheid in acht genommen.‟  
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awarded to HEIs and academic freedom. Quantitative restrictions of research do not 
seem to exist by statute. 
4.3.2.2. Public research funding 
In the following the focus will be on universities as the most research intensive 
HEIs. Government provides most funding generically to universities which is re-
ferred to as the first funding stream (eerste geldstrom). Other public funding is pro-
vided through intermediate organisations, in particular the NWO, known as the sec-
ond funding stream (tweede geldstrom). The third stream (derde geldstrom) contains 
research income from industry, contract research for the government, third sector 
and foreign contributions (in particular from European funds). The fourth stream 
(vierde geldstrom) comes from philanthropic donations.498 Despite generic govern-
mental funding still being the most important funding stream, a shift towards a more 
competitive, impact and priority oriented research system can be observed. This in-
cludes the (admittedly currently still limited) involvement of competitive factors499 
in the determination of generic funding and the growing importance of competitive 
public funding as well as of commercialisation and industry cooperation.500  
4.3.2.2.1. Public generic funding 
Universities still receive the largest part of their funding as generic funding (on 
average almost 50%, even though there are vast differences between universities).501 
The Netherlands have moved towards a more indirect concept of research financing 
in this respect, with more institutional autonomy and (some) external steering poli-
cies. HEIs receive a lump sum for research which is calculated on the basis of a for-
                                                 
498 Rijksoverheid (n 465), Mostert (n 454) p. 11 seq, 16, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294 seq, Schneider et al 
(n 496) part IV p. 12, Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 8, de Weert and P Boezerooy (n 467) p. 37 seq. 
499 The definition of „competitive factors‟ varies. Jongbloed, for example, considers the allocation of 
generic funding on the basis of degree numbers as competitive and thus arrives at two thirds of 
university research funding (competitive elements of generic funding in the wider sense, com-
petitive public funding and external funding) being distributed in a competitive way (see 
Jongbloed (n 453) p. 299). Here, however, „competitive factors‟ should be understood in a nar-
rower sense relating only to aspects such as quality/performance, impact and following of exter-
nally set priorities.  
500 Leisyte, Enders and De Boer (n 456) p. 378 seq, van der Meulen (n 453) p. 516, Mostert (n 454) p. 
19.  
501 See Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 14 seq. 
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mula set out in a governmental decree.502 The formula is mainly based on the num-
ber of degrees conferred and so-called strategic considerations which are mainly 
based on historical allocation.503 Only a small part within the allocation of the lump 
sum is based on competitive steering factors including aspects such as perform-
ance/quality and focus on priorities.504 Resistance from the universities prevented 
attempts by consecutive governments since the early 1980s to give such competitive 
factors more weight. Within HEIs a more managerial style of university governance 
is envisaged giving HEIs the freedom to administer the lump sum as they see fit in-
cluding the possibility of cross-subsidisation between teaching and research. In fund-
ing allocation, quality (for example, the quality ratings of the SEP) and impact might 
play a role.505  
4.3.2.2.2. Public competitive funding 
Competitive public funding from intermediary organisations (tweede gelstrom) 
has gained in importance over recent years.506 How much of its research funding a 
university receives this way varies significantly.507 The NWO is the most important 
funder in this respect and covers all academic subjects. One of the most prestigious 
project funding programmes is the talent funding scheme Vernieuwingsimpuls (offi-
cial English title: Innovational Research Incentive Scheme). This scheme contains 
special grants for early career (VENI), mid career (VIDI) and senior (VICI) re-
searchers. The NWO also offers open competitions where researchers can apply 
                                                 
502 Article 2.6 (1) WHW: „De [...] algemene berekeningswijze wordt bij of krachtens algemene 
maatregel van bestuur vastgesteld.‟ This has been specified in the WHW Executing Act 2008 
(Uitvoeringsbesluit WHW 2008) chapter 4. See also Schneider et al (n 496) part IV p. 2 seq.  
503 For the research formula see Uitvoeringsbesluit WHW 2008 Articles 4.20 - 4.23. For more details 
see Schneider et al (n 496) part IV p. 5 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294 seq, Chiong Meza (n 480) 
p. 8. 
504 Uitvoeringsbesluit WHW 2008 Article 4.23. See also Schneider et al (n 496) part IV p. 7, Mostert 
(n 454) p. 19, Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 8. 
505 On public generic funding see van der Meulen (n 453) p. 516, Mostert (n 454) p. 19 seq, 
Jongbloed (n 453) p. 287, 294 seq, 300 seq, 323, 326 seq, de Weert and P Boezerooy (n 467) p. 
46 seq, Becker (n 480) p. 160, Leisyte, Enders and De Boer (n 456) p. 378 seq. For an example 
of internal steering policies based on excellence and impact see the case study on the University 
of Twente in Arnold, Deuten and Zaman (n 467) p. 42. 
506 Mostert (n 454) p. 16, Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 8. 
507 The University of Leiden, for example, secures about 40% of its funding from public competitive 
funding sources. See Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 14 seq. 
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freely with their proposals. Aside from open calls, the NWO runs thematic calls tar-
geted to achieve certain government policy aims508 and programmes with a focus on 
female researchers. Finally, it provides support for the publication of research results 
with a recent focus on open access publication.509  
In recent years, there have also been attempts at targeted institutional funding. 
In 1998, the Dutch government had already introduced a programme for funding ex-
cellent research schools (Dieptestrategie, Depth Strategy). Six top research schools 
have since been supported with additional institutional funding under this pro-
gramme.510 Since 2010, however, only the two best511 of these research schools con-
tinued to receive funding and the Dieptestrategie was replaced by a new institutional 
funding programme for excellent research schools, entitled „Gravitation‟.512 Fur-
thermore, many of the (semi-)public research organisations described above, in 
which HEIs are often involved, have been set up as a result of specific institutional 
research funding schemes.513 Finally, public institutions might also commission re-
search from HEIs (derde geldstrom).514  
4.3.2.3. Non-state funding 
The importance of non-state funding (derde or, if purely charitable, vierde 
geldstrom) has grown over the last decades and amounts to a little less than a quarter 
of all research funding for HEIs provided almost equally by the third sector, the pri-
vate sector and international sources.515 Government policy encourages the utilisa-
                                                 
508 Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section „NWO and NWO Institutes‟. 
509 On public competitive funding see van der Meulen (n 453) p. 520, Mostert (n 454) p. 10 seq, 20 
seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294 seq, Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 23 seq, de Weert and P Boezerooy (n 
467) p. 47, Directie Kennis (n 471) p. 124.  
510 For more information see Umbrella Committee for the Evaluation of the Bonus Incentive Scheme 
2009-2010, Evaluation of Leading Research Schools 2009-2010 (NWO, The Hague 2010).  
511 Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 'Top research schools' (2012) http://www.rug.nl/research/our-top-
research/top-research-schools/ accessed 13 July 2013. 
512 Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (n 512), NWO, 'Gravitation - Background' (2013) 
http://www.nwo.nl/en/research-and-results/programmes/gravitation/background accessed 13July 
2013 
513 On competitive institutional funding see van der Meulen (n 453) p. 519 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 
297 seq, 305, de Weert and P Boezerooy (n 467) p. 47. 
514 Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294 seq. 
515 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (n 457). For on overview of the significance of this funding 
source in the different universities see Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 14 seq. 
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tion of these funding sources and steers collaborations towards government priori-
ties.516  
With regards to the third sector, it is mainly medical charities that cooperate 
with HEIs. Many third sector organisations follow a „protocol for “good research 
funding practices” that the charities have agreed upon. It includes the possibility for 
programmatic priorities, bottom-up project formulation, and selection of proposals 
by peer review and panels.‟517 In international funding the EU plays an especially 
important role, but Dutch researchers are also active in a variety of bilateral collabo-
rations within and beyond the EU. To encourage cross-border collaboration, the 
NWO has opened up an increasing number of competitive funding schemes for for-
eign researchers and provides additional funding for incoming and outgoing academ-
ics.518 
As in England, collaboration with the private sector can take a variety of forms 
such as research co-operations between HEIs and the private sector, often taking the 
institutionalised public-private partnership (PPP) form of one of the collaborative 
research organisations mentioned above.519 HEIs also undertake contract research 
and consultancy work which is sometimes internally rewarded.520 Exploitation of 
IPRs has increased in recent years. Whilst HEIs usually own IPRs developed by their 
employees, in co-operations, it is often the private sector partner who receives IPRs, 
or they are jointly owned. However, there is no general policy on this and HEIs 
sometimes let the researcher receive some of the income generated. Some HEIs have 
recently introduced special „valorisation centres‟ or technology transfer offices for 
the exploitation of IPRs and exchange of best practices. Occasionally, IPR valorisa-
                                                 
516 VSNU, Prestaties in perspectief - Trendrapportage universiteiten 2000-2020 (VSNU, The Hague 
2012) p. 24 seq, 89 seq, Mostert (n 454) p. 12, 19 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294, 306, Chiong 
Meza (n 480) p. 8, 27, Braun (n 453) p. 6 seq, Leisyte (n 453) p. 439, 441, den Hertog et al (n 
462) p. 16, Becker (n 480) p. 159. 
517 Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294 seq, quote p. 295. 
518 Mostert (n 454) p. 21 seq, den Hertog et al (n 462) p. 30 seq, 99 seq, Chiong Meza (n 480) p. 19, 
23, 26 seq.  
519 Mostert (n 454) p. 19 seq, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 307 seq, 323, 327 seq, VSNU (n 516) p. 25, 91, 
Braun (n 453) p. 6, 10, Leisyte (n 453) p. 445, Directie Kennis (n 471) p. 106. 
520 Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294, 309, 323 seq, Leisyte (n 453) p. 446, Rathenau Instituut (n 462) section 
„Innovation policy‟. 
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tion is conducted by private holding companies established by the HEI or an HEI 
might create spin-offs for the purpose of exploiting IPRs.521 
Start-ups, whether as IPR related spin-offs or beyond, are usually partly owned 
by the HEI and often managed through the mentioned technology-transfer units or 
through holding companies which themselves might also collaborate further with the 
private sector. To encourage entrepreneurship HEIs increasingly offer courses for 
staff and students in this respect. HEIs might also collaborate with the private sector 
in science parks (also referred to as innovation campuses (innovatiecampussen)). 
Here, as in England, HEIs, private sector partners and, potentially, other research 
institutions all work in one geographical location, which is often at least partly 
owned by the HEI, in order to create synergies and encourage collaboration and en-
trepreneurship.522 Finally, there are staff exchanges523 and more informal ways to 
collaborate, such as research networks or private sector representatives sitting on su-
pervisory or executive boards of HEIs.524  
4.3.2.4. Full costing 
Since 2006, universities in the Netherlands have implemented full costing 
methodologies on their own initiative525 but following common standards agreed by 
the VSNU and in continuous exchange. The reasons were FP7 requirements as well 
as the desire to attain a financial sustainability unthreatened by matching require-
                                                 
521 Mostert (n 454) p. 1, 15 seq, 20, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 294, 307, 318, VSNU (n 516) p. 89, Leisyte 
(n 453) p. 442 seq. For an example of a university policy on IPR exploitation and spin-offs see 
the case study of the University of Twente in Arnold, Deuten and Zaman (n 467) p. 44 seq. 
522 Jongbloed (n 453) p. 323, VSNU (n 516) p. 24 seq, 90. See for an example of a university policy 
on science parks and entrepreneurship the case study of the University of Twente in Arnold, 
Deuten and Zaman (n 467) p. 44 seq, Leisyte (n 453) p. 443. 
523 Mostert (n 454) p. 20, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 323 seq, Braun (n 453) p. 5, Directie Kennis (n 471) p. 
111. 
524 Mostert (n 454) p. 20, den Hertog et al (n 462) p. 30 seq, 53, Braun (n 453) p. 4, 7, 10, Leisyte (n 
453) p. 444, 447. 
525 In the University of Amsterdam, for example, cost allocation sheets have been created to show 
how costs relate to a certain activity. The individual schools are the profit centres. Full cost rates 
„consist of personnel costs and an indirect cost component‟ which both vary depending on actual 
costs incurred by the schools. Schools have to use their funds to pay centrally organised support 
staff units. See Estermann and Claeys-Kulik (n 442) p. 23 seq, 29 seq (quote on p. 23), EUA, 
Financially Sustainable Universities - Towards Full Costing in European Universities (EUA, 
Brussels 2008) p. 61. The University of Twente separates the more expensive technical from the 
non-technical subjects applying a higher indirect cost rates for the former. This is then added to 
the direct costs. EUA ibid p. 27, 31, 65. 
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ments for non-generic funding (which was often not provided at full cost basis).526 
The latter is also problematic since matching limits the funds available for direction-
free research. Being able to analyse the full costs, universities still negotiate the 
prices individually with funders to determine which costs they cover.527 In order to 
avoid underfunding as well as problems with state aid law, the government passed a 
number of rules and guidelines in this respect essentially requiring universities to at 
least charge full costs when cooperating with the private sector.528 These rules do 
not, however, generally seem to apply to public or third sector partners, even though 
the recent demand is that the NWO should fund at full cost levels.529 To simplify the 
various funding schemes the NWO, VSNU, KNAW and others have passed an 
agreement on common guidelines for funding provision (Akkord bekostiging weten-
schappelijk onderzoek 2008). 
4.3.3. Interim conclusion on the Netherlands 
While R&D spending has fluctuated in the Netherlands, 2011 has been the 
highest level of the last ten years. Public sector spending has constantly increased. 
Private sector spending suffered a dip in 2009, but had recovered in 2011. The pri-
vate sector provides most research funding and conducts most of the research. HEIs 
are the most important public research organisations. As well as research in the 
                                                 
526 On the introduction of full costing methods see Estermann and Claeys-Kulik (n 442) p. 19, 23, 30, 
47 seq, EUA (n 525) p. 7, 28, 40, 65, Neth-ER, 'EUA toont Europese voortgang full cost' (2013) 
http://www.neth-er.eu/nl/nieuws/eua-toont-europese-voortgang-full-cost accessed 1 May 2013, 
S Herlitschka, Diversified Funding Streams for University-based Research: Impact of external 
project-based research funding on financial management in Universities (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2009) p. 41, 49.  
527 Jongbloed (n 453) p. 309, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Verantwoording en toezicht bij 
rechtspersonen met een wettelijke taak, deel 2 (Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague 2000) p. 97, 108, de 
Weert and P Boezerooy (n 467) p. 37. 
528 Article 41 (2) Kaderbesluit EZ-subsidies (Framework decision EZ subsidies) essentially reinforces 
the rules of the Research Framework (n 8) for collaborative research subsidised by EZ and 
requires for collaborations not fulfilling these rules to be approved by EZ. Section 4.5 Kader 
Financieel Beheer rijkssubsidies (Uniform Susidy Framework) explicitly relates to the state aid 
rules and requires institutions not to breach these. In OCW Richtlijn Jaarverslag Onderwijs - 
Toelichtende brochure bij de Regeling jaarverslaggeving onderwijs (Rijksoverheid, 2011) OCW 
requires and provides guidance for separation of public and private reserves and determines that 
private partners may not be subsidised (p. 11 seq, 107 seq). Section 2.3.8. Regeling 
onderwijscontroleprotocol OCW/EZ 2012 (Regulation Education Control Protocol) provides 
that, when it comes to contract research, public funds may not be used in a way which leads to 
unfair competition and thus HEI accountants need to assure that at least full costs are recovered. 
529 Estermann and Claeys-Kulik (n 442) p. 48.  
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NWO, KNAW, institutes affiliated with ministries and more applied research organi-
sations, there are a variety of collaborative research organisations which are publicly 
funded.  
As a consociational system there are many actors involved in policy setting and 
implementation. Recent policy aims included mobilisation of the private sector, cre-
ating excellence, setting priorities and coordinating policies. This has led to a variety 
of policy programmes aimed at establishing elite intuitions, priority areas and com-
petition. The programmes have, due to the consociational character of the system, 
however, rather increased cooperation (e.g. in consortia) than competition and to 
some extent have led to a very confusing system with a large variety of actors and 
collaborations.530 
 HEIs still receive most of their research funding from public sources. On aver-
age half of their funding is provided generically in the eerste geldstrom which only 
involves a very limited recourse to competitive factors. However, the importance of 
tweede and derde geldstrom (respectively vierde geldstrom if purely charitable) is 
growing. This has been regarded as problematic inasmuch as it might cause con-
straints for the academic freedom.531 Additionally, with the increase in the tweede 
and derde geldstrom „matching‟ became a problem which, combined with the re-
quirements of FP7, led to the introduction of full costing systems and legislation re-
quiring that full costs are met, at least for collaboration with the private sector. 
4.4. Germany 
Germany is the EU Member State with the fourth highest spending on R&D. In 
2012 Germany spent 2.92% of its GDP on R&D having increased spending con-
stantly over the previous ten years. Germany thus nearly met the 3% goal of the 
Europe2020 Strategy, as currently only Finland and Sweden do.532 Whilst the high 
                                                 
530 van der Meulen (n 453) p. 522, 526, Jongbloed (n 453) p. 308, 329 seq. 
531 Leisyte, Enders and De Boer (n 456), Jongbloed (n 453) p. 308 seq, 327, 330. The former also 
describe how researchers find ways around this through intelligent proposal writing. If this strat-
egy is widely used, it would raise the question of why one should impose research agendas in the 
first place, if it only causes additional administrative work for research that would have been un-
dertaken anyway. See ibid case studies on pp. 382 seq. 
532 EUROSTAT (n 376). Denmark is, with 2.99% in 2012, still slightly below the target. 
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spending is a strength of the German research system, weaknesses have been identi-
fied in regard to the lack of utilisation of synergies between actors, transparency, co-
ordination and efficiency of funding utilisation. Additionally, Germany decided to 
increase research funding in response to the economic crisis. Measures to overhaul 
the system in order to address its weaknesses and to distribute additional funding ef-
ficiently have thus been initiated in recent years and the system is, accordingly, in a 
stage of reformation which also includes steps towards competition and commodifi-
cation.533 
4.4.1. General overview  
About two thirds of Germany‟s R&D spending comes from the private sector, 
the importance of which has increased since the early 1990s. This is followed by 
30% from the public sector and 4% from foreign sources. Third sector spending 
plays an insignificant role in overall research spending in Germany amounting to less 
than 1%.534 The private sector mainly conducts its own research, but increasingly is 
also funding research in HEIs as well as in other public and third sector organisa-
tions. Public funding is provided at the federal as well as state levels mainly for re-
search in HEIs and other public research organisations, but also for research in non-
public institutions, particularly for research in the private sector. The majority of in-
ternational funding goes to the private sector.535 
4.4.1.1. Public research  
Germany has in recent years begun to introduce measures towards commodifi-
cation; non-generic public as well as non-public funding (Drittmittel) for research in 
public institutions have gained in importance and are increasingly provided competi-
tively. Generic funding has begun to be allocated partly on the on the basis of com-
                                                 
533 S Hinze, 'Forschungsförderung in Deutschland' in D Simon, A Knie and S Hornbostel (eds), 
Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010) p. 171 seq, T Schubert and U 
Schmoch, 'Finanzierung der Hochschulforschung' in D Simon, A Knie and S Hornbostel (eds), 
Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010) p. 244, J Edler and S Kuhlmann, 
'Coordination within fragmentation: governance in knowledge policy in the German federal 
system' (2008) 35 Science and Public Policy 265, p. 265 seq, 268 seq, Enders (n 365) p. 19 seq, 
23 seq, 26 seq, Wissenschaftsrat, Empfehlungen zur Interaktion von Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft 
(Wissenschaftsrat, Oldenburg 2007) p. 7 seq. 
534 BMBF - Referat Innovationspolitische Grundsatzfragen, Bundesbericht Forschung und Innovation 
2012 (BMBF, Bonn, Berlin 2012) table 1 (p. 412 seq).  
535 See BMBF (n 534) table 1.  
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petitive, performance based elements (leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung). Dritt-
mittel accumulation also became an important indicator of the accomplishments and 
quality of research organisations, especially HEIs, and thus started to play a role in 
the performance based elements of generic funding allocation.536  
4.4.1.1.1. The governmental structure  
As, according to Article 20 (1) of the German constitution (Grundgesetz, GG), 
Germany is a federal republic with 16 federal states (Länder), competences are di-
vided between the different levels of government. As regards research, a concurrent 
legislative competence537 exists regarding „the regulation of educational and training 
grants and the promotion of research‟ (Article 74 (1) no. 13 GG) „if and to the extent 
that the establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory 
or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in 
the national interest‟ (Article 72 (2) GG). All remaining competences, in particular 
competences for HEIs, lie with the Länder. According to Article 91b GG the federal 
level (Bund) and the Länder can, however, cooperate in cases of „supraregional im-
portance‟ in respect of non-HEI research, HEI research and the „construction of fa-
cilities at institutions of higher education, including large scientific installations‟.  
At the federal level, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundes-
ministerium für Bildung und Forschung, BMBF) is mainly responsible for research, 
contributing the vast majority of the federal research budget. Aside from BMBF, the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Technology, BMWi) and the Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium 
für Verteidigung) play a role in research policy coordination. Other ministries are 
less involved. The government needs to negotiate research related policies with the 
federal parliament (Bundestag) and the representatives of the Länder (Bundesrat).538 
Overall the Bund contributes slightly more than half of all public funding with the 
                                                 
536 See Hinze (n 533) p. 162, 167, 171, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 265 seq. See also C Albrecht, 
'Die Zukunft der deutschen Universität' (2009) 2009 Forschung & Lehre 8 p. 9 seq who provides 
a critical perspective of the recent developments. 
537 Article 74 GG enumerates areas of concurrent competence. In these areas the Länder have compe-
tence as long and far as the federal level has not enacted any legislation. 
538 On the federal level see Hinze (n 533) p. 162 seq, 171, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 265 seq, 
Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 62 seq.  
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Länder contributing the remainder. Bund and Länder are coordinating their activities 
in the Joint Science Conference (Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz) and are ad-
vised by the Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat). Additionally, 
there have been a number of ad-hoc advisory bodies. Common endeavours of the 
Bund and the Länder include, in particular, the financing of the German research 
foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) and of the four major non-
HEI public research organisations; Helmholts-Gemeinschaft, Leibniz-Gemeinschaft, 
Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft and Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Except for the possibility of 
cooperation as provided for in Article 91 b GG, the Länder are responsible for HEI 
finances and governance. They voluntarily coordinate their activities in the education 
minister conference (Kultusministerkonferenz) which the federal government may 
attend as a guest. According to the HEI Pact (Hochschulpakt) the Länder are to re-
ceive federal contributions to their HEI expenditure and the federal government will 
increase its own competitive funding for HEIs.539 
The DFG is an intermediary body whose main task is the promotion of research 
in HEIs and other public research organisations in all areas of research at a pre-
competitive stage. It, however, also promotes the inter-play between research and 
industries and conducts related activities. The DFG provides project-related and in-
stitutional research funding in a competitive way. The latter has gained in impor-
tance over recent years. The DFG also advises parliaments, governments and public 
bodies on academic questions. It is financed by the BMBF (60%) and the Länder 
(40%).540 
4.4.1.1.2. Public research organisations 
There are 458 HEIs in Germany, 108 of which are universities. As with the 
Netherlands, Germany entertains a binary system with 205 vocational HEIs called 
Fachhochschulen (in English usually referred to as universities of applied sciences) 
existing alongside the universities. Additionally there are 51 art academies, 37 acad-
emies for administration, 36 teaching hospitals, 16 academies for theology and 6 
                                                 
539 On the interplay between Bund and the Länder see Hinze (n 533) p. 163 seq. Edler and Kuhlmann 
(n 533) p. 267, 269, 271 seq. 
540 See DFG, 'DFG im Profil - Aufgaben' (2010) http://www.dfg.de/dfg_profil/aufgaben/index.html 
accessed 2 August 2012, Hinze (n 533) p. 168 seq, 172, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 267, 
Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 65 seq. 
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academies for educational science. 296 of all 458 HEIs are (mainly) financed by the 
Länder, 12 by the Bund and 150 by non-public sources including 37 HEIs which are 
financed by religious organisations.541  
Non-HEI public research also has an important role in Germany. The most im-
portant players are the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft focussing on basic research, the 
Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft focussing on applied R&D, the Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft 
focussing on long term studies which require large scientific installations and the 
Leibniz-Gemeinschaft focussing on strategic, theme-related research. All these or-
ganisations consist of a variety of institutes. Their funding streams are dependent on 
their tasks; while the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, for example, is three quarters fi-
nanced by generic public funding, the Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft only receives one 
third of its funding as public generic funding.542 Generally, however, competitive 
funding has increasingly gained in importance and the non-HEI research organisa-
tions have been subject to reform. The Pact for Research and Innovation (Pakt für 
Forschung und Innovation) aims at a yearly funding increase of 5% for non-HEI re-
search organisations as well as increasing synergies and international and private 
sector cooperation. The recently passed Freedom of Research Act (Gesetz zur 
Flexibilisierung von haushaltsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen außeruniversitärer 
Wissenschaftseinrichtungen)543 is creating more independence for the non-HEI 
research organisations. Finally, some ministries also have their own research insti-
tutes.544  
4.4.1.2. Non-public research 
Most of Germany‟s R&D is financed by the private sector which also conducts 
more than two thirds of the research. The latter is almost entirely funded by the pri-
vate sector with only limited contributions (less than 8% together) from (in order of 
                                                 
541 See Statistisches Bundesamt, Bildung und Kultur - Finanzen der Hochschulen 2011 (Sta-
tischtisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2013) p. 159.  
542 For more details see Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 256 seq. 
543 On the Freedom of Research Act see BMBF, 'Wissenschaftsstandort Deutschland: Das Wissen-
schaftsfreiheitsgesetz ist ein Signal zum Aufbruch' (2013) http://www.bmbf.de/de/12268.php 
accessed 11 December 2013. 
544 On public research outside HEIs see Hinze (n 533) p. 170 seq, Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 
255 seq, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 267, 270, Enders (n 365) p. 23. 
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relevance) the state, overseas and the third sector.545 Only since the late 1990s/early 
2000s has cooperation with external partners such as HEIs, public research organisa-
tions and other private sector organisations become a major factor in private sector 
company strategies inter alia due to the increasing complexity of research.546 The 
private sector has thus begun to invest into research in HEIs and public non-HEI re-
search organisations.547 Additionally, there are institutionalised co-operations be-
tween private sector entities such as the consortium of industrial research associa-
tions (Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller Forschungsgemeinschaften) focussing on 
the interests of SME.548 Government policy supports private sector R&D549 in par-
ticular through the „High-Tech Strategy‟550 by encouraging „innovation oriented pro-
curement‟, a review of the intellectual property regime, incentives for start-ups as 
well as incentives for collaboration between research organisations from all sec-
tors.551  
We have seen that international funding plays only a minor role in the German 
research system, whilst third sector funding hardly has any part to play. 60% of the 
international funding goes to the private sector and the rest is equally divided be-
tween HEIs and non-HEI public research organisations. Third sector funding mainly 
goes to the latter.552 However, the importance of, especially international funding, is 
increasing; in particular for HEIs. Government is encouraging this development and 
its policy is aiming at better coordination in this respect.553  
                                                 
545 BMBF (n 534) table 1. 
546 R Rohrbeck, 'F+E Politik von Unternehmen' in D Simon, A Knie and S Hornbostel (eds), Hand-
buch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010). p. 427 seq, 431 seq 
547 BMBF (n 534) table 1. 
548 Hinze (n 533) p. 169, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 66 seq. 
549 Rohrbeck (n 546) p. 429 seq.  
550 For an English overview see BMBF, Idea. Innovation. Prosperity. High-Tech Strategy 2010 for 
Germany (BMBF, Bonn 2010). 
551 See BMBF (n 550) p. 9 seq, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 271, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 63 
seq, Rohrbeck (n 546) p. 429 seq. 
552 BMBF (n 534) table 1. 
553 See Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 268, 270. 
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4.4.2. Research in public HEIs 
As mentioned above there are a vast variety of HEIs in Germany. The follow-
ing will focus on public universities as research intensive public HEIs.  
4.4.2.1. Research as a statutory task of HEIs 
The division of competences between Bund and Länder regarding HEIs has 
long been a controversial subject. Before the federalism reform (a general re-
structuring of competences in the federal system begun in 2006) the Bund had the 
competence to pass framework legislation (former Article 75 GG) and Bund and 
Länder had to cooperate regarding research funding. The removal of federal compe-
tences regarding HEIs during the federalism reform had been triggered by a decision 
of the German constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in which the court 
declared that the Bund had overstepped its competences.554 However, Article 125 
GG ensures that framework legislation already enacted remains valid, unless the 
Länder deviate from it. In the field of HEIs, the relevant framework legislation is the 
Framework Act for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmengesetz, HRG). The annul-
ment of this act has since been discussed but never realised.555 
Public HEIs are, according to § 58 HRG, bodies governed by public law as 
well as institutions of the state. According to § 2 (1) HRG, HEIs „shall contribute to 
the fostering and development of the arts and sciences through research, teaching, 
studies and continuing education‟. Regarding research in HEIs § 22 HRG provides 
that  
‘the purpose of research at institutions of higher education shall be the acqui-
sition of scientific knowledge and the scientific underpinning and development 
of teaching and study. Research at institutions of higher education may, sub-
ject to the specific role of the institution concerned, relate to any academic 
                                                 
554 BVerfGE 111, 226. Decision of 27 July 2004 (Junior Professor). Leaving the majority of the 
funding competences to the Länder has now, however, caused financial difficulties and discus-
sions are underway to change Article 91 b GG again to allow for more cooperation between the 
Bund and the Länder as regards research funding in HEIs (Tagesschau.de, 'Hochschulfinan-
zierung soll reformiert werden' tagesschau.de (30 May 2012) 
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/hochschulkooperation100.html accessed 31 May 2012). 
555 M Seckelmann, 'Rechtliche Grundlagen und Rahmensetzungen' in D Simon, A Knie and S 
Hornbostel (eds), Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2012) p. 227, 229 seq, 
232 seq. 
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discipline and to the practical application of scientific findings, including the 
potential impact of such application.’  
There are no quantitative restrictions in the HRG as to the amount of externally 
funded research that can be carried out by an HEI as long as „the fulfilment of the 
institution's other functions and the rights and obligations of other persons are not 
impaired and […] adequate consideration is given to commitments that might result 
from the project‟ (§ 25 (2) HRG). The results of such research should generally be 
made publicly available „within a reasonable period of time‟.  
At state level the provisions are similar.556 The Bremen HEI Act (Bremisches 
Hochschulgesetz), for example, contains almost identical provisions to § 2 (1), § 22 
and § 25 (2) HRG in § 4 (1), § 70 (1) and § 74 (2) respectively. The Berlin HEI Act 
(Berliner Hochschulgesetz) contains very similar provisions to § 2 (1) and § 22 HRG 
in § 4 (1) and § 37 (1) respectively. With regards to externally funded research, it 
simply refers to § 25 (2) HRG in its § 40. The Bavarian Higher Education Act (Bay-
erisches Hochschulgesetz) contains similar provisions to § 2 (1), § 22 and § 25 (2) 
HRG in Article 2 (1), 6 (1) and 8 (1-2) respectively. The Act on HEIs in Baden-
Württemberg (Gesetz über die Hochschulen in Baden-Württemberg) contains similar 
provisions to § 2 (1), § 22 HRG in § 2 (1), § 40 (1) respectively. Regarding § 25 (2) 
HRG the corresponding provision is contained in § 41 (1). In contrast to the federal 
provision, which only entitles staff to conduct externally funded research, this provi-
sion declares the active search for external funds as one of the official duties of re-
search staff. Apart from this, the provision is similar to the relevant provision in the 
HRG.  
It can thus be established that research, including applied research is a statutory 
task of public HEIs and that there do not seem to be any specific restrictions as to the 
amount of commercial research undertaken, so long as HEIs can still fulfil the tasks 
assigned to them. There also cannot (theoretically) be too much external steering, as 
Article 5 (3) GG provides that the „arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be 
free‟. This provision essentially makes academic freedom a human right and thus 
gives it a very strong position in Germany. 
                                                 
556 The provisions of the federal states in which the universities chosen for the empirical study are 
located shall be looked at here as examples. On the choice of universities see chapter 5 below. 
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4.4.2.2. Public research funding  
HEIs receive generic funding and Drittmittel. The latter includes public com-
petitive and other funding. The aims behind the introduction of public competitive 
funding were to reward well-performing HEIs and create transparency after the in-
troduction of lump sums in HEI funding.557  
4.4.2.2.1. Public generic funding 
Whilst HEIs still receive the majority of their funding generically from the 
Länder,558 this has decreased in real terms in recent years.559 Traditionally, generic 
funding was allocated on the basis of detailed criteria. However, emphasis on new 
public management structures and less public regulation, led to generic funding be-
ing increasingly provided as lump sums allowing more independence for the 
HEIs.560 At the same time a criticism that has been made is that the new managerial 
structures decrease the potential for academic self-regulation561 and create competi-
tion between teaching and research.562 Whether generic funding allocation also in-
cludes performance indicators and agreements towards achieving certain aims 
(Zielvereinbarungen) depends on the Länder. In Brandenburg, Hamburg, Hessen and 
Rhineland-Palatinate, the percentage of generic public funding which is allocated on 
the basis of such competitive elements is above 35%. In Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Thuringia, the percentage is between 15-35%. In Meck-
lenburg-West Pomerania, Lower Saxony and Saarland, it is between 5-15% and in 
Bavaria, Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, between 0-5%. Bremen used to have such 
elements in its funding allocation, but suspended this in 2008. Saxony-Anhalt started 
                                                 
557 See Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 248 seq, 251, 253, Hinze (n 533) p. 169 seq, Enders (n 365) 
p. 22, 28, M Jaeger and S In der Smitten, 'Indikatorenbasierte Modelle der 
Hochschulfinanzierung - wie wirksam sind die wettbewerblichen Anreize?' (2010) 2010 HIS 
Magazin 6 p. 6, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 64. 
558 BMBF (n 534) p. 389, table 26. 
559 Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 251 
560 See Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 245 seq, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 271, Enders (n 
365) p. 20 seq, Jaeger and In der Smitten (n 557) p. 6, Albrecht (n 536) p. 9 seq, Seckelmann (n 
555) p. 233 seq, Jansen (n 372) p. 42 seq. 
561 See Seckelmann (n 555) p. 235 seq with further references, who also raises the question of 
whether this might infringe the democracy principle and academic freedom in the German con-
stitution according to Article 20 and 5 (3) GG respectively.  
562 Enders (n 365) p. 22 seq. 
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first introductory steps towards such performance indicators in generic funding allo-
cation in 2011.563 
4.4.2.2.2. Public competitive funding 
Declining generic funding increased the importance of competitive public 
funding. The DFG is the most important public Drittmittel provider, followed by the 
Bund.564 The DFG funds research in all disciplines and interdisciplinary research on 
the basis of applications by German research organisations or individual researchers 
within these. Whilst purely commercial research organisations are not eligible, inter-
national collaborations can also be funded. Next to this non-specific funding, the 
DFG also maintains more specific funding programmes. A board of volunteer ex-
perts assesses the proposals on the basis of scientific criteria. The DFG encourages 
collaborations with users of research; all funded projects can apply for additional 
„transfer‟ funding which inter alia allows for part of the project to take place in a pri-
vate sector organisation. The researchers are encouraged to develop their research 
until they have a „prototype‟ (meaning a transferable result in this context).565 
One of the most important programmes by the Bund is the „Excellence Initia-
tive‟ (Exzellenzinitiative), an institutional funding programme aimed at strengthening 
HEI research, changing the German HEI landscape and creating synergies between 
HEIs and other actors by financing graduate schools, excellence clusters and so-
called „future concepts‟ (Zukunftskonzepte) which aim to create elite universities.566 
Decisions regarding which HEIs will be funded are taken by a common commission 
of the DFG and Wissenschaftsrat. Reactions to the Exzellenzinitiative have been 
mixed. Seckelmann567 expresses the thought that it has a reparatory purpose (because 
                                                 
563 See Jaeger and In der Smitten (n 557) p. 6, figure 1. 
564 See Statistisches Bundesamt, Bildung und Kultur - Monetäre hochschulstatistische Kennzahlen 
2010 (Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2012) p. 121.  
565 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 65 seq, DFG (n 540).  
566 In the final round the following elite universities were selected: the Free University Berlin, the 
Humboldt University Berlin, the University of Bremen, the University of Dresden, the Univer-
sity of Cologne, the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, the Technical University Munich, 
the University of Konstanz, the University of Heidelberg, the Rheinish Westphalian Technical 
School of Higher Education Aachen and the University of Tübingen (BMBF, 'Exzellenzinitia-
tive für Spitzenforschung an Hochschulen: Die Gewinner stehen fest' (2012) 
http://www.bmbf.de/de/1321.php accessed 28 June 2012).  
567 Seckelmann (n 555) p. 228 seq, 239. 
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Länder have come into financial difficulties since the federalism reform), while at 
the same time encouraging inter-HEI competition. Others568 believe that the „Excel-
lence Initiative‟ might actually infringe the constitution in its form after the federal-
ism reform.569  
In addition to the Exzellenzinitiative, the Bund provides project funding in 
those areas it deems relevant for future development and economic growth. The 
trend is towards funding bigger research groups including the private sector as well 
as HEIs and other public research organisations.570 The Bund also encourages con-
tract research by HEIs. The High-Tech Strategy, for example, from 2006 to 2009 in-
cluded a measure (Forschungsprämie) which allowed HEIs and other public research 
organisations to apply for a 25% premium on certain kinds of contract research for 
SME from the public purse. This money was then supposed to be used to establish 
further competences regarding knowledge transfer.571 Finally, the Länder also started 
to introduce additional funding programmes for the interplay of research organisa-
tions and the private sector.572 
4.4.2.3. Non-state funding  
The importance of non-state Drittmittel has also increased. The main sources 
are (in order of significance) funding from the private sector, international funding 
and funding from third sector organisations.573 As mentioned above, the attraction of 
                                                 
568 For a short summary see A Kühne, 'Zweifelhafter Wettbewerb' Zeit Online (14 January 2010) 
http://www.zeit.de/studium/hochschule/2010-01/exzellenzinitiative-verfassungswidrig accessed 
9 November 2011 with references to the work of S. Sieweke. 
569 On the excellence initiative see BM Kehm and P Pasternack, 'The German "Excellence Initiative" 
and It's Role in Restructuring the National Higher Education Landscape' in D Palfreyman and T 
Tapper (eds), Structuring Mass Higher Education (Routledge, New York/London 2009), Hinze 
(n 533) p. 172, Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 250, Edler and Kuhlmann (n 533) p. 270, En-
ders (n 365) p. 23, Seckelmann (n 555) p. 228 seq, 239. 
570 For more details on Bund funding for private-public research co-operation in this respect see Wis-
senschaftsrat (n 533) p. 62 seq. 
571 Bundesregierung, 'Die Forschungsprämie für die öffentliche Forschung' (2012) 
http://www.hightech-strategie.de/de/520.php accessed 3 August 2012.  
572 On competitive public funding by Bund and Ländern see Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 248 
seq, 251, 253, Hinze (n 533) p. 169 seq, Enders (n 365) p. 22, 28, Jaeger and In der Smitten (n 
557) p. 6, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 64. 
573 Statistisches Bundesamt (n 564) p. 121.  
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non-public Drittmittel is encouraged by government policy. EU funding plays an es-
pecially important role in international funding.574  
Whilst third sector funding hardly constitutes a factor in overall research 
spending in Germany, it does have some significance for funding HEIs. Third sector 
organisations provide project and institutional funding including establishing their 
own HEIs, research institutes or chairs.575 Some charitable foundations of private 
sector organisations also have a for-profit section offering advisory services to re-
search organisations such as „CHE consult‟ of the Centre for HEI development (Cen-
trum für Hochschulentwicklung).576  
Research collaboration with the private sector is becoming increasingly impor-
tant for HEIs577 and the private sector is already contributing almost 30% of all 
Drittmittel.578 Funding from the private sector takes similar forms as in the other two 
countries. Research co-operations are conducted, especially in the natural sciences. 
However, agreeing on IPR ownership is occasionally an issue in this respect.579 
Sometimes research co-operations take the form of long term PPPs.580 The currently 
most important form of collaboration between industry and HEIs in Germany is con-
tract research. The increasing integration of contract research into university struc-
tures and budgets posed new challenges to the public non-profit character of univer-
sities.581 
Universities might also receive private sector funding through the commercial 
use of IPRs. Whilst, according to the Copyright Act, the copyright always remains 
with the author rather than with the employer (§7, 11 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und 
                                                 
574 C Andersen, 'Vollkostenrechnung in Hochschulen zur Erfüllung der EU-Anforderungen' (2010) 
10 CöV Heft 1233, 1238, Seckelmann (n 555) p. 228, 240. 
575 See Hinze (n 533) p. 168 seq, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 67, R Speth, 'Stiftungen und Think 
Tanks' in D Simon, A Knie and S Hornbostel (eds), Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, 
Wiesbaden 2010). 
576 Enders (n 365) p. 26, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 67 seq, Speth (n 575) p. 392 seq. 
577 Rohrbeck (n 546) p. 434, in particular table 2, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 7. 
578 Statistisches Bundesamt (n 564) p. 121.  
579 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 34 seq. 
580 Rohrbeck (n 546) p. 435 seq. 
581 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 37 seq, Enders (n 365) p. 22 seq, Andersen (n 574) p. 1235, Seckel-
mann (n 555) p. 228. 
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verwandte Schutzrechte), universities became responsible for patenting innovations 
made by their employees through a change in the Employee Invention Act 
(Deutsches Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen) in 2002. Before 2002 there used 
to be an exemption for HEI personnel. This opened up another source of income 
from the private sector through licensing or spin-off creation; even though the latter 
is currently less common.582 Patenting as a source of income is especially relevant 
for the natural and formal sciences. A negative consequence of patenting could, 
however, be that enjoyment of the publicly generated knowledge is forestalled if a 
patent is not actually exploited.583 
Staff exchanges are equally encouraged by the DFG, at the federal level and by 
the EU.584 The private sector and, to a lesser extent, the third sector and philanthro-
pists also fund chairs (Stiftungsprofessuren) in HEIs which are usually taken over by 
the HEI after a few years. Whilst the funder is not supervising or directing the re-
search undertaken by the chair holder, the funder has previously defined the special-
ity in which the chair will be established. This form of collaboration has become in-
creasingly popular in recent years.585 „Clusters‟ are what is being referred to as sci-
ence parks in the other two systems; a regional agglomeration of organisations which 
are working on related topics. The organisations remain independent and compete 
with each other.586 
Unique features of the German system are the so-called „An-Institute‟. These 
institutes exist outside university structures but are affiliated with them through a 
cooperation agreement. They are often managed by a university professor, conduct 
mainly applied research and are usually incorporated as not-for-profit limited liabil-
ity company (gemeinnützige Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung). The Wissen-
                                                 
582 On spin-offs see Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 43 seq, BMBF (n 550) p. 9 seq. 
583 On IPR exploitation see Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 41 seq, Enders (n 365) p. 24, Seckelmann (n 
555) p. 228. 
584 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 50 seq. 
585 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 36 seq. For more on externally funded chairs see U Claßen et al, 
Stiftungsprofessuren in Deutschland (Stifter Verband für die deutsche Wirtschaft, Essen 2009). 
According to this report there were about 660 of such chairs in Germany in 2009 (p. 5). 
586 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 39 seq, 
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schaftsrat587 describes them as being problematic in respect of their not-for-profit 
character, since they do conduct mainly market research.588 Finally, university-
industry research centres (Universitäts-Industrie-Forschungs-Zentren, UIFZ) are a 
currently less common form of collaboration between the private sector and HEIs in 
Germany. They are used for long-term collaboration on a topic without a specific 
aim and might just receive monetary contributions or involve more practical collabo-
ration. An example for this kind of collaboration is the German Research Center for 
Artificial Intelligence (Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz),589 
a collaboration between three universities, the Frauenhofer Gesellschaft and a variety 
of private companies including John Deere and Microsoft.590 
4.4.2.4. Full costing  
Full costing is relatively new in German HEIs. It became relevant because the 
funding provided by FP7 is given out on a full cost basis and the Research Frame-
work discussed in chapter 3 required implementation of full costing in HEIs by 1 
January 2009 (section 10.2 Research Framework) for economic research.591 While 
implementation has begun in the last years,592 publications on different full costing 
models for HEIs,593 workshops and conferences on the subject594 and consultancies 
                                                 
587 Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 36. 
588 On An-Institute see Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 36, Enders (n 365) p. 24.  
589 For further information see their website on http://www.dfki.de/web.  
590 On UIFZs see Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 37 seq, Rohrbeck (n 546) p. 435. 
591 Andersen (n 574) p. 1236 seq, Enders (n 365) p. 21, Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 86 seq. 
592 See, for example, the resolution of the conference of German Vice Chancellors (Entschließung der 
2. Mitgliederversammlung am 27.11.2007, Zur Einführung der Vollkostenrechnung an 
deutschen Hochschulen (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, Bonn 2007) p. 8 section 4 d) recom-
mending the introduction of full costing following the Anglo-Saxon model or Universität Hei-
delberg, 'Regeln zur Auftragforschung' (2012) http://www.uni-
heidelberg.de/forschung/service/auftragsforschung.html, accessed 1 July 2012, where the Uni-
versity of Heidelberg explains their approach to full costing which has started to be implemented 
there in 2010. The Wissenschaftsrat also recommended the introduction of full costing in its 
2007 report (Wissenschaftsrat (n 533) p. 87). 
593 See, for example, Andersen (n 574) p. 1240 seq, G Friedl, K Eckart and S Winkel, 'Konzeption 
eines Kostenrechnungsmodells an Hochschulen zur Ermittlung von Gemeinkostenzuschlägen 
fuer EU-Forschungsprojekte am Beispiel der Universität Mainz' (2008) 30 Beiträge zur 
Hochschulforschung 86. 
594 For example, Freie Universität Berlin and Syncwork, UniFinanz 2012: Vollkosten- und 
Trennungsrechnung - Chances und Risiken für die Steuerung von Hochschulen (Berlin 14 June 
2012). 
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offering assistance and advice to HEIs seem to indicate that HEIs struggle with the 
details of full costing.595 Coordination at state level only takes place in a limited 
number of states. The implementation of full costing thus differs from HEI to HEI in 
Germany.596  
4.4.3. Interim conclusion on Germany 
Germany has a strong research system with comparably high spending. The 
private sector finances and conducts most of the research in Germany by far. This is 
followed by funding from the public sector and, to a much lesser extent, international 
funding. Whilst third sector funding is negligible in the overall picture, it does have a 
small role to play when it comes to research funding in HEIs. Being a federal repub-
lic, responsibilities for research are divided between the Bund and the Länder. Dur-
ing the federalism reform, the Bund lost some of its former competences, in particu-
lar regarding HEIs. Next to HEIs, there are four major public non-HEI research or-
ganisations which each have a specific profile. 
HEIs receive generic public funding from the Länder which has, however, de-
clined in recent years. Instead public funding is increasingly given on a competitive 
basis and external funders have become more significant. Partly, this is due to an in-
tentional turn towards competitiveness and cooperation between the private and pub-
lic sector after a lack of transparency in funding and a lack of utilising synergies had 
been identified as some of the weaknesses of the system. However, it might also 
partly be due to funding problems created by the federalism reform reducing the 
power of the Bund to fund HEIs. Whether Article 91 b GG should be broadened, 
therefore, is currently under discussion. The current state of affairs could potentially 
also lead to problems with the academic freedom protected by Article 5 (2) GG by 
setting conditions/aims for research funding and thereby influencing the direction of 
research. The recently introduced changes might thus lead to further change and the 
system can, therefore, still be regarded to be in the process of overhaul. 
                                                 
595 See, for example, the specific service offer for HEIs as regards full costing by the company Sync-
work on http://www.syncwork.de/leistungsangebote/vollkostenrechnung-in-
hochschulen/vollkostenrechnung-in-hochschulen-zur-erfuellung-der-eu-anforderungen.html (ac-
cessed 1 July 2012).  
596 Estermann and Claeys-Kulik (n 442) p. 19 seq 
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4.5. HEI research in the three countries and EU competition law 
The analysis of the different systems has been offered in order to better assess 
the relevance of EU competition law for research in HEIs in the three countries un-
der investigation. The interim conclusions allow the following provisional assess-
ment, which will form the starting point for the qualitative empirical study conducted 
in chapter 5. As stated in more detail in chapter 3, EU competition law only applies 
to „undertakings‟ a notion that has been defined as „every entity engaged in an eco-
nomic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is 
financed‟.597 To examine whether or not the research activities of HEIs are within the 
scope of application of EU competition law, an assessment of whether HEIs qualify 
as undertakings for (parts of) their activities needs to be made. This seems unlikely 
when it comes to public generic funding. According the Research Framework,598 
„independent R&D for more knowledge and better understanding‟ is a non-economic 
activity. Under generically funded research the researchers are free to decide what 
they research and there is no requirement that it has any practical uses or immediate 
impacts. Even in England where generic funding will soon be dependent on, amongst 
other factors, impact, the researcher is still free to decide the directions of research 
and the impact does not have to be immediate or economically relevant. A service is 
not defined, but instead it is generally assessed if the HEI in question generates im-
pact at all. It is, therefore, hard to imagine how to conduct such research under mar-
ket conditions. Instead it can be assumed that the non-economic research definition 
of the Research Framework is being fulfilled here.  
Competitive public, international and third sector funding, on the other hand, 
may have to be regarded in a differentiated way. If such funding is provided merely 
on academic merit and researchers can decide freely about the directions of research 
as in German DFG funding and under the Dutch Vernieuwingsimpuls scheme, the 
assessment would probably have to be the same as with public generic funding. Even 
if the calls broadly pre-define a topic area, this is still unlikely to amount to an activ-
ity that could be conducted under market conditions. However, the more pre-set the 
                                                 
597 C-41/90 Höfner para 21. On the notion see above section 3.2.1. The notion of „undertaking‟.  
598 Research Framework (n 8) section 3.1.1. 
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conditions, the more practical the research and the more identifiable potential users 
become, the more it is possible to argue that this could be conducted by commercial 
entities in a market. Actual contract research for these funders, in particular, would 
clearly be an economic activity.  
As regards collaboration with the private sector, this can most easily come into 
the ambit of competition law. The fact that the private sector is interested in the re-
search area in the first place already indicates a certain economic relevance. Never-
theless, collaborative forms differ. Contract research, consultancy and the renting out 
of infrastructure are clearly market activities. IPR exploitation is, according to the 
Research Framework and the Issue Paper discussed in chapter 3, a non-economic 
activity if the invention has been made in the area of non-economic research, the ex-
ploitation takes place internally, is non-exclusive and all income is reinvested into 
the non-economic research areas. Otherwise, for example, if external investors are 
brought onboard as happens in England, IPR exploitation is likely to be an economic 
activity. In clusters/science parks, the individual undertakings remain separated and 
this collaborative form would, therefore, probably not constitute an economic activ-
ity as such, rather it provides a geographical location for undertakings. An-institutes, 
start-ups and spin-offs, are separate entities despite HEIs holding shares in them or 
being affiliated with them. The determination of whether any interaction is an eco-
nomic activity for the HEI would probably depend on the activities these entities 
conduct, perhaps together with the HEI.  
The determination might be more complicated when it comes to the more 
blurred forms of collaboration such as research co-operations, longer term PPPs, 
common centres, staff exchanges or research clubs/networks. It would also here de-
pend on the question whether, in the individual case, the research is independent and 
„for more knowledge and better understanding‟ or if it is research that could be con-
ducted on a market basis. Private funding for a chair, lectureship or PhD which, 
aside from the subject area which is preset, does not have any conditions attached to 
it as well as purely charitable private sector donations are probably to be considered 
as non-economic activities. If the conditions are too preset and the funded researcher 
is essentially conducting a service for the private sector partner, the activity might 
well be economic in nature. These cases, therefore, often need to be assessed on an 
activity by activity basis. 
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4.5.1. Potential problems 
If competition law is applicable, HEIs must not, according to Article 101 (1) 
TFEU, enter into any form of anti-competitive collusion nor must national law bring 
them into a position where they would do so.599 An especially severe form of anti-
competitive collusion is price fixing. HEIs in England and the Netherlands have real 
full cost methodologies that relate actual costs to a research project and which do not 
seem to pose a problem under EU competition law. In Germany, however, there still 
seems to be some confusion and occasionally overheads are being used instead of 
real full cost methodologies. If these are fixed between HEIs, by statute or informa-
tion on them is exchanged, this could potentially be classified as price fixing. After 
having arrived at the costs, HEIs negotiate prices or follow the rules set by the fun-
ders. In the area of economic research, this could lead to potential problems, as, for 
example, preset funding rules could be regarded as price fixing. Furthermore, com-
mon guidelines between funders such as the Akkord by NWO, VSNU and KNAW 
might potentially be seen as anti-competitive.  
Aside from price fixing, Article 101 (1) also prohibits undertakings agreeing on 
any other special conditions or limitations within the collusion without there being 
an economically justified reason. This could cause problems if government policies 
are in place that require or encourage HEIs to prefer SMEs or local companies such 
as in innovation voucher initiatives.600 If HEIs in an area of economic activity agree 
on a collaboration which is not open to all interested parties without an economically 
justified reason, this could equally be seen as anti-competitive. One might, for ex-
ample, wonder, if plans for sharing facilities, as discussed between certain research 
intensive universities in the North of England,601 could be such a cartel, if other will-
ing HEIs were not allowed to participate or preferential conditions were given to the 
partners. Furthermore, the provision prohibits market division. This could cause 
problems, if HEIs agree (or are forced by government policy), to focus on local 
economies, share the market according to subject areas or enter into specialisation 
                                                 
599 13/77 INNO v ATAB para. 30 seq. 
600 Some English HEIS are, for example, planning to establish „innovation vouchers‟. See PACEC (n 
433) p. 5. 
601 See N8 Research Partnership, 'Equipment Sharing' (2013) http://www.n8research.org.uk/asset-
collaboration/ accessed 23 December 2013.  
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agreements. Research co-operations as such could be anti-competitive if entered into 
shortly before an individual discovery would have been made anyway or if there are 
any limitations beyond the research including limitations on parties exploiting the 
results. Finally, Article 101 (1) TFEU could be infringed if limits on research of an 
economic nature are agreed upon or prescribed by national legislation. The latter 
does not seem to be the case, however, in England and the Netherlands. In Germany 
§ 25 (2) HRG only limits economic research at a level where it would collide with 
the statutory tasks of the HEIs which, if considered anti-competitive in the first 
place, might be exempted as SGEI. 
Article 102 TFEU makes the abuse of a dominant position illegal. As discussed 
in chapter 3, HEIs could come into conflict with this provision if they conduct an 
economic activity and are considered dominant in a specific market. In such cases it 
might, for example, cause problems if HEIs do not charge full costs and reasonable 
profit, since this could be regarded as predatory pricing by their competitors. Fur-
thermore, if HEIs operate unilaterally as dominant undertakings and offer special 
conditions, impose special duties, cooperate only with specific partners or limit out-
puts, they could potentially come into conflict with Article 102 TFEU rather than 
with Article 101 (1) TFEU as in cases outlined above. Finally, according to Article 
102, dominant undertakings might be prevented from refusing access to essential fa-
cilities or refusing licenses for IPRs, dividing the market through licenses or attach-
ing specific conditions. Private sector partners might, however, desire special condi-
tions or exclusivity. HEIs would thus need to be aware of these potential problems 
and avoid them in contracts if operating as an undertaking.  
If an economic activity is conducted, the state may also not give particular un-
dertakings advantages exclusively since this could constitute state aid according to 
Article 107 TFEU. HEIs could get into conflict with this provision specifically, if 
they do not charge full costs and reasonable profit for research because the receiver 
of the research (be it their own company) could then be regarded as being subsidised. 
The Netherlands and England have set up full costing systems, while there is some 
doubt whether every HEI in Germany has yet done so and whether the systems are 
correctly measuring full costs. Aside from this, universities still negotiate prices in-
dividually or follow funder rules which might not always cover full costs. In the 
Netherlands, a variety of national legislation also specifically points out that full 
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costs need to be charged by HEIs from the private sector. Nevertheless, there could 
still be problems with Article 107 TFEU. Firstly, in the area of economic research 
full costs are insufficient, but market prices, respectively full costs and reasonable 
profit need to be charged602 something which appears to be required only by the 
Kaderbesluit EZ Subsidies for collaborations which receive subsidies from EZ. Sec-
ondly, the concept of undertaking goes beyond private sector companies. Third and 
public sector organisations can also be classified as undertakings and if HEIs coop-
erate with them in what constitutes an economic activity, they also need to charge 
full cost and reasonable profit from them. While the Kaderbesluit incorporates the 
EU definition for „undertaking‟, the question remains if this is always applied cor-
rectly in practice. As regards TKI subsidies the EZ, for example, seems to use the 
terms „industrial partners‟, „private contributions‟ and „undertaking‟ interchangeably 
and defines „private contribution‟ as a monetary contribution which is not received 
from a research organisation, the NWO, KNAW, public bodies or third sector or-
ganisations.603  
Additionally, public funding (contracts or calls) which could be classified as an 
economic activity might potentially not be given directly to one undertaking or calls 
not be limited to certain types of undertakings respectively. Instead, such activities 
might have to be commissioned according to the rules set out by the Court,604 which 
usually requires a public procurement procedure also allowing private and overseas 
providers to tender. Furthermore, it could also cause a problem in state aid terms if 
additional subsidies are provided to HEIs and other partners in collaborations605 for 
research which could be classified as economic in nature or innovation vouchers are 
given out by the state or HEIs, as this way public funding would exclusively reach 
specific undertakings. If HEIs reinvest commercially gained money in further com-
                                                 
602 C-280/00 Altmark. 
603 Agentschap NL, 'Definities TKI-toeslag' (EZ Topkonsortia voor Kennis en Innovatie 2013) 
http://www.agentschapnl.nl/programmas-regelingen/definities-tki-toeslag accessed 1 May 2013. 
604 C-280/00 Altmark. 
605 In this respect the BMBF generically points to EU guidelines mentioning that undertakings must 
contribute their own assets to a collaboration without providing any details of how this is done. 
It also appears that the term „undertaking‟ is used interchangeably with „private sector entity‟ 
(BMBF, 'Förderung in der Forschung' (2012) http://www.bmbf.de/de/1398.php accessed 2 Au-
gust 2012).  
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mercial activities and offer discounts in an economically reasonable way, this might, 
however, not pose a problem in terms of state aid. To an extent this is therefore a 
question of how separate accounts are. Finally, if IPRs, created in the public area of 
research, are given out exclusively or for preferential conditions or if staff use their 
knowledge generated in the area of publicly funded research during an exchange ex-
clusively for the benefit of one other company, this could equally be regarded as 
state aid.  
4.5.2. Exemptions 
As has been discussed in chapter 3, Article 101 and 107 TFEU and secondary 
legislation provide for exemptions for certain breaches of competition law which 
could be relevant for HEIs many of which depend on market share or the amount of 
the aid. It would thus be impossible to assess in how far they are generally applicable 
without further knowledge. Article 102 TFEU does not include such exemptions. If 
the service is of general interest, Decision 2012/21/EU exempts aid below €15M per 
annum. Finally, the research activities of HEIs might more generally be exempted as 
SGEIs under Article 106 (2) TFEU. As discussed in chapter 3, the latter requires a 
service of general interest to be entrusted to the undertaking in question which would 
then be obstructed by the application of the competition rules. Whilst in Germany 
and the Netherlands legislation is making research a statutory task of HEIs, this 
might in itself not be sufficiently precise to be regarded as an entrustment act. 
Whether or not the service in question is in the general interest, the application of the 
competition rules does obstruct it and the question of whether this is proportional 
would have to be looked at in the individual case.  
4.6. Conclusion 
The systems investigated differ in a variety of ways from the general national 
expenditure on research and the overall character of the system to the importance of 
individual sectors and the extent to which the recent trend of commodification has 
influenced the research systems. Germany has constantly increased research expen-
diture coming close to reaching the 3% goal of the Europe2020 Strategy. Spending 
in the Netherlands has fluctuated, but has now reached its highest level in ten years. 
The UK has had rather stable expenditure on R&D. Over the last ten years, it has 
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remained below 2% and public sector spending is especially low. Germany is tradi-
tionally characterised by a great extent of academic freedom of the individual which 
is even represented in its constitution and the federal structure also plays a signifi-
cant role in the character of the system. England‟s research system is organised in a 
much more centralised and top-down fashion with strong elements of a liberal mar-
ket economy. The Netherlands have a centralised, but very consociational research 
system. These characteristics are, to a certain extent, still visible in the respective 
research policies, despite all three systems having recently undergone changes to-
wards external steering, funding on the basis of achievement and commodification.  
In all three countries the private sector is the biggest research funding provider. 
However, this is most pronounced in Germany were the private sector contributes 
two thirds of all R&D spending, in the Netherlands the contribution is just under half 
of all research spending and it is even less in England. The second biggest spender is 
congruently the public sector providing about a third of all research spending in all 
three countries. Differences are very pronounced when it comes to research financed 
by foreign sources and the third sector. The UK relies heavily on foreign investment 
in R&D with about 18% of all research being financed this way. In the Netherlands 
foreign contributions amount to 11% and in Germany to only 4%. In all countries the 
third sector plays a small role; in England the third sector provides 5% of all research 
spending, in the Netherlands 3% and in Germany it is virtually non-existent.  
Public sector research is also organised rather differently across the three sys-
tems. The German public research sector consists of HEIs and four other public re-
search organisations with clearly defined tasks. In both the Netherlands and England, 
HEIs are the most important public research providers. Nevertheless, the Dutch re-
search system has also a wide and constantly increasing variety of other research or-
ganisations, including many PPPs. In England there are hardly any public research 
organisations alongside HEIs, but there are relevant third sector providers. The latter 
play no significant role in Germany and the Netherlands.  
When it comes to HEI funding, a large amount of public funding is still pro-
vided generically without recourse to competitive factors such as performance or fo-
cus on government priorities in Germany and in the Netherlands. In England the ge-
neric funding allocation always involves competitive factors based on quality and 
will soon also include impact. An attempt to introduce such a system early on in the 
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Netherlands was prevented by strong resistance from the universities, while HEI re-
sistance in England did not lead to the same result. This can be explained through the 
nature of the research systems as consociational and top down liberal systems re-
spectively.606 Despite these differences, an increase in the importance of external 
funding (public competitive as well as non-public) can be observed in all systems. 
This kind of funding is often provided for particular aims and thus poses threats for 
the academic freedom of the individual researcher. Due to the changes in funding, all 
three systems have introduced or are in the process of introducing full costing meth-
odologies. While in England this has been done centrally through the TRAC fEC, it 
is undertaken on an individual HEI basis in Germany and the Netherlands. England 
is the first of the studied systems to have introduced full costing, followed by the 
Netherlands and, only recently and tentatively, Germany. In all three systems, how-
ever, it does not seem to be the case that all non-generic research funding is provided 
at levels covering the calculated full costs.  
From a competition law perspective, generic public funding in all three systems 
would probably not have to be regarded as economic in nature. Public competitive 
and third sector funding could possibly be classified as economic in nature in certain 
cases and thus competition law would have to be applied. This would depend upon 
whether the activities funded could be classified as, as the Research Framework 
phrases it, „independent R&D for more knowledge and better understanding‟ or 
would amount to a service which could be provided on a market. Private sector fund-
ing will in many cases constitute an economic activity, particularly with regards to 
contract research, consultancy and the renting out of infrastructure. Other forms of 
collaboration will have to be assessed on an activity by activity basis. If an activity is 
classified as economic the HEI would have to comply with EU competition and state 
aid rules. It has been shown that in all three systems potential problems could arise 
from this. However, the more economically oriented the system, the more often the 
problems might arise. The next chapter will empirically study in detail how far the 
established concerns might materialise, how far differences can be observed in the 
systems in this respect and how far HEIs are aware of possible consequences.  
                                                 
606 See also Becker (n 480) p. 167 seq. 





The preceding chapter established how the turn towards commodification of 
HEIs has been manifested in the three national research systems under scrutiny. Fur-
thermore, it explored how far this can make research in HEIs vulnerable to EU com-
petition law. The purpose of this chapter is to study in detail how far the established 
concerns might materialise, how far differences can be observed in the systems in 
this respect and how far key actors in HEIs are aware of possible consequences. The 
theoretical framework and the investigation of EU competition law and of the re-
spective national legal frameworks for research in public universities led to the ex-
pectation that exposure to EU competition law might be greater in the UK, where 
commercialisation of the HEI sector had progressed the furthest (indicated by nu-
merous competitive elements in allocating public research funding and pronounced 
encouragement of universities to engage in collaboration with business). It was 
equally expected that this might have resulted in both a higher awareness of this ex-
posure and the ability to circumvent it through either compliance (an indication of 
which could be seen in the early introduction of a full costing methodology) or utili-
sation of relevant exemptions. Germany, with only modest steps towards commodi-
fication of HEIs, on the other hand, might suffer less from economic constraints and 
competition law exposure and, equally, HEIs might be less aware of it.  
This chapter will, firstly, explain the methodology used for the empirical study. 
It will give reasons for the techniques employed (interviews, focus groups) and in-
troduce the strategic sample chosen for the empirical study. It will then elaborate 
upon how the interview questions were established and how they will be analysed, 
namely through a framework based on the competition law problems identified in 
chapter 3 and 4. This will be followed by a subchapter for each country reporting the 
outcomes of the empirical study. Finally, the results will be brought together in the 
conclusion.  
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5.2. Methodology 
In the following the design of the empirical study is, first, set out. The next sec-
tions elaborate on the strategic sample and the interviews themselves. After a short 
section on ethical considerations, the last section contains information on data analy-
sis. In the end a short interim conclusion summarises the results, elaborates about the 
boundaries of the study and leads on to the analytical subchapters.  
5.2.1. Design 
Specific insights about the universities (for example, on research funding and 
collaboration strategies) were needed to establish whether or not the potential com-
petition law constraints can materialise. These insights had to be gained from experts 
in the field i.e. those responsible within the universities for these activities. In-depth 
answers were required and the opportunity to elaborate on these further needed to be 
given in order to fully understand research funding in the individual universities. 
Only through this approach could a substantiated assessment of potential competi-
tion law problems be made. Qualitative research by interviewing experts was, there-
fore, the most appropriate choice,607 since interviewing experts who have more in-
formation than the researcher directly increases the researcher‟s understanding of 
university practice regarding research funding.608   
The research design combined aspects of both an „interview guide‟ (or semi-
structured interview) and a „standardised open-ended interview‟ (or structured inter-
view).609 Whilst a set of interview questions had been established, some flexibility 
was allowed in conducting the interviews in order not to interrupt the flow of con-
versation and to adapt to the specific organisational structures of the chosen universi-
                                                 
607 Quantitative research usually uses closed standardised, often closed questions. MQ Patton, Quali-
tative Research & Evaluation Methods (3rd edn, Sage, Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi 
2002) p. 348. 
608 On expert interviews see B Littig, 'Interviews mit Eliten - Interviews mit ExpertInnen: Gibt es 
Unterschiede' (2008) 9 FQS p. 3 seq, S Mangen, 'Qualitative research methods in cross-national 
settings' (1999) 2 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 109, p. 110, Patton (n 
607) p. 401.  
609 An interview guide „involves outlining a set of issues that are to be explored‟ while a standardised 
open-ended interview „consists of a set of questions carefully worded and arranged with the in-
tention of taking each respondent through [them]‟. Patton (n 607) p. 342 seq, quotes on p. 342. 
See also RK Yin, Case study research (2nd edn, Sage, Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi1994) 
p. 84 seq. 
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ties. The questions were mainly factual while a few questions also enquired about the 
opinion of the experts on the current situation or future developments.610 Some inter-
views took place as focus groups.611 Most, however, were conducted with a single 
expert. 
5.2.2. Strategic sampling 
Besides being limited to research in HEIs in three Member States, as explained 
in chapter 1 and 4, the sample for an empirical study had to be further condensed 
within the frame of a PhD. The sample chosen is outlined below. 
5.2.2.1. Selection of universities 
Only public universities are examined, as these are the traditionally publicly 
funded, research intensive HEIs. In England where a binary system no longer exists, 
HEIs which only became universities with the implementation of the FHEA after 
(post-1992s) have not been considered in order to maintain comparability with the 
other two countries which retain binary systems. Furthermore, only non-specialised 
universities which teach and research in all subject groups have been considered. 
At least three universities have been identified for each country. In order to 
maintain comparability, an attempt was made to include a wide spectrum of universi-
ties. Therefore, at least one university from each country had to fall within each of 
three categories established according to placement in international rankings and age 
of the university. The categories are:  
1. „ancient‟: more than 400 years old and usually ranked within the top 25% 
in national comparison, 
2. „well-established‟: more than 100 years old and ranked within the top 60% 
in national comparison, 
3. „new-coming‟: less than 100 years old and ranked below the top 60% in 
national comparison, but usually presented in the important rankings.  
                                                 
610 For more on question types see Patton (n 607) p. 348 seq. 
611 Focus groups are „interviews with a small group of people [usually with a similar background] on 
a specific topic‟ which are „focused, keeping responses on target‟ (Patton (n 607) p. 385 seq, 
quotes on p. 385 and 388). 
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The Shanghai, Leiden, THE and QS rankings have been evaluated for the se-
lection, as these are the most internationally recognised (though not uncriticised)612 
rankings.613 The selection of universities also attempted to represent a geographical 
spread of institutions within the three countries. Initially one university was con-
tacted from each category. In two cases the universities did not think it appropriate to 
participate in the research (the University of Heidelberg for category 1 in Germany 
and the University of Cambridge for category 1 in England). In these cases, two 
more universities from the same category were contacted. In Germany both alterna-
tives were willing to participate, while in England, despite a number of requests, a 
reply has never been received from the University of Durham. Table 1 below shows 
how the categories were constructed and how the chosen universities fit into them.  
5.2.2.2. Selection of academic subjects 
Since there might be differences regarding funding situations between aca-
demic subjects, experts from different subjects were interviewed, if the structure of 
the relevant research office allowed. For this purpose, a variety of subjects needed to 
be identified from which to recruit the experts. Academic subjects are categorised in 
different ways. Whilst politicians614 as well as states and international organisations 
frequently distinguish between applied and basic research615 and this distinction also 
                                                 
612 One of the criticisms is that they focus too much on research. However, this is an advantage for 
the purposes of this study, which equally focuses on research. On criticism see CHERPA-
Network, Design Phase of the Project 'Design and Testing the Feasibility of a Multi-
dimensional Global University Ranking' (U-Multirank - Interim Progress Report, 2010) p. 62 
seq, R Lange, 'Benchmarkings, Rankings und Ratings' in D Simon, A Knie and S Hornbostel 
(eds), Handbuch Wissenschaftspolitik (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010) p. 324 seq. See also the 
contributions to Erkkilä T, Global University Rankings (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 
2013). 
613 CHERPA-Network (n 612) p. 6 seq, Lange (n 612) p. 324. Note that these publications still refer 
to the combined THE/QS ranking. Since 2010, however, THE and QS publish separate rankings. 
See P Baty, 'New data partner for World University Rankings' THE (30th October 2009) 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/408881.article accessed 15 May 2013 
614 BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, for example, stated that more applied subjects, especially in 
the category of STEM (science, technology, engineering and maths), have a particular value for 
the national interest and should thus enjoy differential funding based on excellence. V Cable, 
'Higher Education Speech' (Oral statement to Parliament 15 July 2010, London) available on 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-new-era-for-universities.  
615 See OECD definition in (n 35). 
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becomes more important in academic debates,616 the academic discourse generally 
categorises disciplines in accordance with subject matter and methods. This leads to 
a distinction between „formal sciences‟, based on objective laws (for example, 
mathematics, computer sciences) , „humanities‟ which employ methods of critical 
and speculative analysis (for example, history, literature) and „empirical sciences‟ 
based on empirical methods. The last category is divided further into „natural sci-
ences‟ studying natural phenomena (e.g. biology, chemistry) and „social sciences‟ 
focussing on human society and individuals (e.g. sociology, psychology). Sometimes 
further subcategories are made and for certain subjects the categorisation is contro-
versial, especially between humanities and social sciences (law, for example is 
mostly regarded as a humanity, while it is sometimes seen as a social science).617  
For this study two more and two less applied disciplines have been chosen 
which at the same time represent the main groups of academic subject classification: 
formal sciences, natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. Due to the difficul-
ties in clearly differentiating between social sciences and humanities at times,618 
these groups have been merged for this study. At least one subject has then been 
chosen as an example for each of the three remaining categories. Computer science 
is envisaged to simultaneously represent an applied and a formal science. Law repre-
sents an applied and philosophy a less applied science from the group of social sci-
ences and humanities. Finally, physics has been chosen as a natural science and 
stands for a less applied science (despite its evident application at times), since it is 
one of the more basic natural sciences. Figure 1 below graphically illustrates the 
sample for the empirical study.  
                                                 
616 T Kuhn, 'Scientific Revolutions' in R Boyd, P Gasper and JD Trout (eds), The Philosophy of Sci-
ence (MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass)/London 1991) p. 146 seq. 
617 On the academic classification of sciences see R Carnap, 'Logical Foundations of the Unity of 
Science' in R Boyd, P Gasper and JD Trout (eds), The philosophy of science (MIT Press, Cam-
bridge (Mass)/London 1991) p. 394 seq, H-C Koller, Grundbegriffe, Theorien und Methoden der 
Erziehungswissenschaft: Eine Einführung (W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart 2009) p. 179 seq, 
C Burschel, D Losen and A Wiendl, Betriebswirtschaftslehre der nachhaltigen Unternehmung 
(Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, München 2004) p. 194. 
618 See Koller (n 617) p. 180 seq. 
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Table 1: University categories according to age and rankings  
University  Shanghai Ranking619  
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
Leiden Ranking620  
2008, 2011/2012, 2013 
THE Ranking621  
2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 
QS Ranking622  
2009, 2011, 2012-13 
Category 1: 
Ancient universities 
(more than 400 years old) 
National rank within top 25%623 
(Below the national rank and, in brackets, the international rank is provided) 
Munich 
(founded 1472)624  
 
1 (world rank 55) 
1 (world rank 52) 
2 (world rank 54) 
2 (world rank 60) 
7 (European rank 67) 
1 (European rank 25) 
4 (European rank 36) 
 
2 (world rank 61) 
1 (world rank 45) 
1 (world rank 48) 
4 (world rank 98) 
3 (world rank 62) 
3 (world rank 60) 
Freiburg  
(founded 1457)625 
6-11 (world rank 101-151) 
6-10 (world rank 101-150) 
7-10 (world rank 101-150) 
4 (world rank 99) 
6 (European rank 64) 
3 (European rank 32) 
5 (European rank 43) 
5 (world rank 132) 
10 (world rank 189-190) 
7 (world rank 144) 
5 (world rank 122) 
5 (world rank 105) 
5 (world rank 106) 
  
                                                 
619 Center for World-Class Universities of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 'Academic Ranking of World Universities' (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)  
http://www.shanghairanking.com/index.html. http://www.arwu.org/index.jsp accessed 6 June 2013.  
620 CWTS, 'CWTS Leiden Ranking 2013' (Leiden University 2013) http://www.leidenranking.com/ accessed 6 June 2013, CWTS, 'Leiden Ranking 2011/2012' (Leiden Uni-
versity 2012) http://www.cwts.nl/leidenranking20112012/ranking.aspx accessed 6 June 2013, CWTS, 'The Leiden Ranking 2008' (Leiden University 2008) 
http://www.cwts.nl/ranking/LeidenRankingWebSite.html accessed 13 August 2010 green ranking.  
621 THE, 'World University Ranking' (2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13) http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/ accessed 6 June 2013. 
622 QS, 'QS World University Rankings' (2009, 2011, 2012-13) http://www.topuniversities.com/qs-world-university-rankings accessed 7 June 2013. 
623 Percentages relate to the number of universities from each country which were ranked in the individual rankings (for example, 40 German, 12 Dutch and 40 UK universi-
ties were ranked in the Shanghai 2009 ranking). If a university ranks substantially below its category in one of the rankings this is highlighted in light red, if above in 
light green.  
624 Communications & Media Relations, LMU at a glance (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich 2009/2010) p. 6/7. 
625 Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 'Die Vergangenheit würdigen. Die Zukunft wagen' (2012) http://www.uni-freiburg.de/universitaet/portrait/geschichte accessed 12 
December 2012. 
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Leiden 
(founded 1575)626  
2 (world rank 72) 
2 (world rank 70) 
2 (world rank 65) 
2 (world rank 73) 
8 (European rank 41) 
7 (European rank 30) 
1 (European rank 13) 
2 (world rank 124) 
3 (world rank 79) 
1 (world rank 64) 
2 (world rank 60) 
3 (world rank 88) 
2 (world rank 75-76) 
Oxford  
(teaching since 1096)627 
1 (world rank 10) 
2 (world rank 10) 
2 (world rank 10) 
2 (world rank 10) 
1 (European rank 1) 
3 (European rank 5) 
2 (European rank 4) 
1-2 (world rank 6) 
1 (world rank 4) 
1 (world rank 2-3) 
3-4 (world rank 5-6) 
2 (world rank 5) 
3 (world rank 5) 
Category 2:  
Well-Established universities 
(100-400 years) 
National rank within top 60%  
HU Berlin  
(founded 1810)628 
- 15 (European rank 91) 
8 (European rank 58) 
12 (European rank 70) 
9-10 (world rank 178) 
5 (world rank 109) 
4 (world rank 99) 
 
6 (world rank 146) 
6 (world rank 132) 
7 (world rank 130) 
Groningen  
(founded 1614)629 
3-6 (world rank 101-106) 
3-6 (world rank 101-105) 
3-6 (world rank 102-150) 
3-7 (world rank 101-150) 
10 (European rank 45) 
10 (European rank 56) 
11 (European rank 52) 
9 (world rank 170) 
7 (world rank 134) 
7 (world rank 89) 
 
8 (world rank 139) 
7 (world rank 115) 
7 (world rank 109) 
Leeds 
(founded 1904)630 
12-15 (world rank 101-105) 
12-14 (world rank 101-105)  
11-15 (world rank 101-150) 
15-19 (world rank 151-200) 
24 (European rank 65) 
28 (European rank 87) 
24 (European rank 56) 
 
26 (world rank 168) 
20 (world rank 133) 
20 (world rank 142) 
 
18 (world rank 99) 
16 (world rank 93) 
18 (world rank 94) 
                                                 
626 Universiteit Leiden, 'About Leiden University' (2012) http://www.about.leiden.edu/about/university-city.html accessed 25th May 2013.  
627 The exact foundation date for the University of Oxford is unknown. University of Oxford, 'A brief history of the University' (2009) 
http://www.ox.ac.uk/about_the_university/introducing_oxford/a_brief_history_of_the_university/index.html accessed 27 April 2013. 
628 HU Berlin, 'Die Geschichte der Universität' (2010) http://www.hu-berlin.de/ueberblick/geschichte/hubdt_html accessed 13 August 2010. 
629 Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 'History University of Groningen' (2012) http://www.rug.nl/science-and-society/university-museum/history/university-of-groningen/?lang=en 
accessed 23June 2013. 
630 University of Leeds, 'Heritage' (2010) http://www.leeds.ac.uk/info/20014/about/21/heritage accessed 13 August 2010. 




(younger than 100 years) 
Below national top 60% 
Bremen 
(founded 1971)631 
25-36 (world rank 303-401) 
24-33 (world rank 301-400) 
33-39 (world rank 401-500) 
31-37 (world rank 401-500) 
34 (European rank 156) 
22 (European rank 87) 
26 (European rank 112) 
- 32 (world rank 399-400) 
34 (world rank 367) 
29 (world rank 347) 
Maastricht  
(founded 1976)632 
10-11 (world rank 303-401) 
10-11 (world rank 301-400) 
10 (world rank 201-300) 
9-10 (world rank 201-300) 
11 (European rank 46) 
12 (European rank 86) 
10 (European rank 44) 
 
- 
11 (world rank 197) 
9 (world rank 115) 
  
6 (world rank 116) 
6 (world rank 109) 
6 (world rank 107) 
Essex 
(founded 1962)633 
37-40 (world rank 402-501) 
36-38 (world rank 36-38) 
34-37 (world rank 401-500) 
34-38 (world rank 401-500) 
- - 
33-34 (world rank 201-225) 
35 (world rank 251-275) 
38 (world rank 273-276) 
38 (world rank 315) 
39 (world rank 321) 
                                                 
631 Universität Bremen, 'Uni kurz vorgestellt -Geschichte' (2010) http://www.portrait.uni-bremen.de/geschichte.php3 accessed 13 August 2010. 
632 Maastricht University, 'History' (2013) http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Main/AboutUM/History.htm accessed 21 June 2013. 
633 University of Essex, 'History of the University' (2013) http://www.essex.ac.uk/about/history/ accessed 23 June 2013. 
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Figure 1: Sample for the empirical study  
The areas relevant for the research are shaded dark. 
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5.2.3. Interviews 
The following explains how the interview guide was established and how ac-
cess to the interviewees was gained and elaborates upon the interview situation.  
5.2.3.1. Interview guide  
The aim of the empirical study to analyse exposure of HEI research to EU 
competition law as an example of exposure to economic constraints has been pre-
pared by discussing potential competition law constraints for HEIs generally in chap-
ter 3. In chapter 4 the HEI research systems of the countries under scrutiny have 
been introduced and a tentative competition law analysis has been conducted. Ac-
cordingly, potential issues which could arise under Article 101 TFEU were related to 
price fixing, market foreclosure (e.g. denying certain undertakings market access), 
market division (e.g. specialisation agreements, geographical division), anti-
competitive research cooperation (e.g. limitations beyond research, close to discov-
ery individually, limitations towards exploiting results), vertical cartels (e.g. special 
agreements with some research users) and limiting markets (e.g. limit on economic 
research or on externally financed chairs). As exemptions here depend mainly on 
market share it is impossible to find out about potential application of the exemp-
tions in general questions. Article 102 TFEU could give rise to potential problems 
regarding non-economically justified contract conditions, output limitation, the re-
fusal to enter into contractual relations or provide licenses, the insistence on long–
term licenses, price discrimination, technical restrictions, predatory pricing or abuse 
of (legal) monopolies. Unlike Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU does not contain 
exemptions. State aid could potentially be given if full costing is not adhered to, if 
economic activities are not commissioned or if publicly generated knowledge is ex-
clusively transferred to one undertaking (for example, through staff working there or 
licenses). Here exemptions could apply for de minimis aid, for transparent aid for 
projects exempted by the GBER or for aid of up €15M per annum for SGEIs. In ad-
dition, certain research services might more generally be exempted as SGEIs. 
The interview questions were then drafted according to the identified potential 
issues as outlined in Table 2 below. For example the question „Are there any limita-
tions as to the amount of research, in particular privately funded research your or-
ganisation may conduct?‟ aims to determine whether there might be a limitation of 
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outputs. Some additional general questions on economic constraints for research 
were asked in order to be able to contextualise potential competition law constraints. 
As the tentative competition law analysis in chapter 4 has shown, anti-competitive 
behaviour under the various provisions can partly overlap. If universities, for exam-
ple, do not use a full costing system in areas of economic research, this can poten-
tially be problematic in state aid terms. At the same time, if they agree on overhead 
rates, this can potentially constitute price fixing. Finally, if a dominant university 
asks for prices that are abusively low, this might be regarded as predatory pricing 
under Article 102 TFEU. Some questions, like those on full costing methodologies, 
thus cover a range of competition law issues.  
Having developed the questions this way, the following structure initially re-
sulted: 1. Introductory questions (questions such as name and role), 2. Economic ac-
tivity (questions on how is research funded and what is expected in return), 3. Full 
costing, 4. Market access/special conditions (most issues under Article 101 and 102 
TFEU were located here), 5. Other questions on economic research (containing ques-
tions on the remaining issues which were not related to access or special conditions) 
and 6. General questions on funding situation (here the experts were asked their 
opinion beyond issues solely related to competition law issues). This structure, how-
ever, turned out not to be ideal for the conversation flow (for example, the questions 
jumped between public and private funding requiring the expert to switch constantly 
between the different funders to answer the questions).  
After interviewing experts in the first couple of universities, the questions 
were, therefore, restructured into the following sections: 1. Introductory questions, 2. 
Publicly funded research, 3. Cooperation with the private sector, 4. Full costing, 5. 
Market entry, limitations of research and 6. General opinion on funding situation. 
Some questions which appeared to be repetitive (i.e. leading to the same answers as 
previous questions) were removed or merged.634 Aside from this, the questions re-
mained the same for all interviews except for minor system-specific alterations (for 
example, adapting the terminology to the relevant systems or omitting superfluous 
questions on full costing in England due to TRAC fEC being compulsory). 
                                                 
634 See Annex 1 for the final interview guide.  
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Table 2: Analytical framework  
The below table demonstrates how the potential competition law constraints on HEIs identified in chapter 3 and 4 have been turned into interview 
questions and how the answers will be analysed to verify potential constraints.  
Issues identified in 




Economic activity 4, 7, 8 These questions aim to discover when research is, or could be, offered as a service on a market and is thus an 
economic activity. 
Market definition  - It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct market definition for all potential problems which 
could arise.  
Price fixing  
(Article 101 TFEU) 
20, 21 
 
Questions 19-21 evaluate costing and pricing. Amongst them, question 20 and 21 inter alia, clarify if there 
might be price fixing which could be seen in cases where it is agreed on how full costing is applied or, gener-
ally, if prices are agreed upon.  
Market foreclosure  
(Article 101 or 102 
TFEU)  
22 This question attempts to find out if a collusion of undertakings denies market access to other undertakings or 
if a legal monopoly is being abused (for example, by insisting on it despite not being able to fulfil demand). 
After studying the systems in chapter 4, this does, however, seem unlikely.  
Refusal to enter into con-
tractual relations with 
certain undertakings  
(Article 101 or 102 
TFEU) 
9, 10 These questions try to establish whether networks or any other kind of collaboration exist from which certain 
undertakings are excluded without justifiable cause since this could constitute a collusion hindering competi-
tion or the abuse of a dominant position, depending on the details of the case.  
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Non-economically justi-
fied contract conditions 
(Article 101 or 102 
TFEU) 
11 This question tries to find out if any non-economically justified contract conditions are used, as these could 
hinder competition. Depending on the case such conditions could be part of a collusion or be imposed on 
other undertakings by a dominant undertaking.  
Refusal to provide li-
censes or unreasonably 
long duration (Article 
101 or 102 TFEU) 
17, 18 Questions 15-18 aim to establish whether intellectual property rights are used in a way that infringes competi-
tion law. Amongst them, questions 17 and 18 try to establish, if a license is not given to certain other under-
takings or unreasonably long durations are attached to licenses. Depending on the case this could be an anti-
competitive collusion or the abuse of a dominant position. 
Anti-competitive 
research co-operation 
(Article 101 TFEU) 
13 This question aims at finding out if a co-operation has been initiated shortly before the discovery would have 
been made individually since this could constitute an anti-competitive collusion.  
Market division  
(Article 101 TFEU) 
25, 26 Questions 25 and 26 aim to establish if any market division is taking place either by subjects (specialisation 
agreements) or geographically. 
Limiting markets  
(Article 101 or 102 
TFEU) 
23 This question evaluates if there are limitations to the amount of economic research an HEI conducts (through 
legislation, collusion or by artificially limiting outputs unilaterally) since this could be seen as „limiting mar-
kets‟. Depending on the circumstances of the case this could infringe Article 101 or 102 TFEU.  
Price discrimination or 
other discrimination  
(Article 102 TFEU) 
12 Question 12 aims to find out if there are advantages which are given to certain research users, but not to oth-
ers. If conducted by a dominant undertaking this could constitute an infringement of Article 102 TFEU.  
Predatory pricing  
(Article 102 TFEU) 
19-21 Questions 19-21 evaluate costing and pricing. Inter alia, it is aimed to find out if there might be predatory 
pricing. Prices are reasonable if they have been calculated transparently including all costs and reasonable 
profit. 
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Mergers - Due to the very high annual turnover requirement it is unlikely that HEIs will come into conflict with the 
Merger Regulation. 
Hidden State Aid  
(Article 107 TFEU) 
 
19-21 Questions 19-21 evaluate costing and pricing. Inter alia, an HEI might provide state aid if it offers services at 
an unreasonably low level. In economic research the costs must thus be calculated transparently including all 
costs and reasonable profit. 
Applying the Altmark 
principles  
(Article 107 TFEU) 
5 This question tries to establish whether calls from public funding agencies which are inherently commission-
ing a service (the existence of any such calls is established in question 4) are open to everybody. If not, this 
might infringe the Altmark principles. 
State aid through com-
mercial use of licenses  
(Article 107 TFEU) 
15, 16 Questions 15-18 aim at establishing whether intellectual property rights are used in a way that infringes com-
petition law. Amongst them, question 15 and 16 evaluate if a right is exclusively given to one undertaking 
without reasonable consideration, since this could be regarded as state aid.  
State aid through staff 
knowledge  
(Article 107 TFEU) 
14 This question is tries to discover whether there are any limitations for staff working part-time or during leave 
in the private sector (or third sector) regarding the use of knowledge they generated during their work in the 
public sector, as otherwise this could constitute state aid. 
Exemptions Article 101 
TFEU 
- The BERs depend on the market share an analysis of which would go beyond the scope of this research. Gen-
erally, the four conditions (efficiency gain, fair share for the consumer, necessity and no total prevention of 
competition) need to be fulfilled. Too much depends on each individual case to establish this in comparable 
questions. 
Exemptions Article 107 
TFEU  
6 This question tries to find out whether there is room for an exemption from state aid law. 
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SGEI 24, 27 Article 106 (2) TFEU exempts infringements of competition law if the service in question is of general inter-
est and has been entrusted to the undertaking in question, the application of competition law would obstruct 
the performance of the service and the development of trade is not affected too an extent which would be con-
trary to the EU‟s interests. These questions ask the expert‟s opinion as to whether the research is in the gen-
eral interest and if it has been entrusted to the HEI.  
 1-3 Introductory questions. 
 28-32 Considering that the thesis focuses on exposure of HEI research to EU competition law as an example of ex-
posure to economic constraints, these last questions were asked in order to gain an overall assessment from 
the expert of economic constraints beyond competition law constraints.  
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5.2.3.2. Access 
The interviewees were identified through researching the universities‟ research 
offices and/or general organisational forms in order to establish who could most 
suitably answer the questions (i.e. questions on public funding streams, private sec-
tor collaboration, IPR, costing and overall strategy). Since research offices are quite 
differently organised within universities, the position of the interviewees varies. 
Some offices are organised into subject areas whereby one person has an overview 
of everything related to the subject they are responsible for. Other offices are organ-
ised according to tasks with, for example, one person being responsible for IPRs, 
another for external contracts and another for public funding streams. In the Univer-
sity of Munich the relevant persons were not even located in one research office. 
Instead, the expert responsible for legal questions in research funding provision was 
situated in the legal department and the person responsible for costing, in the finance 
department. These differences can be explained by the fact that these offices devel-
oped relatively recently and that there is no strict model to be followed. Instead uni-
versities have to find their own ways to establish suitable structures.635  
In each university the persons were chosen solely on their ability to answer the 
questions. If offices were structured according to subject areas, the persons respon-
sible for the subjects identified above were asked all the questions. In other cases 
where offices were structured according to tasks, it was usually the public funding 
officer, the private funding officer, the IPR officer and sometimes a legal or policy 
officer who were interviewed depending on exactly how the tasks where divided and 
who best could answer. In such cases the experts were only asked those questions 
which related to their responsibilities. In other offices where it was difficult to iden-
tify the relevant interviewees, interviews were conducted with the head of the re-
search office or in a focus group containing all potentially relevant persons. The in-
terviews were requested by e-mail. The e-mail contained a short request and had as 
its attachments a formal letter with a slightly longer description of the project and an 
abstract of the thesis. The interviews took place on the universities‟ premises, either 
in the office of the individuals or in a meeting room.  
                                                 
635 For more on this see O Locker-Grütjen, B Ehmann and G Jongmanns, 'Definition für optimales 
Forschungsmanagement' (2012) 18 Wissenschaftsmanagement 34. 
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5.2.3.3. Interview situation 
The interviews took place in a friendly, professional atmosphere with the in-
terviewees seeming keen to help, provide information and showing an interest in the 
project and its outcomes. The one exception occurred in the very first university vis-
ited where, in one focus group, one interviewee was unhappy with the information 
provided by the researcher and with the questions asked, since she did not feel she 
could relate them to the overall project even after further explanation. This inter-
viewee withdrew her consent at the end of the interview. The other participants of 
the focus group, however, gave their consent, so the remainder of the interview 
could be used. In the review after this incident it was decided that the interview 
questions were appropriate and necessary, but that future interviews should adhere 
more closely to the guide rather than being conducted too freely which may have 
partly contributed to the problem. The more structured approach, as well as the in-
creasing confidence of the researcher may have played a role in the much improved 
results thereafter. Nevertheless, the situation seemed rather exceptional, since the 
other focus group conducted on the same day but prior to the problematic group, did 
not present the same difficulties. 
Despite using a more structured approach after the mentioned incident, the 
questions were not always asked in the same order, since they were split between 
different interviewees or the conversation flowed in different directions leading to 
proceeding to a different topic and returning to the other questions later. Sometimes 
interviewees had also already answered a question with a previous answer or less 
important questions needed to be skipped due to time constraints. 
5.2.4. Ethics 
Ethical approval was sought from the University of Leeds AREA Faculty Re-
search Ethics Committee. Since the research consisted of expert interviews in EU 
countries and therefore neither contained vulnerable groups nor any potential risk 
for the researcher or the interviewees, there were no particular ethical concerns. The 
research was approved without changes on 19 June 2012.636 The interviewees had 
been informed in the e-mail requesting the interview that they would be interviewed 
in their capacity as experts in the field and this was reiterated before each interview. 
                                                 
636 Ethic reference: AREA 11-173 
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They had to sign a consent form (including a brief description of the project) in 
which they gave their general consent for the interview and could choose between 
three options regarding consent for direct quotes under their name (consent, consent 
if seen in context, no consent for direct quotes). Despite most interviewees choosing 
the second option, it was later decided not to use any names in the thesis. 
5.2.5. Data analysis  
The interviews were recorded (except for a couple of interviews where re-
cording was not or only partly possible due to technical problems) and notes had to 
been taken which were transcribed more extensively immediately afterwards. The 
recordings have been transcribed either by the author herself in shortened form 
(„notes and quotes‟) or as verbatim transcripts by others which have later been 
checked and summarised by the author. The answers have been analysed using the 
framework set out in Table 2 above.  
This resulted in the following structure for the results subchapters: 
0. Commodification constraints faced by the universities 
1. Awareness of competition law 
2. Economic Activity 
3. Full costing 
4. Market foreclosure 
5. Refusal to enter into contractual relations and preferred partners 
6. Non-economically justified or discriminatory contract conditions 
7. Anti-competitive use of IPRs 
8. Anti-competitive research co-operation 
9. Market division 
10. Limiting markets 
11. Applying Altmark 
12. State aid through staff knowledge 
13. Exemptions 
14. SGEIs 
15. Interim conclusion 
As mentioned above, an attempt was made to achieve a balanced sample of 
universities. As regards the topic of this study, this did not, however, lead to largely 
different results between the individual universities. If any peculiarities have been 
detected this has been made clear in the results chapters. 
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5.2.6. Interim conclusion  
The above has set out the methodology used for the empirical study. Qualita-
tive expert interviews which employed a format between „interview guide‟ and 
„standardised open-ended interview‟ were the most appropriate design for the re-
search. The study has been limited to a small number of universities and subject ar-
eas (if appropriate) which have been chosen in an attempt to achieve a balanced 
sample. The questions were designed according to the results of the competition law 
analyses in chapter 3 and 4 and the experts were selected based on their ability to 
answer these questions. Generally, the interviews took place in a professional and 
friendly atmosphere. As only experts in their official role have been interviewed, 
there were no specific ethical issues. The interviews have been recorded and tran-
scribed and were then analysed according to the same framework which had been 
used to establish the questions.  
It is expected that the interviews have a high level of validity, since the experts 
are reporting about their everyday tasks and do not have any incentive to give false 
answers. The only concern could be that experts might be worried that their univer-
sity is engaging in anti-competitive conduct and therefore attempt to cover this up. 
This, however, seems unlikely, since, unlike, for example, a breach of criminal law, 
a potential breach of competition law is not necessarily an imminent threat. Firstly, 
HEIs would have to be regarded as undertakings to fall under competition law in the 
first place. Secondly, if competition law did apply and a breach was detected, there 
are a number of potential justifications. Thirdly, there have so far been no major in-
vestigations at the EU level which would lead one to think that this is currently a 
focal point of the enforcing authorities and that a thesis pointing to potential prob-
lems would lead to immediate action. The research thus did not try to uncover a 
clear breach of law which would lead to definitive action, so that interviewees 
should not have felt any need to disguise anything. Instead it aimed at uncovering 
potential problems which it would be in the interest of the HEIs to know about in 
order to circumvent them. The interviewees seemed to widely understand this, found 
it helpful and were interested in the results.  
The research is also expected to have a high degree of reliability. The ques-
tions have been designed to find out about specific situations in order to gain an in-
sight into potential problems and they will be analysed in accordance with a frame-
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work set out in advance. As is general with more structured approaches, it was ex-
pected that similar results would have been obtained if the research had been con-
ducted by another researcher and that the data gained can thus be regarded as rela-
tively reliable. However, the research is a qualitative empirical study and as such has 
certain boundaries. Only a small number of universities in three Member States have 
been studied. Whilst the sample has been strategically selected in order to present 
various types of universities, it can still only give an impression. The results are 
therefore not necessarily representative for all HEIs in Europe.  
5.3. England 
In discussing university research in general, many interviewees expressed the 
view that there was increasingly less money available for curiosity driven basic re-
search due to the increasing importance of non-public funding and government pri-
orities and impact playing a role in public funding. Potentially resulting from this 
there was increasing emphasis on larger, collaborative, interdisciplinary research 
and the professionalization of researchers. Whilst the interviewees seemed to under-
stand the reason for these policies from government and the tax payer perspectives, 
many also expressed the worry that this could go too far and threaten the traditional 
mission of a university for which basic research was still regarded as academically 
the most valuable. Additionally, despite competition for funding having become 
generally fierce, differences between subjects were detected with subjects such as 
medical sciences, engineering and chemistry attracting funding more easily whilst 
the humanities, pure mathematic and astrophysics found it more difficult. Whilst this 
could partly stem from government priorities and the emotive character of medicine, 
differences in culture between disciplines might also facilitate this divide, with re-
searchers in the social sciences and humanities being less eager to apply. An inter-
viewee from Essex, however, also mentioned that it depended somewhat on the uni-
versity‟s strength making it easier for certain universities to attract funding in areas 
generally regarded as difficult. Within subjects, as many interviewees remarked, cer-
tain topics would always be preferred (for example, connective community, digital 
economy, climate change and renewable energy). 
Regarding university culture, it was felt that there have been significant 
changes in recent years. Whilst TRAC fEC was generally regarded positively by the 
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interviewees, since it helped to achieve financial sustainability, one interviewee 
from Leeds mentioned that the application of TRAC fEC could lead to inequality 
between universities as costs drivers such as buildings and salaries varied signifi-
cantly between universities. Additionally, full costs were not always paid requiring 
research offices to look out for a healthy mix of funders with at least some paying 
more than full cost, something which could influence the decision whether or not to 
apply for a grant. Equally, other funder conditions (for example, ethics, required 
partners and legal issues) could determine whether or not a project could take place. 
Researchers would also occasionally be encouraged, or even required, to find uni-
versity-wide collaborations on interdisciplinary themes, since otherwise their topic 
might find funding difficult to obtain. On the other hand, universities also occasion-
ally actively encouraged academics to apply for certain grants. Another pressure re-
garding research council funding, mentioned by many interviewees, would arise 
when research councils limit the number of applications universities could submit 
thereby making the whole process less transparent due to incoherent internal pre-
selection. A few interviewees expressed their feeling that generally universities were 
expected to do more for less and to strict deadlines. Such deadlines would also often 
require the subcontracting of elements of a project not conducted by the principal 
investigator (PI) rather than employing another researcher due to the high adminis-
trative requirements in universities. A few interviewees mentioned that these 
changes were „quite a culture change for academics‟ who, in particular, felt that their 
academic freedom would be limited.  
Overall the interviewees expected public funding to decrease further in the fu-
ture with impact, performance indicators and priority areas gaining in importance. 
Some feared this might increase the divide between institutions as well as subjects. 
Such concentration could narrow opportunities, as the current government had  
‘a very narrow view of what the universities can do in terms of helping the 
British economy. It’s very focussed on technology and innovation and I don’t 
think it’s, even then, a particularly expansive view of what innovation is. And 
the danger is that in their desperation to resolve the economic crisis that 
they’re in, they will just narrow it down more and more and more [...] 
[thereby weakening Britain’s] position of influence and contribution, because 
some of the areas where we have expertise will, without appropriate funding, 
will just be lost.’  
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Many interviewees believed, therefore, that EU funding and other non-public 
funders, including third sector organisations and foreign funding, would gain in im-
portance. English universities would increasingly become eligible for the latter, 
since funders would increasingly want to fund cutting edge research wherever it 
took place and foreign researchers would bring such grants with them. Such funding 
would, however, also increase risk and administrative difficulties due to different 
languages and jurisdictions. Finally, many interviewees expected open access and 
new media technology to gain in importance. The former would, again, be more dif-
ficult in the arts as well as being costly for universities and mainly benefit the pub-
lishers.  
5.3.1. Awareness of competition law  
Most interviewees were not aware that EU competition law might play a role 
in their job. Some said that it could indirectly influence their work as it could be 
relevant for contracts or tendering. One interviewee whose work concerned com-
mercialisation activities remarked that, in such activities and with non-standard con-
tracts, care had to be taken that the market was not distorted. Generally, however, 
areas of concern seem to have been implemented into university policy or would be 
dealt with by a separate legal/contracts team or even external solicitors who could be 
consulted if necessary. One interviewee mentioned that senior management made 
the final decision, if a problem was detected. Research offices would normally not 
apply competition law directly themselves and are thus often „not necessarily aware 
of what the competition rules are‟.  
5.3.2. Economic activity  
As has been explained in chapters 3 and 4, HEIs would have to be conducting 
an economic activity in order to fall under the competition rules. It was concluded 
that this is not likely to be the case regarding generic funding provided by HEFCE 
despite the recent impact agenda. The interviewees explained that research council 
funding can generally be divided into two categories; the responsive mode whereby 
the academic can apply at any time with any project falling into the remit of the re-
spective council637 and themed calls where a subject and a deadline for application is 
                                                 
637 Within the responsive mode there would, however, sometimes be „highlight notices‟ giving pref-
erential treatment to certain themes. 
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set. These still seem to be broad calls allowing the academic to decide about the ex-
act project. An Oxford interviewee explained this as the aim of the research councils 
being to strengthen the knowledge base and, ultimately the economy, generally 
rather than serve a more immediate goal. The academics would therefore compete 
on an academic level and the research council would pick the proposal most valu-
able for the public good. From this description, it does not generally seem to amount 
to a service which could be provided under market conditions and research council 
funding would thus probably generally also not amount to an economic activity. One 
interviewee, however, mentioned that very large grants would sometimes be quite 
specific and come closer to a tender, something which might change this assessment.  
Government departments usually have, according to the interviewees, very 
specific calls essentially commissioning research which would also often be classi-
fied as a tender and require declarations to be signed giving assurance that no anti-
competitive behaviour is taking place. These calls, therefore, seem to be economic 
in nature. Other public funders might have specific as well as broader calls. With 
regards to third sector organisations, how specific the calls usually are would depend 
on the raison d‟être of the organisation. The WELLCOME trust, for example, would 
„come out with these really quite broad themes, but then the smaller charity that has 
been set up to look into a particular type of malignant tumour will have quite a nar-
row focus‟. Judging from these descriptions, decisions would need to be made on a 
case by case basis on whether or not a call would amount to a service which could 
be provided under market conditions.  
In relation to collaboration with the private sector, the interviewees mentioned 
that all forms identified in chapter 4 existed. They did not elaborate further on sci-
ence parks perhaps explicable by this being a loose form of collaboration essentially 
amounting to a space where research takes place. As has been mentioned in chapter 
4, these would, in themselves, probably not constitute an economic research activity. 
Many interviewees talked about other looser arrangements for „keeping in contact‟ 
including industry days, enterprise boards and research networks. More institutional-
ised forms of such arrangements might also provide funding to facilitate new col-
laborations. Some interviewees also mentioned strategic partnerships in which work 
was conducted collaboratively with a company on a regular basis which might go 
beyond research and also include employment schemes for graduates or access ar-
rangements for technology. Research co-operations were described as general co-
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operations whereby research is conducted jointly in the longer term and the private 
sector contributes financially (e.g. through staff time or use of their equipment). 
Sometimes these would be supported by EU or national public funding sources, for 
example the Technology Strategy Board or the research councils. Collaborations 
increased through user-partners being required on „the impact side‟. Networks, stra-
tegic partnerships and research co-operations would have to be regarded as under-
takings conducting an economic research activity if the research could have been 
conducted on a market. Judging from the descriptions, this would, again, need to be 
assessed on a case by case basis with the stage of the research, openness of direction 
and predefinition of targets playing a role in such an assessment.  
The universities rely on academics to report innovations which they then ex-
ploit, often through especially established companies. Sometimes this might occur 
through spin-offs which, as some interviewees explained, initially will only exploit 
one patent, but they eventually added to their portfolio. Occasionally, venture capital 
firms invest in such spin-offs. In section 3.1.1. Research Framework,638 the Com-
mission explains that licensing and spin-off creation are to be considered as non-
economic if they are of an internal nature. The Issue Paper further determines that 
the knowledge must have been created in a non-economic area of research and must 
be exploited non-exclusively. If this is not the case the activities are of an economic 
nature. According to the descriptions, both non-economic and economic exploitation 
seem to occur. With regards to spin-offs and start-ups, whether or not their behav-
iour or university interaction with them amounts to an economic activity for the uni-
versity, would depend on how affiliated they still are with the university and on the 
exact nature of their activity. 
According to the interviewees, the universities would also have privately 
funded chairs, fellowships, post-docs or PhD researchers. The interviewees ex-
plained that the latter can be fully funded, if the company had a specific project it 
wanted to be conducted. They might also be co-funded with additional research 
council funding. As part of such a project the PhD researcher would then also some-
times be seconded to the company. Such PhD studentships would be especially 
common in the (natural) sciences. If staff or PhD researchers are essentially con-
                                                 
638 Research Framework (n 8).  
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ducting a pre-described service for the private sector, this could amount to an eco-
nomic activity. From the explanations provided by the interviewees, this might oc-
casionally be the case, especially in some of the PhD studentships. If the private sec-
tor is simply donating money to a chair in an area of interest and the holder of the 
chair can still determine the direction of teaching and research, this would probably 
not amount to an economic activity.  
Finally, the universities conduct some activities which are more obviously 
economic in nature. In this respect the interviewees mentioned contract research, 
consultancy, the leasing of research infrastructure, material transfer agreements 
when the university has created materials which a company is interested in (e.g. 
cells or compounds) as part of their research and data access agreements if compa-
nies want to access university data sets. Interviewees from two universities men-
tioned that such activities are mostly conducted through separate technology transfer 
companies owned by the universities. The universities might equally, require such 
activities from private sector undertakings.  
5.3.3. Full costing 
As has been explained in chapter 4, English universities are using TRAC as a 
costing methodology and this seems to be unproblematic from a competition law 
perspective. Nevertheless, pricing could be anti-competitive if, in areas of economic 
activity, full costs and reasonable profit are not applied. The interviewees explained 
that the full cost methodology is always used, but that there are very few sponsors 
paying full costs and the universities would need to underwrite many projects. Re-
search councils would pay 80%, charities only direct costs and with the private sec-
tor and other public funders (government departments, local government and quan-
gos) it would be a matter of negotiation. The problem would then, as emerged from 
a focus group, be that they have, in advance, set aside a sum they are willing to pay 
for a certain piece of research. Therefore, the universities would have to go back-
wards to see how they could fit the project into the price. Especially with the private 
sector, the universities would attempt to receive 100% fEC and, when an activity is 
classified as contract research or consultancy (which some interviewees mentioned 
was a „commercial activity‟) or less beneficial research, an attempt would be made 
to generate an additional profit. This would be reinvested into activities which are 
not funded at 100%. If 100% fEC could not be achieved, universities would be more 
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restrictive with other terms of the agreement, in particular, the partners would have 
to share IPRs. Generally, the question of whether or not less than 100% fEC is ac-
ceptable for the universities would also depend on the strategic importance of the 
project and the partner in question. One interviewee working in the area of formal 
sciences mentioned that universities would not like to go below 90% with these fun-
ders. This would be hard to explain to academics who believed that the 80% the re-
search councils were paying was a generally acceptable level. Some interviewees 
expressed that negotiations would be made more difficult by academics promising to 
do more than is possible for the price. This is especially facilitated by government 
departments and local authorities constantly expecting more for less and other uni-
versities accommodating this tendency by undercutting prices. 
Some interviewees mentioned the „public benefit test‟639 which is applicable to 
all charities in the UK, an organisational form often taken by UK universities includ-
ing the ones under scrutiny. Accordingly, universities would not be allowed to trade 
and work for profit, but would have to further their charitable goals by conducting 
tasks for the public benefit. The test would establish if a certain activity serves the 
public benefit. If this was not the case for a certain research activity it could still be 
conducted, but usually as part of a university trading company. However, as an in-
terviewee from the area of social sciences expressed it: 
‘It’s still actually then delivered by the same academics, but that work would 
attract the VAT and there’s an extra charge for doing it, and we would have to 
make sure that we were covering all our costs, so there’s no way we’d be able 
to subsidise it in any way. It’s quite rare for things not to pass, and usually 
we’d try and renegotiate the terms to make sure that things did pass.’  
The public benefit test under national law does not necessarily seem to be con-
gruent with the question of whether an economic activity is taking place. As has 
been explained above and more extensively in chapter 3, an economic activity is tak-
                                                 
639 The test entails that there must be clear benefits and that these „must be to the public‟. Whilst this 
excludes organisations that are run for profit, it does not mean that organisations cannot charge 
fees. Organisations must pass the test to be registered as a charity and registered charities have 
to make sure that their activities fall within the test. See JE Martin, Hanbury & Martin Modern 
equity (19th edn Sweet & Maxwell / Thomson Reuters, London 2012) p. 458. R Edwards and N 
Stockwell, Trusts and equity (10th edn Pearson Education, Harlow 2011) p. 205 seq. According 
to the latter, this means for research that it should be „useful‟ and that „some provision for the 
information gained to be disseminated and made available for study‟ should be made (ibid p. 
211). It is thus a rather wide definition capable of capturing most research conducted by HEIs.  
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ing place if goods and services are or could potentially be offered on a market. It is 
irrelevant whether or not they are in the public interest. The latter might only play a 
role when it comes to exempting certain activities as SGEIs. Research which consti-
tutes an economic activity has to be provided at market prices or for full costs and 
reasonable profit. The impression gained from the interviewees leads to the conclu-
sion that currently this might not always be the case. Instead it appears that there 
might be instances of potential state aid. The fact that some universities are (con-
sciously) undercutting prices could be regarded as predatory pricing if they were 
dominant and could be challenged by competitors.  
5.3.4. Market foreclosure 
Market foreclosure takes place if a collusion of undertakings, national legisla-
tion or a dominant undertaking denies market access to other undertakings. No signs 
of this could be detected for research in England.  
5.3.5. Refusal to enter into contractual relations  
Whilst particular factors might facilitate certain collaborations,640 partners are, 
according to the interviewees, usually chosen by the academics, occasionally as-
sisted by research offices and driven by research interests. In this respect, future 
prospects of collaboration or the question of whether the collaboration was in an 
area of research strength or in a niche area in a currently relevant topic might play a 
role in deciding which partners to approach. Whether additional funding was avail-
able for certain forms of collaboration or if a certain call required a certain kind of 
partner are also factors. In so far government priorities might be taken into consid-
eration. However, the interviewees seemed to agree that the main point was whether 
or not there was a „good match‟ and the universities under scrutiny would not 
change their research strategies around government priorities641 or apply for calls 
where the cooperation was not genuine even if partners could be added „on paper‟. 
Equally, an interviewee from Essex mentioned that if they were approached by pri-
vate sector entities to do work in an area that was simply not conducted by any of 
                                                 
640 Larger enterprises might more often attend conferences making it easy to establish relations. 
Common events or fieldwork could be easier conducted with local companies. Contractual ne-
gotiations were facilitated by existing relationships.  
641 One interviewee mentioned that she knew about a university other than those under scrutiny 
which had a very strong „working locally‟ policy. 
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the academics and had no relation with anything they would do, they would not be-
come involved solely for the purpose of catering for the market.  
The only reason for exclusion of partners, aside from reasons intrinsic in the 
research, would, according to the interviewees, be that a partner does not fulfil cer-
tain standards. Before a collaboration is begun, certain checks (e.g. credit and ethics) 
would be conducted and/or the external funder might have certain requirements re-
garding project management, auditing, quality assurance or the experience of the PI. 
Many interviewees mentioned, for example, that they would not work with tobacco 
companies due to ethical considerations and, as a Leeds interviewee pointed out, this 
could potentially lead to the withdrawal of funding from charitable organisations. 
With regards to financial requirements, however, usually companies would not nec-
essarily be excluded, but payment for their contribution might only be made after the 
contribution was received. Another Leeds interviewee spoke of cases where a uni-
versity requires research work to be conducted by another party. Here the work 
would be commissioned under normal purchasing rules which, depending on the 
value of the work, would entail comparing prices, tendering or even Europe wide 
procurement. However, the commissioning of external research would be rare.  
Given that the universities do not appear to exclude partners, there does not 
generally appear to be a general problem from a competition law perspective. The 
exclusion of partners due to ethical considerations might potentially be regarded as 
anti-competitive behaviour, while the exclusion or the imposition of additional con-
ditions upon certain companies for economic reasons would probably have to be 
seen as reasonable commercial practice. One interviewee mentioned that there are 
also policies in place to avoid anti-competitive behaviour at the level of the individ-
ual academic. The behaviour could be anti-competitive through constantly working 
with or subcontracting work to the same company. This would be especially prob-
lematic if the academic held shares in that company or had any personal ties. Pre-
project questionnaires and annual reviews attempted to detect such links which were 
prohibited if applicable.642  
                                                 
642 The interviewee did, however, state that at one occasion an otherwise prohibited constellation 
'was managed in a way that we set a price that was being payable to this company and it was a 
lot lower than had we gone somewhere else'. If this was the best price for that piece of research, 
the practice not a recurring constellation and the company not a dominant undertaking, this 
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5.3.6. Non-economically justified or discriminatory contract conditions 
The interviewees suggested that difficulties in contractual negotiations with 
private sector entities arose if the company desired to keep certain information secret 
whilst the mission of a university is to disseminate research results. Another issue in 
the more open forms of collaboration was that companies often wished to agree 
upon milestones and deadlines which could be difficult in academic research where 
the outcome of the research and the timing of any results were not known in ad-
vance. Furthermore, issues would often arise as regards liabilities as well as IPR 
ownership and access. Universities would also oppose contractual terms that pre-
vented them from working with other companies in the sector. Finally, universities 
had a variety of terms and conditions (e.g. financial regulations on travel, ethics 
etc.). Usually any issues arising could be resolved in the negotiations. Conditions 
might also be imposed by the funder regarding ownership and backflow of IPRs or 
whether or not subcontracting is permissible. Some funders would also make provi-
sion for the results of a collaboration to be made publicly available if they were in-
teresting to other companies as well. A Leeds interviewee explained this as institu-
tions being „increasingly conscious about state aid rules and not using public money 
to support just one company‟s development‟. She expressed that public funding 
rules would be welcomed since they would make certain terms clear before starting 
negotiations. 
As mentioned above, the exclusion of certain companies might be regarded as 
anti-competitive. Opposing conditions requiring universities to do so would thus be 
in line with competition law and universities might be able to utilise competition law 
in this respect. That publication requirements avoid state aid accusations, as men-
tioned by an interviewee, might be occasionally the case. In other circumstances it 
might, however, constitute anti-competitive conditions if an economic activity is 
taking place, such requirements are not reasonable commercial practice, full costs 
are charged and such publication requirements are dictated upon an undertaking. 
This, as with most of the other conditions required by universities that are regarded 
as anti-competitive in the first place, could, however, probably be exempted as 
SGEIs. Only the occasional condition that subcontracting was not permissible im-
                                                                                                                                         
would probably not be problematic from a competition law perspective. The question whether 
or not this would be consistent with other areas of law would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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posed by funders might cause concern if an economic activity is taking place, since 
this could be seen as excluding other undertakings. 
5.3.7. Anti-competitive use of IPRs 
As has been discussed in chapter 4, the employer owns the inventions made by 
its employees. The interviewees explained that the academic therefore informs the 
university or the exploitation company respectively about a potential invention. The 
academics would be motivated to do so, since they might get generous returns from 
licensing in addition to their salary, since exploited IPRs created impact and since it 
was regarded as prestigious to have a patent on one‟s CV. Patent searches and mar-
ket evaluation would then be conducted to see if the innovation is exploitable. The 
registration and licensing or sale is often conducted by an exploitation company or 
an external agent, but the universities (and academics) received revenues. If the po-
tential market is considered large enough a spin-off might be created which, as an 
Essex interviewee mentioned, was often the academics‟ preferred choice. The uni-
versity and the academic would hold equity in the spin-off and sometimes venture 
capital firms would be taken onboard diluting the equity shares. The latter would 
sometimes be complicated, according to an interviewee working in the area of 
commercialisation, due to the value of the company being difficult to estimate. He 
also mentioned that there are preferred investors whereby the equity split is known 
in advance.  
According to this interviewee, there are a variety of special conditions univer-
sities might impose when exploiting IPRs. Generally, unlike private companies who 
might hold back a patent in order not to dilute their market, universities would have 
to ensure that patented innovations are being used. In this respect it would also occa-
sionally be discussed whether certain innovations (e.g. cancer therapeutics) should 
be „open source‟. However, considering the expense required to bring initial results 
to a marketable product (for example through clinical trials), commercialisation 
would mostly be the best route because companies would not be willing to make 
these investments if „other companies can just come in and take the market from 
them‟. It would therefore always be necessary to consider the best way to achieve 
the desired impact from an IPR. Unlike private sector companies, universities would 
also only give limited warranties on licenses (i.e. ownership and that no other com-
mercial arrangements in relation to that IPR are known, but no guarantee that no-
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body else‟s IPRs are infringed), as any further warranties would require more mar-
ket research than a university can reasonably conduct. Furthermore, sublicense part-
ners need to be disclosed with universities retaining the right to object to inappropri-
ate partners (e.g. the tobacco industry or military applications in certain countries). 
Since university research is often not complete when the IPR is created, partners 
could also benefit from IPR improvements for reasonable commercial terms, in par-
ticular as universities would not be free to exploit improvements with another party 
anyway. Finally, as it is often beneficial for partners, especially SMEs, to use a uni-
versity‟s name when exploiting an IPR, universities would require knowledge about 
and, if applicable, object to the usage of their name.  
With regards to externally funded research, some interviewees mentioned that 
charities would increasingly oblige universities to exploit in their funding conditions 
in order for the research to get „out there‟. External funders (charities and, espe-
cially, the private sector) would also increasingly require royalties. In private sector 
collaborations, who acquires ownership of IPRs would be contractually agreed. 
Since private sector companies might sometimes be better placed „to take it through 
to the marketplace‟, the company might patent and thence provide the university 
with an academic license and royalty returns. Alternatively, if a higher rate is paid, 
the company might own the patent. Such routes could be desirable for the universi-
ties because the company would then take over the high costs associated with pat-
enting. In other situations, where the research is mainly publicly funded, the univer-
sity patents and provides the company with an option right and, if applicable, a li-
cense for reasonable commercial rates. In both cases, the universities would require 
the IPR to be exploited to its full potential and if a partner does not commit to this, 
the partner might only acquire the right in particular fields or the university might 
„take back rights in particular fields […] [to] exploit the IP with other interested par-
ties‟. In determining which route to go, the stage of the innovation might also play a 
role, since certain results are too early to be interesting for private sector partners. 
One interviewee additionally mentioned that universities needed to retain the right to 
publish, either independently or with the funder, and therefore needed to be cautious 
about restrictions to this (delays or complete denial) in prior negotiations. 
If internally managed, knowledge transfer in the form of IPR exploitation has 
to be regarded as a non-economic activity according to the Research Framework. 
This means the rules around direct exploitation efforts by universities will mostly 
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not create competition law concerns. IPR exploitation could be classified as eco-
nomic if venture capital firms have co-invested, if the IPRs arise from economic re-
search or if the transfer is exclusive. If IPR exploitation is of an economic nature, 
special conditions granted to certain undertakings, be it to make innovation accessi-
ble, could be regarded as state aid. Contractual conditions, such as the limitation of 
sublicensing, thrust upon undertakings could equally be regarded as anti-
competitive. In both cases, however, the possibility of exemption according to Arti-
cle 106 (2) TFEU remains. In collaborations universities would have to demand 
market prices for any rights the partner obtains unless all the costs for the research 
have been taken over by the partner or any returns are granted under economically 
justified conditions respectively in order for IPR transfer not be regarded as state 
aid. Furthermore, any economically unjustified contractual conditions could be re-
garded as anti-competitive. The latter could potentially be identified in the require-
ment to exploit to the full potential of the IPR. 
5.3.8. Anti-competitive research co-operation 
According to some interviewees, collaborations can start at any stage from the 
initial idea up to further development of already created IPRs. Inter alia that would 
depend on if there were existing relationships leading to the partner being involved 
early on or whether relationships needed to be constructed at a later stage where in-
volvement of a partner seemed indicated or if it was the company which approached 
the university. Attempts to involve partners would generally be made as early as 
possible and, if the project was externally funded, the partner had to be already es-
tablished at the application stage. Taking these explanations into consideration, there 
thus does not seem to be any indication that research was begun at an unreasonably 
late stage which could be in breach of Article 101 (1) TFEU, as discussed in chapter 
3.  
One might also wonder if the topic of the collaboration itself could be anti-
competitive in nature. One interviewee mentioned that they were involved in a re-
search council funded collaboration where the university was working with a com-
pany „to help increase their market share of a product and looking at the social as-
pects of what that product‟s about‟. While the latter part seems to be unproblematic 
from a competition law perspective, a university helping to increase a certain com-
pany‟s market share appears questionable. 
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5.3.9. Market division 
The Oxford interviewees suggested that their university prefers to have every-
thing „in house‟. An Essex interviewee explained that occasionally national archives 
are hosted by a university, an example being the UK data archive for socio-
economic data sets managed by her university. However, she also did not mention 
any specialisation or facility sharing agreements beyond this. Likewise, most inter-
viewees in Leeds were unaware of this and only two Leeds interviewees mentioned 
that this was a new endeavour in which their university was „leading the way‟, since 
it had established an equipment database which was being linked to the N8 (eight 
universities in the North of England). These universities could then share equipment 
something that was encouraged by the research councils. As stated in chapter 4, the 
latter could potentially cause competition law concerns if other universities who 
would be willing to be involved are excluded and if market prices for the use of in-
frastructure are not paid. One interviewee mentioned that they currently feared that 
VAT might become applicable to such activities643 which might discourage universi-
ties from collaborating. This might indicate that, so far, market prices (including 
taxes and profits) have not been charged for such activities.  
5.3.10. Limiting Markets 
Generally, there do not appear to be any artificial restrictions in place as re-
gards the amount of research, although some interviewees mentioned natural limita-
tions (a member of staff can only commit to a maximum of 100% fte and schools 
equally need to assure the necessary teaching capacity). However, thresholds where 
this would cause concerns are not normally reached and, instead, an increase in ex-
ternally funded research projects is generally attempted. However, the interviewees 
in two universities mentioned the importance of the public benefit test in this re-
spect. Research which passed the test could be conducted with no restrictions. Re-
search which did not pass could still go ahead, but this had to be accounted for sepa-
rately. One interviewee stated that only 10% of such research could go through the 
                                                 
643 The Commission had made HMRC aware that the VAT exemption for research was not in line 
with Directive EEC/77/388 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment OJ [1977] L 
145/1 as interpreted by the Court in case C-287/00 Commission v Germany. HMRC has thus 
withdrawn the exception since 1 August 2013 making VAT applicable on „business research‟ 
while „non-business research‟ remains to be outside the scope of VAT. See further HMRC, 
'VAT: supplies of research between eligible bodies' (2013) 11 VAT Info Sheet.  
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university books. The interviewees from the other university explained that such re-
search could not be classified as research income. The interviewees from both uni-
versities mentioned that such research could instead go through the universities‟ 
trading companies. However, they all also mentioned that such research was very 
rare since the academics would not be interested in doing research which had no 
academic or broader interest. Additionally, as this would be a purely commercial 
transaction, they would also not be able to use any of the results thus reducing the 
output of high quality publications, in turn causing constraints regarding the REF. 
Despite inherent limitations, the necessity to account differently for non-public-
benefit research and academic interest potentially leading to less research of a solely 
commercial character, there do not appear to be any artificial limitations on output 
which could be regarded as limiting markets from a competition law perspective.  
5.3.11. Applying Altmark 
The funding agencies determine who can apply for a call which, according to 
the interviewees, varies between calls. Some interviewees mentioned that regarding 
the research councils, it is mostly only UK publicly funded universities and pre-
recognised research centres that are eligible to apply. Sometimes they would be en-
couraged or required to have other partners which would, however, usually not be 
directly sponsored. Other funders would generally have broader eligibility require-
ments regarding the lead institution and would also partly fund other partners. In ad-
dition to defining the eligibility of organisations to apply, the funder rules often 
stipulate requirements as to the person of the PI (for example, regarding length of 
employment in the applying institution), the number of applications from one insti-
tution and the total value of the application. Government departments and local au-
thorities would issue a request to tender. In these scenarios tendering organisations 
would need to sign declarations that they will not behave anti-competitively by ex-
changing information or deterring others from bidding. To an extent it would be 
possible to tender to become a preferred provider in which case, calls would then 
occasionally only be issued to the preferred providers. According to an interviewee 
working in social sciences, the conditions for contracts with the latter group of fun-
ders would become increasingly hard. She even mentioned one example where a 
local council contractually required the contract price to be decreased during the du-
ration of the project, even though that had never been invoked. 
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If public calls can be classified as economic activities, they would need to be 
commissioned according to the Altmark criteria which stipulate that calls need to be 
open to any willing provider, including foreign providers, and either market prices 
or full costs and reasonable profit need to be charged for it not to be state aid. As has 
been mentioned above, the majority of research council funding might not be of an 
economic nature. If it or funding from other public sources would have to be classi-
fied as such, the limitations in eligibility would probably need to be regarded as state 
aid. Furthermore, whilst government departments and local authorities would usu-
ally tender, the fact that they often do not pay „full costs plus‟ in the end and that 
they employ contract conditions forcing the contract price to decrease during a pro-
ject, might potentially be regarded as anti-competitive.   
5.3.12. State aid through staff knowledge 
According to the interviewees, staff members, especially post-docs, would oc-
casionally be seconded to the private sector during a leave of absence or on a part 
time basis. Such practices had become more common in recent years. The inter-
viewees elaborated in this respect about the previously mentioned fully privately 
funded PhD studentships and those which involved secondment to the private sector 
as well as about industrial fellowships for academics in which the funder (for exam-
ple, the Royal Society) would pay the salary for the fellow for a period of time al-
lowing them to work in industry. One interviewee even mentioned that her univer-
sity used to have a formal secondment programme with a private sector company. 
According to the interviewees, the advantages and disadvantages of such a second-
ment would first need to be weighed. Some interviewees mentioned that this would 
take place at school level. Then research offices would need to cooperate with per-
sonnel, legal services and other university departments to negotiate the secondment 
agreements in order, inter alia, to protect the individual, the university and deal with 
IPR issues and confidentiality questions. In particular the latter, two issues would be 
problematic, since it would be difficult for researchers to „forget‟ something they 
have learned especially if it was vital to their research. An interviewee in a focus 
group thus mentioned that, in her opinion, companies should not share highly confi-
dential knowledge during such an exchange, as requiring that the researcher kept 
this information confidential would reduce the benefits of the exchange. 
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From a competition law perspective, problems could occur if advantages are 
given to companies through staff knowledge, particularly through IPR creation or 
public funding paying for an employee in a company. Also, PhD studentships could 
amount to state aid where a company essentially defines a research task to be under-
taken by the student because, even if the researcher is fully funded by the company, 
the researcher will still receive academic support and be registered as student with 
all the associated benefits rather than being a fully paid company employee.  
5.3.13. Exemptions  
Potential exemptions for anti-competitive behaviour under Article 101 TFEU 
must be assessed on an individual basis, in particular the exemptions provided for in 
BERs, as they often involve market shares. Regarding state aid, as mentioned in 
chapter 3, the De Minimis Regulation644 excludes aid below €200,000 and the De 
Minimis SGEIs Regulation645 aid below €500,000 respectively over three fiscal 
years to any one undertaking from the ambit of Article 107 (1) TFEU. The GBER646 
exempts transparent aid for basic research of up to €20M per project with 100% aid 
intensity, applied research of up to €10M per project with 50% aid intensity and ex-
perimental development of up to €7.5M with 25% aid intensity and Decision 
2012/21/EU647 provides an exemption for aid below €15M per annum for SGEIS 
provision. Outside of these exemptions, aid would need to be notified and could po-
tentially be exempted according to Article 107 (3) TFEU for which the Research 
Framework provides some guidance in sections 4 and 5. The latter, in particular, re-
moves the ceilings of the GBER for research and development if the aid intensities 
are adhered to, the other conditions of that section are fulfilled and the aid has an 
incentive effect (section 6).  
According to the interviewees, the amount of funding provided through public 
calls varies significantly. Whilst the smaller grants (for example, for travel) might 
only be a few hundred pounds, the highest calls could be up to £10M for the re-
search councils‟ centres of excellence and networks of excellence calls which are 
                                                 
644 De Minimis Regulation (n 327). 
645 De Minimis SGEIs Regulation (n 343). 
646 GBER (n 347). 
647 Decision 2012/21/EU (n 199).  
- 180 - 
 
often collaborative. Some interviewees also mentioned, however, that with certain 
grants, researchers could ask for as much as they needed to do the project which 
could technically be any value. A few interviewees remarked that recently there was 
a tendency towards calls for larger and longer projects. Smaller projects, if qualify-
ing as economic in nature, might, due to the de mimimis rules, not fall under Article 
107 (1) TFEU in the first place. Many projects which would need to be considered 
as infringing state aid law might be able to benefit from the exemptions in the 
GBER provided that it is transparent aid and that the aid intensities are adhered to. If 
projects can be classified as providing an SGEI, they are also likely to fall under the 
€15M threshold in the SGEI Decision, since there rarely seem to be projects with a 
higher value in England. Individual cases need to be evaluated to determine whether 
these conditions are fulfilled or, alternatively, the measure could utilise Article 107 
(3) TFEU as an exemption. 
5.3.14. SGEIs 
For potentially anti-competitive activities by the universities to be exempted as 
SGEIs they would need to be in the general interest, be entrusted to the university, 
the application of the competition rules would have to obstruct the service in ques-
tion and the development of trade must not be affected in such a way that it would 
be contrary to the EU‟s interests. When asked whether they believed the research in 
their institution to be in the public interest, many interviewees mentioned high im-
pact research on topics regarded to be of societal importance in answer to this ques-
tion which seems to indicate that research based purely on the researchers‟ curiosity 
is less seen as being in the general interest. Interestingly, it could, however, be ar-
gued that the English impact agenda is geared more towards creating any impact on 
anyone which could favour particular interests, while one might argue that curiosity 
driven research for the development of science, as such, is in the interest of every-
one. Nevertheless, the interviewees also emphasised that the research had to pass the 
public benefit test. Such research would then involve some sort of public interest 
and, as previously mentioned, this encompasses the majority of the research con-
ducted by the universities. In line with what has been discussed in chapter 4, the in-
terviewees did not believe research to be a statutory task of HEIs, but a task they 
could conduct and could receive funding for. However, as one interviewee pointed 
out, if universities did not conduct research they would have significantly less in-
come due to lack of external grants as well as less generic funding which is partly 
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based on research quality and contains a bonus for externally generated research in-
come.  
Except for research which has not passed the public benefit test, a general in-
terest might thus be assumed. However, the concept of SGEI seems, in addition to 
the general interest, to require a „uniform‟ and „binding nature‟ which might not al-
ways be applicable. At the same time, Member States have a fair amount of discre-
tion in this respect. As for the question of whether the SGEI is entrusted to the uni-
versities, research, unlike in the other two countries, does not appear to be a statu-
tory task. However, grant agreements might be regarded as acts that entrust universi-
ties with the specific task in question. To achieve more clarity on the question as to 
how far potentially anti-competitive research could utilise the exemption of Article 
106 (2) TFEU, the interpretation of the Court would have to be awaited. Whether the 
application of competition law would obstruct a potential SGEI, proportionality and 
effects on trade would have to be evaluated on an individual case basis. 
5.3.15 Interim conclusion 
Overall, the funding situation was viewed critically by the interviewees, as 
public funding was conceived both shrinking in general and increasingly concen-
trated on research with impact and research in certain areas. It was mentioned that, 
in particular, academics perceived this as creating unnecessary administrative hur-
dles and causing tensions with academic freedom. The interviewees expected further 
concentration of funding in certain areas and on certain institutions making it neces-
sary to look for alternative funding sources. Additionally, the interviewees saw the 
importance of open access publishing and new media technologies as becoming in-
creasingly relevant for research in the future.  
The interviewees overall were not particularly aware of competition law them-
selves, as this would have been implemented into university policy and they would 
just follow the policy as such. If any problem would come to their attention they 
would consult separate units or external solicitors rather than dealing with the issue 
themselves. They thus would also not themselves make a distinction between eco-
nomic and non-economic activities.  
In areas of economic activity, full costs plus profit would need to be charged 
which, in reality, despite the use of TRAC fEC to calculate the costs, does not al-
ways seem to be the case. Therefore, there might be instances of state aid or preda-
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tory pricing, if HEIs were dominant. Furthermore, the exclusion of partners for ethi-
cal reasons, the imposition of publication requirements and the prohibition of sub-
contracting by funders might potentially be regarded as anti-competitive. If IPR ex-
ploitation is of an economic nature, any economically unjustified advantageous con-
ditions for undertakings, be it to make innovation in the public interest accessible, 
could be regarded as state aid. Also, contract conditions dictated upon undertakings 
such as the limitation of sublicensing could be regarded as anti-competitive and uni-
versities would have to demand market prices for any rights the partner obtains or 
exploits. Another issue which came up in an interview is the question of whether the 
topic of a certain piece of research could, in itself, be anti-competitive. Generally 
market division seemed not to be present in England, however, envisaged facility 
sharing endeavours might be regarded as anti-competitive if certain partners were 
excluded and/or market prices were not paid. Problems might also occur if public 
calls are classified as economic activities and have not been commissioned accord-
ing to the Altmark criteria. Finally, if advantages are bestowed upon companies 
through staff knowledge, in particular IPR creation or PhD students essentially con-
ducting a study for the private sector, this could potentially be regarded as state aid. 
 Depending on the individual case, there might be exemption possibilities un-
der Article 101 (3) TFEU or Article 107 (3) TFEU respectively and smaller projects 
may not fall under Article 107 (1) in the first place due to the de minimis rule. If pro-
jects infringing the state aid rules could be classified as providing SGEIs, they could 
mostly benefit from the SGEI Decision, as projects seem to be (almost) always un-
der the €15M threshold. More generally, it might be possible to exempt some poten-
tial breaches of competition law as SGEIs under Article 106 (2) TFEU. 
5.4. The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, many interviewees expressed the view that overall public 
funding, especially generic funding, was decreasing, which made the other funding 
streams more important. The interviewees generally described that, while basic re-
search (especially research funded through the Vernieuwingsimpuls) is academically 
most prestigious, government policy (especially top sector policy) increasingly 
steers towards impact oriented and applied research. As regards academic disci-
plines, the interviewees expressed that generally the natural sciences, life sciences 
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and medicine are more easily funded and arts, humanities, law and social sciences 
have more difficulties. However, there are exceptions such as astronomy, for which 
it is harder to find funding, and archaeology and economics which are relatively 
successful. Whilst all subjects can still be funded in the Vernieuwingsimpuls, other 
funding options for certain subjects are declining which increases competition in the 
Vernieuwingsimpuls. An interviewee working in the field of business collaboration 
expressed his belief that certain subjects might ultimately die out or would only be 
offered in a few universities in the country, in Europe or even worldwide. The ten-
dency in government policy, but (influenced by this policy) also within universities 
themselves to focus on certain research areas, would, according to the interviewees, 
also influence research priorities within subjects. Many interviewees were critical of 
this as basic and curiosity driven research was needed „to get these really big 
changes that you need as knowledge economy‟, to maintain a high academic stan-
dard and to provide high quality, research informed teaching. However, while many 
academics would thus attempt to utilise the open funding streams as much as possi-
ble and, as an interviewee in Leiden mentioned, even private sector voices were call-
ing for retaining sufficient space for basic research in universities, there would not 
be any real resistance. Instead universities would just adapt to the changes in re-
search funding. 
Commodification tendencies have thus led to certain changes in university cul-
ture. The feeling that a lot of pressure is created, when universities always have to 
compete for everything, was expressed in a focus group. A few interviewees men-
tioned that due to the increasing importance of the tweede and derde geldstrom and 
of impact and performance indicators generally, universities had begun to focus on 
non-generic funding providing internal incentives for this and to work on their visi-
bility to justify to the public their receiving of funding. This required a careful bal-
ancing act between following official policy, attracting sufficient funding and pro-
viding sufficient freedom to researcher to do their work. EU funding, especially, was 
seen by many as increasing in importance, but a few interviewees also mentioned 
the need to utilise the vierde geldstrom further to achieve a certain independence. In 
the course of these developments, research support offices became increasingly im-
portant in helping to attract and administer research funding, including its legal as-
pects. One interviewee working on the legal aspects specifically mentioned competi-
tion law in this context and expressed that he finds certain STW schemes question-
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able from that perspective. Many also mentioned the importance of attracting fund-
ing at full cost levels to achieve financial sustainability which would not always be 
the case in many of the collaborative schemes. Another concern expressed was the 
fear to be losing talent. Since the open talent funding schemes like Vernieuwingsim-
puls, but also ERC funding, often require certain career stages for researcher eligi-
bility, researchers, especially early career researchers, from a subject area in which 
not many funding alternatives are present, may, according to a focus group, find it 
too hard to find funding and decide against an academic career.  
When asked about their expectations for the future, a few interviewees ex-
pressed that they believed that these developments will continue and universities 
would become more commercial. A few mentioned that they believed that the Neth-
erlands are following the same path as the UK but are about ten years behind. Addi-
tionally, some interviewees flagged up as a likely future development an increase in 
cooperation with emerging economies (e.g. China, Brazil) as funders and partners in 
research as well as the establishment of subsidiaries in these countries. At the same 
time, increasing local clustering of research specialities was something that a Leiden 
interviewee saw as likely. Another interviewee from the same university suggested 
universities might need to get more creative as regards accessing or generating fund-
ing. For example, they could offer fee-based continuing education courses to pen-
sioners to generate income which could then be used for research projects. A Gron-
ingen interviewee even speculated that research funding might, in the future, be pro-
vided as loans rather than grants, to be paid back with interest. 
5.4.1. Awareness of competition law 
All interviewees seemed aware of competition law and most stated that compe-
tition law plays a role in their job to a varying extent depending on their exact posi-
tion. It was frequently stated that they would obtain advice from legal officers if 
needed. The legal officer in Leiden described EU competition law and the Research 
Framework as paramount. Whilst the university would sometimes have a vertical 
relationship with companies (and hardly ever a horizontal one), it was more com-
mon that it would act as the state, making state aid law particularly important. This 
view was shared by many interviewees who saw state aid law as the main concern, 
as it would inter alia assert influences on access conditions (exclusivity, option peri-
ods, price) for IPR generated in publicly funded research and the levels of financial 
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participation in PPPs. It was also stated that competition law would prohibit dis-
criminatory contract conditions. Generally, it would appear that the awareness for 
EU competition law amongst research office staff in the Netherlands is quite ad-
vanced and comprehensive in comparison to England. 
5.4.2. Economic activity  
As in England, research conducted freely with generic funding is not likely to 
be regarded as an economic activity. With regards to funding provided through the 
tweede geldstrom, the interviewees confirmed that the Vernieuwingsimpuls in NWO 
funding is a completely open talent funding scheme given mainly for basic research. 
It would therefore, probably also not amount to an economic activity. Another part 
of NWO funding would go towards bottom up ideas provided by senior researchers 
for projects of varying kinds and sizes. Open calls like this where researchers enjoy 
a large amount of freedom to conduct independent research and which, according to 
the interviewees, also existed in other intermediary agencies like ZonMW and STW, 
would probably also not have to be regarded as an economic activity. An increasing 
amount of public funding, however, is themed. Two interviewees considered that 
themed calls would represent more than half of the non-generic public funding over-
all, especially since the introduction of the top sector policy. Themed calls are, ac-
cording to the interviewees, sometimes very detailed with exact descriptions to be 
followed, especially the public funding provided for bigger co-operations or public-
private funding for PhD projects. Similar to what has been discussed for England, 
this might be considered as an economic service that could be commissioned on a 
market. Within the top sector funding, as an interviewee explained, the private sec-
tor and academia must come up with a research agenda within the field of the top 
sectors and then receive public funding to set up the co-operation as well as most of 
the academic funding. The classification as an economic activity, would therefore 
depend on the research agenda as will be discussed further below for public-private 
co-operations.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the derde gelstrom consists of funding from a vari-
ety of providers. Firstly, there is contract research for the government which will 
have to be regarded as an economic activity. Secondly, there is EU and international 
funding which will not be looked at in this study. Thirdly, there is funding provided 
by charities. According to the interviewees, funding from charities would usually 
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only set out a subject area within which researchers freely apply with any kind of 
projects. As this is difficult to replicate under market conditions, it seems unlikely 
that this amounts to an economic activity. Finally, collaborations with the private 
sector fall under the derde geldstrom. Here a variety of collaborative forms have 
been identified in chapter 4 which all seem to be present in the universities under 
scrutiny. The interviewees described contract research as delivering certain results 
with little or no freedom for researchers. As in England, this form of collaboration is 
clearly an economic activity. 
Also like in England, the interviewees did not elaborate further about science 
parks (or innovatiecampussen) which could equally be explained by the loose form 
of the collaboration which in itself will probably also not have to be regarded as an 
undertaking. In PPPs, the universities would, according to the interviewees, look for 
companies to collaborate with which would then pay cash or contribute in kind, 
while additional public funding is often also available from the government or the 
EU. In such co-operations work packages are agreed and the main point is joint re-
search and mutual learning. The parties in the co-operation share intellectual prop-
erty with each other in order to do further research (not to exploit). Commonly gen-
erated IPRs will be allocated according to previously agreed contracts which also set 
out the other terms of the co-operation. There are standardised templates, but espe-
cially the negotiation of IPR issues could be lengthy. This form of collaboration 
would currently be pushed by both the government, especially through the top sector 
policy, and by the EU. It is difficult to make a general statement about the economic 
nature of this collaborative form. If the research takes place freely with the aim of 
generating knowledge and disseminating it at a pre-competitive stage and the uni-
versities have sufficient influence on the directions of research, the collaboration 
might be non-economic in nature. If the cooperative project essentially amounts to 
conducting a research service for the private sector partner or the partners are, in es-
sence, cooperatively conducting a research service for the government, as the de-
scription of the calls for some collaborative projects given by some interviewees in-
dicate, this could amount to an economic activity.  
IPR exploitation was regarded as very important by interviewees. Firstly, the 
commercial interest and exploitability of the research would be assessed and then 
there would be a search for partners to develop the research further and exploit the 
results. The exact deals in this context would be negotiated. These could either be 
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with existing companies or a spin-off would be created specifically for the exploita-
tion. The latter is preferred if the potential IPR is „disruptive‟ technology signifi-
cantly different from what companies are currently doing and there is little synergy 
to integrate it into an existing company. Start-ups beyond spin-offs were not men-
tioned by interviewees. As, discussed above, IPR exploitation has to be regarded as 
non-economic activity if, according to the Research Framework, it has an internal 
character. The Issue Paper specified this by also requiring that the research arose 
from non-economic activities and is non-exclusive. As regards newly founded com-
panies, whether or not they constitute an economic activity for the university de-
pends on the activity and on how affiliated they still are.  
The vierde geldstrom contains purely charitable donations without any consid-
eration. An interviewee responsible for charitable donations explained how in his 
university a charity as a separate legal entity is established to collect donations and 
then pass them on to the university thereby allowing for the donations to be tax de-
ductable. The charity is also utilised if calls in the tweede or derde geldstrom require 
a charity to be involved. The interviewee gave the example of the Coca-Cola Foun-
dation which would only accept applications from charities and wherein the univer-
sity fund would then submit the application for the researchers. The money gener-
ated by the fund would mainly go to research projects, but also to educational activi-
ties and community projects. The persons or institutions providing the funding can 
chose between general donations or donations for a specific fund dedicated to schol-
arships or chairs. Higher donations can also be named funds which can be dedicated 
to specific kinds of research. Generally a committee in the university fund chooses 
which project is to be funded, but occasionally donors would want to be involved. 
This can even go as far as donors prescribing a very specific project, although this 
would be exceptional. The interviewee mentioned the example of a donor demand-
ing a project be undertaken on rehabilitative medicine for musicians with physical 
problems resulting from playing their instrument. Sometimes the university fund 
also approaches philanthropists who are known to be interested in a specific topic 
with an already existing project requiring additional funding. A donor may also ap-
proach the fund wanting to donate to a specific project. Generally, the described 
situations where money is provided in a purely charitable fashion to the university in 
general or even for research in specific areas could not be regarded as buying a mar-
ket service. However, in the exceptional cases where a very specific project is de-
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manded, this could probably be seen as being able to take place under market condi-
tions. The fact that the commissioners of such research are neither using the results 
themselves nor making an economic profit from them, does not change the possibil-
ity that such studies could be commissioned on a market from private providers. It 
might therefore be regarded as an economic activity.  
5.4.3. Full costs 
While, as explained in chapter 4, all Dutch universities have an individual full 
costing system, a financial officer interviewed explained that most of the systems 
ended up being relatively similar. He further explained that in his university a „profit 
and loss account‟ was in place. They would therefore know the income and the costs 
from their annual report. From the total costs specific education related costs would 
be deducted and the remainder would then be divided by the number of fte and then 
by 1600 hours per year. This would result in the cost rate per fte per year. On this 
basis the university had created 70 categories of salaries with the equivalent full cost 
rates. Researchers could simply look up their salary in the list to know their full cost 
rate. The project costs are then calculated by the full cost rates of the hours of the 
staff members working on it which already includes all the hidden costs (e.g. for in-
frastructure or electricity). Common rules for universities would not exist, as univer-
sities had not been able to agree on them.  
According to the interviewees, the funder usually determines the rules (in pub-
lic funding).648 NWO would only pay direct costs with occasionally a small over-
head, as it had been agreed between government, NWO and universities that a part 
of the eerste geldstrom is intended to match NWO funding. There are, therefore, in-
centive payments for every fte created from NWO funding.649 Some funders have 
fixed hourly rates which do not always cover full costs. Others allow for full-cost 
calculation. For the EU a simplified full cost method is used. Things could get par-
ticularly complicated, as a few interviewees mentioned, if a number of funders con-
tributed to a project, as then the funding rules would have to be made compatible. 
The big PPPs especially were described as administratively complicated regarding 
                                                 
648 It is assumed that this is also true for charity calls. However this was not explicitly mentioned. 
649 It was not entirely clear whether these incentives are provided through internal funding allocation 
or directly through the eerste geldstrom, as the statements of the interviewees differed in this re-
spect.  
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costing. Interviewees from one university mentioned that partly universities even 
created a private sector entity to avoid risk and make cost calculation easier as well 
as fulfilling the requirement of some calls to have a private sector partner. One in-
terviewee also talked about the danger of providing state aid through PPPs and 
pointed out that intellectual property is, therefore, only made accessible for partners 
in PPPs for the duration for the project rather than being transferred. Beyond that, 
universities would only grant an option right to negotiate commercial access and po-
tentially a discount equal to the company‟s contribution to the overall project. Fur-
thermore, the universities seemed very aware that publicly funded projects are often 
costing them money. Whether or not to utilise this funding, would therefore be a 
strategic decision which depended on their matching capacity, the importance of the 
project and also on whether „in kind‟ or „in cash‟ matching would be required, 
wherein the former would be preferable. It was often mentioned how prestigious 
NWO funding is and a few interviewees pointed out that this funding would always 
be matched in their universities.  
Companies are usually, particularly in contract research, asked for full costs 
and a surplus for profit, risk and capital investment (the rates for this varied between 
universities). An interviewee in Maastricht mentioned that if clear market prices 
were accessible, these would be applied as a reference point. Interviewees seemed 
very aware that this could otherwise infringe competition law. However, according 
to the interviewees, strategic decisions for lower prices could be made for strategi-
cally important partners or based on past agreements. One interviewee explained: „It 
can be worth to put your own money in that project. That is also what companies do 
in general.‟ However, there would be guidelines in this respect and full costs at least 
should be covered. He also pointed out that, to retain financial sustainability, this 
cannot be done too extensively. Furthermore, the faculty board or board of directors 
would have to co-sign the contracts and would not do so if pricing was completely 
disproportionate. Simultaneously, a few other interviewees explained that due to the 
public funding rules being limited to direct costs or certain hourly rates, researchers 
would often think those were the actual costs or that full cost plus prices would be 
too high and thus offer arrangements below full cost prices to companies. They 
would then thereby sell themselves under-price and companies would also, despite 
being aware of that, try to negotiate prices as low as possible. The assumption that 
matching might thus still occur was therefore expressed. 
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IPR exploitation follows different rules entirely. Here the universities operate 
on a risk sharing basis with the private sector, since it would be very difficult to as-
sess the value of an IPR and companies would also not be keen on making huge in-
vestments up-front for an uncertain development trajectory where the technology 
could simply fail. Given this, the agreements would provide for the university to 
share some of the success through royalties on sales and milestone payments (e.g. 
for a successful clinical trial or drug approval). The royalties and milestone pay-
ments are calculated based on the plans of the company and the market forecast re-
garding revenue as well as comparable deals (i.e. a fair market rate). Regarding 
charitable donations, research could only be supported with what has been provided. 
There is, therefore, no full costing. Potentially, matching has to take place or addi-
tional funders have to be found. 
The full costing methodologies generally seem to comply with competition 
law as they are based on actual costs and there do not appear to be fixed profit rates 
or other anti-competitive agreements. Competition law problems could thus only 
occur if, in an economic activity, full costing plus profit is not applied. The greatest 
risk here could be public calls not using full costing despite being an economic ac-
tivity, given that, as discussed in the last section, some of these calls might poten-
tially be considered as an economic activity. The rules regarding PPPs seem in line 
with competition law requirements and risks in this area seem low. The rules de-
scribed for contract research or IPR seem generally unproblematic from a competi-
tion law perspective since they charge full costs and are oriented along market 
prices. However, if incidents occur where full costs plus profit is not applied this 
could constitute state aid or predatory pricing (if the HEI is a dominant undertaking). 
Finally, charitable donations are, as explained in the last section generally unlikely 
to be an economic activity and therefore full costing would not be required. In the 
exceptional cases where a study on a subject is essentially commissioned, this might 
be regarded as state aid. 
5.4.4. Market foreclosure 
As in England, no signs of market foreclosure could be detected for research in 
the Netherlands.  
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5.4.5. Refusal to enter into contractual relations  
All the interviewees stated that the universities, as such, do not exclude part-
ners. An interviewee working on business collaborations mentioned this would 
amount to anti-competitive discrimination. He explained they would like to „col-
laborate with as many parties as we can‟, as that would be beneficial for the univer-
sity. Even collaboration in one project with companies which are competitors would, 
from the university‟s point of view, be welcome. Essentially, as many interviewees 
stated, it would depend on the researchers and the research question. Nevertheless, 
some interviewees stated that they might have preferred partners for certain subjects 
due to existing relationships, geographical proximity, a company being the producer 
of high-end equipment and therefore the natural choice or, when it comes to other 
HEIs, due to the fact that they are in an association or strategic partnership. One in-
terviewee, for example, stated that in the area of food and agricultural research they 
would often look for local partners, since in their area many companies are working 
in this field. Funding agencies would, on the other hand, sometimes insist on certain 
partners; regional agencies are aimed at economic prosperity in the region and thus 
require regional partners, national funding is partly for national partners only,650 
other programmes might require the involvement of SME and the Coca-Cola foun-
dation would only fund charities. A few interviewees mentioned, however, that ful-
filling these conditions is not always possible or appropriate, especially in basic re-
search, and might lead to the university not applying for a call. As the universities 
do not appear to exclude willing partners, there does not seem to be a problem from 
a competition law perspective. Only the public funding rules might potentially be 
regarded as anti-competitive, something which will be discussed further below. 
5.4.6. Non-economically justified or discriminatory contract conditions 
The interviewees saw the major contractual problem which needed to be 
solved to be the desire of some companies for secrecy versus the aim of the univer-
sity to disseminate knowledge through publication, further exploration of results and 
informing teaching through research. Additionally, as an interviewee working on 
business collaborations mentioned, it was a concern for the university that research 
                                                 
650 An interviewee mentioned that this is not the case in top sector funding where international coop-
eration is possible and even foreign partners can receive the subsidy. 
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needed to be „result-open‟ rather than geared towards making a specific invention. 
An invention should always be an added bonus that occurred in „result-open‟ re-
search. Another interviewee mentioned that universities, in his opinion, should ex-
clude ethically questionable research. He mentioned that he had heard that compa-
nies had specifically come to Dutch universities to undertake animal testing as ani-
mal protection laws in other countries would be stricter. He found this especially 
controversial if the testing is merely standard not containing any scientific interest. 
Beyond that, interviewees did not know of any particular conditions for partners. 
Generally, however, as the business collaboration officer stated, it is important for 
universities to establish strategic long-term relationships due to the benefit gained 
from increasingly substantial knowledge which is created in a line of common pro-
jects. Therefore, it was an aim in contract negotiations to find solutions both sides 
can benefit from.  
This would sometimes be difficult, according to a legal officer due to the ex-
pectations which companies have and which would differ between companies. As an 
example he mentioned the general culture of „ V Nederland‟, namely the view of 
the Netherlands as a trading nation where the assumption is commonly held that if 
one supports Dutch industry the whole nation will prosper. Due to this mindset 
Dutch companies expected to gain advantages. This would be especially true with 
regards to publicly funded universities as the companies, as tax payers, expected re-
turns. According to him this mindset had led to many incidents of anti-competitive 
behaviour in the past in other sectors. With other company types there might poten-
tially be other issues that needed to be resolved in the negotiations.  
As explained for England, requirements on dissemination, leaving research 
„result-open‟ and, perhaps, ethics might potentially be regarded as anti-competitive 
conditions if dictated upon undertakings in the area of economic research. However, 
it seems likely that they could be exempted as SGEIs. If companies, due to a specific 
corporate culture in a country or sector, try to impose anti-competitive conditions on 
HEIs, they could potentially also use competition law to their advantage. 
5.4.7. Anti-competitive use of IPRs 
As mentioned in chapter 4, IPRs created by employees are usually owned by 
the employer. The interviewees explained that, as with the procedure in England, 
employees report their inventions. They are then reviewed to determine how far the 
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university is free to exploit them (i.e. potential rights of other parties are scrutinised) 
and the potential for exploitation is evaluated. If applicable, rights are registered 
which are often managed by a university holding. The universities do not exploit 
IPRs themselves, but look for partners for exploitation or found spin-offs. If a spin-
off is created the holding might hold equity in it or assist with other IPR related ac-
tivities. The preference would be towards conferring licenses rather than the assign-
ment of IPRs. As has been mentioned above, royalties and milestone payments at 
market rates are received for licenses. Next to compensation, another important fac-
tor for universities is the limitation of restrictions regarding future research based on 
the IPR. In particular, if PhD researchers are involved in the creation of the IPRs, 
they are eventually required to publish their theses. Additionally, as universities aim 
at making knowledge publicly accessible (be it through a product created by a com-
pany), the agreements would contain an anti-shelving clause. If no partner willing to 
exploit the IPR could be found, the application would, according to a legal officer, 
usually be dropped after 30 months. He mentioned that there used to be patent tar-
gets in some Dutch universities which had led to unexploited patents, but such poli-
cies have been abandoned. 
As it is sometimes difficult to find partners for exploitation (for example the 
invention might still be at too early a stage to be attractive to private sector partners 
(knowledge gap)), another interviewee explained that his university would some-
times lend money from a fund established for this purpose to companies in order to 
jointly bring the invention to a prototype stage which can then be further developed. 
At that stage, except for receiving royalties from the license, the university would 
leave the collaboration. The company would also need to invest during the common 
phase and sometimes additional public funding is available. The interviewees ex-
plained that, in PPPs, the agreements would contain rules concerning sharing IPRs 
and future income. According to an interviewee working on business collaborations, 
the rule „ownership follows inventorship‟ would apply in his university. Thereby, 
jointly made inventions would be jointly owned, those made by the company are 
owned by the company and if university staff made the invention, it is owned by the 
university. Another interviewee mentioned that his university would try to negotiate 
that the IPRs would generally belong to the university as far as possible. If the uni-
versity has the rights, the procedure as outlined above is followed. Companies might 
additionally want a first option clause, so „they can be sure that if they want they can 
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get access to the technology‟, but reasonable commercial rates would still need to be 
paid. 
From a competition law perspective, the rules seem generally unproblematic. 
If anything, demanding anti-shelving clauses might be regarded as anti-competitive 
if imposed on undertakings, but they could probably be exempted as SGEIs. A legal 
officer explicitly mentioned the potential of IPR assignment or licensing agreements 
to constitute state aid. Interestingly, he mentioned that companies would be equally 
aware of this, but would nevertheless try to negotiate advantages, as they would as-
sume that the amount would usually be below the de minimis threshold and that in-
terstate trade would, in most cases, be unaffected. Even if that was the case, the uni-
versity would, however, nevertheless not agree to anti-competitive arrangements 
because Dutch competition rules would still apply. The subsidies/loans provided 
through public funding or through the university, mentioned by one interviewee, 
might, however, qualify as state aid if they are received without consideration.  
5.4.8. Anti-competitive research co-operation 
There did not seem to be any indication that research was begun at an unrea-
sonably late stage which could be in breach of Article 101 (1) TFEU, as discussed in 
chapter 3.  
5.4.9. Market division 
The interviewees explained that in national (NWO, national infrastructure 
roadmap) and European (European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructure) 
funding policy strong attempts are made not to duplicate expensive research equip-
ment. Thus if such equipment already exists it is often not funded again in another 
university, unless there is a particular reason for it. The universities would also be 
discussing to share facilities beyond that; amongst each other as well as with the pri-
vate sector (which also sometimes contributes to the equipment). Furthermore, a 
Leiden interviewee explained that universities would be expected to give start-ups 
(not just their own) access to costly equipment as it would be too expensive for the 
start-ups to maintain themselves. Specialisation would also occur, to some extent, 
mainly regarding patient care due to reimbursement issues, since health insurers de-
termine what and where is acceptable treatment. From a competition law perspec-
tive, one might wonder if the placement of infrastructure into only one or a few uni-
versities could be regarded as anti-competitive. Firstly, this might amount to state 
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aid as it provided one institution with an advantage over others particularly if it can 
then charge others rent for use of the infrastructure. Secondly, it might place the or-
ganisation into a dominant position in a certain research market which it could abuse 
should it not provide (equal) access. If voluntary facility sharing between HEIs or 
between HEIs and other parties makes economic sense, no party is discriminatorily 
excluded from it and, if the equipment is co-financed, all parties receive reasonable 
economic rates when letting the infrastructure out, this would, however, probably 
not constitute anti-competitive behaviour. Access to equipment for start-ups would 
probably only amount to anti-competitive behaviour if no consideration was paid. 
Other areas of specialisation like the example of health insurers deciding about spe-
cialities in universities and university hospitals might cause constraints because it 
could be regarded as a vertical cartel. 
While institutions need no accreditation to research and the research market, as 
such, is thus open, the public HEI market is widely foreclosed by government. Inter-
viewees in Maastricht described the difficulties their university had to establish itself 
as a university because the government was of the opinion that the public HEI mar-
ket was sufficiently saturated and did not want a new public university to be estab-
lished. Maastricht University was only able to be founded, because it argued that it 
was focussing on the international market rather than the local one and would have a 
different, problem-based teaching philosophy. The other interviewees confirmed that 
it is almost impossible to establish a new university and receive public funding. An 
interviewee in Groningen described how Friesland recently failed in its endeavour to 
establish a publicly funded university, despite having argued that they would cater 
only for the local market where need had apparently increased. The same would be 
true for new courses or research areas within a university. Indeed, all the interview-
ees pointed out that the government now expects universities to pick focus areas and 
to concentrate on them which are then also supported through extra funding. Some 
interviewees were rather critical of that, as they saw their university as a comprehen-
sive research university which carries a certain prestige. Attempts would thus be 
made to attract non-public funding in order to continue to excel in all areas. One in-
terviewee mentioned that he believed it would make interdisciplinary research more 
complicated, if not every area was researched intensively in-house. Aside from these 
concerns, it also seems possible that, if and in so far as universities can be regarded 
as undertakings, these government policies would amount to market division and 
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state aid for existing universities to the detriment of those trying to establish them-
selves or establish a new area.   
The universities would, according to some interviewees, also often collaborate 
more extensively with each other in an inner state region (Twente, Nijmengen, 
Groningen and Wageningen or Leiden, Delft and Rotterdam), across borders 
(Northern Netherlands and North Germany) or Europe wide (Gent, Groningen, Göt-
tingen and Upsalla) in strategic partnerships. Particularly in these partnerships, but 
also beyond, partners, according to one interviewee working on policy aspects, tried 
not to double-up in research specialisation or duplicate equipment. Thus if one of the 
partners has a chair in a certain area the other partner would not employ a professor 
with the same speciality. This would enhance cooperation. Even if universities re-
tained all subject areas, concentration would take place within specialities. Another 
interview described an internal research policy in his university which provides that 
they would not compete with local companies. Investment was therefore only sup-
posed to go to such spin-offs and start-ups deriving from unique research in the uni-
versity. In particular, infrastructure was not to be exploited if it would lead to com-
petition with local companies. He also described a scheme between his universities, 
the local Hogeschool and one in a different location. In this scheme, the two HEIs in 
the first location would stick to one area of research, while the other HEI would in-
vestigate, together with private sector entities, whether the waste from the former 
could be utilised to make certain products. The former HEIs refrained from investi-
gating what could be done with the waste. Depending on the exact details of the 
cases, (particularly on the question as to whether it is normal market behaviour to 
offer a slightly different product or if behaviour amounts to actual collusion) all 
these policy examples risk being regarded as market division.  
5.4.10. Limiting Markets 
The interviewees stated that there were no quantitative restrictions on the 
amount of research generally and on privately funded research in particular. On the 
contrary, as public generic funding decreased there would be a strong desire to at-
tract more privately funded research, in particular private funding for full costs. 
However, as two interviewees pointed out, there might be reservations as to the con-
tent. If a project has little academic value or it excessively limits academic freedom, 
universities might refrain from conducting it. However, in a focus group the concern 
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was expressed that the decreasing public funding might, in the future, also lower the 
threshold with regards to content. Only such content restrictions could possibly be 
regarded as limiting markets. However, if that was the case, these could probably be 
exempted as SGEIs.  
5.4.11. Applying Altmark 
The funding agencies determine who can apply for a specific call which, ac-
cording to the interviewees, varies. An interviewee working on public funding 
streams mentioned that most calls are for universities and, depending on the call, 
partners. Only few schemes have a reverse approach. If partners are allowed or even 
required, there are, as has been mentioned above, occasionally limita-
tions/requirements as to which kind of partner organisations need to be involved. As 
mentioned above, if public calls can be classified as economic activities, they would 
need to be commissioned according to the Altmark criteria which contain that calls 
need to be open to any willing provider, in particular also foreign providers, and that 
market prices or full costs and reasonable profit need to be charged for it not to con-
stitute state aid.  
5.4.12. State aid through staff knowledge 
In the Netherlands, according to the interviewees, university staff do some-
times work in the private sector. In these cases academics would still have to follow 
the national code on academic integrity which researchers needed to sign and which 
require them inter alia to behave ethical, trustworthy and carefully. Sometimes, staff 
work in their own companies spun out of the university. This would be a preferred 
situation, as staff can retain their employment within the university whilst experi-
menting with the setting up and running of a company. It was mentioned by some 
interviewees, that such constellations became problematic if staff were in manage-
rial positions and able to sign contracts for both sides. This would be a concern be-
cause the university could not be certain that these members of staff represented the 
university to its best interest. One interviewee working on legal aspects specifically 
mentioned, as an area for concern, the potential of favours given to spin-offs 
led/owned by employees because this could constitute state aid. He said that this is 
difficult for the research office to scrutinise since academics are managed by line 
management not by the research offices and the former are not involved in the spin-
offs activities. However, such constellations would be rare, as most companies 
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would quickly spin out properly and very close ties are only maintained with few. 
Generally, the interviewees also mentioned IPR issues which needed to be negoti-
ated as regards ownership and publication of results as a concern in cases where 
staff worked in the private sector. Beyond these issues, as one interviewee working 
on policy pointed out, there is not much concern as regards staff knowledge being 
used in the private sector. Instead, the exchange would be regarded as mutually 
beneficial. From a competition law perspective problems could occur, if advantages 
are bestowed on companies through staff knowledge, in particular IPR creation or 
favourable contract conditions given to staff owned companies.  
5.4.13. Exemptions  
As has been mentioned in the subchapter on England above, it is impossible to 
make a general determination of the potential for exemption under Article 101 
TFEU, as this would depend too much on the individual cases and, in the case of 
BERs, on market shares. As in England, the amount of funding provided through 
public calls differs, according to the interviewees, significantly from a few thousand 
Euros to up to €30M per collaborative project or even €40M for institutional funding 
through the gravitation programme. As regards state aid, smaller projects could thus 
equally benefit from the de minimis rules, the exemptions in the GBER and, if pro-
jects can be classified as providing an SGEI, from the €15M threshold in the SGEI 
Decision. The amounts of funding provided through public calls are much higher 
than in England, though. Therefore there is more room for potential aid falling out-
side of the exemptions. The measures, if classified as infringing the state aid provi-
sions, might then still be able to utilise Article 107 (3) TFEU as an exemption gen-
erally, which would need to be evaluated in the individual case according to the 
guidelines in the Research Framework. 
5.4.14. SGEIs 
In addition to the exemptions mentioned in the last section, potential infringe-
ments might be exempted as SGEIs under the conditions mentioned above in the 
relevant section on England. In the Netherlands, the interviewees generally believed 
that the research conducted in their university was in the general interest. A few in-
terviewees mentioned that academics were divided into those who believed impact-
focussed and applied research would be more in the general interest, while others 
believed that curiosity driven, basic research would, in the long term, serve the gen-
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eral interest better and had more academic integrity. It was noted that a scientific 
interest was needed in both cases, though. A few interviewees, however, pointed out 
that occasionally there might be an economic necessity for conducting research for 
particular interests even without a scientific interest (e.g. contract research for a 
company for full costs) even though currently that was seldom the case. One inter-
viewee in Leiden mentioned that if research seemed too far removed from the uni-
versities conception of what it should be doing or was unethical or illegal, they 
would not conduct it.  
From these statements, it seems as if the universities would only pursue re-
search if there is a scientific interest, unless they felt economically required to do 
other research to attract income. Except for the latter cases a general interest (i.e. the 
advancement of science) might thus be assumed. As with England, more than just 
such an interest might be required for research to be an SGEI, however, and clarity 
can only be achieved through a ruling by the Court. As regards the question of 
whether the SGEI is entrusted to the universities, the interviewees named the WHW 
as an act entrusting universities with the task of research. While this tasks them with 
research in general, this might not be precise enough to fulfil the conditions on en-
trustments acts in the post Altmark legislation.651 Grant agreements might, in that 
case, be regarded as acts entrusting universities with the specific task in question. If 
the application of competition law would obstruct a potential SGEI, proportionality 
and effects on trade would have to be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
5.4.15 Interim conclusion 
Overall the funding situation was viewed critically since public funding was 
conceived as shrinking and increasingly concentrated only on certain areas and for 
research with impact. This was regarded as being potentially limiting to academic 
freedom and basic research. Despite the widespread criticism, the interviewees ex-
pected this development to continue and for the Netherlands to follow the path taken 
in England. Unlike in England, all interviewees were aware of competition law and 
seemed to have a relatively comprehensive knowledge of it. In government policy 
there seemed to be detailed rules for publicly funded PPPs which seem to indicate 
that there is awareness that these might be economic activities. The main areas 
                                                 
651 See chapter 3 text surrounding n 339-343.  
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which might be erroneously classified as non-economic could be themed public calls 
and charitable donations which amount to commissioning a service.  
If areas are erroneously identified as non-economic and no full costs are ap-
plied, this could amount to state aid or be regarded as predatory pricing. Further-
more, public funding rules excluding or requiring certain partners in collaborative 
projects might potentially be regarded as anti-competitive if they apply in areas of 
economic activity. The rules on IPRs seem to be generally unproblematic. Only anti-
shelving clauses or subsidies to companies willing to exploit university IPRs might 
potentially be regarded as anti-competitive, but at least the former could probably be 
exempted as SGEIs. Unlike in England there seemed to be rather strong indications 
for potential market division. The placement of infrastructure in only one or a few 
universities, health insurers determining specialisation in university health research, 
limitations on the establishment of new universities, division of research specialisa-
tion and no competition policies or agreements might perhaps be regarded as prob-
lematic from a competition law perspective. Problems might also occur if public 
calls are economic activities and have not been commissioned according to the 
Altmark criteria. Finally, if advantages are given to companies through staff knowl-
edge, in particular IPR creation or favourable contract conditions given to staff own-
ing companies, this could potentially be regarded as anti-competitive. 
As in England, depending on the individual case, there might be possibilities 
of exemption. However, the sums provided for public research are much higher than 
in England and thus there is more potential for certain potentially anti-competitive 
public calls to fall outside the scope of the de minimis, GBER and SGEI legislation. 
It might, more generally, be possible to exempt potential breaches of competition 
law as SGEIs under Article 106 (2) TFEU. Whilst the WHW might not be precise 
enough to serve as entrustment act, individual grant agreements might.  
5.5. Germany 
As has been mentioned in chapter 4, the overall climate for investment in re-
search is good in Germany, something which benefits universities. One interviewee 
expressed this by saying: 'Academic research is prospering, quite unlike France, It-
aly or Great Britain... That's a catastrophe [there].' Generic funding and DFG fund-
ing under which researchers are free to pursue any direction of research comprises 
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the majority of research funding. Interviewees also felt less pressure from perform-
ance indicators implemented into generic funding distribution. Most interviewees, 
therefore, felt that there was still significant academic freedom in Germany. In the-
matic calls some interviewees felt that there was a push towards applied, collabora-
tive and economically impactful research. These programmes would also be influ-
enced by, and merge with, the aims of Bologna and Lisbon/Europe2020. This was 
viewed critically by interviewees from two universities since they felt that big col-
laborations can be suffocated by administrative requirements and communication 
problems, can require too much to be achieved by a single project and nobody ever 
seemed to research whether the assumed added value is actually achieved. Most in-
terviewees felt that there was more funding for subjects such as engineering and IT 
and less for the humanities. It was also mentioned that inter-disciplinary research 
sometimes found funding hard to come by as experts from one subject when evalu-
ating a study from another employing their methodology might easily find it lacking. 
However, a couple of interviewees mentioned that the preferential situation of some 
subjects could also be explained by different needs (e.g. humanities and social sci-
ences inherently needing lesser resources than human medicine), less of a culture of 
applying for Drittmittel in certain subjects or simply due to a lack of interest in the 
topics of the calls. It might thus not (entirely) be the result of intentional governmen-
tal steering. Most interviewees mentioned that, within subjects, calls are often issued 
in particular fashionable areas (for example, climate change, electronic cars) which 
might be explained by the accessibility of certain subjects to the public (for example, 
curing cancer or preventing climate change is more obviously desirable than study-
ing the Merovingians).  
Despite the mentioned criticism, economic constraints and culture changes did 
not appear to be seen as significant as they were in the other two countries. In par-
ticular, it was felt that the situation did not (yet) require researchers to apply for 
Drittmittel, that through creative proposal writing one could draft applications in a 
way to fit one‟s agenda into a variety of only loosely related calls and that academ-
ics had the chance to influence the thematic areas. The latter was viewed critically 
by one interviewee because the researchers may have personal motives (for exam-
ple, trying to continue their research area until retirement). It was also mentioned 
that young researchers particularly might be influenced by extrinsic pulls of the-
matic calls. Despite being encouraged to collaborate more with the private sector, 
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private funding was still regarded as playing a small role in German universities. An 
interviewee from a South German university, however, mentioned that universities 
are not at an eye to eye level with private sector partners in contract negotiations. In 
particular, companies would still try not to pay full costs and, especially if the re-
searcher negotiates and signs agreements without the involvement of the relevant 
research offices, they may succeed in this. More generally it was feared that relying 
strongly on Drittmittel, particularly if not provided at full cost levels, might be fi-
nancially unhealthy for universities. Especially in a traditional university, it was felt 
that success in attracting Drittmittel was, in this way, being punished. At the same 
time, it was for certain situations seen as bizarre to ask for full costs. An example 
given as a funder providing full costs for a visiting researcher, as this would amount 
to the visitor (or the funder on the visitor‟s behalf) paying to come and work at the 
university. This seemed to collide with the general self-perception and university 
culture of universities in Germany.  
When asked for an opinion on how research and research funding will develop, 
an interviewee from a South German university expressed that generally too much is 
expected from universities. They were required to do basic research leading to new 
ideas in all subject areas, innovate, excel in topical subjects, identify a unique focus, 
provide research informed teaching which also focussed on employability and stu-
dent satisfaction, engage internationally, attract external funding and perform well in 
rankings with a variety of parameters. This would lead to a mission overload. Uni-
versities would currently have to find their place in all this, also considering their 
own understanding of their role. The same interviewee said that, despite the gener-
ally positive research funding situation in Germany, he believed public funding 
would continue to be underfunded. Especially there was insufficient generic funding 
which, combined with the fact that non-generic funding is not provided at full cost 
levels, might lead to insufficient infrastructure. Another problem identified was that 
the programmatic calls, even though they are supposed to encourage innovation, 
would often lag behind „real cutting edge‟ research since once an idea is through the 
administrative process and a call is issued, research has already developed beyond 
that. Therefore, innovation can actually be hindered by increasing competitive pro-
grammatic calls and, for an institution which invested highly in an area which is dis-
continued after one call, this may also have significant financial consequences. A 
focus group expressed their fear of certain subjects being destroyed and that teach-
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ing and research could be increasingly separated, something which collides with the 
traditional German understanding of university education.  
5.5.1. Awareness of competition law 
Concerning the relevance of competition law for research, all interviewees 
were aware of the Research Framework and its requirement to distinguish between 
economic and non-economic activities as well as to apply full costs to the former. 
Beyond that most interviewees were not generally aware of competition law prob-
lems or had not yet come across competition law in their everyday tasks respec-
tively. Only two interviewees mentioned IPRs and one interviewee mentioned pro-
curement as areas where competition law becomes relevant. This does not necessar-
ily mean the other interviewees are not aware of competition law beyond that if 
prompted further, but it was very clear that the Research Framework and full costs 
were the first things that came to mind for all interviewees.  
5.5.2. Economic activity  
As in the other two countries, research conducted independently with generic 
funding will probably be a non-economic activity. As regards public competitive 
funding the interviewees pointed out that DFG funding is mostly open subject-wise 
and provided for basic research. BMBF funding (and other ministerial funding) 
would implement research policy in areas which are „fashionable‟. Here universi-
ties/researchers could lobby in advance for their subjects, but, once the calls are out, 
they have to apply within set limits which differ between calls. The majority of the 
interviewees stated that calls can be very specific. Sometimes the creation of a pro-
totype in a certain area is required or a specific study commissioned whereas, on 
other occasions, programmes just generally encourage entrepreneurship, co-
operation or offer institutional funding. Some of the larger programmes were offered 
for collaborations between companies, HEIs and others which were then supposed to 
work together and utilise synergies from basic research up to the final product stage. 
Situations where the funders are essentially commissioning a prototype or a study 
would probably have to be regarded as economic in nature, as they could be pro-
vided under market conditions. The responses from the interviewees seem to indi-
cate that such calls exist. The universities under scrutiny, however, seemed to regard 
any public funding as non-economic in nature. Only the interviewees in Munich 
made a specific point of declaring that they do assess public funding for its eco-
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nomic nature. That assessment would usually lead to the result that they considered 
it non-economic. 
All the universities under scrutiny seemed to be involved in (almost) all the co-
operation forms of non-public funding described in chapter 4. A cluster was de-
scribed as an area where many public and private sector research organisations are 
located which all work on a few subject areas. They do not collaborate in an institu-
tionalised way, but instead create synergies and can lead to smaller co-operation on 
project basis. Sometimes there are also shared laboratories in a cluster. With the ex-
ception of renting out infrastructure or when common projects are agreed upon, 
which could be economic activities, clusters themselves, as has been discussed for 
the other two countries (there referred to as science parks), would probably not be 
regarded as undertakings because they are essentially just a space in which separate 
entities are located. Also, privately funded chairs are probably mostly not an eco-
nomic activity. The interviewees explained that these are often not entirely privately 
funded. Instead, it was in their experience, more common that private or third sector 
partners only contribute to existing chairs in a subject area. Even if they do help cre-
ate a new chair, the academic is free to decide how to proceed within this area. This 
kind of institutional funding appears to enable independent research for better 
knowledge rather than being a service which could be commissioned on a market. It 
therefore seems likely to be non-economic in nature. 
Research co-operations have been described as „eye to eye‟ co-operations in 
which outcomes are shared fairly by providing the private partner with know-how 
and the researchers with publications. The project theme is decided upon between 
partners and researchers from both parties working together, often in the facilities of 
the universities. The details of such co-operations are agreed upon in contracts, in 
particular, who has ownership of which results. Sometimes co-operations are co-
financed through additional public funding. An interviewee from a South German 
university expressed that he is doubtful if it really is always a „win-win‟ situation, as 
the private partners are sometimes overly influential in deciding the direction of re-
search due to their financial investments and the involvement of their staff. They 
would also profit significantly from use of the infrastructure and from receiving the 
results. It is for this reason, as well as because the companies do not want their com-
petitors to know with whom they cooperate, that these co-operations are sometimes 
kept at a low profile. He considered this as being potentially at odds with the mis-
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sion of a university which involved disseminating research results and sharing re-
search experiences with students. PPPs are, according to the interviewees, co-
operations with the private sector for a longer term. They have been described as 
forums for intellectual exchange, common projects, reciprocal support and ad-
vancement to new areas. Such collaborations have framework agreements in place. 
Equally, they often receive additional public funding. UIFZ were described as inno-
vation centres with common infrastructure. Accordingly, they seem to be something 
in between PPPs and a cluster, sometimes with a special focus on entrepreneurs.  
All these forms of collaborations need to be assessed on a case by case basis as 
to the question of whether an economic activity is taking place. If the research is tak-
ing place freely with the aim of generating knowledge and disseminating it at a pre-
competitive stage and the universities have sufficient influence on the directions of 
research, the collaboration might be non-economic in nature. If essentially the coop-
erative project is conducting a research service for the private sector partner, if the 
partner gets to use the university infrastructure beyond the level necessary for the 
projects or receives all the IPRs, it might be of an economic nature. This did not 
necessarily seem to be clear to the interviewees. Whilst a few interviewees pointed 
out that a differentiation between economic and non-economic activities needs to be 
made and that it can be difficult, many interviewees seemed to assume that co-
operations are usually non-economic in nature (with which they also seemed to be 
more comfortable) and that in particular the involvement of additional public fund-
ing would automatically take the co-operation out of competition law. One inter-
viewee also said he assumed that the fact that one institution is particularly chosen 
because it might be the only university conducting a certain type of research, and 
therefore had no competitors, would mean that any involvement with them would 
not take place on a market. The interviewees in Munich seemed to be the most clear 
on the fact that this needs to be assessed for every individual activity. They pointed 
out that, in cases of doubt, they would assume it was an economic activity. In accor-
dance with the Research Framework they would only assume a non-economic co-
operation if both partners contributed equal amounts of work and when success and 
risks are shared and every partner owns their results. If one party retains all the re-
sults this would be an indicator of an economic activity and they would then apply 
full costs. However, while the Commission indeed declares in section 3.2.2. Re-
search Framework that under such conditions it does not consider a collaborative 
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project to constitute hidden state aid for the private sector partner, this does not nec-
essarily mean that in such a case no economic activity is taking place and that other 
provisions of competition law cannot apply.  
An-institut have been described by the interviewees as small entities which are 
independent, but with which the university keeps a close relationship and partly does 
cooperative research with. Often they are led by university academic staff, but with-
out the university having supervisory powers over the staff in their managerial ca-
pacity in the An-institut. Sometimes they were described as service sector compa-
nies, sometimes as public entities. Spin-offs and other start-ups were also described 
as independent companies in which the universities might have shares but in which 
private partners are also involved. Often they are led by, or employ, university staff 
and they also often receive additional public funding. It was recognised by the inter-
viewees that such entities need to differentiate between economic and non-economic 
activities. However, as they are independent entities, this was not necessarily re-
garded as a problem for the university. The universities could, however, conduct an 
economic activity, provided the external entity is doing so, through holding shares in 
them, through common projects as outlined above and by transferring IPRs to them.  
As has been previously mentioned, contract research is clearly an economic 
activity of which the interviewees were also very aware. According to the interview-
ees, companies prefer this way of co-operation because it allows them to keep all the 
research results and it is therefore most common among the various collaboration 
forms.  
5.5.3. Full costs 
The interviewees realised that full costing needed to be used in areas of eco-
nomic activity. The interviewees were also aware that the implementation period for 
full costs of the Research Framework has expired. As some of the interviewees ex-
plained, to enable a real full costing method, the universities would need to change 
from governmental accountancy (kameralistische Buchführung) to double entry 
book keeping (Doppelte Buchführung) which would allow them to simulate an eco-
nomic accounting system. This would, however, be both very difficult to achieve 
and a significant change for public accounting in universities in Germany. The uni-
versities were currently working on financially simulating a private sector company 
for the areas identified as economic in nature, using full costs for them and adding 
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VAT. However, none of the universities under scrutiny had, at the time of the inter-
views, implemented a real full costing methodology. Instead they were using over-
head rates in addition to direct costs which usually differed between subjects. Partly 
they were already able to prove the full costs for some of their activities the results 
of which had informed the overhead rates and they generally aimed at having real 
full costing systems in the future. Many stated that they often needed to sign a clause 
in agreements stating that they comply with state aid law. 
Full costing is, according to the interviewees, not defined by a common ap-
proach or guidelines at the federal level, in Bremen, Baden-Württemberg or Berlin. 
Bavaria seems to be the exception since a state working group has agreed a frame-
work of how to separate accounts and calculate costs which formed the basis for the 
individual models. Some interviewees stated that they exchange information about 
their methodologies/rates with other organisations and that the approach used 
needed to be approved by a certified accountant. The accountants would generally 
approve the approach/rate rather than the price for every individual contract. The 
information exchange and the approval required may, according to some interview-
ees, have led to similar approaches and rates because the accountants usually ap-
proved systems for a number of universities and it was easier to suggest using the 
same scheme. Also accountants may be worried that it could look „suspicious‟ if 
they approved rates which varied extensively between universities.  
Conflicts with competition law in this respect could mainly occur if an area is 
erroneously classified as non-economic and full costs are not used. This could 
amount to hidden state aid or competitors could challenge unreasonably low prices 
as being predatory pricing. Also, publicly funded research might potentially be eco-
nomic in nature and it would then not be sufficient that the public funder only covers 
the direct costs. Additionally, as many interviewees stated, the costing systems 
might not be completely sound yet. While the universities are currently working on 
this, it could in the meantime lead to unreasonable prices. Finally, if overhead rates 
are agreed upon between universities or are discussed to an extent beyond discussing 
which factors need to be included, this might potentially be regarded as anti-
competitive in itself. 
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5.5.4. Market foreclosure 
As in the other two countries, no signs of market foreclosure could be detected 
for research in Germany. 
5.5.5. Refusal to enter into contractual relations 
The interviewees stated that partners are usually found through relationships of 
the researchers and that it is also topic dependent (i.e. who works on the subject at 
all). Generally the universities would not have particular preferred partners nor ex-
clude certain entities as potential partners. Some interviewees talked about the 
knowledge transfer chain whereby a researcher has an invention, for which the uni-
versity gets an IPR, which then turns into a business idea and a spin-off in the re-
gion, ideally even in their own cluster. This would then be supported by receiving a 
preferential start-up license. Once it has grown, it offers internship opportunities, 
part time jobs for students and later employs graduates and gives research contracts 
to the university. Such a regional focus appears to be something that is theoretically 
aspired towards. However, this ideal chain would, according to the interviewees, 
rarely occur in practice because all sides will look globally for the best partners, es-
pecially in cutting-edge areas. In a focus group the issue was raised as whether co-
operation with two or more competitors would be possible. Although interviewees 
were themselves unsure, as they were yet to experience the situation, they assumed 
if a certain amount of secrecy was adhered to this should still be possible. However, 
this would need to be carefully considered with an eye to the public mission of the 
university to disseminate knowledge. The only situation interviewees described in 
which the choice of partners may be limited or certain partners (regional or SMEs) 
compulsory were collaborations receiving additional funding, since this may be re-
quired by the funding rules. The only influence the universities have in this respect 
is pre-call lobbying. An interviewee working on aspects of knowledge transfer stated 
that this, to a degree, influences their co-operations because they like to cooperate 
with partners with whom they will receive additional public funding since this 
makes co-operation more attractive for the private partners.  
The universities do not generally appear to anti-competitively exclude part-
ners. Limitations seem to only derive from the public funding rules which will be 
discussed below. Public regulations might also potentially be regarded as anti-
competitive if they are based on a recommendation by a committee of experts from 
- 209 - 
 
within the sector, unless the experts acted independently from interested undertak-
ings and suitable governmental review took place.652 The lobbying of, or advice for, 
the government regarding which areas to have calls in might potentially be viewed 
critically in this respect. Whilst it might also appear somewhat controversial that 
many co-operations are apparently based on personal relationships, this would 
probably not constitute a competition law infringement if no other potential partners 
are excluded, no preferential conditions are provided and full costing is adhered to. 
As one interviewee reported, the actual extent of relationships is also partly tested 
through questionnaires in order to avoid the impression of corruption or collusion.   
5.5.6. Non-economically justified or discriminatory contract conditions 
The interviewees explained that the universities try, as far as possible, to nego-
tiate the right to publish results and to use experiences to inform teaching. Further-
more, they would insist on the right of the researchers not to be obliged „to do any-
thing they do not want to do‟ which according to some interviewees is also foreseen 
by statute. Otherwise they do not generally have any conditions. The private sector, 
on the other hand, might prefer to keep certain things secret and to retain IPRs. The 
exact details are then always negotiated in agreements which can vary. An inter-
viewee from Bremen stated that he would find it helpful if they had standardised 
conditions or legislation prescribing details of university-private sector collaboration 
because the negotiations can prove very difficult and certain universities might give 
in more easily to private sector requests which provide them with a competitive ad-
vantage. Some interviewees mentioned that the rules of public funders might some-
times dictate conditions, for example, it might be required that the outcomes of a 
project will be brought to the market in the end and that this is done by an SME in-
volved in the co-operation. There might also be different funding rates depending on 
whether the SME wants to retain the IPR. Other programmes may be tailored to re-
gional co-operations. The universities themselves, in attempting to provide a good 
climate for entrepreneurs might offer special conditions in this respect, for example 
for spin-offs. 
                                                 
652 See C-185/91 Reiff para 14 seq on the question of when expert committees can be regarded as an 
anti-competitive collusion under Article 101 TFEU. See also case C-35/99 Arduino para 34-37. 
For more see also chapter 3 above. 
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From a competition law perspective, the condition that results should usually 
be made publicly accessible through publication or in teaching might technically 
qualify as „supplementary obligations‟ imposed by a collusion of HEIs or a domi-
nant HEI upon other undertakings, especially if they would be required in fixed con-
ditions or legislation. Such conditions, however, are likely to be exempted as SGEIs. 
Perhaps HEIs may also be able to use competition law against the private sector if it 
attempts to impose secrecy or other conditions upon them. Public funding rules 
might be more problematic. If the funded activity can be classified as economic in 
nature, rules providing advantages for certain undertakings or excluding certain un-
dertakings from a collaboration could be regarded as anticompetitive behaviour or as 
state aid. The same might be true for advantages provided by HEIs to start-ups if this 
happens selectively.   
5.5.7. Anti-competitive use of IPRs 
As mentioned in chapter 4 inventions belong, according to the Arbeitnehmer-
erfindungsgesetz which now also applies to HEIs, to the employer. The process in 
the universities is, according to the description of the interviewees, similar to the 
processes in the other two countries; researchers need to report inventions even if 
made in their spare time or while working in the private sector. The latter would, of 
course, be difficult to control, but such scenarios would also not occur that fre-
quently. Some interviewees said that this may have occurred more often in the past 
before Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz applied to HEIs. Inventions are then assessed 
as to their suitability for exploitation and an IPR (usually a patent) registered if ap-
plicable. The IPR is then sold or licensed to partners by contract which can take 
various forms from a patent pool and geographic licenses to having very small non-
exclusive patents. Occasionally funding rules, specific laws or ethical considerations 
would lead the universities to give licenses for free to certain organisations or to 
everyone who wants it. In this respect an interviewee from a South German univer-
sity described a project funded by a charity where the funding rules required that a 
license for a special food related invention would go to all third sector organisations 
who wanted it free of charge. The universities assign the right or licence it rather 
than exploiting it directly, except perhaps through a spin-off. They receive an in-
come of which the inventor and the relevant school get a share or they might hold 
equity in spin-offs which are often founded by the relevant researchers. Some of the 
universities under scrutiny use an exploitation company to transact IPRs. Generally, 
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IPR exploitation would still not be very common and could mostly be found in the 
natural and life sciences. Copyrights would, as mentioned in chapter 4, always re-
main with the author, although certain exploitation rights might be with the em-
ployer. 
In collaborations, universities have to negotiate IPR ownership and conditions 
which can, according to some interviewees, become rather tedious. It emerged from 
a focus group that large companies often want to receive all IPRs, register them 
themselves and keep them with related ones in „patent families‟. SMEs, on the other 
hand, are very keen to obtain the intellectual property without necessarily registering 
the right and they like to keep their research quite secretive until they have an actual 
product. Excepting contract research, where it is accepted that the partner gets the 
IPRs, the universities generally try to negotiate ownership of all the rights in order to 
be able to publish, use the knowledge in teaching, for financial benefits and to avoid 
state aid accusations. The latter aspects are more important in negotiations than the 
durations of licenses. Finally, funders may also have rules on the use of IPR.  
As explained above, the procedures of IPR exploitation in the universities as 
such would partly be of a non-economic and partly an economic nature. If the latter 
is the case, competition law problems might arise should universities offer special 
conditions or advantages to certain undertakings. However, there was no general 
indication for this, except for the afore-mentioned cases based on charitable consid-
erations. These could perhaps be regarded as non-economic in nature in the first 
place or, if considered as problematic from a competition law perspective, these 
cases are likely to be exempted as SGEIs. With regards to IPRs generated in col-
laborations, any economically unjustified limitations as to the use of generated IPRs 
could fall under competition law if an economic activity takes place. The universi-
ties insistence on being able to publicise the results may potentially be regarded as 
such but, again, might be exempted as an SGEI. When it comes to state aid law, 
whether or not the conditions of the Research Framework are fulfilled will have to 
be assessed on a case to case basis. In particular, universities may not transfer IPRs 
without receiving appropriate consideration. While some of the interviewees men-
tioned that they are aware of this provision and negotiate accordingly, there might 
still be a risk that this is not always assessed correctly by referring to public funding 
rules and the assumption by some universities that additional public funding auto-
matically makes a collaboration a non-economic activity.  
- 212 - 
 
5.5.8. Anti-competitive research co-operation 
As in the Netherlands, there did not seem to be any indication that research 
was begun at an unreasonably late stage which could be in breach of Article 101 (1) 
TFEU, as discussed in chapter 3.  
5.5.9. Market division 
Some interviewees mentioned that the universities do coordinate to an extent 
regarding rare subjects. Accordingly, one university might continue to teach and re-
search in one rare subject which another ceases to offer. The second might instead 
focus on another rare subject that the first university ceases to offer. This would be 
an economically more efficient use of decreasing resources. If there are economic 
activities within such a subject division and the „coordination‟ amounts to an agree-
ment or concerted practice this might constitute market division.  
5.5.10. Limiting Markets 
All interviewees stated that there are no quantitative restrictions to the amount 
of economic research their universities can conduct. Many interviewees expressed 
they would be concerned if too much economic research would be conducted be-
cause they did not regard this as the role of a university. They also pointed to the 
restriction inherent in the HRG, discussed in chapter 4, which states that there must 
still be sufficient capacity for research and teaching in the public interest. However, 
they also believed that the universities are still far removed from a stage where this 
would become a problem because universities have only started to generate private 
sector income and it does not yet account for a large percentage of all research. 
Limitation of markets, therefore, does not seem to be a problem in the universities 
under scrutiny and if, as some interviewees suggested, this should become necessary 
in the future to protect the capacity of public research and teaching as required by 
the HRG, this would probably be covered by the exemption in Article 106 (2) 
TFEU.  
5.5.11. Applying Altmark 
The interviewees explained that there is much variation between calls from 
public funders as to who can apply. Sometimes they are limited to universities and 
sometimes a consortium of partners is required and they may even stipulate what 
kinds of partners need to be involved. Within a call, the rules applicable to the indi-
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vidual partners might also vary. Universities might only be allowed to apply for di-
rect costs for their share of the research, while private partners apply with full cost, 
but do not get 100% of them funded. Non-HEI research organisations can only apply 
under limited conditions. Some calls would also be clearly marked as commission-
ing research, are open to industry and those who tender are specifically alerted to the 
state aid rules.  
If public calls constitute economic activities, they would need to be commis-
sioned according to the Altmark criteria which require them to be open to any will-
ing provider, including particularly foreign providers, and market rates or „full cost 
plus‟ need to be charged. While this is apparently the case with some calls which are 
also clearly marked as contract research, other calls could potentially also be classi-
fied as economic in nature. An interviewee working on legal aspects also pointed out 
that the university is sometimes just given research contracts and that they would not 
examine whether this should have been commissioned as they assume this to be the 
responsibility of the public authority. As the university would potentially have to 
pay back illegally obtained aid, this could, however, also put universities at risk. 
5.5.12. State aid through staff knowledge 
While, according to the interviewees, there are staff working in the private sec-
tor during research leave or a sabbatical and there are funding programmes for such 
staff transfers between the universities and the economic sector for a limited period 
of time, this is rather rare because, inter alia, a public interest in doing this has to be 
proven and that is difficult. It is more common, though not frequent, that members 
of staff have a side job in the private sector or work as entrepreneurs having estab-
lished their own companies out of the universities, often with the help of the univer-
sity or public funding initiatives. One interviewee, for example, mentioned state 
funding which pays half the salary of the member of academic staff to allow them to 
work part time in the start-up. Some interviewees mentioned that the universities 
may help through initially providing infrastructure or giving contracts to the start-
ups or spin-offs, but with a view to the companies eventually becoming economi-
cally self-sustainable. Often such support would be regarded as starting help without 
returns being required, but if the investments are more significant, the universities 
attempt to agree some kind of payback to be received in due course. The spin-
offs/start-ups could also be beneficial for the university because they may later in-
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volve them in common projects. Finally, PhD researchers would sometimes write 
their theses in co-operation with a company. In the latter case the companies would 
often pay a scholarship and direct costs which, according to one interviewee, allows 
them very cheap access to research results.  
The interviewees explained that if staff work in the private sector they have to 
notify the universities of the private sector role and its extent. For civil servants, ap-
proval must be sought which may be denied if there is a conflict of interest (i.e. if 
the work for the private sector is something which should be done in their main ac-
tivity). According to an interviewee working on business collaboration, this assess-
ment has been more relaxed in the past and has recently become more strict. Since 
the employers own any inventions, companies may try to argue that they own an 
IPR if it was made during the researcher‟s working time at the company. As men-
tioned above, the universities will, however, always argue that any invention should 
belong to them as the invention could not have been made without the experience 
made during staff‟s public sector work. In some universities this is contractually 
agreed and the Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz also supports this assessment. The 
private sector company may, however, get an option right towards receiving a li-
cense for the usual fee. As regards general experience and knowledge, staff can 
bring this freely into their private sector work without any further obstacles because 
the main focus here is the transfer of knowledge and the bringing of academic re-
sults to the market as actual products. 
Universities try to protect themselves from private sector exploitation of IPRs 
which could only be generated through the knowledge by seconded staff acquired in 
the universities. This would, however, obviously, require the universities being noti-
fied about IPRs which might not always be the case, since the universities rely on 
inventions being reported by employees. Furthermore, knowledge is being trans-
ferred beyond actual inventions leading to IPRs through staff or PhD students work-
ing in the private sector and, additionally, there are even public initiatives supporting 
this. While the creation of a spin-off by the universities itself and with the sole aim 
of reinvesting all income into the primary activities is regarded as a non-economic 
activity by the Commission, this might end if the spin-off becomes privately owned. 
Additionally, all knowledge transfer beyond this may potentially be regarded as state 
aid because the private sector company in question exclusively benefits from the re-
searchers knowledge and potentially from additional funding. 
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5.5.13. Exemptions  
As has been mentioned in the previous subchapters, it is impossible to make a 
general determination of the potential for exemption under Article 101 TFEU, be-
cause it depends too much on the individual cases and, with regards to BERs, on 
market shares. As in the other two countries, the amount of funding provided 
through public calls differs, according to the interviewees, significantly from a few 
thousand Euros to up to €8M per annum or even €20M per annum for institutional 
funding through the Excellence Initiative. As regards state aid, smaller projects 
could equally benefit from the de minimis rules, the exemptions in the GBER and 
the SGEI Decision. As in the Netherlands, the amounts of funding provided are 
higher than in England and, therefore, there is more scope for potential aid falling 
outside of the exemptions. However, such measures, if classified as infringing the 
state aid provisions, might then still be able to utilise Article 107 (3) TFEU as an 
exemption generally, which would need to be evaluated in the individual case ac-
cording to the guidelines in the Research Framework. 
5.5.14. SGEIs 
In addition to the exemptions mentioned in the last section, potential infringe-
ments might be exempted as SGEIs under the conditions mentioned above in the 
relevant section on England. The general opinion in the universities seemed to be 
that if the public funder decides to fund a project it is therefore in the general inter-
est. This would be particularly so since the main outline of the programmes would 
need to be agreed on by parliament and could be lobbied by researchers, even 
though a few interviewees said that they did not necessarily always agree with the 
funders‟ assessment of what was in the public interest. Research funded by the pri-
vate and third sectors was regarded by some as being in the funders‟ interest, even 
though this could simultaneously also be in the public interest. From these state-
ments, it thus seems as if the universities would pursue research in the public inter-
est as well as in particular interests. As has been mentioned above, it might require 
more than just such an interest, however, and clarity can only be achieved through a 
ruling by the Court. As regards the question of whether the SGEI is entrusted to the 
universities, the interviewees named the HRG, the respective state laws, the consti-
tution (with the academic freedom) and EU law, especially the Research Frame-
work, as acts entrusting universities with the task of research. However, they only 
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entrust them with research in general rather than with specific tasks which they 
might conduct as part of a research project. Potentially the grant agreements could 
be seen as such acts, though. Whether the application of competition law would ob-
struct a potential SGEI, whether this would be proportional and whether the devel-
opment of trade would be unduly effected, would depend on the individual case. 
5.5.15. Interim conclusion 
Since investments are high in Germany, the research funding situation was 
generally seen more positively compared to other countries. However, whilst generic 
and DFG funding remain the most important sources and these allow researchers to 
unfold their academic freedom, the increasing importance of steering calls was re-
garded as somewhat problematic. It was felt that universities suffer from a mission 
overload and that the current problems may lead to less innovation, the extinction of 
certain subjects and teaching and research separation. All interviewees were aware 
of competition law, however, the focus here was mainly the Research Framework 
and its requirements of full costs for economic activities. The interviewees all ex-
plained that their universities differentiated between economic and non-economic 
activities. However, this determination might potentially not always be in accor-
dance with competition law particularly since the involvement of public funding 
seemed to be regarded as automatically making an activity non-economic in nature.  
If areas are erroneously identified as non-economic and no full costs are ap-
plied, this could amount to state aid or be regarded as predatory pricing. Exchange 
about costing systems, depending on what kind of information is exchanged, could 
also be anti-competitive. Universities do not seem to prefer partners in an anti-
competitive way, even though public calls seem to sometimes require certain part-
ners. In addition to this, lobbying attempts for certain calls might potentially be re-
garded as anti-competitive. The universities under scrutiny also do not seem to im-
pose special duties, except, usually, a requirement to make results publicly accessi-
ble which, if regarded as anti-competitive, is likely to be exempted as an SGEI. If 
other undertakings require universities to act in a way they do not wish to act, they 
may also be able to use competition law to their advantage. Public funding rules as 
well as universities providing advantages for certain undertakings or excluding cer-
tain undertakings from a collaboration, could potentially be regarded as anticompeti-
tive behaviour or as state aid. The procedures of IPR exploitation in the universities 
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as such do not seem problematic from a competition law perspective. With regards 
to IPRs generated in collaborations, any economically unjustified limitations as to 
the use of generated IPRs could fall under competition law if an economic activity 
takes place. When it comes to state aid law, the conditions of section 3.2.2. Research 
Framework need to be adhered to in order to avoid state aid accusations. Problems 
with competition law could also occur, if universities divide workload along subject 
lines (some indication of which was found), if this amounts to an agreement or con-
certed practice in the area of an economic activity. Furthermore, if public calls are 
economic activities, they would need to be commissioned according to the Altmark 
criteria also allowing foreign and private providers to tender. Finally, special support 
for certain privately owned spin-offs or knowledge being transferred exclusively to 
one entity through staff working in the private sector, might potentially be regarded 
as state aid.  
As in the other two countries, there might be exemption possibilities depend-
ing on the individual case. However, the sums provided for public research are 
higher than in England and thus there is more potential for certain, potentially anti-
competitive, public calls to fall outside the scope of the de minimis, GBER and 
SGEI legislation. As in the other two countries, it might also more generally be pos-
sible to exempt potential breaches of competition law as SGEIs under Article 106 
(2) TFEU. As in the Netherlands, research is a statutory task, but the legislation es-
tablishing this might, in itself, not be precise enough to be regarded as an entrust-
ment act. This might, however, be achieved by the grant agreements. 
5.6. Conclusion 
The chapter has shown that when it comes to the overall estimation of the re-
search systems, the opinions of the interviewees differed. However, there were some 
common tendencies. In Germany there was a generally positive opinion of research 
funding, although the increasing importance of steering calls was regarded as some-
what problematic and it was felt that universities are suffering under a mission over-
load which could ultimately lead to less innovation, the extinction of certain subjects 
and a separation between teaching and research. The interviewees in the Nether-
lands, were more pessimistic as it was felt that public funding was shrinking and in-
creasingly concentrated on certain areas and for research with impact. This was seen 
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as causing tensions with academic freedom and as unduly limiting basic research. 
The problem of shrinking public funding, a strong focus on impact and concentra-
tion on certain institutions and areas, was expressed even more strongly in England. 
Whilst the interviewees in the latter country seemed to be understanding of the gov-
ernment‟s approach in general, it was said that it might be taken too far and that, 
academics especially, perceived this as creating unnecessary administrative hurdles 
and causing tensions with regards to academic freedom. In all three countries it was 
expected that the tendency towards more economically based approaches in research 
funding would continue.  
The awareness of competition law also differed in the three countries under 
scrutiny. Whilst the interviewees in Germany were very aware of the necessity to 
implement full costing methodologies according to the Research Framework, the 
Dutch interviewees and the relevant legislation presented a broader awareness of 
potential competition issues. The English interviewees, on the other hand seemed 
less aware of competition law themselves, but the policies followed seemed to have 
taken many aspects of potential issues into consideration. This seems to correspond 
with the fact that England has a more commercialised top-down system which might 
have required certain adaptations to happen early on whilst not necessarily commu-
nicating the reasons to employees at every level. The Netherlands, being a consocia-
tional system with a medium degree of commodification, are increasingly consider-
ing competition law and involving these legal aspects into the research offices. 
Germany, which has only taken the first steps towards commercialisation of HEI 
research, is only just coming to grasp with competition law implications. Thus far 
this is limited to the most pressing concern of full cost calculation of which the re-
search officers were, however, very aware drawing the distinction between eco-
nomic and non-economic activities independently.  
Generic public funding and most calls from public funders would probably be 
non-economic in all three systems. However, public funding which essentially is 
paid for a commissioned service, irrespectively of whether it is classified as a call or 
as the commissioning of a service, would be economic in nature. While contract re-
search, consultancy and similar activities are of an economic nature, the differentia-
tion between economic and non-economic activities would need to be made on an 
individual case basis in other collaborative forms with the private or third sector. 
These forms were relatively similar in the three countries. Whilst England and the 
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Netherlands have advanced costing methodologies which in themselves do not pose 
competition law issues, German universities appear to mainly still use overhead 
rates. Nevertheless, in all three countries it appeared as if there were cases which 
would need to be classified as economic in nature and where full costs plus profit 
were not charged which could potentially be regarded as state aid or predatory pric-
ing.  
Other potential constraints also seemed to be similar in the three countries. 
Universities do not seem to exclude partners unless, perhaps, due to ethical consid-
erations or the rules of funders which might be regarded as anti-competitive if ap-
plied in area of economic activity. In Germany one might also wonder if govern-
mental consultation of stakeholder when it comes to determining research agendas 
could be anti-competitive. Whilst it was also occasionally mentioned that lobbying 
took place in the other two countries, this appeared to take a less organised form. 
The universities in all three countries do not seem to impose any uneconomically 
justified contract conditions on partners, except perhaps for the requirement to allow 
them to publish. The latter if regarded as anti-competitive, could possibly be ex-
empted as an SGEI. If other undertakings require universities to act in a way they do 
not wish to act, they may also be able to use competition law to their advantage here. 
Generally, the procedures for IPR exploitation in the three countries seem to be un-
problematic from a competition law perspective. Only anti-shelving clauses, the 
limitation of sublicensing or subsidies to companies willing to exploit university 
IPRs might be regarded as anti-competitive, but at least the former could probably 
be exempted as SGEIs. In collaborations, universities would have to demand market 
prices for any rights the partner obtains or exploits and neither side may impose 
economically unjustified limitations as to the use of generated IPRs. An issue that 
only came up in England was the question of whether the topic of a research project 
as such might amount to an anti-competitive collaboration.  
There were also different degrees of potential market division. While this does 
not appear to be present in England, there was some division in Germany, even 
though this might not actually amount to collusion captured by Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. In the Netherlands, however, there seems to be a high degree of government 
supported concentration. Problems might occur in all three systems if public calls 
would need to be classified as economic in nature, but do not fulfil the Altmark crite-
ria. Finally, if advantages are conveyed to companies through staff knowledge (in 
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particular IPR creation), favourable contract conditions are given to staff owning 
companies or PhD students are essentially conducting a study for the private sector, 
this could potentially be regarded as anti-competitive. 
The assessment of the potential of exemptions would have to be made on an 
individual case basis. Regarding state aid, generally, many smaller projects in Ger-
many and the Netherlands and most projects in England (as the funding levels are 
lower), might be able to benefit from the de minimis rules, the GBER, if the corre-
sponding aid intensities are adhered to, or the SGEI Decision, if the projects could 
be classified as providing SGEIs. More generally, it might be possible to exempt 
some potential breaches as SGEIs under Article 106 (2) TFEU. The next and final 
chapter will connect these results to the overall situation of HEIs in Europe.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: European HEIs under EU law constraints 
6.1. Introduction  
This thesis has investigated EU law constraints on European HEIs. This was 
undertaken by firstly, explaining the traditional mission of European HEIs and situ-
ating European HEI policy within the context of European integration theories. The 
second chapter investigated the position of HEIs in European policy and the poten-
tial of spill-over from other provisions of EU law in overview. It has been shown 
that there is a tendency towards commodification of HEIs, inter alia, influenced by 
research and education policies at the European level. Nevertheless, despite increas-
ing EU level activity in these policy areas, the main competences for research and 
education remain with the Member States. At the same time, however, their policy 
choices have to comply with directly applicable EU law which might cause con-
straints potentially leading to further commodification. In order to illuminate this 
further the following chapters were dedicated to studying this more specifically for 
the area of competition law. As a first step in this endeavour chapter 3 investigated 
potential EU competition law constraints on HEIs from a legal doctrinal perspective. 
Chapter 4 then prepared the empirical study by outlining the research systems in 
three countries selected on the basis of their different degrees of HEI commodifica-
tion. This was followed by chapter 5 where the methodology of the empirical study 
was explained and the results reported. This last chapter will integrate the results 
from all previous chapters highlighting potential consequences and setting these into 
the wider context. 
6.2. The comparative socio-legal project 
The contribution of this thesis lies in its unique combination of legal doctrinal 
and empirical research. The interdisciplinary approach chosen related the discussion 
of EU law constraints from potential spill-over of constitutionalised provisions of 
EU law to European integration theory explaining the theoretical foundations of 
such potential spill-over. Furthermore, it linked the discussion of EU law constraints 
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on HEIs to the discussion on the position of HEIs in Europe which takes place more 
widely in other disciplines such as political science and education studies,653 but had 
received only limited attention from a legal studies perspective. One of its most im-
portant contributions, however, is the in-depth legal doctrinal analysis of potential 
EU competition law constraints on HEIs in chapter 3, a thus-far largely unexplored 
area.  
Furthermore, the project included a comparative empirical study to test the 
findings of the legal doctrinal analysis on the systems of HEI research in three 
Member States chosen on the basis of their varying degree of commodification. As 
part of this study the research systems of England, the Netherlands and Germany 
have been detailed and doctrinally tested for their vulnerability to EU competition 
law in chapter 4. This has then been complemented by an empirical phase in which 
the potential problems were tested against realities described by experts in research 
offices in a variety of universities chosen from three categories established on the 
basis of age and international ranking positions. To test the potential problems a 
novel framework had been developed based on the results of the general competition 
law analysis in chapter 3 as well as on the results of the tentative competition analy-
sis for the three countries in chapter 4. Additionally, the interviewees were also 
questioned as to their awareness of competition law and on other constraints they 
might experience or foresee. The developed methodology of the empirical study and 
the results are presented in chapter 5.  
The results of the thesis which are brought together in the following sections 
are thus not only drawn from legal doctrinal analysis, but are also based on the reali-
ties of research funding in the institutions studied. Therefore, although the qualita-
tive study was not representative, it does provide some insight into the problems 
universities face in the three countries. This is not only interesting from an academic 
point of view, but might also make policy makers and professionals in HEIs in the 
three countries aware of the potential consequences of the current developments. 
Additionally, the results and, in particular good practices, could be utilised by policy 
makers in other countries and at the EU level in order to circumvent potential prob-
                                                 
653 See those cited in chapter 1 and 2, for example, Allen (n 9), Clark (n 14), McKelvey and Holem 
(n 5), Enders and de Weert (n 5), Palfreyman and Tapper (n 5), Corbett (n 100). 
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lems in future policy settings. As such the findings have relevance beyond the uni-
versities under scrutiny.  
6.3. European HEIs and EU law 
As shown in chapter 1 and 2, European HEIs were first established in the Mid-
dle Ages as centres of learning and teaching which were later nationalised and, in 
the Humboldtian era, succumbed to a strong research mission. In recent decades 
HEIs have, again, undergone changes due to the introduction of mass higher educa-
tion, increasing commodificaton and a stronger focus on internationalisation. The 
latter two trends have not gone unnoticed by policy makers at the EU level who 
originally had not concerned themselves with HEIs as the European project had 
started as an economic integration endeavour and the economic value of HEIs had 
not been initially apparent. At the same time, potentially due to the important value 
of HEIs in national culture and them being maintained by public funding, the Mem-
ber States seemed reluctant to provide far reaching competences to the EU level and 
only equipped them with a supplementary competence in education and a shared 
competence in research, the latter only having been extended recently with the 
Treaty of Lisbon. These limited consequences did not lead to, and in the case of 
education, indeed, explicitly prohibited, harmonisation. As this, nevertheless, ap-
peared to have been desired (to a certain extent), the Member States in cooperation 
with European third countries agreed on the Bologna Process for the harmonisation 
of higher education systems. Research and the role of HEIs for the „knowledge 
based economy‟ has become increasingly important in the framework of the Lis-
bon/Europe 2020 Strategy with which the FPs will soon be streamlined as Horizon 
2020. These soft law mechanisms have attracted a variety of criticisms including the 
legal and democratic concerns of the Bologna Process pointed out by Garben.654  
At the same time, HEIs need to comply with other seemingly unrelated directly 
applicable provisions of EU law such as those on Union citizenship, the fundamental 
freedoms, competition and state aid. These, as neo-functionalism explains, may 
spill-over and influence national policy concepts on HEIs. This assumption seems to 
have already been proven true by the citizenship cases of Austria and Belgium, dis-
                                                 
654 Garben (n 6).  
- 224 - 
 
cussed in chapter 2, despite the Court having accepted concerns about the health 
care system as a justification in Bressol.655 The possibility of HEIs coming within 
the ambit of the more economic free movement provisions or competition and state 
aid law increases with ongoing commodification and might in turn require even fur-
ther commodification. In the cases Schwarz, Jundt and Neri656 the fundamental free-
doms have already been applied to educational activities and required tax changes in 
national policy in the former two and a change in diploma recognition policy in the 
latter.   
As regards EU competition and state aid law, there have yet to be any EU level 
cases regarding HEIs. As explained in chapter 3, for these provisions to be applica-
ble to HEIs the latter would need to conduct an economic activity.657 The Commis-
sion recognised in Decision 2006/225/EC658 and in the Communication on state aid 
and SGEI659 that „public institutions can also offer educational services which, due 
to their nature, financing structure and the existence of competing private organisa-
tions, are to be regarded as economic‟.660 In the Research Framework661 the Com-
mission provided guidance as to when research amounts to an economic activity. 
Accordingly, in particular, „independent R&D for more knowledge and better under-
standing‟ is a non-economic activity, while, in particular, „supplying services to 
business undertakings or performing contract research‟ are activities of an economic 
nature.  
Whilst the application of the competition rules might occasionally aid „con-
sumers‟ (students) or HEIs themselves, there are situations where they might have a 
detrimental effect. The scholarship scheme which was challenged as price fixing in 
an US American case662 might be such an example, even though a compromise was 
found in the end and the case settled. It might also be conceivable that competition 
                                                 
655 Cases C-147/03 Commission vs Austria, C-65/03 Commission vs Belgium and C-73/08 Bressol. 
656 Cases C-76/05 Schwarz, C-281/06 Jundt and C-153/02 Neri. 
657 C-41/90 Höfner para 21. 
658 Decision 2006/225/EC (n 210).  
659 Communication on state aid and SGEIs (n 210).  
660 Ibid para 28. 
661 See above n 8. 
662 United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91-CV-3274.  
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law will require national bodies distributing study places to be opened to institutions 
from other Member States of which the systems might not be capable. As regards 
research HEIs must, in particular, demand full costs in areas of economic activity to 
avoid state aid accusations. Furthermore, accounts must be strictly separated and 
public funders might have to commission research if it had to be regarded as eco-
nomic in nature.  
While some663 have argued that the General Court‟s approach in BUPA664 
might indicate some leniency of the EU institutions towards areas of primary re-
sponsibility of the Member States, it is the NCAs who are now investigating most 
competition law cases and the national cases on educational institutions discussed in 
chapter 3 seem to indicate that they are not reluctant to open proceedings. If HEIs 
would have to pay fines for the infringement of competition law, the question would 
also arise how or by whom these would be paid. On the other hand, strict compli-
ance with the competition rules might commercialise the activities of HEIs even fur-
ther. For example, if HEIs cannot fix tuitions fees at a low level, less well-off stu-
dents might not be able to get into certain universities and if HEIs have to compete 
on a full cost level, those located in parts of the country with higher salary levels or 
those owning antique buildings would have a competitive disadvantage which they 
could not rationalise in a way private companies could whilst at the same time re-
taining their heritage and traditions. There are, of course, still exemption possibili-
ties for infringements of competition law under Article 101 (3), 107 (2) and (3) and 
under Article 106 (2) TFEU. These might, however, not capture every situation and, 
in any case, it might make the conduct of HEIs increasingly complicated from a le-
gal/administrative perspective.  
6.4. Competition law constraints on research in Germany, the Neth-
erlands and England 
The research systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK differ in a vari-
ety of ways. The UK is a devolved state with four separate countries. England, 
which has been the focus of attention, is organised in a centralised and top-down 
                                                 
663 Hatzopoulos (n 179) p. 236 seq. 
664 T-289/03 BUPA. 
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fashion with strong elements of a liberal market economy. The UK‟s research 
spending has been relatively stable and below 2% of its GDP over the last ten years. 
The private sector provides less than 50% of all research funding which, neverthe-
less, makes the sector the largest funder. Whilst the public sector is the second larg-
est funder, as in the other two systems, the UK relies to a larger extent on foreign 
funding. HEIs are by far the most important public research organisations in regards 
to which England is, in comparison with the other two countries, most progressed on 
the path towards commercialisation. 
The Netherlands are a centrally governed, yet consociational system. Research 
spending has fluctuated, but has now reached its highest level over the last ten years 
with 2.16% of its GDP. The private sector is the largest research funder and conduc-
tor, followed by the public sector which contributes slightly more than a third of all 
research funding. Foreign and third sector spending plays a smaller role than in Eng-
land. While publicly funded research is mainly conducted by the 14 universities, 
there are also a variety of other research organisations including many collaborative 
organisations. The Netherlands have equally begun to introduce steps towards a 
more commercial system, but, as some interviewees expressed, they are some years 
behind England in this endeavour.  
Germany is characterised by a strong constitutional protection of academic 
freedom. As a federal republic, the states as well as the federal level play a role in 
devising research polices and providing research funding. Research spending is 
comparably high and has increased consistently over the last decade nearly meeting 
the 3% target of the Europe2020 Strategy. The private sector is by far the biggest 
contributor of funding most of which is, however, also used for research conducted 
by the private sector. Publicly funded research is undertaken in four major non-HEI 
research organisations with clearly defined tasks and in HEIs. While these are still 
significantly publicly funded, first steps towards commodification have recently 
been introduced.  
In Germany and the Netherlands, a large amount of public funding for HEIs is 
still provided generically without recourse to competitive factors such as perform-
ance or focus on government priorities. As generic HEI funding is a state compe-
tence in the former it differs between states if performance indicators are used at all 
and, if yes, to what extent. In the Netherlands, consecutive governments have tried 
- 227 - 
 
to make generic funding allocation more reliant on performance indicators which, 
however, has continually been prevented by the universities. In England the RAE 
systematically involved research quality and soon the REF will also measure impact. 
In all three systems non-generic funding (public as well as non-public) has increas-
ingly gained in importance. While all three countries offer open public competitive 
funding, themed calls and priority areas have started to play a significant role and 
non-public funding is dependent on the intentions of the funder. The increase of 
such funding methods might thus pose a threat for purely curiosity driven research 
and academic freedom. Due to increasing non public funding and EU requirements, 
all three countries have begun to introduce full costing methods. While this is well 
developed in England where TRAC fEC has been systematically introduced, the in-
troduction has taken place later in the Netherlands and every university has found its 
own system. In Germany many universities still do not have real full cost method-
ologies and are using overhead rates instead. Despite the differences regarding the 
introduction of full cost methods, universities in all three systems seem to struggle to 
actually receive funding at full cost levels from many funders.  
While the interviewees in England generally seemed to understand the idea 
that publicly funded research needs to be justified as to its use for society, it was ex-
pressed that current policy with shrinking public funding, its focus on impact and 
priority areas and concentration of funding might be taking this too far and that es-
pecially academics perceived this as creating unnecessary administrative hurdles and 
causing tensions with academic freedom. The interviewees in the Netherlands 
equally felt that public funding was shrinking and increasingly concentrated on cer-
tain areas and research with impact. This was regarded as causing tensions with aca-
demic freedom and limit basic research unduly. Interviewees in Germany generally 
saw the research funding situation more positively, as investments are high. How-
ever, some regarded the increasing importance of steering calls as problematic when 
it comes to academic freedom and it was felt that universities are suffering from a 
mission overload which could ultimately lead to less innovation, the extinction of 
certain subjects and a separation between teaching and research. Many also felt that 
the growing importance of non-generic funding combined with the fact that such 
funding is mostly not provided at full costs levels, financially punishes successful 
institutions. In all three countries it was expected that the tendency towards more 
economic approaches in research funding would continue. 
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The awareness of competition law as a potential constraint for HEIs differed in 
the three countries under scrutiny. While the awareness of the interviewees in Ger-
many seemed to focus on the necessity to implement full costing methodologies ac-
cording to the Research Framework, the Dutch interviewees and the relevant legisla-
tion presented a broader awareness of potential competition law issues. The English 
interviewees, on the other hand, seemed less aware of competition law themselves, 
but the policies followed seemed to have taken many aspects of potential issues into 
consideration. This seems to correspond with the fact that England has a more com-
mercialised top down system which might have required certain adaptations earlier 
while not necessarily communicating the reasons to staff in research offices. The 
Netherlands, being a consociational system with a medium degree of commodifica-
tion, are increasingly considering competition law involving these legal aspects into 
the research offices. Germany, which only took first steps towards commercialisa-
tion of HEI research, is only coming to grips with the competition law implications. 
Thus far this is limited to the most pressing concern of full cost calculation of which 
the research officers were, however, very aware, drawing the distinction between 
economic and non-economic activities independently.  
From a competition law perspective research conducted freely financed from 
generic public funding in all three systems would probably not fall under EU com-
petition law as it constitutes „independent R&D for more knowledge and better un-
derstanding‟665 and it is difficult to imagine how this could be replicated under mar-
ket conditions. Competitive public calls equally would probably not amount to an 
economic activity if they are completely open or just establishing a broad area of 
research. According to the interviewees, this appears to be the case for most public 
calls. There also appear to be calls in all systems which are very specific, essentially 
prescribing a service for which a provider is sought and which could be commis-
sioned under market conditions. The latter could amount to economic activity and 
partly such research is also officially procured. A similar distinction would need to 
be drawn for third sector funding or private philanthropical contributions. The forms 
of private sector collaboration are quite similar in the three systems. Some research 
funded by the private sector, such as contract research, consultancy or renting out 
infrastructures would have to be regarded as economic in nature. With other forms 
                                                 
665 Research Framework section 3.1.1. 
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of private sector collaboration such as research co-operations, private funding of 
academic staff or PhD researchers the lines are less clear cut and the distinction 
would have to be made on a case by case basis by asking if the research is amount-
ing to a service which could be conducted under market conditions. The Issue Pa-
per666 seems to confirm the latter by pointing out that mere labelling of an activity as 
collaborative research does not necessarily make this non-economic in nature. As 
regards the exploitation of IPRs, the Commission in the Research Framework and 
the Issue Paper determines that this is of a non-economic nature if the exploitation is 
managed internally, the IPR arose from a non-economic area of research and the 
knowledge transfer is non-exclusive. One could thus assume that if venture capital 
firms are brought on-board in spin-offs, this might become economic. Furthermore, 
IPR generated as part of economic research activities and exclusive arrangements 
could amount to an economic activity.  
Whilst the advanced full costing systems in England and the Netherlands 
themselves do not pose competition law issues, the overhead rates used in Germany 
could potentially cause constraints, if they did not capture the actual full costs and 
thus left room for state aid and predatory pricing. Furthermore, exchange about cost-
ing systems, depending on what information is being exchanged or commonly set 
rates, might be regarded as price fixing. More importantly, universities in all three 
systems do not necessarily appear to be charging full costs plus profit in areas of 
economic activity which could constitute state aid. Additionally, it was often men-
tioned that companies (supported by academics which are not necessarily aware of 
the implications), seem to try to agree on prices below full cost plus profit levels. 
Finally, it has been mentioned in England that some universities would consciously 
try to undercut prices to gain research contracts to the detriment of others (universi-
ties or other research providers) which are unable or unwilling to do so. The latter 
could be regarded as predatory pricing.  
While the exclusion of partners from economic forms of collaboration might 
be regarded as anti-competitive, there were generally no signs of this in the three 
systems except for ethical considerations or funders rules. In Germany, one might 
also wonder if governmental consultation of stakeholders when it comes to deter-
                                                 
666 See above n 215.  
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mining research agendas could be anti-competitive. In the other two countries lobby-
ing research funders or policy makers also seemed to take place, but to a less organ-
ised extent which might thus be less likely to cause constraints. The universities in 
all three countries do not seem to impose any economically unjustified contract con-
ditions on partners, except perhaps for the requirement to allow publication. The lat-
ter is unlikely to be regarded as anti-competitive in the first place and if so could 
probably be exempted as SGEI. As regards IPR exploitation the universities in all 
three systems generally do not seem to act anti-competitively. Occasionally, condi-
tions such as anti-shelving clauses or the limitation of sublicensing could be re-
garded as unduly limiting the companies behaviour and thus as anti-competitive or 
subsidies to companies willing to exploit university IPRs might be regarded as state 
aid. However, it might be assumed that at least the former could potentially be ex-
empted as SGEI. When it comes to the exploitation of IPRs generated as part of a 
co-operation, the Research Framework determines that market prices have to be paid 
for those which are retained by the private sector partner which generally seems to 
be the case in the universities under scrutiny. 
In England one interviewee mentioned that the topic of an envisaged co-
operation was to increase the market share of a certain company. In this respect one 
might wonder if the topic as such makes this co-operation anti-competitive, as it 
could be regarded as state aid. In Germany and the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
there were signs for potential market division. While division of the subject market 
in Germany might not actually amount to an agreement or concerted practice under 
Article 101 (1) TFEU, market division seems rather common in the Netherlands and 
is officially supported by the government which might become problematic. Prob-
lems might occur in all systems if the Altmark criteria are not adhered to when the 
state is commissioning economic research. As the eligibility criteria appear to differ 
between calls and funder, this would need to be assessed on a case by case basis. 
Finally, if advantages are being given to companies through staff knowledge, in par-
ticular IPR creation, favourable contract conditions given to staff owning companies 
or PhD students essentially conducting a study for the private sector, this could po-
tentially be regarded as anti-competitive. In Germany protection against this ap-
peared to be highest by, in particular, prescribing that any IPRs created in such a re-
lationship would belong to the universities, whilst in England especially certain ex-
ternally funded PhD studies seemed questionable.  
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The assessment of potential exemptions would have to be made on a case by 
case basis. As regards state aid, generally, many smaller projects in Germany and 
the Netherlands and most projects in England (as the funding levels are lower), 
might be able to benefit from the de minimis rule, the GBER, if the corresponding 
aid intensities are adhered to, or the SGEI Decision, if the projects could be classi-
fied as providing SGEIs. More generally, it might be possible to exempt some po-
tential breaches as SGEIs under Article 106 (2) TFEU. However, for this there 
would need to be an entrustment act. While there is legislation making research a 
statutory task in Germany and the Netherlands, this legislation might be too general 
to fulfil the requirements for entrustment acts set out by the Commission.667 In that 
case, entrustment acts might be seen in the actual call or agreement. 
6.5. Constraints faced by the HEI sector  
Whilst the results of the empirical study, of course, just give an impression (as, 
being a qualitative study of a small number of universities, the study cannot be rep-
resentative for all HEIs in Europe), the observation of the interviewees mentioned 
earlier do match the general tendency towards commodifaction regarding HEIs ex-
amined generally in chapter 1 and for the three systems in chapter 4. This tendency 
has been reinforced through EU policy on HEIs,668 especially regarding research 
policy which will be even more strongly pronounced in Horizon 2020.669 The con-
sequences (beyond potential legal consequences) have been analysed and been re-
garded critically by many, often in line with what the interviewees expressed. En-
ders, for example, assumes an increase in productivity (measured in publications and 
patents). At the same time, he also assumes that the relative homogeneity of (in his 
analysis German) universities will change towards more differentiation and that 
there will be a stronger divide or even competition between research and teaching.670 
Jansen also sees the differentiation amongst HEIs, especially the concentration of 
resources in already strong HEIs as problematic, as these strong HEIs make it in-
                                                 
667 See the secondary legislation in n 340-343. 
668 See also Garben (n 101) p. 6, 20 seq.  
669 See further DJ Beech, 'The European Research Area: Beyond Market Politics' Europe of Knowl-
edge (5 October 2013) http://era.ideasoneurope.eu/2013/10/05/the-european-research-area-
beyond-market-politics/ accessed 7 October 2013. 
670 Enders (n 365) p. 27 with further references.  
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creasingly difficult for others to survive and for newcomers to enter the „market‟. 
Furthermore, Jansen points to the fact that certain areas of research are more fa-
voured than others and that this will affect the directions of research traditionally 
decided autonomously by the researchers.671 Schubert and Schmoch as well as 
Albrecht fear that while research might become more economically efficient, the 
market-like structures could lead to subjects regarded as less relevant dying out and 
a strong tendency towards applied research, which might restrict future long term 
innovation.672  
This tendency might actually go so far that basic curiosity driven research be-
comes a luxury that needs to be earned as advocated by De Fraja673 who develops a 
model where HEIs are to receive a governmental block grant for which they need to 
conduct a certain amount of applied research. Only if funding remains after having 
done so, they may use the surplus for basic research. If the „social value of applied 
research is sufficiently high‟674 HEIs can receive more funding for additional ap-
plied research which will, however, always be provided below full-cost levels and 
thus require HEIs to match. The latter is to encourage HEIs to also use their „sav-
ings‟ for applied research as that would be co-funded whilst basic research would 
not. This model seems precarious not only because of the overwhelming limitation 
of basic research, but also from a competition law perspective as it is generally ad-
vocating to „“co-fund” […] in contrast to the “cost-plus” approach‟675 without dif-
ferentiating between economic and non-economic activities.  
Another worrying aspect is the increasing use of targeted calls imposing cer-
tain research themes currently deemed relevant, as this seems to infringe the aca-
demic freedom. In Germany, where academic freedom is even to be found in the 
human rights catalogue, one might wonder if such developments might at some 
point become unconstitutional. Furthermore, one might wonder more generally if 
such steering policies are steering in the right direction and if short term political 
                                                 
671 Jansen (n 372) p. 45 seq.  
672 Schubert and Schmoch (n 533) p. 252 seq and Albrecht (n 536) p. 8 seq. 
673 G De Fraja, 'A Theoretical Analysis of Public Funding for Research' (2011) 31 University of 
Leicester Department of Economics Working Paper.  
674 Ibid p. 4. 
675 Ibid p. 4. 
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goals should be imposed upon academic research which develops over decades 
rather than until the next election, as this might, again, hinder innovation long-term. 
After all, as  eech phrases it, „scientists throughout European history have tradition-
ally been driven in their work by curiosity […] [and] it is this blind and often seren-
dipitous pursuit of knowledge that has been behind many of the greatest scientific 
breakthroughs of the modern world‟.676 Additionally, the research by Leisyte, En-
ders and De Boer might question the effectiveness of steering policies, as their em-
pirical research suggests that creative proposal writing allows researchers to do the 
research they would have done anyway just with a much higher administrative ef-
fort.677 
Some interviewees had also pointed to the negative effects on employment 
situations and opportunities for early career researchers. Accordingly, it was often 
easier to hire external companies than employing a research assistant for short term 
assistance and funding opportunities for post-docs are rare which leads young re-
searchers to leave academia. These concerns link to a general divide between man-
agement and academic staff as mentioned in an interview by Sally Hunt.678 This is 
problematic as HEIs as institutions are fundamentally different in nature to busi-
nesses. It is difficult for them to rationalise in the same way private companies could 
and to remain true to their mission and history. Increasingly commercialised re-
search might also be questionable as it might hinder free, unbiased innovation. An 
example would be the increasing focus on generating intellectual property when the 
use of patent law as an incentive to innovate has generally been questioned.679 As 
regards non-public funding there is, additionally, the concern about conflict of inter-
est. Friedman and Richter,680 for example, found a strong correlation between con-
                                                 
676 Beech (n 669). 
677 Leisyte, Enders and De Boer (n 456).  
678 K Catcheside, 'The growing divide between academic, administrative and management staff' 
guardian.co.uk (23 June 2011) http://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/higher-
education-network-blog/2011/jun/23/ucu-sally-hunt-academic-admin-divide accessed 11 July 
2011. 
679 S Thambisetty, 'Why Patent Law Doesn't Do Innovation Policy ' (2013) 20 LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers.  
680 LS Friedmann and ED Richter, 'Relationship Between Conflict of Interest and Research Results' 
(2004) 19 JGIM 51. 
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flict of interest (i.e. financial relationships with companies)681 and publication of 
findings in favour of said companies in their study on medical research and Lem-
mens and Dupont have pointed to the questionability of commercial cooperation in 
the alcohol or illegal drug business.682  
Whilst the above was focussed on constraints regarding research in HEIs, as 
this aspect was the focus of this thesis, there are also questionable points in the 
commercialisation of the education aspect of HEIs, some of which have been dis-
cussed in chapter 1.683 The legal constraint arising from EU law discussed previ-
ously which both aspects might face might reinforce the commodification tenden-
cies. This might get to the point where HEIs even have to comply with international 
trade laws such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which, again, might 
have unforeseen consequences and could further commodification. 
6.6. Towards an EU level HEI policy beyond economic integration  
As mentioned in chapter 1, European integration began as an economic inte-
gration project, as it was assumed that this would automatically also lead to „an in-
crease in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer rela-
tions between the states belonging to it‟ (Article 2 EEC). If, however, economic in-
tegration was seen as a means to an end in that sense, there is no necessity to limit 
EU law to economic competences.684 Additionally, even when insisting on narrow 
boundaries for integration, these are hard to be contained, as integrated areas tend to 
spill-over with unforeseeable and possibly undesirable consequences. Having ana-
lysed 244 cases as to their challenges for economic and social integration from a pe-
riod of seven years, Schiek observes that „a slight bias in favour of economic free-
doms emerges in the frequency with which economic freedoms prevail over either 
                                                 
681 For the exact definition used see ibid p. 52. 
682 P Lemmens and H Dupont, '"Onder invloed": is samenwerking met commerciële partijen te 
verantwoorden?' (2012) 3 Verslaving 66. 
683 In the English discourse where the student is now „at the heart of the system‟ the effects of such a 
customer-provider relationship have also been raised in the popular debate. See, for example, S 
Coughlan, 'Is the student customer always right?' BBC News (28 June 2011) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-13942401 accessed 11 July 2011. 
684 Schiek (n 45) in particular chapter 1 (p. 13-52) and 5 (p. 216 seq). 
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national policy or social policy‟.685 She thus concludes that it becomes increasingly 
impractical to limit the social to the national level while the economic is being effi-
ciently integrated.686 
From what has been set out above, this seems particularly true in the area of 
HEIs. Not only might the application of directly applicable EU law deconstruct na-
tional policy concepts, but also the concerns about the Bologna Process and the Lis-
bon/Europe 2020 Strategy set out in chapter 2 would advocate for a coherent policy 
at the supranational level.687 Furthermore, as the attempts of the Commission to 
combine the aims of competition law and the increasing commodification of re-
search policies encouraged by the Lisbon/Europe 2020 Strategy in the Research 
Framework688 show, the balancing between letting activities fall under EU law and 
exempting them if regarded necessary (as many of them have previously been en-
couraged by the EU‟s own policy), makes the whole area immensely complicated 
and uncertain. Finally, there is some indication that the European citizens are un-
happy with the current developments towards ever more commodification of public 
services in general and of HEIs in particular. Regarding the former, the first Euro-
pean citizen initiative to ever succeed in collecting the necessary number of signa-
tures which requires halting privatisation of water supply and sanitation689 can be 
seen as an example. As regards the latter, the protests against Bologna style reforms 
and the critical voices in academic writing mentioned in chapter 2 as well as what 
many interviewees expressed indicates that stakeholders are equally unhappy with 
the current development of European policies on HEIs.690 In addition, the abolish-
ment of tuition fees by the state government in Bavaria after a successful citizen ini-
                                                 
685 Ibid p. 213.  
686 Ibid p. 242. 
687 Similar Garben (n 101). See also Prosser 2005 (n 147) who generally points to the problem of 
hard law integration in more economic areas (there competition law) versus soft law integration 
in the area of public services.  
688 The Research Framework provides extensive and complicated guidance as to where the line be-
tween desired more commercial activities and state aid needs to be drawn, as the measures in 
question such as cooperation with the private sector, a focus on SME and exploitation of results 
have often been encouraged by the EU‟s own policy. Currently, the Research Framework is be-
ing redrafted assessing these guidelines and some aspects in the Research Framework are found 
in the revised drafts of the GBER. 
689 Tagesschau.de, 'Eine Million Bürger gegen private Wasserversogung' Tagesschau.de (11 
February 2013) http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/wassernetze100.html 12 February 2013.  
690 Similar as regards the future of the European Research Area Beech (n 669). 
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tiative on the matter at state level691 can be named as an example of public discon-
tent with the commodification of HEIs.  
Even though, as mentioned in chapter 1, a currently negative attitude towards 
the EU might make this difficult, an alternative more coherent policy for HEIs at the 
supranational level thus might seem timely. Garben692 has, for example, explored 
various options and, while remaining doubtful that a stronger primary law compe-
tence can be achieved, suggested alternative measures for „a stronger base in EU 
law‟ for education. In the area of competition law Swennen has raised the question 
as to whether competition law as a whole should be differently drafted, as currently 
it conceivably favours a specific kind of undertaking. In a completely different com-
petition law the problems arising from application on public services might become 
irrelevant.693 Currently, the Research Framework is, as has been mentioned in chap-
ter 3, being redrafted and some aspects contained in the current Research Frame-
work can be found in the draft of the revised GBER. Considering that, as set out in 
chapter 3, the Commission in various documents indicates that HEIs might for part 
of their activity fall under EU competition law; one might more generally wonder if 
there would also be scope for a BER specifically for HEIs.  
While it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to offer a solution as to how 
to legislate HEIs at the supranational level and therefore this question will have to be 
left to future research, a few points to be taken into consideration can be made. In 
developing stronger EU policies the question of in how far these could be regarded 
as lex specialis to other areas of EU law would need to be addressed to avoid strate-
gies, laws and policies to conflict. Given the problems identified as regards com-
modification of HEIs and the mentioned critical voices, an alternative direction 
might be considered consulting stakeholders and allowing public debate. Addition-
ally, it might be desirable to decrease the administrative efforts involved in applying 
for EU research funding if truly efficient research is envisaged, as currently, as some 
interviewees mentioned, these have deterred researchers from applying. Whilst it has 
                                                 
691 BR.de, 'Langtag schafft Studiengebühren ab' BR.de (24 April 2013) 
http://www.br.de/nachrichten/studiengebuehr-landtag-100.html accessed 25 April 2013.  
692 Garben (n 70) p. 184 seq, Garben (n 101) p. 24 seq.  
693 Swennen (n 3) p. 279. 
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already been planned to increase the budget for Horizon 2020694 and research and 
innovation in contrast to the EU budget in general seem to be an area for which there 
is a willingness to invest,695 there might be the necessity for even further research 
funding, as, if the impression gained from the interviewees is more widely true, 
many HEIs are increasingly looking towards Europe for research funding.696  
6.7. Final conclusion 
This work has assessed EU law constraints on HEIs. It has used a socio-legal 
approach including an empirical study by, first, placing the legal assessment in the 
wider context of the historical mission of HEIs and of European integration theory. 
It has then assessed the political and legal situation of HEIs in Europe before con-
ducting a comprehensive competition law analysis, a thus far largely unexplored 
area. The research systems of Germany, the Netherlands and England have then 
been explored and analysed as to their potential for tensions with EU competition 
law. These potential tensions as well as the awareness of experts in research offices 
for competition law and their overall estimation of the research situation have then 
been empirically examined. Due to the differences in the systems the awareness and 
potential conflicts with competition law differed, but in all systems a vulnerability 
has been detected. Additionally, the systems all seem to face economic constraints 
beyond competition law which mirror critical voices in literature.  
This thesis thus concludes that constraints from the more constitutionalised 
provisions of EU law can indeed arise for HEIs, especially with further commodifi-
cation, and can indeed require even further commodification potentially endangering 
the traditional non-economic mission of European HEIs. It might thus be time to 
implement a more coherent EU level policy on HEIs which moves away from the 
current tendency towards commodification. However, the details on how this can be 
                                                 
694 Beech (n 669). 
695 Tagesschau.de, 'EU kürzt sich den Haushalt' Tagesschau.de (12 November 2013) 
http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/eu-haushalt130.html accessed 22 November 2013. 
696 This seems counterintuitive in England with the government‟s eurosceptic rhetoric. Indeed, the 
president of the Royal Society raised the importance of EU funding for the UK‟s research base 
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achieved will need to be left to future research. In the meantime the thesis offers a 
comprehensive discussion of the topics and constraints. As such it can be utilised by 
policy makers and staff in research offices to become aware of potential constraints 
in order to circumvent these and instead chose the best practises. The thesis thus has 
relevance beyond the three countries studied.  
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Annex: Interview questions 
Section 1: Introductory Questions 
1. Could you please first state your name and task within the university?  
2. Does EU competition and state aid law play a role in your everyday tasks? 
3. Which measures, if any, have been undertaken to adhere to legal requirements 
and what consequences has this had on research funding? 
Section 2: Publicly funded research 
4. This question concerns funding awarded from public budgets and not-for-profit 
organisations for which your organisation competes with other organisations. Is 
such funding awarded to any type of research or any type of research in a spe-
cific field? Or are the calls very detailed and you have to adjust the research 
very much according to what is wanted in your application? Can you give ex-
amples of the latter? 
5. Are you aware of any limitations as to who can apply in any of these calls? In 
particular, can the private sector and the third sector also apply for such calls? 
Can you give examples of cases which are limited to certain organisations? 
6. Subject to confidentiality, what is the highest amount of funding you received 
from public sources in a competitive way? 
Section 3: Cooperation with the private sector 
7. In addition to contract research, what kind of collaborations/knowledge ex-
change/interaction with the private sector is your organisation involved in (e.g. 
research co-operations, patenting and spin-offs, setting up new companies, indi-
viduals working in undertakings next to their HEI task, privately financed 
chairs, science parks/clusters, etc)? 
8. Subject to confidentiality, can you give some details of the named collabora-
tions? In particular, who contributes in which way (financially)? Who decides 
what will be researched?  
9. How is it decided in these forms of collaboration with the private sector (or 
third sector) who can join such a collaboration/apply? Can anyone join who 
wants to? 
10. Are there any kind or undertakings (e.g. SME or local undertakings) whom your 
organisations prefers to cooperate with? If yes, what are the reasons for this? 
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11. Are there any networks/collaborations with special conditions/duties for partici-
pating parties? Please specify any conditions which are imposed upon your or-
ganisation or which you require from others (e.g. limitations beyond the re-
search, limitations towards using the results)? 
12. Are there any advantages in such networks/collaborations in terms of prices or 
contract conditions for any undertakings? Do you give advantages to any re-
search users? Examples in both cases could be advantages for SMEs or local 
undertakings. 
13. If you are planning to enter into a research co-operation, what conditions your 
decision? Is this usually something that is done at the beginning of a project/an 
idea or at a later stage? Are research co-operations also entered into, if the re-
search is almost finished (shortly before a breakthrough)? 
14. If you have staff partly working for the private sector or who can take leave to 
work in the private sector, what are the conditions? Is it a concern to share pub-
licly generated knowledge or to make sure not to do so?  
15. What arrangements are made in respect of intellectual property rights? How are 
these used (directly, in spin-offs, leave it for the public)?  
16. Do the arrangements regarding IPRs differ according to who is funding the re-
search (public funding, private sector funding, third sector funding)?  
17. Do you have a practice of giving licenses for IPRs? If yes, how does this work? 
Do you give licenses for the use of IPRs (e.g. patents) to anyone who wishes to 
use them?  
18. Are there any limitations or conditions regarding licenses? What is the usual du-
ration of a license? Is that what is the common duration in the sector? 
Section 4: Full economic costing 
19. Has your organisation adopted full economic costing?  
20. How are the full economic costs calculated? Are there any agreements/guide-
lines which apply to universities in this respect? 
21. How are costs calculated in cases where full economic costing does not apply? 
Section 5: Market entry, limitations of research 
22. Having studied the research systems, I do not think this is the case, but for the 
sake of completeness; are there any limitations as to who can conduct research 
(e.g. through national legislation or due to having to be accredited in any way)?  
- 241 - 
 
23. Are there any limitations as to the amount of research, in particular privately 
funded research your organisation may conduct? 
24. Are you aware of any legislation or other act entrusting your organisation with 
the task of research? 
25. Do you have any specialisation agreements with the private sector or other 
HEIs? A specialisation agreement is an agreement between two or more entities 
which contains that rather than both/all conducting a variety of tasks/services, 
one undertaking is conducting one task/service and the other another. They then 
receive the task/service which they stopped conducting from each other.  
26. Now, again, having studied the systems, I do not believe there is anything of the 
kind, but for the sake of completeness; do you have any arrangements for geo-
graphical division of workload with other parties? 
27. In your opinion, is the research your institution is conducting in the general 
(public) interest? Can you think of examples of research which was mainly for 
the benefit of particular interests? If yes, how is such research funded? 
Section 6: General opinion on funding situation 
28. Do you think that your organisation is expected to increase specific kinds of re-
search (e.g. applied research, research that generates impact, basic research)? 
29. Are there any differences between subjects (i.e. is it easier to generate funding 
for certain subjects rather than for others)? If yes, which subjects are easily 
funded and for which is funding more difficult to be obtained?  
30. What consequences have the general developments in regards to funding 
streams over the last decades had in your institution? 
31. Do you think legal requirements and your responses to them, if applicable, have 
resulted in limitations on academic freedom? 
32. What do you expect to be the trends in research funding and research policy in 
the next 10 years? 
Thank you for your time  
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